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THE CHRISTIAN IDEAL FOR HUMAN SOCIETY

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BY

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TO

THE SACRED MEMORY

AND THE BLESSED PRESENCE

OF A

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PREFACE

This volume is a companion to my book, published five years ago, on *The Christian Doctrine of the Godhead*. As that dealt with *Christian dogmatics*, so this with *Christian ethics*. If health and strength be granted to me, I hope in the course of a few years to publish a third volume, which should have come first in order, on *Christian apologetics*, entitled *The Christian Belief in God*, with special reference to the study of religions, science, and philosophy. During twenty-seven years I have been lecturing on the History of Religions, the Philosophy of Religion, Christian Ethics, Sociology and Dogmatics ; and in these works I am attempting to gather up the harvest of these years of study and reflection. A German theologian, thoroughly familiar with the theological books in English, remarked to me recently that what he missed was books on systematic theology. Whatever value the result may have, it is my purpose at least to present a *system* of Christian thought, life, and work.

It has been impossible for me, taking an active part, as I have held it to be my duty to do, in the practical concerns of the Christian Churches, to specialise, as I should have wished, in all the branches of study with which the Christian thinker must needs have some contact. I do not profess to be an expert in psychology and sociology, nor in the particular aspect of the history of the Christian Church dealt with in the first part of this volume. Accordingly, although I have read more widely in these subjects, in the sections of this book dealing with them, I have presented the views of others, indicating my own in comment and criticism. To the authors, whose books are frequently referred to, I desire to offer my grateful appreciation.

In the more constructive parts dealing with the Christian standard, personality, and society, I have fully and freely expressed my own judgment, based not only on study of books, but even more on experience and service among men. The volume would have exceeded any feasible limits had I discussed in detail particular remedies proposed for, or being applied to, the diseases of " the body politic." I have tried as closely as possible to confine myself to general principles, and to movements of more than local interest.

I was honoured with an invitation to give a course of lectures at the University College, Bangor, in the early part of the year 1928. The lectures then delivered (January 13th to 17th and March 9th to 13th) have been for the most part re-written, and their substance appears in the Introduction ; Part I., Chapters I.–IV. ; Part II., Chapter I. ; Part III., Introduction ; Part IV., Introduction. The generous appreciation shown has encouraged me to go on with my task, which might have been completed in a shorter time had I not devoted my holidays to attendance at conferences or committees of an international scope, generally held on the Continent, since the Stockholm Conference on Life and Work in 1925. I have not regarded these as a regrettable diversion of time and toil from my proper task, but as one of the most promising opportunities and, therefore, most urgent obligations, in the interests of the realisation of the Christian ideal with which this volume deals, as the subsequent references to these various movements will show.

Believing as I do that to know the doctrine it is necessary to do the will, I regard my varied activities in the common practical movements of the Christian Churches as affording some qualification for the treatment of the subject of this volume. Recognising fully the claims of practice, I have always endeavoured to preserve my sense of the value of experience : I have tried to steer a safe and straight course between Calvinistic *activism* and Lutheran *quietism* ; between works without faith, and faith without works, striving ever to receive the sufficiency of the divine grace in the dependence of human faith, but ever a faith which energises in love as the fulfilment of the law. In the name for the Stockholm Conference, Life and Work, the truth is indicated ; the work which man does is impossible without the life which God gives, and the life that God gives must show itself in the work which man does. " So let your light shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father which is in heaven " (Matt. v. 16).

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

LONDON,
June 3rd, 1930.

INTRODUCTION

RELIGION AND MORALITY: FROM FAITH TO FACT

In a previous volume, *The Christian Doctrine of the Godhead*, it was shown how, from the fact of Jesus Christ Our Lord, faith in God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is reached. The life in the Spirit of God is realised, not only in the experience of the divine love through the grace of Christ, but also in the character in which the Christian virtues and graces are manifested as expressions of the supreme Christian motive of love to God and man, "the fruit of the Spirit." This character creates moral customs, standards, and institutions, which make the progressive history of mankind the fulfilment of the purpose of God. In history lie the roots of the Christian faith; in history its fruits are grown. If through fact we pass to faith, no less from faith we pass again to fact. The Word became *flesh* in order that all flesh might be cleansed, renewed, and hallowed by the Word. The eternal reality of God was manifested as man in order that mankind might realise the eternal destiny of the children of God. By the faith which links man to God the eternal is brought into the temporal, not only as reality revealed, but as ideal realised. Christian character and experience are inseparable, and in them morality and religion find their highest and fullest realisation. The inseparableness of these exercises of human personality, their mutual dependence, may, as the subject of the Introduction of this volume, serve as a transition from the contents of the previous volume. Through fact to faith, from faith to fact, is an unbroken ring, a continuous process in human history as the fulfilment of the divine purpose.

I

(1) It is a common saying, but not necessarily true, because it is so common, that it does not matter what a man believes; what matters is what he does. In so far as the words are intended to express the truth that faith without works is dead, that the test of conviction is conduct and character, the saying can be approved. But in so far as it means, as it often does, that the quality of a man's actions

does not depend upon, is not affected by, what he holds as true and right, it is a falsehood to be exposed. "Every good tree bringeth forth good fruit; but the corrupt tree bringeth forth evil fruit. A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit" (Matt. vii. 17, 18). No man has ever proved so consummate a hypocrite that what he was inwardly in "the hidden man of the heart" he did not show himself outwardly, in his ways and works, although the exposure might be delayed. "Out of the heart are the issues of life." Even the hypocrite illustrates this fact of human experience; for he believes that it is in his own interest, his profit or his reputation, to conform to the current morality or religion; and it is this faith that expresses itself in his works; but there are temptations which this faith is not strong enough to withstand, and demands which it fails to meet; and so he does not consistently sustain his part. The man who is pure in heart, sincere in motive, and sees God, moral perfection, as the ultimate reality, has in himself an unfailing source of goodness, which makes him proof against temptation, and fit for every demand. The consistency of his works is the evidence of the fixity of his faith. Taking a wide survey, we may affirm generally the principle that *morality depends upon religion.*

(2) The exceptions on closer scrutiny are only apparent. A man may practise the Christian morality who not only does not profess the Christian religion, but may even repudiate it as superstition. Even if he has not been educated in a Christian way, he is living in a society which, however inadequately, yet in sufficient measure, has been affected in its customs, manners and morals, standards and institutions, by Christianity to mediate to him Christian influences, which, however unconsciously on his part, are moulding his life to the shape it takes. A confirmation of this statement may be found in two directions. (*a*) What are distinctively Christian works are not generally found in lands or ages which have not been reached by Christian faith. And (*b*) a deterioration of morals generally follows on a decay of religion. If we press our scrutiny of these instances further, without in any way depreciating the moral value of the character and conduct, we discover that, where religion is expressly repudiated, there is often lacking that humility and contrition of spirit which are the marks of Christian saintliness; and there is present a self-sufficiency and self-reliance which compare unfavourably with the

Christian saint's confession : " Not unto us, not unto us, but unto Thy name be the glory." Lastly, it may be added that only atheism or agnosticism can justify the repudiation of religion as a constituent and an influence in morality. If there be a God at all, man cannot be indifferent to that fact, uninfluenced by it in his conduct. To the realisation of the ideal of his manhood the recognition of his relation to God in practice as well as in theory is essential ; and such graces of Christian saintliness as have just been mentioned, if God be as Christ has revealed Him, belong to complete manhood. Even if a man were, and could be in his relations to his fellow-men, all that he ought to be, without faith, he would fall short of perfection, because ignoring or neglecting his relation to God.

(3) That there are very many men who profess a religion, and do not practise the morality corresponding to it, is a fact which cannot be denied, but can be explained. Here again, when we look below the surface, the challenge of the principle which has been laid down is not conclusive. It is assumed that the faith professed is in reality as it is in words ; whereas the experience probably falls very far short of the doctrine. Christ is confessed Saviour and Lord ; but He has not been allowed by a growing faith, receiving and responding to abounding grace, to save from the sinful, weak, and unworthy past as fully as He can ; and there has not been as constant and consistent a submission to His inward rule as by right He claims. The imperfect works testify to an imperfect faith. Again, in cases of surprising, sudden, and striking conversion, while the change is real, it is not nearly so great as the convert thinks and feels it to be, and so freely speaks about it ; for in such cases, on the one hand, emotion is so stimulated that the language becomes exaggerated, and, on the other, old habits have not yet lost their hold or old temptations their attractions as much as under emotional strain is imagined. Further, we must consider the teaching which is being received by many persons. While the complaint is made that much of the preaching of to-day is too ethical, and not evangelical enough —a complaint which may disclose a defect in the previous Christian training of the hearer no less than in the theology of the preacher—there was a tendency, more general than it now is, to be evangelical, and not ethical—to warn against dead works (that is, works without faith) more than against dead faith (that is, faith without works). In more secret

and more dangerous forms the assumption has prevailed which Paul exposes in putting it explicitly: "Shall we continue in sin that grace may abound?" (Rom. vi. 1). Erroneous teaching on the relation between religious conviction and moral character must be recognised as in large measure responsible for the reproach of inconsistency between profession and practice.

(4) When ethical societies set themselves the task of propagating morality without religion, in the belief that religion is not necessary to morality, but may even be a hindrance to it, they often make two false assumptions, which popular presentations of Christianity in some measure justify; the one is of a more general, the other of a more particular character. (*a*) It is assumed that naturalism has triumphed, and that, therefore, religion as affirming the supernatural is no longer intelligible or credible; and that, if morality is to be preserved, it must abandon the sinking ship of religion. Naturalism has not triumphed; and the thought of men of science is moving in a direction which makes that triumph far less probable than it seemed when this ethical movement began. There is a crude supernaturalism that shuts God out of His world in the regular order of nature, and lets Him in again only in solitary miracles, which is discredited. But that there is a supernatural reality, God, above as well as in and through all, and that His relation to His world is supernatural; that He is not "cribb'd, cabin'd, and confin'd" by nature as we know it, is still an intelligible and credible faith, as I have tried to show in a previous work, *The Christian Doctrine of the Godhead.*[1] The moral motive, purpose, and sanction of Christian morality do not depend, however, on the supernatural nature of God, or of His relation to the world. This morality addresses itself to reason and conscience, the affections and aspirations of human personality.

(*b*) If the Christian pulpit has often enforced Christian morality by insistence on future rewards and punishments, it has failed and fallen short of presenting the whole truth. The faith in immortality is still, where there is faith in God, intelligible and credible. It is wise and right for men to take account of the consequences of their actions, not only as they affect others, but as they affect themselves, although it is not their individual pleasure or pain, but their whole personal good, which should be the standard of judgment.

[1] See Section II., chapter ii., pp. 244–254. Cf. D. Cairns, *The Faith that Rebels*.

If there be a future life, concern for that future life—final destiny—is not necessarily selfish, in so far as the concern is to attain personal perfection, and not merely individual happiness hereafter. It is, however, a gross travesty of the Christian religion to assume that its only relation to morality is to supply this sanction. As will afterwards be shown, that relation is much more intimate and vital. Neither assumption of the ethical societies is legitimate ; and their contention falls to the ground.

(5) If it is necessary against these current misconceptions to insist on the essential dependence of morality on religion, it is no less necessary to affirm that religion should express itself in morality, and is inadequate if it does not. The Christian religion by its very nature expresses itself in the Christian morality. Psychology may at this point be invoked to support the contention. We have abandoned the "faculty" psychology which divided men into mind, heart, and will (head, heart, and hand would have been a convenient but equally incorrect description), and insist on the unity of human personality, of which we still recognise three aspects, thinking, feeling, and willing, none of which is ever absent, but one or another of which is at different times more prominent for consciousness. Each mental process has these phases, unless it is arrested at one or another—*impression*, *affect*, *expression* ; the impression may be a percept, an image, or an idea, and the expression may be an intention, a resolve, or an action ; but to the completeness of the process the three belong. So far as our knowledge goes—for the problem of the ultimate relation of mind and body has not yet been solved, if it ever will be—to the mental process there corresponds an organic in the body ; the *afferent* nerves convey the impressions of the organs of sense to the *central organ*, *the brain*, and the *efferent* nerves convey the expression to the surface of the body, to the movements of eye, lip, tongue, hand, foot, etc. So far as we can use a term with physical associations for what is not physical, the brain is the seat of consciousness, where the affect is. Some psychologists would treat consciousness as only, as it were, an idle, if interested, spectator of a process, in which it is in no way an actor. But it is a legitimate assumption that there is some kind of interaction, although we cannot conceive it, between mind and matter ; that matter affects mind in sensation, and mind matter in action.[1] There are

[1] See Ward's *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, II., p. 25.

experiences which do not rise into consciousness, although even here we may suppose mental as well as organic process. There are reactions to stimulus which follow without deliberation or decision, as when we close the eye to a bright flash of light, or drive off a fly from the face. But what has made man's thought and life what it is, is that the process does not always pass thus spontaneously. It can be arrested at each stage.

(*a*) Man's impressions have not at once passed into expression ; he does not always act on what he sees or hears or feels. Percepts are retained by the memory as images, and images are compared, and combined in ideas. Man has made the progress he has because of his capacity to detach himself from this immediate sequence in his relation to the outer world, and to develop an inner life, which becomes increasingly less dependent on, and determined by, the outer life. Great as is the gain of this arrest, it has also its dangers ; the man may become a *dreamer* when he should be a *doer*. In human relations especially, in morality and religion, the need and the duty is action. Jesus, in the Parable of the Two Buildings, the one on rock and the other on sand, enforced the duty of expression following impression (Matt. vii. 24–27), and so does James in the simile of the man seeing himself in a glass (James i. 23–24).

(*b*) Still more dangerous is the arrest of the process at emotion. It is often good for a man to stop and think before he allows his feelings to overcome him ; but when he feels strongly, it is good for him not to indulge the feeling, but as soon as he can to translate it into action. The man whose fine feelings are not followed by noble deeds is the sentimentalist, a Rousseau. In religious revivals we witness the getting up of the steam of emotion, and then the blowing off again. These revivals, because emotion has run riot, often fail to result in moral reformation, and are even followed by moral reaction. The cognition is subordinate to, and completed in, the conation.

In the æsthetic feelings, the appreciation of beauty, emotion appears to be accepted as an end, although imitation may follow admiration ; and the appreciation of art become the inspiration of its achievement. But even this statement needs qualification. Art for art's sake has been recognised to be a false motto. For no part of life can be detached from the whole of life, and, although no moral lesson need be expressed in, or conveyed by, the statue or

symphony, the picture or the poem, yet the creation of the work of art, its appreciation or imitation, should be a contribution to the fullness of life, the development of personality. In religion, too, there is a legitimate cultivation of devotion, the spirit of reverence, adoration, delight in God. A service has not been conducted or a sermon delivered in vain, even if no moral obligation has been enforced or moral motive imparted, if only this spirit has been increased or developed; since, when the summons of duty comes, the permanent disposition and not merely temporary mood of devoutness will sustain the ready response. If, however, devotion is cultivated apart from the practical service of God and man, it will prevent the full development of the whole personality, its final self-expression in action.

(6) The expression of religious impression and affect in action may be in two directions; it may be in acts which are distinctively religious—praise, prayer, and sacrifice, communion with the object of faith, and submission to that object. This seems to be in all religions the inevitable and spontaneous expression of religious thought and feeling.[1] Much that in religious ritual may now appear to us inexplicable may be the immediate reaction to the influence experienced. What is described as sympathetic magic may be no deliberate imitation of the desired natural process, as of the fall of rain by sprinkling of the ground with water, but action as a natural gesture following on imagination of the falling rain. With this expression in religion we are here, however, not immediately concerned, except to add that, as acts of worship have proved themselves appropriate to the thought and feeling of religion, and the outward expression reacts on the inward experience, such acts of worship are a religious duty, and are, therefore, elements, and necessary elements, of a morality that has its proper relation to religion. The other expression of religion is in morality, as it has a necessary function in the whole range of human life. Righteousness and ritual, however, are not necessarily opposed, nor need the prophet exclude the priest.

II

(1) Having shown the mutual dependence of religion and morality, we may now more closely examine their relation.

[1] See, for a thorough discussion of the subject of worship, the French book, *Le Culte*, by Robert Will.

But relation implies difference, and not identity ; and it is therefore necessary to make an attempt at distinguishing the one from the other. We are on the wrong track if we relate the one or the other to one aspect of personality, as, for instance, religion to emotion, and morality to action ; for both exercise the whole personality—thinking, feeling, willing. It is not in the subject that the distinction lies, but in the object, purpose, or function. (*a*) Religion is concerned with *what is* ; it is an interpretation of, and attitude with action corresponding to reality, not as it appears to be, but as it is believed to be, or, to use the language of philosophy, not the phenomenal, but the noumenal. What is essential reality, the ultimate cause or the final purpose of existence ? It asks of the world and self : What, how, why ? It seeks and finds an answer, which enables man to feel himself, not an exile in an alien universe, but at home, with some kinship with, and, therefore, some expectation of, kindness from whatever powers or power directs the universe and determines his lot. While at the highest stage of religion God Himself is the good, yet, however obscurely and inadequately, at every stage there seems to be, as the motive of the search and the discovery of the solution of the practical problem just described, an innate movement of man towards God, as the well-known words of Augustine show. Religion is a *practical* not a *theoretical*, interest in man ; it does not gratify curiosity, but satisfies necessity. In it man by worship seeks and believes he finds the aid of the gods or God in securing his own good, whether he thinks of that good as natural good, moral goodness, or the spiritual good, God Himself.

(*b*) Morality is primarily concerned with what *ought to be* in human conduct—that is, conscious, voluntary action—as to its quality. It judges an action right or wrong, or good or bad. These alternative pairs of terms point to a difference of standard in judgment ; the first judges actions as in accord with, or contrary to, a law, the second as helping or hindering the attainment of an end. To this question we must subsequently return. While religion apprehends *what is*, morality affirms what *ought to be*.

(*c*) Religion may rise to faith in a God in whom all human ideals are real ; morality, if it soars to the vision of these ideals, conceives them as still to be realised by man. The emphasis in religion falls on God, and man's dependence on, and submission to, God. Morality lays stress on man, and what man can be, because he ought to be. Religion may so

emphasise man's dependence on God as to deny his liberty, as in Augustinianism and Calvinism; morality may so assert man's liberty as to negate his dependence, as in Pelagianism, but not Arminianism. Their spheres cannot be separated; for if God be essential reality, ultimate cause, and final purpose of the universe, nature, and man, the conduct towards self or others, to which the standard of morality is applied, has a relation to Him also. And if there are actions in direct relation to God which man ought to do, as has been already indicated, then these parts of religion are subject to moral judgment. Indeed, neither morality nor religion can be confined to a department of life, but must pervade and control the whole. As will afterwards be shown, all human activities, whether in the pursuit of truth, as in science and philosophy, or the appreciation and realisation of beauty, as in art, using the word to cover all human efforts directed by the æsthetic sense, or the development of personality as in culture generally, or in social relations, as in customs, manners, laws, are *subject to the moral standard, and elevated by the religious influence.*

(2) The relation of religion and morality in human history has been by no means uniform; there are religions which seem to be *indifferent* to morality, e.g. the Japanese mythology has no moral code, and this lack is compensated for by the adoption of Confucian ethics in Japan.[1] (*a*) Sometimes even a religion seems to be allied with immorality: Plato condemned Greek mythology; Lucretius rejected religion, because of "the many and great evils to which it had persuaded mankind"; Hinduism in its worship encourages lust and cruelty. What has to be remembered, however, is that the immoral acts assigned to the gods prove on examination to have been originally, at a less advanced moral stage, personifications of natural phenomena, and that, as morality is more progressive than religion, a religion may conserve what was once not morally condemned, although moral condemnation now falls upon it. Polytheism, it must be admitted, with conflicting demands on man from rival deities, involves morality in confusion. There have been, and are, conceptions of the divine, as in India, which do foster immorality. *We cannot affirm that religion uniformly assists morality.*

(*b*) On the other hand, the tribal god is often the guardian and the vindicator of the tribal morality, far short as that

[1] See Moore's *History of Religions*, I., p. 107.

may fall of our more advanced moral standards. The Code of Hammurabi shows that the social order might find its reinforcement in the authority of the god. In Israel, moral obligations were regarded as divine commands ; but it must be admitted that ceremonial requirements were invested with the same authority, and even in the popular religion were regarded as more important. It was the service of the succession of prophets to develop the conception of the moral character of God, and consequent moral duties of man.[1]

(3) This historical development must afterwards be traced ; at this stage of the discussion it will be enough in general terms to indicate how religion affects morality ; and we must here have in view specially the Christian religion.[2] First of all, *religion gives morality a wider horizon.* It is not only in human relations that the moral standards apply ; if there be a God, as religion affirms, then those standards have a relation to Him as well as to man. While temporal and local conditions do affect the content of the moral standard, yet what a morality allied with religion seeks and strives for is as complete an expression as is there and then possible in moral standards of principles which have permanent and universal validity, because expressive of the character and purpose of this essential reality, ultimate cause, and final purpose. Not only are religious duties added to social, but morality has more than even a cosmic range, for it reaches out to God.

Secondly, the conviction that these moral standards, however inadequately and imperfectly, are yet in some degree expressive of God, *gives morality a firmer assurance* that the moral conscience is not a chance product of a cosmic evolution, which has itself no moral significance and value. Whatever the challenge which the world seems to offer to human goodness, however indifferent the course of nature may appear to moral values, the belief in God (a much more satisfying conception than the vague abstraction of " a power not ourselves that makes for righteousness ") assures the good man that in loving God, making God's purpose, as he understands it, his own, all things are working together for his good (Rom. viii. 28). It may be only in the wider range of history, and not in each situation in each moment, that good ethics proves sound economics and safe politics, that holiness

[1] See the next chapter.

[2] See the *Evolution of Ethics*, edited by Sneath, for an account of the morals of other religions.

promotes health, happiness, and peace ; but religion does, despite appearances, sustain the confidence of the man contending for the right that his is no losing battle.

Thirdly, religion assures a man that in this battle not only are there forces beyond himself on the side of right, but that within himself there are *greater resources* in his relation to God than he could otherwise command. Modern psychology is showing that there are reserves of energy in most men which they do not draw upon ; religious experience proves, and psychology offers no disproof, that beyond these human reserves there are incalculable divine resources. Man is in contact with a spiritual environment, a store-house of power, from which he can draw, even as his physical organism can draw from the physical environment. The doctrine of the Holy Spirit is in this connection coming to be properly appreciated. The career of a Paul is a crucial instance of how out of weakness a man may be made strong to overcome. [1]

Fourthly, religion gives to morality a *stronger motive* ; " the love of Christ "—that is, the love shown in His sacrifice for man's salvation—" constraineth us " (2 Cor. v. 14)—that is, brings the whole life, all its interests and activities, into one channel, the self-surrender in all things to Him as Saviour and Lord. The current need not be less full, and it will be more swift and strong because thus confined. The moral rigorist may say that this is an impure motive, as the *categorical imperative* must be obeyed because of its own authority, and that obedience is polluted if any personal affection enter into its motive. But such an argument is the substitution of an abstraction for the reality. Just as natural laws describe the normal operation of physical forces, so moral law describes what personal relations ought to be, and would be, if the free action of persons were as invariable and regular as are the processes of nature. Morality apart from persons has no content. Jesus expressly substituted love for God absolutely and love for neighbours and self equally for law ; and He did not thereby degrade morality, but vitalised and invigorated it. Love for Christ is love for God as He comes nearest man, does most for man, and gives Himself in sympathy, service, and sacrifice most fully to man. And love for Christ is also love for man at his best, and sustains that love for men when they are not at their best as no merely

[1] See the volume of essays on *The Spirit*, edited by Streeter, especially the contribution of Dr. Hadfield.

humanitarian feeling can. As a personal relationship it cleanses, hallows, strengthens, and enlarges all personal relations.

Fifthly, religion gives to morality a *higher example*. The moral perfection of God, which the Hebrew religion in the prophets affirmed, and which Greek philosophy in a Plato conjectured, is translated into " the tale which can enter in at lowly doors," " the creed of creeds " which is wrought " in loveliness of perfect deeds " in Jesus. Even if, as some scholars contend, the moral teaching of Jesus is not as original as it is generally held to be, His whole personality, compared with any other recorded in history, presents a humility, a sympathy, an elevation, and a constancy, blended in harmony, that make Him, as no other, the manifestation of divine perfection within human limitations.

Lastly, morality holds out to religion a *longer prospect*, for it brings with it the promise, and in the Risen and Living Christ the pledge, of immortality. For Kant the hope of immortality was one of the postulates of the moral consciousness. Even if the conclusion is not justified, " Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die " (1 Cor. xv. 32), yet the moral task is but half begun if death ends all ; and men are inspired in their moral aspiration and endeavour by the assurance that they are labouring in themselves and others for eternal values.

(4) All these considerations regarding the relation of religion to morality bear equally on the relation of morality to religion. So intimate is their mutual relation that at the highest stage of development morality is no less essential to religion than religion necessary to morality. The imitation of the divine perfection, the keeping in love the commandments of Christ, the sanctification by the Spirit, the love of neighbour as of self because of the love of God, the seeking of the Kingdom of God and His righteousness—in all such aspects does the essential moral content of the Christian religion find expression. Hence in any complete system of Christian theology Christian ethics must follow on Christian dogmatics, the determination of what the Christian man ought to be and do on the interpretation of what God is, and in Christ has done, and by His Spirit is doing. This volume is accordingly intended to be a companion, and an inseparable companion, to the previous volume, *The Christian Doctrine of the Godhead*.

III

In dealing with the nature, the character, and the purpose of God, Christian theology must for the most part rely on the content of the religious consciousness as receptive of, and responsive to, the historical revelation of God in Christ. The moral conscience has also its contribution to make, and in some parts of the discussion some account has to be taken of the conception of God in speculative philosophy. In dealing with the relation of God to the world and man, science and philosophy cannot be ignored; and what is taught in revelation regarding that relation must be translated into contemporary language. In dealing with Christian morality we are moving on earth among men; and while, as has been indicated in the previous section, religion, and revelation through religion, has an essential contribution to make[1]; yet, in working out the details of Christian ethics for to-day we must relate this distinctive contribution to human knowledge and judgment so far as it is relevant to the subject.

(1) Morality has, since the days of Socrates, been the subject of reflection; there is a branch of knowledge called ethics which concerns itself with morality. Regarding this there is some dispute as to whether it is to be called a science or a part of philosophy. Not only ethics, but other branches of knowledge dealing with the mind of man, are in this ambiguous position. The inclusion of nature as well as man in the scope of philosophy is seen in the survival of the term "natural philosophy" for physics. The first division of human knowledge was into physics and metaphysics (what lies beyond physics), and the assumption was that the sphere of science was nature or matter, and of philosophy man, or mind. But in modern times one aspect after another of the mind of man has been annexed by science, as its methods have been found applicable. And to this procedure no objection can be made, so long as the science is not taken as a Procrustes bed into which the whole mind of man is to be forced, whether violence is done to its character and content or not. For there are problems of mind which science cannot solve. Science observes facts, explores causes, formulates laws; but only regarding *that which is*. It cannot, without changing its methods, grasp *what ought to be*—purposes and ideals. Ethics may be included in science in so far as descriptive and

[1] That contribution will be briefly discussed in the first part of this volume.

explanatory of what human morality has been, and is, but as science it cannot define the ends to which morality should be directed ; it cannot determine the moral ideal. As that ideal is related to total reality—as has just been shown in discussing the relation of morality and religion—this determination must pass over to philosophy, which attempts the interpretation of the universe as a whole ; its whence, why, and whither. It is in this its philosophical phase that we shall be concerned with ethics in the second part of the volume.

(2) We are dealing in morality with man as conscious and self-determining personality. We must examine human nature and its capacities for morality, human conduct as free action, human character as the product of the reaction of this conduct on human nature. God in creating man has, as it were, not completed him, but has created him with capacity to complete himself. In all his actions man is making himself for weal or woe, for good or ill. It is very important that the development of human personality, the formation of human character, the relation of conduct to character, and of character to nature, should be thoroughly explored and carefully described. This is what the science of psychology aims at doing. It is a science which is at its beginnings ; it has made, and is making, mistakes ; theories have run in advance of the facts ; claims are made which have not been justified ; conclusions have been advanced in the name of the science which challenge the moral conscience and the religious consciousness, and which provoke suspicion and prejudice ; but in these conclusions the limits of science as such have been passed, and they have no more authority than any philosophical speculation. Of the value of the science, however, there can be no doubt. It is helping us to understand man as the subject of religion and morality, and so is throwing light on the nature of both. In dealing with Christian character, especially its virtues and graces, the science of psychology is indispensable ; it exposes errors of the past, discloses truths for the future. With psychology the third part will deal.

(3) Human personality is the agent, but human society the sphere of morality. We need not at present raise the question whether a man has duties to himself as well as others, as to separate the human personality from the human society, to which its relation is not accidental but essential, is a false and vain abstraction. We may assume that morality is realised in society ; it has been described as a " special

quality of the social tissue." Conduct reacts on the personality and forms the character ; but it also, besides its immediate effects on the lives of others, reacts on the society in forming customs, standards, and institutions. Just as there are laws of personal development, so there are laws of social evolution ; and we understand morality only as we know the laws of its sphere as well as of its subject. The branch of knowledge which deals with society has been given the name *sociology*. The term has been applied in three ways : (1) the widest application is to all the social aspects of human conditions and conduct ; (2) the narrowest application is to the formulation of the laws discernible in *society in evolution ;* (3) the intermediate application is to the study of social institutions generally. It has also been discredited in many minds for two reasons : (*a*) As Auguste Comte was the first advocate of the science, and it has since his time often been treated from his standpoint, it is in many minds associated with his discredited theory of knowledge and religion. But in recent years, as in the works of Maciver and others, it has been dealt with from a generally more acceptable standpoint.

(*b*) In many minds it is associated also with theories of social reform which are suspected. This branch of knowledge is not committed to any one method, or to any philosophical assumptions ; and there can be no doubt that the subject of human society can be, and ought to be treated, so far as it allows, by the methods of observation, explanation, and generalisation, which have had so valuable results in other sciences.

(4) A caution may be added that this science, as also ethics and psychology, deal with phenomena more complex than do many physical sciences, and do not lend themselves to so rigid conclusions. Personality is always a not wholly calculable factor ; and any science of man which for simplification ignores this factor cannot give an adequate account of its subject. Even thus qualified, the approach to the subject of morality by way of these sciences will correct three errors which have often marred the treatment. (*a*) Despite Paul's contention that the Christian is not under law but under grace, and Jesus' own declaration of love as supreme law, the treatment of the morality has often tended to be *legalistic*. The discussions about our Lord's teaching in regard to resistance of wrong or divorce have often assumed that, once what He taught has been ascertained, literal

obedience is the only possible course for a Christian. So also claims have been put forward for the absolute authority in all matters of the individual conscience, which could only lead into utter moral confusion. The discussion in *ethics* of the standard of moral judgment will lead, as I believe, to a wider and higher point of view, in which the authority of law on the one hand, and individual conscience on the other, will be more accurately determined.

(*b*) So, again, isolated texts of Scripture about human sin and conversion have been doctrinally interpreted contrary to the testimony of experience. Here psychology can serve as a corrective of *dogmatism*. The moral and religious life can be made more intelligible when the nature and the development of human personality have been carefully observed and described. While there must needs be in the last resort the inexplicable and ineffable in the relation of man to God, there is much in the human experience of grace and the exercise of faith which can be subjected to exact scrutiny and can be presented intelligibly. Much harm has been done by the mishandling of souls because the preacher or teacher did not understand the processes of the mind. There is a moral and religious discernment which makes some masters in the cure of souls ; but most men need the guidance which knowledge can give. The psychology of Christian experience and character is, therefore, deserving of study.

(*c*) Once more the tendency of Christian ethics has been towards *individualism*, the discussion of the values and the graces which are distinctive of Christian character. But such a discussion remains abstract, remote from reality, unless it is brought into relation to the society within which this character is to be acquired and expressed. It is in and by means of social institutions, such as family, school, industry, neighbourhood, that Christian virtues and graces can be realised. And in the sociological treatment of Christian morality we translate, as it were, out of the abstract into the concrete. If we are discussing obedience, we must refer to the relations of parents and children, teachers and scholars, employers and employed, rulers and subjects. Justice remains an abstraction unless we show what mutual obligations it involves for fellow-citizens. Plato's *Republic* may be cited as an instance of the kind of treatment which morality should be given. In the following parts the ethical, the psychological, and sociological approach will be attempted ; but the historical approach must be the first made.

PART I

HISTORICAL

(1) The Christian religion is receptive of, and responsive to, the historical revelation of God, progressive in the Hebrew nation, as recorded in the Old Testament, and consummated in Jesus Christ, as narrated and interpreted in the New Testament. In Christian morality there must be constant reference to that revelation.[1] The Christian ideal has been presented, and is being realised in history. Hence the treatment of Christian ethics must be historical. Such a treatment does not mean, however, that all the moral facts, commands, counsels in the records need to be considered. Some of these contents are not only inconsistent with, but even contradictory of, the Christian ideal. It has been a fatal error for the Christian Church that the Old Testament was, as regards authority as a divine revelation, put on a level with the New Testament ; and that practices of which divine approval is recorded were justified even when contrary to the teaching and example of Jesus. Although the early Church was justified in resisting the attempt to reject the Old Testament altogether, as by Marcion, since the New Testament revelation is continuous with the Old Testament, and the one is not fully intelligible without the other, yet the doctrine of an equal verbal inspiration of the whole Bible has done untold mischief in preventing the Christian Church becoming completely Christian in religion and morals. Even in regard to the teaching and the example of Jesus, we must recognise that temporary and local conditions affected not only the form, but even the content, of particular precepts ; and that we must detach from their historical setting the permanent and universal principles, which belong essentially to the revelation of the character and the purpose of God as Father. Not all that the Christian Churches in past ages allowed and approved can be taken up into the Christian morality for to-day ; much must serve for warning rather than example. It is not with the details of biblical or ecclesiastical ethics that we need concern ourselves in this Part, although it may be necessary to return to a discussion of some of these when dealing with particular moral problems ; but with the general movements in human history

[1] See *Copec Reports, I. : The Nature of God and His Purpose for the World.*

in which the character and the purpose of God have been disclosed for the guidance of the life of man.[1] It will suffice to discuss the preparation of the Christian ideal in the prophets, the revelation in Christ, the application by the Church, and the present challenge for a definition of that ideal.

(2) To give unity to the treatment it is necessary to find one distinctive dominant conception in which all the variety of moral phenomena can be harmonised. In recent discussions it has been usual to find that conception in the *Kingdom of God* ; and when I began the preparation of this volume I intended to use that term in the title ; but further study and reflection have led me to the conclusion that this term is not the best to describe what is the Christian ideal. As I am aware that in so doing I am detaching myself from current usage, reasons must be given for this decision. In *the first place*, it is still much disputed whether the term should be understood ethically or eschatologically, whether the Kingdom is a present, progressive, moral, and religious order for mankind which can be hindered or advanced by human effort, or is a future, supernatural event, the act of God alone, which men can neither hasten nor delay, but the advent of which can be determined only by the counsel of God. This antithesis was thrown into very bold relief at the Conference in Stockholm on Christian Life and Work in 1925, the British and American speakers as a rule assuming as beyond doubt or denial the first conception, the German as a rule as confidently asserting the second. Some of the German accounts of the Conference condemn the former attitude as *Anglo-Saxon activismus :* English-speaking countries have so far not retaliated by calling the second attitude *German quietism.* So important for co-operation has a mutual understanding been felt to be that a conference was held at Canterbury of a small group of English and German theologians in April 4th–9th, 1927, to discuss this one conception. The report of this Conference appeared in *Theology* and *Theologische Blätter* for May 1927. Only a drastic criticism of the sources can justify the eschatological view ; only an undue modernising of the teaching of Jesus the ethical. The data justify an intermediate view—the presence of the Kingdom in its commencement in the ministry of Jesus and

[1] See *Copec Reports, XII. : Historical Illustrations of the Social Effects of Christianity.*

[2] See Part IV., chapter vii., for a further discussion of the relation of the Kingdom of God to the Church.

the response of men thereto, the consummation of the Kingdom in the future by the action of God, which, however, can be delayed or hastened by human unbelief or faith. It seems better not to use an ambiguous term in a title.

Secondly, the term is rooted in the Old Testament conception of the relation of God and man, and not that of the New Testament. God as sovereign and man as subject is not the truest description of the relation of God and man as realised in Christ, and as through Him to be realised in all men. Jesus came as Jewish Messiah, and offered Himself as such first of all to the people to whom the promises of God were given, and so He used the language most appropriate to His historical situation. We do not now primarily think of Him as Jewish Messiah ; it is because the title " the Christ " has become a personal name that we still use it. We now think of Him as the World's Saviour and Lord. His use of the term does not require our use of it, as it may now be regarded as belonging to the temporary and local conditions of His historical activity. If we continue using it, we must put into it a meaning which He never did. Many activities to-day are justified as services of the Kingdom of God which did not appear on the horizon of His aims or hopes.

Thirdly, the term itself is a figure of speech, which carries far less meaning for us to-day than it did for the contemporaries of Jesus. It meant then an absolute sovereignty, a claim over the whole life, such as no modern monarchy would with safety to itself among civilised nations ever dare to assert. A constitutional, limited monarchy is not what the term means. Our King reigns, but does not rule ; and, loyal as the nation may be, and has reason to be to the present occupant of the throne, that loyalty would be severely strained if he claimed to rule as God may claim to rule, and as the prophets and Jesus believed God had a right to rule. How many monarchies have since 1918 been laid low? Monarchy is not necessarily the permanent and universal form of government, and is being widely superseded. It is, therefore, not the best analogy of the relations of God to man.

Fourthly, the reason why so many of the advocates cling so closely to the term " Kingdom of God " is that it for them justifies the social application of the Gospel in contrast to the individualism which was dominating Christian thought and life when this term was, as it were, recovered

for Christian theology. And yet it is by no means certain that the term itself carries any such social implications, for it may mean *rule* as well as *realm* ; *Kingship* is the primary meaning of *βασιλέια*, and *Kingdom* the secondary.[1] The term thus does not settle the quarrel between individualism and the more social apprehension of Christian religion and morality. Its use, then, in describing this moral ideal does not determine what the contents of that ideal must be.

Lastly, the moral ideal should be described in terms as closely corresponding as possible to the reality of the relation of God and man as Christian theology defines it. In my previous volume, *The Christian Doctrine of the Godhead*, God revealed in Christ as Father, and man redeemed in Christ as child of God, was regarded as the least inadequate analogy of the relation of God and man. This analogy does not lend itself to individualism, the exclusion of the social applications of the Gospel : for, even although God's Fatherhood is an individual relation—and the stress of Jesus on the one sheep and the one coin must never be allowed to fall out of our thought (Luke xv. 1–11)—yet as God is the universal Father, it carries with it a universal relationship to men—" All ye are brethren." The absolute love to God and the equal love to self and neighbour—the first and greatest commandment—does not so closely correspond with the relation of sovereign and subject, or of fellow-citizens, as does that of the father and the family. This is not a mere question of words ; but this dominant conception will affect the whole treatment.

[1] The idea has been most thoroughly examined in a recent German book, *Reich Gottes und Kirche im Neuen Testament*, von Dr. theol. Gerhard Gloege, 1928.

CHAPTER I

THE PREPARATION IN THE PROPHETS

I

While God is the God of all the earth, with whom is no partiality or exclusiveness, so that in all lands and all ages He has His witnesses and agents, yet a discerning survey of human history justifies the conclusion that the divine purpose of the human good has been most clearly revealed and most fully realised in the Hebrew prophetic succession and its consummation in Jesus Christ our Lord, as Son of God bringing God to men, and as Saviour bringing men to God. The historical treatment must begin with this Hebrew prophetic succession. It lies beyond the scope of this volume to discuss the psychology of the prophetic consciousness, the historical details of the ministries of the prophets, or the particular contents of their individual messages.[1] The discussion must be confined to their significance as preparing for the manifestation of the Christian ideal in Jesus Christ; and that significance can be presented only in the general distinctive features. There are three preliminary considerations, however, which claim our attention.

(1) A great deal of confusion, moral and religious as well as mental, has been caused to the devout reader of the Old Testament by a failure to recognise the contrast between the popular and the prophetic religion; and all religious ideas and moral standards recorded in the Old Testament have been invested with divine authority as revealing God's character and purpose. Into the popular religion much of the superstition and corruption of Semitic heathenism was carried over, and this was honestly believed by sincere worshippers of Yahveh as His counsel or command. Many of the objections made by sceptics to the Holy Scriptures find their occasion in the misunderstanding (for which not only Christian piety, but even theology, bears responsibility) that all which is recorded in the Old Testament belongs to the revelation of God. So far were the people as a whole from displaying any unique religious genius, any distinctive tendency to monotheism, that they were constantly proving

[1] See the article on "Prophecy" in Hastings's *Bible Dictionary*, Vol. IV., and on "Revelation" in the *Extra Volume*.

themselves " stiff-necked " (Acts vii. 51), and it was needful for God to hew them by His prophets (Hosea vi. 5). Neither in their religious ideas nor moral ideals were the prophets merely the product of their environment ; they were a challenge of the religion and the morality of their fellow-countrymen. Conditioned by their historical situation they were, as Jesus Christ Himself was, and as no man is too great to be ; but the account they give of themselves as receiving their message from God, and delivering it on behalf of God, is intelligible and credible.

(2) The message of each prophet was addressed to his own time ; what prediction of the future as warning or as promise there was included was related to the immediate future as depending on the present, although behind that future God's ultimate purpose was discerned. It was intended to affect present conduct in evoking repentance or faith. The fundamental belief of the prophets was that human history was, and could be, interpreted as being divine providence ! Historical occurrences disclosed divine intentions ; human policy was a means of divine purpose. Assyria was the rod of God's anger (Isa. x. 5) to punish His people. Cyrus was God's anointed (Isa. xlv. 1) to secure for them deliverance. It was no abstract doctrine of God which they taught. It was God as present and active in their own day, whom they discerned for themselves and declared to others. What conception of God resulted we shall afterwards consider ; here we emphasise the fact that prophetic preaching was concrete and practical, an interpretation of divine purpose as a guide to human conduct. If in the historical books, written from the prophetic standpoint, this pragmatism seems often artificial ; if in the complexity of life the relation between conduct and its punishment or reward is not so direct and invariable as these writers make it appear ; yet we may accept as true the prophetic conviction of God living and acting in human history.

(3) The occasion of prophecy was the historical crisis, when a new situation made traditions and conventions, religious and moral, inadequate ; and when the guardianship and guidance of the nation in the way of truth and righteousness demanded an authentic voice from God. Socrates in a similar situation sought to resolve his problem by reflection ; the prophets offered their solution more confidently because they relied on inspiration from God. But as Socrates claimed to have his *daimon* as monitor to restrain,

so these prophets show in their messages that the divine inspiration did not supersede human activities. Even if some abnormal psychic state (Isa. vi.)—a vision and a voice—accompanied the prophet's call, the content of the prophetic writings makes highly improbable the theory of continued abnormal psychic conditions.[1]

II

The contribution of the prophets has often been described in the phrase "ethical monotheism"; the adjective indicates not only the distinctive content of the conception which the noun connotes, but no less the distinctive method by which the conception was reached; and the use of such a qualifying term is itself an indication that the conception has value for us in dealing with the Christian ideal.

(1) It is probable that Moses, the founder of the Hebrew religion as he was the maker of the nation (an assumption which even the Higher Criticism may allow us to make), was not a *monotheist* in the strict use of the term, nor, it would seem, was Elijah. What both insisted on was *monolatry*—that Yahveh, as the covenant-God, should alone be worshipped by His people, while the existence of other gods was not denied. David's complaint, when he was driven out of his native land, that he would need to worship another god (1 Sam. xxvi. 19), Naaman's request that he might be given some of the earth from Yahveh's land in order that he might properly offer worship (2 Kings v. 17), the popular *syncretism*, in which the local Baal, as source of the fertility of the soil, was worshipped along with Yahveh (Hosea ii. 16), without, it would seem, any sense of apostasy from Him—all these are indications that monotheism had not, before the succession of prophets, been reached in the religious development. That a moral code suitable to the circumstances of the people was associated with the ceremonial rules in the covenant with Yahveh is altogether probable; and the discovery of the Code of Hammurabi gives support to this assumption. Elijah's action in regard to Naboth's vineyard (1 Kings xxi. 19), and, earlier, Nathan's in regard to David's moral outrage (2 Sam. xii. 1–15), show that from the beginning the moral note was struck. Nevertheless, it remains true that the "ethical monotheism" was the contribution of the prophetic succession which begins with Amos

[1] See *Prophecy and the Prophets*, by T. H. Robinson, chapter iii.

and Hosea. Despite the prevalence and persistence of polytheism, there are to be traced modifications of it towards the conception of the divine as unity, although only in the Hebrew prophets was a consistent monotheism reached. Max Müller called attention to what he called *Kathenotheism* in the Vedic hymns, the temporary absorption of the worshipper in the immediate object of his worship, in which, it may be, an altogether inferior deity is endowed with the titles, honours, and functions of other gods, as though he were god alone.[1] Tribal unity was consolidated by the worship of one tribal deity, as in the *monolatry* just mentioned. When two or more tribes were combined in a nation, this tendency towards unity assumed one or other of two forms. A *pantheon* was formed ; but to the god of " the predominant partner " in the combination was assigned a pre-eminence, what we may call a *monarchy*, as that of Zeus in the Greek, and Jupiter in the Roman pantheon, or of Assur in Assyria, and Marduk in Babylonia.[2] Or, if two gods were similar enough in function and character, a fusion might take place —the *syncretism* of Amon-Re in Egypt,[3] or Yahveh-Baal in Israel. Among the priests, who also were the thinkers in some of the ancient religions, while the exoteric practice was polytheism, there was an esoteric doctrine of a more or less developed *pantheism* ; in Egypt there was the abstract conception of divinity or power, *nutar*[4] ; in China, T'ien, or Heaven the impersonal, is found alongside of Shang-Ti, the personal conception.[5] In Brahmanic thought, the chief gods of the two popular cults, Çiva and Vishnu, are combined with Brahma (masculine), a priestly deity, as manifestations of Brahma (neuter), the only reality.[6] Greek philosophy along the lines of speculative thought reached the conception of one God, but He never became the object of worship, displacing the many gods.[7] It was only in the Hebrew prophets that the belief in not only one God, but the God whose nature is such that He can be God alone, asserted itself in a nation's religion.

(2) This monotheism is *ethical* in a double sense—as regards its contents and as regards the method in which it was reached. (*a*) As Plato's criticism of Greek mythology and Lucretius' outburst against religion because of the many

[1] *Hibbert Lectures*, p. 271.
[2] See Moore's *History of Religions*, I., 413, 542, 234, 208.
[3] *Idem.*, p. 169. [4] Renouf, *Hibbert Lectures*, pp. 93 *ff.*
[5] Moore, *op. cit.*, p. 34. [6] *Idem.*, p. 344. [7] *Idem.*, pp. 502 *ff.*

and great evils to which it had persuaded mankind show, the conception of the divine exercised an injurious effect on morals. The obscene decorations and the immoral practices of some of the Hindu temples offer a modern instance. The conception of deity has often lagged behind the moral development of a people, and been injurious to its thought and life. The Yahveh-Baal syncretism debased the conception of Yahveh to the level of the Baal conception ; as Baal as the god of the land was the source of its fertility, sexual licence was associated with worship. In opposition to the popular religion, the prophets offered a moral conception of God, and in His name made moral demands on man which marked a great advance. Without entering into details, let a few instances suffice. As Yahveh's covenant-nation the people expected preferential treatment at His hand, His continued favour. Amos declares that, just because of this more intimate relation, penalty will fall upon their transgression (iii. 2). There must be affinity of purpose where there is to be community of interest. " Shall two walk together, except they have agreed ? " (*v.* 3). The people believed that they could win God's favour by the multitude and the costliness of their sacrifices, even to the offering of the firstborn. Micah replies that what God requires is good : " to do justly and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God " (vi. 8). Hosea, who lays stress on the inwardness of religion, makes a declaration, which Jesus on several occasions quoted against the legalism of the scribes and Pharisees : " I will have mercy and not sacrifice " (vi. 6). The antithesis, which frequently occurs between moral obligations and ceremonial observances in the prophets has led some scholars to assert that they intended to set aside sacrifice as worthless—to supersede ritual entirely by righteousness, to supplant the priest wholly by the prophet. It does not seem to me necessary to draw so extreme a conclusion. Popular speech, to be effective, must state truth in the most challenging way, without the qualifications which may be necessary. To the popular exaltation of ritual over righteousness the prophets were undoubtedly hostile ; to ceremonial observances many of them may have been indifferent ; but it is not probable that any of them wished so definite a breach with the past as the abolition of the current modes of worship. This question is not of merely antiquarian interest ; for in our own day there are Christian thinkers who would, as regards the outward

expression of the religious consciousness, limit it almost exclusively to moral activity. But worship is so universal and permanent, because it would seem to be so spontaneous and inevitable an expression of religious emotion, that, however much moralised a religion may become, there will still be need for, and an impulse to, prayer and praise and the symbols of communion with and consecration unto God. Be this as it may, we must recognise that it is an incalculably valuable contribution to human progress which we owe to the prophets in this thorough moralisation of the conception of God, and the consequent consistent moralisation of the relation of man to God; if what is most often struck in this new melody of divine truth is the note of righteousness, or of holiness, love is not absent. Hosea stresses the divine tenderness, yet consistently with righteousness and holiness, in such a way as to anticipate the revelation of God in Christ. There is very little, if anything, in this prophetic conception of God which is inconsistent with the Son's revelation of the Father; and Christ does not contradict, but confirms this ethical monotheism. It can be taken up into the Christian Ideal.

(*b*) How did the first of these prophets—Amos—reach this ethical monotheism? It seems to me that the first three chapters of his book disclose the secret. We do not deny the guidance of the Spirit into the truth, if we try to trace the path by which the prophet was led. It was through his moral conscience that his religious consciousness was reached. The conviction that there is, and can be, only one law of righteousness, only one supreme moral authority, was the basis of his monotheism. Polytheism leaves the moral conscience in confusion; to obey the behests of one god may be to offer an affront to another, as the gods—so, at least, testified Homer[1]—are not always a harmonious company, and even Father Zeus finds his authority defied. A tribal deity has dominion over his own people, recognises obligations to them, and imposes obligations on them. But these tribal deities share the rivalries and conflicts of their worshippers. To realise what the declarations of Yahveh's judgment on the sins of inhumanity of the neighbouring peoples signified as a forward leap of the religious consciousness and the moral conscience, we must try to recapture in imagination the background of Amos. Nations were divided from one another in worship and morals, recognising

[1] See Moore, *op. cit.*, I., pp. 428 *ff.*

no universal moral obligations, and no one God as moral authority over all ; and amid this confusion and conflict the herdsman of Tekoa asserts there is only one God; and summons all the nations which come within his political horizon to the judgment bar of that God. And, more significant still, in a world and among a people where ritual was exalted above righteousness the judgment is represented as falling, not on ceremonial neglects, but on moral outrages. That that righteous judgment knows no prejudice and no partiality is shown in the summons of Judah and Israel to appear before the same tribunal. A speculative monotheism, as in Greece, may be tolerant of polytheism, but not a monotheism based on the moral conscience, the conviction that, as there is only one law of righteousness, so there can be only one supreme moral authority.

Hosea's approach to monotheism is no less ethical, although it is by the path of human affection ; for the loving heart no less than the righteous deed is a moral obligation. His intolerance of the popular syncretism, which in belief and worship confused Baal, the god of the land, with Yahveh, the covenant-God, had its source in the necessary exclusiveness of the supreme human affection. Because his own forbearing and forgiving love demanded no less from his erring wife than complete loyalty and devotion, he so passionately pleaded with his people to love Yahveh alone. While Hosea, absorbed as he is with the relation of his own people to God, has not the universal outlook of Amos, and accordingly his monotheism is not so explicit, yet his statement (chapter ii.) that it is not Baal from whom all the gifts the soil has yielded come, but that all are Yahveh's gift, is an assertion of His lordship even over this land for which, in the popular thought, another god was claimant; and is an implicit denial of polytheism. We may be sure that for him Yahveh alone was, and could be, God. It was amid the polytheism of Babylon, when Yahveh's people was in exile, that the most triumphant, and even defiant, assertion of this ethical monotheism was made. It is not only one supreme moral authority, or only one sole object of worship, which is asserted in Isa. xl. 12–26, but the Creator, Preserver, and Ruler of the Universe. The God who judges all nations in righteousness, and the God who claims the complete loyalty and devotion of His worshippers, is the absolute deity ; and polytheism and idolatry deserve only scathing scorn.

III

(1) While *universalism* is implicit in Amos' assertion of one supreme moral authority, and *individualism* in Hosea's demand for the intimate relation to God as of wife to husband, yet it is for our purpose important to note that the prophets addressed their message to a *nation*, and called for national repentance and reform; for, unlike as are the circumstances of our own time to those of the prophets, yet in this respect our historical situation resembles theirs more closely than that of Jesus and the Apostolic Church. Jesus did address Himself to the Jewish people, and offered Himself as Messiah; and yet it was individual disciples whom He gathered around Him, and, as subject to Rome, the Jews were not able to take corporate action, as the prophets desired the nation in their own time to take, and as modern nations may be summoned to take by legislation and administration in the realisation of the Christian ideal. While Christianity, which in its individualism and its universalism alike has reached a stage of development beyond that of the prophetic period, cannot return to be a national religion as was the religion of Israel, yet on the other hand it is necessary to insist to-day that the nation in its corporate activity can become the agent of the divine purpose. There is to-day a Christian individualism which would confine the religious constraint and the moral command of the Christian Church as interpreting and applying the Christian ethics to individuals only, and regards individual character and conduct as the only agency to be used for the hastening of the Kingdom of God upon earth. That the national appeal of the prophets, and no less of Jesus, failed in bringing about the nation's amendment and deliverance does not prove that there is not a duty which a nation through corporate action alone can discharge; and that, given that an adequate proportion of the individuals of the nation is receptive and responsive to the moral and religious appeal, their influence may not secure that corporate action. Disappointing as may be the experiences of reformers, yet modern history does prove, not only the necessity, but also the possibility of realising moral principles in national policy as well as in individual conduct. Politics is not a region in which ethics should not intrude, as seems sometimes to be assumed by those who apply a very much more Christian standard to their own personal action than they are prepared to do in

their demand on, and judgment of, the political party to which they belong. Granted that a nation's policy is not likely to be in advance of the general moral level, and will be below the level of its best citizens, the prophets nevertheless by their example support the appeal to the nation in God's name.

(2) The fact that Isaiah was led to the doctrine of the remnant (i. 9 and many other passages) as alone holding out any hope for the future of the nation may be regarded as the first break with nationalism in the ministry of the prophets. When the nation was laid low by Babylon, Jeremiah, lonely among his own countrymen, looking to the future, hoped for a national restoration ; but within the restored nation the new covenant anticipated an individual relation to God, an inward change in each man (xxxi. 33–34). This individualism was exaggerated by Ezekiel, who detached one generation from another, ignoring the continuity of history ; one individual from another, despite the interdependence of the members of any society ; one phase of the individual's life from another, as though one moment could express the worth or unworthiness of personality (chapter xviii.). This development of individualism has its significance for us. The Christian ideal can be realised in the policy of a nation only in the measure in which its citizens are Christianised. Whatever material advantages reforms might bring which were initiated by a Government without the nation's assent, or carried by a majority, the moral value of the reform must be measured by the quality of the assent of the individuals which compose the nation, and the quality of the influence which is exerted on individuals. The value from the Christian moral standpoint of, for instance, prohibition in America must not be estimated by industrial advancement, physical improvement, or any of these external consequences, but by the degree in which the nation's character as a whole is purified and elevated. I am not offering any judgment on the expediency of the policy at all, but only pointing out that in regard to the realisation of the Christian or any ideal the test is that of Jeremiah : " Is the law put in the inward parts and written in the heart ? " As must be very much more fully shown hereafter, the moral good must be estimated by the individual character which is developed as well as by the social institutions which are formed. For the social reformer of to-day, who rightly attaches importance to the moralising and Christianising of government, general and local, it is

instructive to be reminded of this transition from nationalism to individualism in the prophetic teaching. The exaggeration of that individualism by Ezekiel is, however, not less instructive as warning. This prophetic teaching finds confirmation in the teaching of Jesus. It was not only the circumstances of His own age, which made an appeal to individuals in the nation rather than to the nation as a whole inevitable, that explain his individualism, but His conception of God as Father implies an individual relation to man, and no less His conception of each man as a child of God attaches value to each individual.

(3) The universalism which is implicit, as has been shown, in Amos' teaching regarding Yahveh's sole moral authority, is found in other instances. (*a*) Two only need here to be mentioned in illustration. A prosaic literalness of interpretation of the Bible has in the popular mind invested one of the most significant of the Old Testament writings, *Jonah*, with comic associations. As I heard a preacher once say, many people have been much more concerned about the anatomy of a fish than about the psychology of a prophet. Properly interpreted, the story, which, taken literally, does leave room for ridicule, is a summons to the nation, privileged to possess this knowledge of God through the prophets, to become missionary. Jonah is the nation, to whom God has committed His message, and Nineveh is the world to which it is to be delivered. Still more impressive is the picture of the Suffering Servant in Isa. lii. 13.–liii. 12. To that vision Christ alone is the corresponding reality ; He Himself saw in this vision His own vocation, and faith sees in Him alone the fulfilment of its promise. Nevertheless, the immediate intention of the prophet was to describe his own nation, its martyrdom a necessary condition of the fulfilment of its mission. It was his conviction that the sacrifice which his people was enduring in the Exile might prove for the salvation of other peoples through the message which it alone could deliver. This vision seems to me to be but the fullest expression of a conception which is elsewhere recurrent. All the prophets subordinate its national destiny to its national duty. Isaiah opposed to the counsels of the contemporary politicians, who believed themselves to be following the path of prudence, a policy of sole reliance upon God. Confident as he was that that policy was the way of wisdom and would be justified by events, because he was convinced that the preservation of Jerusalem against the immediate

danger from Assyria was necessary to the fulfilment of the divine purpose ; yet, if we read him aright, he would have advocated such a policy, even if he had seen it beset with risks, and as involving costs in safety and prosperity to the people. Jeremiah was deemed a traitor because he counselled submission to Babylon as God's will. He summoned his people to sacrifice in obedience to the will of God. The prophet of the Exile offers the solution of the problem of the chequered career of his people. Its outward lot as a nation must be one of suffering and loss, that its inward life might thereby be so developed as to make it a spiritual blessing to the world.

(*b*) This development of thought in the prophets is a challenge to our own thinking. The appeal which Jesus made to the nation, and afterwards in plainer terms to His disciples, to take the Cross and follow him (Mark viii. 34), compels us to ask whether He saw not only His own personal vocation in the fulfilment of the prophet's vision, but for a time at least anticipated that, if not the whole nation, yet at least the *remnant* of it represented by His disciples, would share this sacrifice. The late Dr. MacKennal believed that the self-sacrifice of a nation might be necessary to assure an enduring world peace.[1] Even if such an anticipation should appear to most Christians an idle dream, since there seems no probability of any nation as a whole being so sanctified, so set apart for God's purpose, as to allow its Government to take the risks, and pay the cost, of a policy which endangered or injured its national interests ; nevertheless, the Christian ideal must incorporate this prophetic vision, in the practical application that a nation should be prepared to subordinate its own exclusive good to the inclusive good of humanity. For a nation no less than an individual there is a cross to be taken up in following Christ. The Christian ideal will be realised only as such a universalism dominates nationalism ; and that lesson comes to us from the prophet.

(4) The nation is the middle term between the individual and humanity. It is through his citizenship, not less, if not more, than by what he can individually do, that the individual can first advance, not only his nation's interests, but also the service that it can render to all humanity. The

[1] Don Sturzo, in his book *The International Community and the Right of War*, makes a similar suggestion : " To arrive at the complete elimination of war . . . a group of the most courageous and highly civilised States should renounce all wars, and declare their willingness to be recognised as disarmed and neutralised States, no matter what the international situation might be."

tendency which has too often asserted itself in the Christian Church to detach the individual from what are called the secular interests of his citizenship, and to exalt above these what are named the sacred interests of his churchmanship, for which the New Testament, inevitably in the conditions under which the Apostolic Church was placed, seems to offer some sanction, finds its correction in this prophetic teaching. Hence the importance of insisting that this preparation of the Christian ideal must not be passed over in the formation of it. The exponents of that ideal sometimes show an inclination to treat the teaching of Jesus during His earthly ministry as if that alone had to be taken into account ; and isolated sayings of His are treated as general principles, without any regard to the historical situation which is the explanation and the justification of them. Jesus Himself expressly declared that He had come, not to destroy, but to fulfil (Matt. v. 17), and, even if fulfilment does mean correction and completion, it does imply continuity. The ethical monotheism of the prophets was assumed by Him, especially some of their teachings to which special attention has been here directed, and we do not get the full content of His revelation of the ideal unless we do justice to the teaching of the *prophets* in its nationalism, individualism, and universalism.

IV

While in the prophetic message the relation to Yahveh—that is, religion—was the primary concern, and because Yahveh was moral personality, morality is inseparable from it ; yet there is not in the prophets generally any aloofness from the interests and activities of life. It is not on religious observances that they insist, nor even on moral obligations in the abstract ; they are not only theologians and moralists, but also social reformers and politicians.

(1) Because they saw in the course of human history the divine providence, the home and foreign policy of their own nation must be judged as in accordance with, or contrary to, the divine purpose. (*a*) Whether there should be resistance or submission to Assyria, whether Egypt was to be sought as an ally against Babylon—these were not matters to be settled by the king and the courtiers alone, but the prophet of God claimed a right to state what God's will

was. As has already been shown, the occasion of prophecy was usually in a political crisis, a threat or a danger, a promise or a deliverance to the nation. We do find evidence of a careful scrutiny of the national situation ; but it is not political shrewdness which determines the counsel or the command given. It is moral and spiritual discernment of what is the will of God in the circumstances. And as one reads the record one does not carry away the impression that the prophets were in this, their dependence on God's disclosures of His will, unpractical *doctrinaires*, but rather that they read the signs of their times aright. Can we still believe with the prophets that divine providence is discernible in human history, and that " surely Yahveh God will do nothing, but He revealeth His secret unto His servants the prophets " (Amos iii. 7). If the prophets were not deluded fanatics—and the impression they make upon us is that they were sane and sober men—they possessed the necessary discernment of the real divine providence.

(*b*) Has that providence ceased in human history, and has the Christian Church lost what these prophets possessed, the gift of discernment ? There has been so much human folly in what professes to be the reading of " the signs of the times " that to make any such claim may seem absurd to many Christians. Yet when we give the subject more consideration, surely it is not the claim that God's purpose can be discovered which is absurd, but the method of interpretation that is at fault. It is not the interpretation of the symbolic predictions of Daniel or the Revelation which puts the Church in the prophetic succession. But a moral and religious discernment of God's nature, character, and purpose will enable the Church through its seers to trace the path of God's will through human history. The demand is more and more insistent that, while the details of legislation, administration, and diplomacy should be left to the experts (although, indeed, not all who exercise the functions have the qualifications), yet the guiding principles of home and foreign policy should be laid down by the Christian Church in the discharge of its prophetic function. That function to-day demands, as it did of old, an understanding of the signs of the times as well as a discernment of God's will. I do not believe that if the Christian Church sincerely desired and honestly used the guiding of the Holy Spirit in this matter in the interests of the Kingdom of God, it would fail to fulfil this function.

(*c*) It is true that no nation now calls itself a covenant-nation ; but our nation at least professes an acceptance of the Christian ideal as the highest moral standard ; and there are few responsible leaders of the thought and life of the nation who will assert, as did a Lord Rector of Glasgow University in my student days, that the morality which obtains between individuals has no authority in the relation of nations. In countering this claim, however, it is necessary to show earthly prudence as well as heavenly wisdom. Just as individual duty is affected by vocation, the duties of the teacher, for instance, in relation to the taught not being the same as the duties of the taught towards the teacher, so a nation has responsibilities towards its citizens, and it may even be towards other nations, which the individual has not. As in a civilised community there is law and order maintained by the corporate action, the citizen has not the right to self-defence in the degree in which a nation must possess that right, until an international law and order by the corporate action of the nations is established. The principle that the Kingdom of God condemns war and commends peace is the same, but the application is different. The nation cannot be forbidden to defend itself against what imperils its vital interests ; but means should be devised of such international action as will make such defence unnecessary. Changed as are the circumstances, and, therefore, different as must be the methods, nevertheless the Christian Church, if the Christian ideal is to be realised on earth, must recognise the duty, and, therefore, claim the right, to be in the prophetic succession in laying down the general principles which should guide the policy of a nation in understanding the opportunity and the consequent obligation of each historical situation, and in interpreting these general principles in their particular application in that situation.

(2) The prophets were not only politicians, they were social reformers. (*a*) There is one most interesting and valuable result of the modern biblical scholarship—that it rids us of that unintelligible and incredible supposition that God through Moses gave the covenant-nation an authoritative law for all times, making provision for conditions which did not arise till long after the law was given, e.g. nomads being given a code applicable only to an agricultural community. We now can trace the development of the legislation, the *Torah* being a living voice and not a dead letter in Israel.

We have also learned the part the prophets played in this modification of the codes. The settlement of the wandering tribes in Canaan, the change from pastoral to agricultural pursuits, necessarily involved change of law. When Amos began to prophesy, there had been, especially in the Northern Kingdom, economic and consequent social changes. Political relations and commercial intercourse had so changed conditions that the simpler morality had broken down as a guide to conduct, and many wrongs cried for redress, and rights for assertion. The scale of the economic and social changes was small in comparison with the Industrial Revolution of our own age, but there was a real problem to be solved, and the prophets essayed the solution in the name of the Lord. It may be that they were not as well instructed in economics as they were confident in their ethics; and it may be needful for the social reformer in the much more complex and extensive conditions of to-day to study economics as they did not; and yet he may, he must be as resolved as they were that oppression of the poor by the rich, injustice of the mighty toward the feeble, impoverishment of the many to provide the means of luxury for the few, as contrary to the will of God, must, if allowed to go on unchecked, lead to disaster. Righteousness and lovingkindness, truth and mercy, never go out of date as the guiding principles of society, if it is to endure. Isaiah, the courtier in Jerusalem, no less than Amos, the herdsman of Tekoa, was insistent, not that ceremonial ordinances were to be scrupulously carried out, but that morality should prevail in all social relations: "Wash you, make you clean; put away the evil of your doings from before mine eyes; cease to do evil; learn to do well; seek judgment, relieve the oppressed, judge the fatherless, plead for the widow" (i. 16–17).

(*b*) In this denunciation of wrongs and assertion of rights the prophets allowed themselves great freedom of speech. A fashionable, wealthy congregation in West London would be startled and shocked beyond measure if a preacher addressed the idle, frivolous, luxurious, and heartless women as did Amos—"Kine of Bashan" (iv. 1–3); and Whitehall would be perturbed if one of the bishops were to speak as harshly to responsible Ministers about their indifference to the miseries in many industrial areas as did the same prophet to those who were "at ease in Zion, and secure in the mountain of Samaria," and whose chief offence was

that "they *were* not grieved for the affliction of Joseph" (vi. 1–6).[1] The prophetic denunciation was of the rich and the mighty, and their solicitude was for the poor and the weak; they were always on the side of "the under-dog." So, we may say, was Jesus, who had blessings for the poor and woes for the rich. "Other times, other manners"; and I do not suggest that the modern preacher need imitate the ancient prophet in his manners; although consistently with the Christian spirit of charity, consideration, and courtesy to all men, he should show the same solicitude for the moral and religious dangers of the *top-dogs* and the bodily needs of the *under-dogs*. The Church must try to be unprejudiced and impartial, but it would be a forgivable offence if she were to show sometimes the prophetic bias.

(*c*) As we shall in the next chapter see, there were reasons in the historical situation why Jesus did not follow in the prophetic succession in dealing thus in details with the economic injuries and social wrongs of his own time; but this seeming aloofness—although, as has just been indicated, where His interest and sympathy lay was clearly shown in occasional utterances—does not justify the assumption which is often advanced by those who love the *status quo* that the Christian Church, in conditions much more like those of the prophets, should also hold aloof, and not in this respect take up the prophetic succession, and deal as courageously and faithfully as they did with the evils of their times and the duty of their rulers.

(3) What has been said might, if left without further explanation, leave a false impression. The prophets were not of those who think morality an adequate substitute for religion. They did exalt righteousness over ritual, although they did not, as has been contended, propose the cessation of the ritual. But when they spake, it was in the name, and by the authority, of Yahveh; and the amendment in society, and the policy for the nation which they demanded was the outward expression of repentance towards, and faith in God. For them God as the living, active God was fulfilling a purpose, carrying out His will in all the confusions and conflicts of human history, and the moral good for them could not be realised apart from God's working, but only as men in

[1] The intervention of Anglican bishops and Nonconformist leaders in the coal crisis a few years ago was regarded by many Christian people as an outrage; but they were in the prophetic succession. Much misery and loss would have been avoided had their pleadings been heeded.

their doings entered into partnership with Him. The earliest of the prophets, Amos, in striking imagery lays down the fundamental convictions of the succession. Whatever occurs in human history, God is there acting or speaking. When He acts or speaks, the prophets know His secret, and cannot but utter it. When the people hear His message, they cannot but be impressed. Yet they cannot continue to be His people unless knowing and fearing they accept His will (iii. 3–8). The prophets were not concerned with their own age alone. Behind the immediate activity of God they were always discerning the final fulfilment of God's purpose, the day of Yahveh, the Kingdom of God, the coming of the Messiah. They were not conscious of the long historical process by which the fulfilment of God's purpose would be secured, because they so vividly realised God's presence and activity in their own age, and because the moral and religious issues with which they were concerned were not for them of temporary or local significance, but had a permanent and universal import, as related to God. The consummation of their hope has been in Jesus Christ; but that consummation was not in the few years of the earthly manifestation, but in the centuries during which the truth and grace of the Lord Jesus Christ have been expanding throughout the world as the mustard plant, and permeating human affairs as the leaven in the lump. And that consummation is not yet at its close.

To-day also God is fulfilling this purpose; we may call it the Kingdom of God, or the redemption of man, or whatever we will, so long as we recognise the reality. To-day God is revealing that will, not in individual oracles, but by the Spirit's guidance of the Church into all the truth and grace as given in the revelation of Jesus Christ. To-day all human societies must be summoned to hear and to obey, for only as men, loving God, make His purpose their own, can that purpose be fulfilled, all things working together for good (Rom. viii. 28). As Christ completed law and prophecy, so the Church must be His complement on earth, until He himself is the completion of all things in all persons, and through Him God completes all in all (Eph. i. 23; 1 Cor. xv. 28).

CHAPTER II

THE REVELATION IN CHRIST

In what has been said in the previous chapter on the prophetic succession, one important element has been mentioned only at the close. But it may be resumed as the proper transition to the subject of this chapter. While prophecy was mainly *forthtelling*, it was also *foretelling*. The denunciation of sin was accompanied by warnings of judgment, and the summons to repentance and amendment by promises of mercy ; and warning and promise alike had a direct reference to the historical situation. Yet looming on the present horizon was a future expectation, constant in substance but variable in form, of the decisive crisis of the nation's history—the day of Yahveh or the Coming of the Messiah. The varying details of this expectation need not now detain us ; only this general feature needs to be emphasised : the progressive revelation had a forward look to a final consummation. Christian faith believes that the Messianic hope was fulfilled, not literally in its historical forms, but essentially in its moral and religious substance in Jesus Christ ; and He Himself claimed that He had come, not to destroy, but to fulfil law and prophecy (Matt. v. 17). The ethical monotheism of the prophets was completed in His revelation of God as Father. The morality of the best teaching of the Old Testament was continued by Him ; but its defects were corrected. The hope of salvation was stripped of its national, secular, earthly aspects, and clothed in universal, spiritual, heavenly reality. The highest conception of sacrifice in the Old Testament was made historical fact in His Cross. Divine revelation was accomplished and human redemption achieved in His person and work. Not by teaching about God and goodness and salvation only was He Saviour and Lord, but in the whole range of His personality, character, activity, and influence. In the fullness of the times (Gal. iv. 4) God sent His Son into a world that had been prepared for His coming. We must recognise both the continuity with the past and the creative difference made in human history by Jesus Christ.

I

The personality of Jesus Christ must be put in the forefront. What distinguished Him from all other men were: (1) His supreme religious consciousness, known as Son only by the Father, and alone as Son knowing the Father and revealing the Father unto men (Matt. xi. 27). (2) His perfect moral character, transcending the limitations of heredity and environment, and offering mankind a permanent and universal ideal realised; and (3) in virtue of both His relation to God and to men His mediatorial efficacy and sufficiency in bringing God to men and men to God. Of the first of these unique features all that need be said for the present purpose is that it is His certainty as Son which gives men confidence to believe in God as Father; and that it is this faith in God as Father which gives to Christian morality its distinctive character as love to God and love to man.

(1) Of the moral character of Jesus more must be said. It is not possible in words to describe adequately the glory which men beheld as of the only-begotten of the Father (John i. 14). (*a*) It was this personal relation to God as Son depending on and submissive to God as Father which was expressed in one of the most surprising characteristics of His personality, and one He claimed for Himself—*His humility* (Matt. xi. 29). Theologians have often, in their concern to prove His divinity, laid stress on the claims He made for Himself. He did make claims which would have proved megalomania in any other man, but which the impression He made on receptive and responsive souls confirmed as true and right. He claimed to reveal God as no other could, to forgive sins in God's name, to be appointed as the Judge, relation to whom would determine destiny, to save and to redeem by His sacrifice. But we get the right point of view, I think, if we recognise that He regarded all as a trust and a task from His Father. "All these things had been delivered to Him by His Father," and He accepted everything, only as "was well-pleasing in His Father's sight" (*vv.* 26 and 27). Thus even in His relation to God He has given us an example, that we may follow in His steps. This universal Fatherhood of God, which He proclaimed, He illustrated in His own attitude to men. He attracted men to Himself, and most of all those whom the religious teachers repelled, the outcasts of Jewish society, the women and the children, not then held

in high esteem. As was the depth of His humility before God, so was the breadth of His *sympathy*, *charity*, *generosity* towards men. His loving kindness and tender mercy was no indifference to, no compromise with, no condonation of sin ; there was no lowering of the moral standard, no lessening of the moral claim. The demand He made on others, and enforced by exemplifying in Himself, was for a righteousness which exceeded that of scribes and Pharisees (Matt. v. 20), a perfection as is the Father's (*v.* 48). The love to God and men He enjoined and himself displayed transcended in its requirements all previous moral law. This exalted ideal He realised in His relation to God and man with a *constancy* that no opposition could break, and that endured through the Temptation in the Wilderness, and at Cæsarea Philippi, in the Trials of Gethsemane and Calvary which showed the Son's obedience unto death. It was what He was, said, and did in this relation to God and to man that gave to His mediatorship its efficacy and sufficiency. Because in His religious consciousness and moral character God and man met in perfect personal unity, He brought God to men and men to God. For it was not by way of example only that He brought the highest good of a life in loving fellowship with God, and growing likeness of God to men. Through Him alone as Saviour and Lord can that highest good be realised in men. He not only sets the end ; He is the means of reaching it for men. He is both goal and course in the Christian's Godward race.

(*b*) But even more than this ; not only does human weakness need divine support for this life ; human sin also needs divine forgiveness as the very beginning of this life. The revelation of God is redemptive in the action and the passion which saves by sympathy, service, and sacrifice, and not merely in the declaration that God is slow to anger, merciful and gracious (Ps. ciii. 8), ready to forgive and deliver. The Son of Man is the pattern of the perfect life, because He came, not to be served, but to serve and to give His life a ransom for many (Matt. xx. 28). In Christianity morality is inseparable from religion, and the divine revelation as redemptive determines the distinctive character of both ; religion is essentially faith, receptive of and responsive to grace, and morality essentially that *faith energising in love* (Gal. v. 6), equal love to self and neighbour and absolute love to God under the constraint of the love of Christ as shown in His Cross, the love that worketh no ill to a

neighbour (Rom. xiii. 10) and is the fulfilment, the correction and completion of all law (Matt. v. 17).

This redemptive revelation in Christ is, according to Christian experience, not merely an event in the past, although the light of truth and the warmth of grace are, as it were, focused in the historical Jesus ; it is a continuous process ; the Jesus Christ who is the same yesterday, to-day, yea and for ever (Heb. xiii. 8), who ever liveth to make intercession for us, and is able to save to the uttermost all who come unto God through Him (Heb. vii. 25), is by His Spirit, the Spirit of God, always and everywhere still radiating that illumination and inspiration. It is a purpose of God, past, present, and future, which is being fulfilled in this redemptive revelation, this highest good of man, which man receives in faith, and then realises in a love of the same quality and of the same activity as the love of God revealed to redeem. The maintenance of the faith which relates man to God is no less essential than the manifestation of the love which relates man to his fellows. The Christian ideal for man's morality has its source, standard, and support in the Christian reality, God reconciling the world unto Himself in Christ (Col. i. 20).

(2) This conception needs to be set in the forefront in order to correct several errors which have crept into the doctrine and the practice of the Christian Church.

(*a*) The contrast made in the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel, " the law was given by Moses ; grace and truth came by Jesus Christ " (i. 17), the contest of Paul against Jewish legalism for the emancipation of the Gentiles, not only from the law of Moses, but from all law in contrast to grace, has its justification in the life and teaching of Jesus in His earthly ministry. He contended against scribes and Pharisees. His disregard of ceremonial defilement, His breach of the accepted Sabbath rules, His defence of His disciples for not fasting, His attack on some of the scribal interpretations of the law, were all directed against this tyrannous legalism. To make love, not one of the commandments, but the first and greatest of them all, on which all depend (Mark. xii. 30–31), is to sweep away law as distinctive of Christian morality. Such a love as He required is, however, not a relaxation of law for licence, but an exaltation above law into a complete self-surrender to God, and a full self-giving to others for their good. As law, the outward commandment, is a stage of moral development towards

love, the inward constraint, it can be superseded only by love. He who has not yet come under grace, remains as a moral necessity under law. Even in the life of the individual Christian it is not likely that there will be a distinct temporal separation. Only as a man advances under grace does law for him recede. Unless and until he is in love for Christ, keeping His commandments of love, he must be guided and guarded in his moral way by the old commandments of law. "Love God, and do as you please," is a true and right maxim only for a mature and developed Christian. Recognising as we should that even in the Christian life law may still serve as tutor (Gal. iv. 2) unto Christ, we must insist, however, that what is distinctive of the Christian ideal is an emancipation from, because an elevation above, legalism.

(*b*) The term "conscience" does not occur in the teaching of Jesus as in that of Paul, but the recognition of this inward monitor is there—He does not base His authority on His miracles as credentials, but on the appeal of His teaching to man's sense of the true and the right (Luke xii. 57). He recognises that there is a light within, but also that that light may become darkness (Matt. vi. 23), i.e. the possibility of a bad conscience, a standard of conduct which is not an advance on, but a lapse from, a higher standard which, if not acknowledged, yet can be known. Accordingly the appeal to the Christian conscience as the ultimate standard requires qualification in several respects. *Firstly*, it must be indeed a Christian conscience in reality, and not only the conscience of a man who professes to be a Christian. It must be a conscience which has with the whole personality experienced cleansing, enlightening, and quickening by the truth and grace of Jesus Christ through His Spirit; light must come instead of darkness. But how can we tell whether the conscience is a bad conscience? Here is the advantage of our objective standard such as is given in the historical reality of Jesus Christ. As the Spirit enlightens, He does not supersede, but interprets and applies the truth thus once for all given (John xvi. 13). While the individual Christian conscience cannot be absolutely bound by the standards of the Christian society, since the progress of the Church has again and again depended on the more sensitive consciences of saints and seers; yet no Christian can treat with disrespect the common judgment of the Church, and he can disregard it only when he can justify that

disregard by a compelling vision of a larger and loftier application of Christian principles. The continuous development of the Christian conscience in individuals and communities by the constant operation of the Spirit of God is the necessary condition of the realisation of the Christian ideal, man's highest moral good.

Secondly, the distinctively Christian conscience will not be atomic, as individual consciences have often been. It will not consist of isolated, and sometimes even inconsistent, moral demands. It will have a unity, the unity that Jesus gave to all the commandments in the law of love. To do unto others as we would be done unto (Matt. vii. 12) is not another independent principle, but the practical application of equal love to self and neighbour. The exchange of parts, as it were, which this rule involves, presupposes this equality. Only if I value my neighbour as myself, am interested in my neighbour as in myself, that is suffer and rejoice with him, and seek the highest good for him as I do my own, am I putting myself in his place, and allowing him in my thought to take mine. There will be as great a variety in action as there is in the situations into which men are brought in their mutual relations. What will be necessary is the discernment in each case of what love's attitude and action should be. Knowledge of the concrete facts will be necessary to reach the proper application of Christian principle ; but love, if sincere, will be prepared to take the pains which may be necessary to gain this knowledge ; for love is not blind, but gives insight and understanding.

Thirdly, even the sayings of Jesus must not be taken by the Christian conscience in individual isolation ; such a command as that of non-resistance must not be taken by itself (Matt. v. 39), as though it superseded the principle of love, and were in all circumstances the only possible application of that principle. There must be knowledge of the consequences which will follow the course of action chosen, not merely the immediate consequences to the one person directly affected by the action, but the more remote consequences as they affect generally the community involved ; and based on this knowledge, there must be judgment, unprejudiced and impartial, so that the maxim adopted could be justified as a general law under the same conditions, to determine whether love's ends would be best fulfilled by acting on this particular teaching or not. This is no disrespect to, or disregard of, the authority of Jesus ; for He

was teaching in a particular time and place, with the special circumstances which distinguish His situation and ours ; and morality has always, and must have, this twofold aspect, the general principle and the application which the concrete conditions demand.[1]

Lastly, the place and task of a man in the world, his vocation, determine the range and the quality of his duty. There are obligations which every man as a moral agent owes to others as moral subjects ; but there are obligations which arise from a man's calling, and the relations to others in which he is placed thereby. Without contradicting or challenging the essential moral identity of the ideal which was historical reality in Jesus Christ, and that which through the relation of human faith to divine grace is to be realised in each Christian, there must be necessary differences between the Saviour and the saved, the Lord and those whom He by the constraint of His love makes His bondslaves. I have a strong aversion to a phrase which a journalist of noble life, but not always sound judgment, made popular : " Be a Christ." We are Christians because we believe in Him as the Christ, and cannot be Christs : He alone is and can be. To give only one instance to justify a statement which will probably provoke dissent in many minds. Aloofness from the common life of business and citizenship has been advocated on the ground that Jesus refused to deal with the quarrel about an inheritance, and instead rebuked covetousness (Luke xii. 14), and that He had no political or social programme, but confined Himself to the relation of God and the individual soul. This argument is seen to be irrelevant, if we recall that to fulfil His vocation of revealing God and redeeming man He had to reject the popular expectations of a king after the manner of David, victorious, prosperous, and righteous, a deliverer from the Roman yoke, and an avenger of the wrongs of His people. He whose mission and message was for all lands and ages could not allow Himself to be involved in the local and temporary conditions, social and political. May I add an illustration without here attempting the theological justification ? His death was an instance of self-sacrifice, inspiring imitation where the conditions make the demand, but His death was also a service of God and man, which is solitary in human history.

(*c*) We must get above and beyond the fulfilment of a law,

[1] The details of Jesus' teaching will, if necessary, be discussed when concrete moral questions are being treated.

or obedience to conscience, if we are to conceive the Christian ideal as the highest good adequately. The description which may be given is self-realisation through self-sacrifice in partnership with God in the fulfilment of His purpose. (Mark viii. 34–35 offers the key to Christian ethics—" dying to live.") How Jesus Christ gives content to that description will be shown in the next section of this chapter. What here is to be emphasised as one of the errors to be avoided is this: that not the *static* character, which the standpoints of law and conscience would lead us to assume, but the *dynamic*, must be asserted ; the realisation of the ideal is an individual development and a universal evolution. This progressiveness, even to our impatience the gradualness, of the divine method must not be ignored ; it must be recognised in the new as in the old creation. The value of an individual and a communal life is not to be judged by its absolute correspondence with an abstract ideal, but by the measure in which under the concrete conditions of time and space, reality, sure and enduring, is being given to that ideal. As we look back on the incalculably long process by which the evolution from star-dust to man has been accomplished, or even within a much narrower range, the to us comparatively long process of human history, are we not tempted to ask, Why did God not at once make His world what He meant it to be ? Why has mankind made so slow progress in fulfilling God's purpose, and could not God have quickened the pace ? Without entering on the metaphysical consideration that God can do only what is possible, and that the very nature of any reality imposes necessary limitations, we may surely from our own experience draw the conclusion that the process no less than the product has value, and that we must not condemn what now appear to us the faults and errors of the past unreservedly, because while there was sin as a factor, and not a negligible factor, yet the imperfection of the realisation of the ideal is not all to be ascribed to sin. The imperfectly realised ideal is creating those conditions in which a closer approach to the ultimate perfection becomes possible. We must in our attitude avoid the idle acquiescence in all that is, and also the angry impatience with what, though imperfect, may be tending towards perfection. We must often recognise, if regretfully, that the conditions are not yet present in which the full application of a Christian principle is practicable ; and we must always aim at the best that all the conditions allow. That does not mean

that sacrifice is to be avoided, if by sacrifice we can make the application practicable ; but it does mean that we shall not make a merit of sacrifice in itself, regardless of its having any result. Each stage of God's purpose is fulfilled in the fullness of the times. Without any detailed discussion, some instances of the problems which confront the Church may be given. Is pacifism the only way in which the solution of the problem of war (Matt. v. 38–42) is to be sought, or should the League of Nations, which recognises the use of force in the last resort, be approved ? Should marriage be declared indissoluble except for the one offence against its moral reality, adultery (Mark x. 1–9), or may other grounds be admitted ? A difference must be recognised by the Church between the ideal which it sets up before its members, and the legislation for a community, only partially Christian, which it will use its influence to secure. In this gradual realisation of the ideal both the moral personalities and the social institutions are being formed which are the necessary conditions of its realisation in some fuller measure. It is a creative movement of persons and institutions, and each stage prepares for a higher. So long as the direction of movement is towards the ideal, and the rate of movement is as rapid as the total conditions, which even morality and religion must take into account, allow, we need not be impatient, but may maintain heart and hope.

II

We must now endeavour more fully to describe this Christian ideal as not only taught, but lived by Jesus Christ, and more closely to relate it to the moral good, which we have defined as self-realisation through self-sacrifice. (1) Jesus' summing up of the law in the command of love to God absolutely and equal love to self and neighbour at once makes clear that morality implies relations, and that the self is realised only as it is related to other selves. (*a*) If self-love is implicit in the demand of equal love for the neighbour, the self to be loved, that is, to be valued, to be interested in, and to be realised in its good, is the self which loves God absolutely and the neighbour equally. The self-love excludes all selfishness, whatever may be the object to which desire is directed—wealth or culture. Even a moral selfishness, which is concerned only about the personal character, or a religious selfishness, which is solicitous only about the

personal relation to God as only elements of an individual good, stands condemned. While love does find its good in giving itself, that good would not be its good if it were the end of the self-giving. A calculated sacrifice will fail to obtain the full satisfaction. Self must be forgotten in the self-giving which is also the self-finding of love ; the dying must be real, if the living to which it leads is to be real. The cross must be a real cross, endured in self-abnegation, if its proper joy is ever to be found (Heb. xii. 2). Love for God and man, as Jesus enjoins, is nothing else or less than self-realisation in self-sacrifice.

(*b*) Love is the expression and exercise of the whole personality, thinking, feeling, willing ; and I may here repeat the description of love in its threefold aspect which I have had occasion to give before : as thinking it is a judgment of value ; as feeling it is a sentiment of interest ; as willing it is purpose and effort for the good of its object. If God is to be loved as He ought to be, He must have absolute value for man ; a man does not love another unless that other has at least as high a value for him as is his self-esteem. If we are not interested in God's purpose, do not rejoice in its fulfilment, and grieve at its frustration, we do not really love God. So in human love there is interest, rejoicing or sorrowing with another in his joys or sorrows. If a man says he loves God, and is doing nothing to further the fulfilment of God's ends, he is a deceiver or deceiving himself. Protestations of love between men sound hollow, unless there be corresponding service of another's interests. Such an analysis of the conception of love is an indication of its adequacy as the guiding principle of Christian ethics, illumined as the application of the principle is at every stage by what Jesus Himself was, did, and suffered. Paul's inspired pæan of love in Cor. xiii. is a description of Him as love's reality.

(2) There are two concrete applications of this principle which Jesus Himself very explicitly taught, and which He made manifest in His own life, *forgiveness* and *sacrifice*. What is love's response to the two challenges of life : the wrongs which men inflict on one another, and the services which they need from one another ? (*a*) When one person does wrong to another, whether it be some direct personal injury, or the pain that the sin of one loved inflicts, the personal relation which is constituted by love is disturbed, and may at last be destroyed. But the love which is real at once reacts in forgiveness, the effort to restore the relation ; if the

wrong is simply ignored and treated as negligible, the relation has not been genuinely moral, or has ceased to be so. Where forgiveness is real, there is, and must be, judgment on the wrong as that which ought not to have been, as that which the wrongdoer should himself condemn. Forgiveness does not make light of the sin forgiven, but recognises its full seriousness as a hindrance to personal relationships. Accordingly we must recognise that the completion of the forgiveness, the restoration of the personal relation, depends not on the volition of the wronged alone, but on the response of the wrongdoer to such approach and appeal as the love of the wronged may constrain him to make. It is said, and rightly, that there must be repentance if forgiveness is to be justified morally. It is not right to forgive the impenitent. But from this truth a wrong inference is often drawn. It is said that forgiveness must wait on penitence, that the initiative should come from the wrongdoer ; by his penitence he should appease the wronged. But this is not the kind of forgiveness Jesus taught and lived. We may for clearness distinguish the resolve and the realisation of forgiveness. Love will resolve to forgive the offence as soon as it has been committed, and will use every means at command to make that resolve manifest to the wrongdoer to evoke the penitence, without which the forgiveness cannot be realised. What the means shall be to change the disposition of the person needing forgiveness will vary in different cases. Rebuke, displeasure, suspension of the previous personal relation, as in the case of Hosea and his wife (iii. 3), may have a place in the process. But whatever the means taken, the motive must be ever the restoration of the relation of love, thus interrupted. It may be that the forgiving love will take upon itself the painful consequences of the sin committed, or, if these fall on the sinner, will in sympathy share them. A forgiving love must needs be a vicarious love. It may be that the only means of securing repentance is just bearing the burden of suffering and sorrow. Even if there be no outward consequences, there will be the inward grief that one loved has proved unworthy ; the ideal value which love gives to its object will enhance the sense of loss in the lowered actual value of his conduct and character. This has been God's method of dealing with the sin of man in forgiving. God did not wait for man's penitence ; His was the initiative in Jesus Christ. By the Cross He not only made manifest His resolve to forgive, but in such a way as to show love's

vicarious sorrow, and consequent judgment on sin. This revelation of the Cross was anticipated in the earthly ministry of Jesus by His attitude to sinners.

The duty of human forgiveness is inseparable from the gift of divine forgiveness. Not only is the motive of the human duty the divine gift ; but the gift cannot be possessed unless the duty is discharged, as the condition attached in the Lord's Prayer to the petition for forgiveness proves (Matt. vi. 12, 14, 15). This condition is no indication of God's reluctance to forgive, but is inevitable. He who refuses to forgive is not fulfilling the condition of repentance without which forgiveness is not fully realised. This hostility to his neighbour necessarily hinders his reconciliation to God. The unforgiving man cannot be restored to full personal relation to the forgiving God. Further, how can he fully believe and trust in God as forgiving who knows not what forgiving means ?

(*b*) As has already been indicated, forgiveness involves sacrifice, the second distinctive feature of Christian morality. But it is not only in forgiving that Christian life is sacrificial. The personal relations of men involve a very large range of services which they need from one another, and can render to one another. " The Son of Man came to seek and to save that which was lost " (Luke xix. 10). " The Son of Man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many " (Matt. xx. 28). This description of the purpose of His life by Jesus defines what Christian love involves. Here the Christian ideal is the absolute challenge of the maxims and practices of men. Self-realisation through self-seeking, self-pleasing, self-sparing, self-advancing—that is the world's way. Self-realisation through self-sacrifice alone is Christ's. In the measure of His ability and opportunity the Christian ought to live and labour for the common good. Wherever there is the need and he has the means to help, there he is to prove himself the neighbour, as did the Good Samaritan (Luke x. 30–37). Much of this service, although it must involve self-denial from the standpoint of selfishness, may not make any great demand for self-sacrifice ; but in many cases only by sacrifice can service be rendered. As the Cross was a necessity for Christ Himself, so must it be for those who in their life and labour keep close to Him. The cynic sometimes suggests that self-sacrifice may after all be only a more far-seeing selfishness, a lesser good is given up for the sake of a greater. It is an injustice

to the human heart to assume that there is any calculation in the sacrifice which love prompts. The loss and the suffering for the loved one is itself the good, if it be for his good. But even when there is the foresight of the greater good to be secured by the renunciation of the lesser, the lesser is what selfishness can apprehend as good ; the greater it cannot appreciate as such. Insistence on the rewards of virtue in the future life, a common feature of some preaching, brings morality down to a lower level than the Christian, and, when allowed to become a conscious motive, lowers the quality of the Christian life. These two principles, forgiveness and sacrifice, as closely related aspects of love, need to be applied by Christian wisdom, love's insight and foresight in many varied ways adapted to the varying circumstances ; but their sufficiency as the guiding principles must be recognised, and their efficiency as the impelling motive, since they ever bring us into intimate communion with Jesus Christ Himself as aspects of the truth and grace of His life, in which the nature of God is clearly revealed to us.

III

There is one feature of the Christian ideal which demands special treatment, i.e. its universality.[1] (1) While the principle of universality was formulated by Paul—that in Christ Jesus there is one human race, neither Jew nor Gentile, barbarian nor Greek, bond nor free, learned nor unlearned, male nor female—it follows, from the very nature of the love which Jesus enjoined, that it must have this range ; and He by His example confirms that inference. He went to the outcasts of Jewish society ; He welcomed any evidence of Gentile faith ; He presented the Samaritan as an example of neighbourliness, although in the fulfilment of His vocation as Jewish Messiah He had to confine His own ministry, in the brief time He had for it, to " the lost sheep of the house of Israel." It was to a world divided by the differences of sex, class, work, culture, nationality, religion, that this message of a universal love was given, a love which He expressly taught must rise above and reach beyond natural affections and even personal affinities (Matt. v. 46–47). The unlovable and unloving must be loved. How can natural affection be transcended ? What reason and what motive does Jesus offer ?

(*a*) *The first reason* that he offers is the universal goodness

[1] See Rom. i. 14, 15 ; 1 Cor. xii. 13 ; Gal. iii. 28, v. 6, vi. 15 ; Col. iii. 11.

of God, His care and bounty for all men (Matt. v. 45), and even for the birds of the air and the flowers of the field (vi. 26, 28). Those who respond to that universal Fatherhood in childlike trust and obedience must become imitators of God : the perfection of the heavenly Father (Matt. v. 48) is His love for all that lives. (Here may be emphasised what will be discussed in a later chapter that the range of Christian morality is not confined to the human race, but embraces nature and the lower animals as all embraced in the divine purpose of universal good. Paul's universalism here proves itself of narrower range than Christ's.)

(*b*) *The second reason* that in His teaching and practice Jesus offers is found in His justification of His going among the outcasts of Jewish society. In the Parables of the Lost Sheep and the Lost Coin (Luke xv. 1–11), indeed in His use of the term " lost " for sinners generally, there is affirmed the value of each man as a man to God. Rightly, Harnack uses as descriptive of one aspect of the teaching of Jesus the combination of terms. " God the Father and the infinite worth of the human soul ! "[1] God suffers in the loss, and rejoices in the recovery of even one soul : the value is not to be measured by the finitude of man, but by the infinitude of God. It is God's love which finds such a value in man, takes such an interest in man, and purposes such a good for man as the redemptive revelation in Christ discloses.

(*c*) *The third reason* is suggested in the Parable of the Last Judgment in the words : " Inasmuch as ye did it unto one of these, My brethren, even these least, ye did it unto Me," and its negative counterpart (Matt xxv. 40–45). And the same identification of Himself with men is surely expressed in the title which He chose for Himself, the Son of Man. He, in love, so incorporates Himself in the race that their wrongs are His, and their goods His also ; and as God is in Christ, so in man's sorrows and sufferings there is disclosed an attribute of God not yet recognised fully—His *omnipatience*, His suffering with and for all. Paul's universalism was based on his belief in man's common need and common provision of salvation in Jesus Christ. Here too the insight of Jesus goes deeper. Man's love for man is an expression of his love to God.

And surely these reasons are necessary to sustain that love. Those who most need the ministry of that love, and whom the Christian who shares the spirit of Christ will most desire

[1] *Das Wesen des Christentums*, pp. 40 *ff.*

to serve, are often so unloving and so unlovable, so unresponsive to, and ungrateful for, the service, that human affection could not sustain the strain, or bear the burden. But to become channels of God's love, to think of, feel for, and will the good of men as God does, to see in the least of His brethren the Saviour and Lord Himself, that raises love above the merely human resources, and gives to it a divine content, constraint, and potency. Here we may recall a thesis of the Introduction, that the Christian morality demands for its support the Christian religion, human goodness needs divine grace.

(2) For many Christians the love of God and the love of man blend in the love of Christ. In Him, the Son, God the Father is known and loved; in Him, the Saviour and the Lord, mankind as redeemed in Him is known and loved. There are some moralists to whom this would seem sentimentalism; but, as has already elsewhere been urged, the sphere of morality is in personal relations; and, just as natural laws have no reality apart from the physical forces, of the normal operation of which they are descriptive, so moral laws are abstractions apart from the personal relations for which they prescribe the standard. It is a unification and a simplification, and surely also an energising of morality and religion, to conceive both as love to God and to man in Christ. When Paul conceived his life as a crucifixion and a resurrection because of his personal union with Jesus Christ (Gal. ii. 20; Rom. vi. 1–11), he was only expressing in a form suitable to the new relation of the living Lord to believers what Jesus in His earthly ministry had expressed as personal discipleship to Himself. Come to Me, learn of Me, take My yoke, follow Me, and take up your cross for Me (Matt. xi. 28–30, xvi. 24). The two spiritual geniuses among the New Testament writers are echoing the voice of Jesus: "If ye love Me, ye will keep My commandments" (John xiv. 15); "The love of Christ constraineth us" (2 Cor. v. 14).

(3) There is a misunderstanding of this universalism which must be removed. (*a*) This love for mankind does not supersede or abolish the normal human relationships. Owing to the historical situation Jesus had to hold Himself aloof from the political expectations of His people, and His own expectations of the coming of the Kingdom of God forbade His formulating any programme of social reform, or possibly even giving any attention to it. He does recognise

the nation, inasmuch as He offered Himself to the nation as the promised Messiah ; and, to avoid any offence to national feeling which might prejudice His appeal, He confined His ministry to His own people, unless in the exceptional cases, where Gentile faith overcame His necessary reserve in this matter. This patriotism was, however, consistent with an acceptance of the Roman dominion, and His avoidance of any encouragement of rebellion. His answer about the tribute money was not an evasion (Mark xii. 17), but meant this : as long as you make use of the benefits this authority confers, accept the obligations it imposes. What His patriotism desired and sought to confer on His people was not political emancipation, but moral and spiritual regeneration. How intense that patriotism was, the lament over Jerusalem shows (Matt. xxiii. 37). The imagery in His parables discloses a far-spread interest in the manifold labours of man ; but apart from His rebuke of covetousness, His warnings against Mammon, His woes for the rich and blessings for the poor, His instructions recognising the use of wealth in the relief of others, there are no specific injunctions regarding the application of this principle of love in the economic sphere.

One institution, however, He dealt with expressly, the *family*—the relation of husband and wife, parents and children. Here He set Himself in opposition to current interpretations of the law. Admitting that the provision about divorce was a commandment of Moses, given for the hardness of the people's hearts—that is, their moral inability to rise to the ideal of marriage—He affirmed the divine institution in marriage as an indissoluble union (Mark x. 1–9). There seems little ground for doubt that the qualification in Matthew's Gospel (v. 32) is a later insertion. The relation of the two persons in marriage is so intimate as by its very nature to involve permanence. How far the necessity of recognising the hardness of men's hearts must determine the legislation of a modern State is one of those questions of Christian casuistry (using the word in quite a good sense) which cannot now be discussed, but will be in the last section of this volume. Within the universal human relations Jesus recognises this relation of a unique character, comparable to no other. How much Christian love has cleansed and hallowed this relation, Christian marriage, when its ideal is in measure realised, shows. A physical relation, a social institution, has been transformed into a oneness and

wholeness of soul which even death cannot destroy. In the passage about Corban, the duty of children to their parents is asserted as more sacred than any ceremonial acquirement, for it is surely not the abuse only that is condemned (Mark vii. 10–13). We may say that for Jesus the focus of human affection is the home ; in it there is a concentration, that from it there may be an expansion of the universal love. That He was conscious of God as Father and Himself as Son endows this relationship with a transcendent value.

(*b*) In view of this estimate of the family relationship, all the more significant is the subordination in the teaching of Jesus of family relationship, not only to the claims of the kingdom, but even to the fellowship of faith. To be a disciple a man must be prepared to forsake all, to hate father and mother (Luke xiv. 26). A son is forbidden to go home either to make arrangements for his father's burial or to carry on his duties as son till his father's death gives release. The obscure saying may be interpreted in these two ways (Matt. viii. 21-22). Jesus at Cana of Galilee is Himself represented as setting aside His mother's authority in respect of His use of His supernatural power (John ii. 4), and, on a later occasion, when His family made an attempt to interfere with His public activity, He exalted the spiritual relation of those who are together doing God's will above natural relationship (Mark iii. 35). These instances, however, do not justify the assumption of later asceticism and monasticism, that in the religious life human relationships must be repudiated ; it is only when a conflict arises of their respective claims that the natural must be subordinate to the spiritual claim. For most men in ordinary circumstances the spiritual claim is being met, not merely alongside of the natural, but in the discharge with Christian love of the duties involved in the natural. The Christian can be the best son, brother, husband, father, worker, citizen.

IV

This discussion raises a question which recent writings on the teaching of Jesus have thrust into the foreground.

Is the moral teaching of Jesus an *interim ethic* ?

(1) Was He so dominated by the expectation of the imminence of the catastrophic end of the present world order and beginning of the supernatural order of the Kingdom of God that He was laying down only rules of temporary validity

for the short interval which was to elapse before this eagerly expected event? As has already been indicated, there is necessarily a temporary and local context to many of the concrete illustrations that Jesus gave of the application of His principles. But this is a necessary condition of all practical moral teaching. It must be adapted to time and place. Jesus gives no indication, however, that He had in view only a preparatory period such as Paul clearly gives (1 Cor. vii. 26).

(2) When we come to the central principle of Jesus' teaching—this absolute love to God and equal love to self and neighbour, and its twofold distinctive applications in forgiveness and sacrifice—we need not entertain the suggestion that this is an *interim ethic*. Surely the character of the teaching itself commends it to reason and conscience as permanently and generally significant and valuable. The relation of God and man, and the relations of men to one another, who are thus related to God, on which these obligations are based, is the very core of the divine revelation and human redemption in Christ. Can we conceive any doctrine more reasonable, authoritative, satisfying, than this doctrine is?

(3) Not only so, even were the teaching given in special anticipation of the coming end, since that was the consummation of the divine purpose in human history, can we suppose that the preparation for the end would be of lower quality than the consummation itself would be? Such a summons as "Prepare to meet thy God" could not demand action other than such as might be consistent with the character of the God to be met. If we took the Apocalyptic language literally, we might not be justified in drawing such a conclusion; but we must, in thinking of the Kingdom of God and its coming, always conceive God as He is revealed to us in Christ. This Father God cannot be thought of as requiring of His children anything more consistent with His own character than what is taught by Jesus.

(4) The revelation was given under temporary and local conditions; time and place affected the form of its delivery; scholarship can so acquaint us with the times and the surroundings of the life and work of Jesus that we can, as it were, become contemporaries, and recognise what in the form belongs to time and place; but moral and religious insight also can enable us to discern the permanent and universal, the divine in the human, of this historical reality. And, accordingly, many as have been the changes in the centuries which divide us from the beginnings of the Christian era,

our faith is justified that Jesus Christ does not grow old, that His teaching and example have not been superseded, and that what He taught and how He lived may still be the light of all our seeing of the way in which the Christian ideal can here and now be realised.

CHAPTER III

THE APPLICATION BY THE CHURCH

The Christian ideal revealed in word and deed, life and death by Jesus Christ had to be realised progressively and expansively in the world ; and the agent of that realisation has been the Church. The conception of the Kingdom of God, so prominent in the teaching of Jesus, recedes into the background in the writings of the New Testament apart from the Gospels except as an eschatological conception, and the Church as the historical reality comes to the forefront.[1] In dealing very briefly with the most important features of the history of the Church in the realisation of the Christian ideal we may distinguish three main periods, the Ancient, the Mediæval, and the Modern, and, although no one term can exhaustively characterise any one of them, we may, as throwing into bold relief the outstanding feature of each period, use the terms *pervasion*, *domination*, and *emancipation*.

I

(1) The first period embraces the first four centuries, from Pentecost till the fall of the Roman Empire. It was the period in which the Church was spreading throughout the length and breadth of that Empire, and into some regions beyond, and exercising such a growing influence that early in the fourth century an astute Roman Emperor deemed it sound policy to confess himself a Christian, and to grant to the Christian Church, not only toleration, but even his patronage.

(*a*) The characteristics of the Primitive Church were briefly these : the confession of Jesus as the Christ (Messiah) and Lord, because He was not only the authoritative teacher, but had also given His life for the community, was risen from the dead, and now reigned with God[2] ; the eager expectation of His speedy Second Advent in power and glory to judge mankind and to usher in the Kingdom of

[1] See Part IV., chapter vii., for a discussion of the relation of the Kingdom and the Church.

[2] Harnack, *Das Wesen des Christentums*, pp. 96–98.

God ; the intense experience of new enthusiasm and fresh energy by the presence and possession of the Holy Spirit ; and, though less prominent in the earlier writings, the preservation of the memory of all that Jesus did in His earthly life. The Church even in the early days was influenced by its environment, first Jewish, and then Gentile.

(*b*) The outstanding personality was the Apostle Paul, the learned Jewish rabbi, but also the Apostle of the Gentiles, and deriving from both sources the forms in which he expressed his vital personal experience of the grace of Christ. For our present purpose there are two directions in which he influenced the Church which must be mentioned. The working of the Spirit was accompanied by abnormal psychical conditions, such as speaking with tongues, to which there was a tendency, as in Corinth, to attach too high a value. Paul corrected this error by not depreciating the *charisms* or gifts, but by subordinating their exercise in the Church to the sovereign sentiment, love, and by emphasising sanctification, the cleansing and renewing of the moral character, as the Spirit's distinctive function. While he never himself altogether abandoned the hope of the speedy Second Advent, although he sometimes did recognise that he himself might not survive to it (2 Cor. v. 1–10), yet he censured all unwholesome excitement, as in Thessalonica (2 Thess. iii. 10–12), which directed interest and effort away from the present duties of earthly life. In such matters as marriage his ethic was undoubtedly *an interim ethic* affected by this expectation (1 Cor. vii.) ; but in other respects his moral teaching has permanent value. He was a man of his own time and surroundings ; and, although he does often surprise us by his spiritual insight and moral discernment, as above his contemporaries ; yet, as regards the practical application of his moral principles, he shows the inevitable historical limitations. In this he is not to be depreciated ; for morality, if it is to be effective, must take full account of the existing conditions, and the moralist is not to be blamed, even if his outlook is limited by his historical horizon.

On two questions does Paul disappoint what must be described as not unreasonable expectations. Neither as regards the status of woman, nor the rights of the slave, does Paul appear to apply his own principle of Christian universalism. It must be conceded that he is least happy when dealing with women ; but his insistence on the

continued subordination of women, despite their spiritual emancipation in Christ, had good ground in the existing social conditions. In his beautiful letter to Philemon he describes the relation of master and slave as brethren in Christ in such terms as indicated the ultimate condemnation of the institution from the Christian standpoint. Paul was not consciously adapting himself to existing conditions ; and yet what may be depreciated as earthly prudence does on closer scrutiny show itself also heavenly wisdom.

(2) The task of the Christian Church in the world was indicated in four of our Lord's figurative sayings, the *light of the world* (Matt. v. 14), *the salt of the earth* (*v.* 13), *the mustard seed* (xiii. 31–32), and *the leaven* (*v.* 33). As the light of the world, the Church in word and deed proclaimed the Gospel, made manifest in the world the truth and grace of the Lord Jesus Christ. By this spread of the Gospel, the Church itself grew, as did the mustard plant.[1] With these aspects, the proclamation and the expansion, we are not now directly concerned, but rather with what is suggested by the salt and the leaven—that is, the preservation of its own distinctive character, and the pervasion of its moral influence. In the earlier part of the period under review the hostility of the surrounding world limited the influence of the Church in society outside its own borders, and its main task was to maintain its own character. Its *philanthropia*, or love of mankind, was necessarily confined for the most part to its *philadelphia*, or love of the brethren. Wherever and whenever there was opportunity, the *philanthropia* was exercised; but the *philadelphia* was itself an influence, rebuking a heartless world, and attracting men from outside to the Christian fellowship.

The character of this fellowship was maintained by a strict and yet loving discipline, " the basic principles " of which have been described by Dr. Bartlet as follows : " First, it was relative to the nature of the Christian Society as God's Family of Love, resting on Faith in God and man, and so on Hope for one's fellow-members, in the light of Christ's ' good news ' about the ' Kingdom ' of God's manifest power —of which the coming of the Spirit at Pentecost was the pledge and foretaste. Next, it was remedial rather than penal. Lastly, there was the all-inclusive nature of repentance, as the one condition of restoration of broken personal

[1] In Part IV., chapter v., these figurative sayings are again discussed in relation to the Church's present functions.

relations within the Family of God."[1] The Ancient Church fully recognised the need and the duty of the discipline of its members by the whole community both for their own sakes as well as for the sake of the society, called to bear a witness to the world of what the holy life in love should be. Only after loving remonstrance and rebuke had failed to bring about penitence was the penalty of the exclusion from the Christian fellowship imposed ; and as soon as there was due penitence shown in open confession was the fellowship restored. This discipline was not exercised by the officers alone, but it was the corporate action of the whole brotherhood, conscious of acting in the name and on behalf of the Head of the Church. If we recall Paul's descriptions of what the Christian converts had once been, his warnings against the vices into which they were still in danger of lapsing, his expectations regarding the virtues and graces which are—the fruit of the Spirit—the fulfilment of the supreme principle of love, we must recognise how difficult was the task which was set in this Christian discipline. The two characteristics of Christian life which impressed the world are described in the words of James, which themselves indicate how morality dominates in the Christian religion. " Pure religion and undefiled before our God and Father is this, to visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction, and to keep himself unspotted from the world " (i. 27). The *philadelphia* went as far as the practical communism described in Acts iv. 34–35, and was continued in the collection made by the Gentile Churches for the poor saints in Jerusalem, to which Paul attached so great importance. Against all sexual immorality or laxity the Church set its face like a flint. The ideal of marriage and parenthood, of which many Christian homes presented a living example, was one of the most striking evidences of the exaltation of the Christian standards above all current customs. Into further details it is not necessary here to enter.

(3) It must be confessed that as the Gospel spread and the Church grew, the salt did lose some of its savour, although persecution again and again served as a means of purification. The influence of the environment was not by any means all evil, for discerning Christians came to see that the world around them was not all hostile to God's purpose, and might be influenced for good. The principle of Christian

[1] *Social Discipline in the Christian Community*, edited by Malcolm Spencer, pp. 10–11.

love, for instance, was practically applied to the possession and use of property. Its devotion to philanthropy was a "sacrifice" to God. Not only so, the Church was very scrupulous as to the means by which property had been acquired; it not only refused any wealth made in morally doubtful trades or by dishonesty and oppression, but even withheld membership from those guilty of any such practices. "Among forms of tainted money the Church reckoned *usury*, mainly having in mind the poorer class of borrower in time of distress, who could ill afford to pay the high current rate of interest, and often fell as a debtor into the power of the lender."[1] The problem of the payment of interest on loans engaged the moralists of the Church till after the Reformation. There were Christians, however, who maintained that the Christian must not possess or administer property; and to meet this view Clement wrote his treatise *What Rich Man can be Saved?* in which he condemns avarice, commends "the happy mean between riches and poverty," and nevertheless does not advocate any measure by which this might become the lot of all; his conception of fraternity does not lead him to question the existing distribution of wealth. There was, however, a growing tendency towards asceticism as a reaction against the growing worldliness of the Church; but the consequence of this tendency was to withdraw from society the influence of many of the finest Christian persons. The salt sought to preserve its savour; but the leaven left the lump.

(4) The three attitudes towards property and the goods of this earthly life now indicated go to explain why, when Constantine recognised Christianity as a tolerated religion, and even gave it encouragement, it did not produce a greater effect on the Empire. During the centuries of repression, when hindered in realising its vision of a Christian society, it lost the clearness of the vision, and also much of the vigour to realise even what it still saw.

(*a*) What Christianity in its original enthusiasm and energy might have done must not be limited by what the Church did. In estimating the value of the influence of the Church there are some historical considerations which must not be overlooked. The world into which it entered to bear its witness and do its work was still predominantly pagan, and was determined so to continue. Even a Roman Emperor had not the power, even had he willed, to change the hearts

[1] *Copec Commission Report, XII.*, p. 46.

and habits and lives of the majority of his subjects. Less than a century after the recognition of Christianity, Alaric and his Goths entered Rome ; and that century was so full of peril for the Empire that there was little interest and effort directed towards moral reform. Unhappily, too, theological controversy diverted energies which might have been directed to social progress. It is a mistake to suppose that the Church was ever established in the Empire, as, for instance, the Anglican Church is in England. Most of the officers of the Empire were heathen, and many hostile to Christianity. When the Church assumed a position of authority, the Empire was already tottering to its fall. " It is one of the most tragical facts of all history," said J. S. Mill, " that Constantine, rather than Marcus Aurelius, was the first Christian emperor. It is a bitter thought how different the Christianity of the world might have been had it been adopted as the religion of the Empire under the auspices of Marcus Aurelius instead of those of Constantine."[1] But even if the Empire could not be saved, we must not suppose that the limited influence the Church was able to exercise was in vain. There are no absolute breaks of historical continuity ; and seed was being sown of which the harvest lay in the future. The Church preserved for more favourable conditions an inheritance of thought and life the value of which cannot be estimated in any historical judgment. Even if we were to believe that a State could be completely Christianised, and how little reason have we even now for holding that conviction, it is certain that an Empire such as was the Roman offered no favourable opportunity for the maximum influence of the Church.

(*b*) The teaching of the Church, however, gave promise of better things, given the full opportunity of its application. The belief in the equality of all human beings before God gave to childhood and womanhood a place never before accorded. So rooted was slavery in the very constitution of ancient society, and so familiar was the institution, that the question of its abolition did not even emerge. Plausible theological explanations of it were offered. It was a result of the Fall. " As it was due to sin, that is to the will of man, it was not necessary, and, as it was allowed by God, it must be for some holy and gracious purpose. It was a punishment for sin, and a discipline for the sake of righteousness."[2]

[1] *Essay on Liberty*, p. 58, quoted in *Christ and Civilisation*, p. 242.
[2] *Christ and Civilisation*, p. 253.

The heightened sense of dignity which the life in Christ inspired enabled many slaves to bear their harsh lot. Gradually this new estimate of man undermined the ancient structure. The Church was also solicitous for the poor as from its earliest days. The martyrs by their sacrifice won the battle of religious liberty for the time against imperial despotism. Of the ideal of brotherhood the Christian Church showed some realisation in its own fellowship. The generosity which had marked the Church at its beginning was conspicuous in its subsequent history. Julian, who tried to restore paganism, found a rebuke of its indifference to human need in the beneficence of Jews and Christians. Great as was the loss to the world in the withdrawal of so many of the best men and women in monasticism, yet within the monastery itself there was a social life ; learning was cultivated in it ; charity was exercised by it. It was the heroic self-sacrifice of the monk Telemachus that put an end to the gladiatorial shows. Despite the persecution the Church had suffered from the Empire, the attitude generally is one of respect ; and even the sense of the transitoriness of the earthly order, and of belonging to the eternal heavenly order, did not in most cases lead to a neglect of practical duties. So involved in the early centuries was the State in paganism, that Christians sought to hold aloof from military and civil duties. "Nothing is more foreign," says Tertullian, "than public affairs." But Augustine throws down this challenge : "Let those who profess that the Christian religion is hostile to the Republic give us military men, provincials, husbands, parents, sons, masters, servants, kings, judges, and administrators equal to those that Christianity has formed."[1] Even if the tone is boastful, it points to the fact that Christians were in the lump as a leaven.

(*c*) The direct influence on legislation was not only dependent on the will of the Emperor, but also on the state of public opinion. Some laws remained inoperative, and legislation on some matters could not even be attempted. Constantine issued in seven years 140 edicts which showed the new spirit. Dean Stanley enumerates the following decrees : "the observance of the Sunday in the towns of the Empire, the use of prayers for the army, the abolition of the punishment of crucifixion, the encouragement of the emancipation of slaves, the discouragement of infanticide, the prohibition of private divinations, the prohibition of

[1] Quoted in *Christ and Civilisation*, p. 267.

licentious and cruel rites, the prohibition of gladiatorial games."[1] Laws were passed to secure the speedier course of justice, to improve the treatment of prisoners, to enable actresses to leave their demoralising profession, to give mothers the guardianship of their own children, to suppress vice and limit divorce, to relieve prisoners' needs in many forms, to protect against oppression. "Amid all the perverse errors of legislation and the hopeless corruption of the financial service," says Dr. Dill, "the central authority was keenly alive to its duties and almost overwhelmed by its responsibilities."[2] Great as were the limitations and many the failures in the realisation of the Christian ideal by the Church in this ancient period, the salt did not lose all its savour, nor was the lump wholly unleavened. From the Church of those days there comes the call of an example to the Church of to-day in a much more favourable situation, and with far greater resources, to attempt and to achieve proportionately more.

II

After the fall of the Empire the task of the Church was to transfer the culture and civilisation, so far as the Church had assimilated it, of the ancient world, together with its own morals and religion, to the new nations which were formed out of barbarian tribes on the ruin of that Empire. As the Church itself had assimilated not a little of the spirit of the Empire, and as its own organisation had been largely modelled on that of the Empire, the method and the manner of its discharge of the task may be not unappropriately described as *domination*. Although historical necessity may be pleaded for this development, it must be recognised as producing conditions, and involving factors, which from the standpoint of the Gospel and even the Primitive Church must be judged as defective and even injurious. The domination was carried so far, and continued so long beyond any historical necessity, that the *emancipation*, which characterises the next period, in the Renaissance and Reformation appears inevitable. Nevertheless, the only hope for the progress of the world was in the Church, for the Saracen culture was not adequate to the task. Much as there is that we must deplore and condemn in the Christianity

[1] *Eastern Church*, vi., p. 230, quoted in *op. cit.*, p. 268.
[2] *Roman Society in the Last Century of the Eastern Empire*, quoted *op. cit.*, p. 270.

of what have been called the Dark Ages, and even of the Middle Ages, it was the Church which saved the good of the ancient for the modern world.

(1) The survival of the Roman culture—for the Greek culture was transmitted only very partially in the Roman —may have been greater than has often been assumed ; but apart from the Church it would not have reached these barbarian peoples. The Church had to Christianise, however superficially in many cases, before Roman law or Roman learning could be assimilated. Latin literature was little known in the Middle Ages, and Greek still less ; and the Renaissance was a recovery of lost treasure. Because of its association with paganism the attitude of the Church to classic literature was for the most part hostile. Barbarous as were the new peoples with whom the Church was now brought into contact, they were in their vitality and vigour good soil for the seed of the Word. That seed had to take root and spring up, bearing fruit, before any renewal of civilisation or culture was possible. It may be said that the wholesale conversions, which so largely marked the missionary activity of the Church, were only in name and on the surface of life ; that little more than the superstitions were accepted, and the fierceness of the savage tribes was only turned in new directions against those who remained pagan, or departed in any way from the orthodoxy of the Church. But the day of small things should not be despised ; it may hold the promise and potency of greater. These peoples did not come to their maturity during the Middle Ages ; the Reformation was their coming-of-age. "Christianity," says Ritter in his *History of Christian Philosophy*,[1] "offered itself and was accepted by the German tribes as a law and as a discipline, as an ineffable incomprehensible mystery. Its fruits were righteousness and works and the belief in the dead word. But in a barbarous people this is an immense advance, an inestimable benefit. Ritual observance is a taming, humiliating process ; it is submission to law ; it is the acknowledgment of spiritual inferiority ; it implies self-subjection, self-conquest, self-sacrifice. It is not religion in its highest sense, but it is a preparation for it." Rome accommodated itself to this imperfect situation. Gregory the Great defends the principle of accommodating, not only in the law of the State, as according to Jesus' judgment Moses did to the hardness of men's hearts (Mark x. 5),

[1] Quoted in *Christ and Civilisation*, p. 286.

but even the requirements of the Church. "It is evidently impossible," he says, "in the case of hard hearts, to cut off everything at once. A man who is endeavouring to scale a summit rises by steps, not by bounds."[1] The Early Church refused to let itself be assimilated to the pagan world; the Mediæval Church adopted the policy of syncretism. A similar problem is emerging in the mission-field to-day, e.g. in mass movements; but although there are advocates of the policy of accommodation, most missionaries are maintaining their high standards.

(2) Recognising, then, on the one hand the intractable material which the Church had to handle, and on the other the defective methods which it often adopted, we shall not expect to find that the Christian ideal was adequately realised in the new nations by the influence of the Church. Attention must *first of all* be called to the most striking contrast between the Church and the world around it. The Church had as the deepest source of its thought and life, however scanty and defiled even the streams which flowed from that source might become, Christ as its divine Saviour and Lord; and, to change the metaphor, imperfect as the tool might be, He did use it for His saving work among men. His presence and influence gave to the Church a solidarity, a unity of doctrine, ritual, and polity, that gave it authority even against the world of barbarism, characterised by an anarchic individualism. It possessed and manifested the principle of social reconstruction. The revolt against this solidarity at the Reformation was justified, both because it had degenerated into a tyranny, and because by the social reconstruction which it had effected there was made possible an individualism on the higher level of faith and morals, which was not anarchic as was the barbarism. In the religion of Israel also national solidarity had to precede the individualism of a Jeremiah. A man can be prepared for the higher freedom only by the subjugation of the lower licence.

(3) The details of this social reconstruction may be now briefly indicated. As a greater value was assigned to human life, infanticide and abortion, recognised practices of the Roman Empire, now fell under condemnation, and foundling hospitals were established, which, however, in time became a danger to chastity as the means of easy disposal of an unwanted and unwelcomed babe. The barbarity of the

[1] Quoted in *Christ and Civilisation*, p. 287.

penal code was not, however, mitigated, but even persecuting zeal against schism or heresy aggravated it. In 1252, torture was legalised, first against heretics ; and it was then extended to the civil courts. While slavery was generally recognised in theory, in practice its evils were moderated. Emancipation of slaves was inculcated as a meritorious act "for the benefit of the soul." Gradually slavery came to be almost unknown ; but serfdom was continued, and the emancipation of serfs was hindered by the selfish interests of the Church itself, as many serfs were attached to the estates of the Church. Mediæval serfdom was not as evil in practice as it now appears to us. Constant were the efforts of the Church to redeem Christian captives ; and prominent churchmen made great personal sacrifices for this end. The abolition of slavery carried in its train an increase of poverty. From the very beginning the Christian Church had been distinguished by its abundant and constant charity ; and of this spirit of compassion St. Francis of Assisi may be regarded as the finest example. While relief of want was enjoined as a duty, poverty itself was regarded, where voluntarily accepted, as a means of spiritual gain. St. Francis loved poverty as his bride. If with the motive of charity was mingled the intention to win merit, nevertheless the practice of it was a social necessity in the conditions of the times. The record of the Church in regard to war is less creditable ; but it did bear a witness to the ideal in instituting in the tenth century the "Truce of God," and it used its influence to lessen the atrocities of war. The Church encouraged and consecrated chivalry by the rites which it provided. Womanhood was idealised in the worship of the Virgin ; and this tended to improve the position of women. But, on the other hand, the exaltation of virginity did depress the estimate of marriage and parenthood ; and yet we have instances of very beautiful home life ; and some women attained positions of great authority and wide influence. The Church relied on the civil authority to bring order out of chaos in the centuries when the new nations were being formed ; but in later centuries the interests of the papacy demanded that she should challenge the absolute authority of the State, and so, without intending it, she promoted the cause of civil liberty.

(4) There were a few thinkers of the Middle Ages, such as Marsiglio in his *Defensor Pacis* (1324), who anticipated the democratic theories of modern times. Scholasticism

was an attempt to liberate the mind. The dogmas of the Church were accepted on its authority ; but the effort was made to make them appear rational. Unlike as the methods of argument were to our thinking, mental activity was encouraged. The heralds of democracy may be seen in the social guilds, which combined mutual helpfulness in the manifold needs of life with a common outlet for the joy of life in popular amusements ; and these guilds, as indeed all the activities of the Middle Ages, were closely associated with the Church ; for the claim of papal supremacy involved that the Church became a State claiming authority in the whole life and work of men. Hence the frequent conflicts of the Church with the State in the developing nations. This secularisation of the Church resulted in many evils, the protest against which culminated in the Reformation. Monasticism served to consolidate the universal dominion of the Papacy. Its corruption in later centuries should not hide from us its values. When it was at its best, it held up a higher, if one-sided, standard of life ; it asserted the dignity of toil ; it fostered learning ; it enjoined obedience and enforced discipline. But among the evils it fostered was an unnatural asceticism, a disturbing anti-naturalism, a corporate selfishness in giving the first place to the monastery or to the order. What is evident is that, many as were the corruptions of the Mediæval Church, there was enough Christian thought and life to give birth to, and further the growth of, reform movements to purify its practice, to resist its suppression of independence, to revive the ideal of poverty, and to protest against some of its doctrinal and ritual developments. Francis of Assisi and John Wycliffe stand for the Church's self-judgment in this period.[1]

III

No physical occurrence or historical event has only one cause ; each has a number of conditions the conjunction of which is followed by the effect. We fix on one outstanding condition and treat it as if it were the adequate explanation of a far-reaching change. When we distinguish the Modern from the Mediæval Period, if our dominant interest is in religion, we ascribe the difference to the Reformation ; if

[1] See *Christ and Civilisation*, chapter vii. To this chapter the above summary is greatly indebted.

we recognise some of the conditions of that movement, we may even take account of the Renaissance. But there were many political and economic conditions affecting the complete situation ; and we may ascribe to the Reformation or Renaissance consequences with which neither had any direct connection. Again, great as the change seems when we compare the Modern Period as we know it with the Mediæval Period as it appears to us now, yet a closer scrutiny will disclose the fact that in the later parts of the Mediæval Period there were changes, anticipatory and preparatory for the more potent change, and that there survived after Reformation and Renaissance conditions which bear the characteristics of the Mediæval Period. Great as were Luther and Calvin, yet they were men of their own time and surroundings, and did not rise far above them. In their religion, and probably still more in their thought, they had more kinship with the past which was being superseded than with the future which was emerging. We can neither isolate a movement from its environment nor can we treat any event as a new beginning. Solidarity of condition and continuity of events mark history.

(1) The outward conditions at the close of the Mediæval Period were entirely different from those at its beginning. Tribes had been formed into nations ; barbarism had yielded to culture and civilisation. By knowledge and skill man was winning a mastery over nature ; the horizon of commercial interest was expanding ; the resources of industry were increasing. "The religious revolution of the age came," says Tawney,[1] " on a world heaving with the vastest economic crisis that Europe had experienced since the fall of Rome. Art and scientific curiosity and technical skill, learning and statesmanship, the scholarship which explored the past and the prophetic vision which pierced the future, had all poured their treasures into the sumptuous shrine of the new civilisation." The new situation was a challenge to Christian ethical thought : could the Christian ideal be maintained in this changed world ; could Christian principles be freshly applied so as to meet the demand of the hour ? The Catholic Church, conservative in morals as in religion, had failed to meet the situation : did the Reformers prove themselves men adequate to the task ?

(2) It must be confessed that the Reformation is less

[1] *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, p. 66. To this work I gratefully acknowledge my deep indebtedness.

significant in regard to morals than to religion. Although there was as insistent a social problem (economic and political) then as now, it did not receive the attention which it deserved ; the solicitude was given to doctrine, worship, Church government. Apart from his own intense, passionate, personal experience of free grace through faith alone, and his protest against and opposition to whatever in Catholic doctrine or practice was a challenge to that experience, Luther remained essentially mediæval ; and he became more conservative himself as the results of his teaching declared themselves in his environment. His teaching that a man might fully meet God's requirements in his earthly calling was a protest against monasticism and the exaltation of the life of monk or nun as the distinctively " religious " life, and in that respect was valuable ; but it did not carry with it any recognition that the social order might be such as would be unfavourable to the distinctively Christian character of the fulfilment of the calling ; it did not involve any criticism or censure of the *status quo*. To any change, economic or political, he was increasingly opposed. Himself a peasant and a man of warm heart, he felt with and for the peasants in their wrongs and miseries. But when, moved by his preaching, the peasants in the revolt of 1524 made a practical application of the new truth, he turned against them with a reckless vehemence of speech which will always remain a blot on his name. In his pamphlet *Against the Murderous, Thieving Hordes of Peasants*, he hounded on the nobles to their slaughter. " A prince can now," he wrote, " better merit heaven with bloodshed than with prayer."[1] Distrustful of the people, he allowed them no voice in the administration of the Churches ; and, relying on the goodwill of princes, he subjected the Church to the State. " The movement from 1521 to 1525," says Professor Pollard,[2] " had been national, and Luther had been the hero ; from the position of national hero he now sank to be the prophet of a sect, and a sect which depended for its existence upon the support of political powers. To the end of the eighteenth century, the German peasantry remained the most miserable in Europe. Serfdom lingered there longer than in any other civilised country save Russia, and the mass of the people were effectively shut out from the sphere of political action." The interests of religion itself suffered from Luther's refusal to apply in morals the principles for which he stood in religion.

[1] Quoted in *Christ and Civilisation*, p. 342. [2] Quoted *op. cit.*, p. 344.

The Lutheran Church in Germany since his day has on principle held aloof from any social reform. One result has been the widespread antagonism to religion of the working classes. His attitude to the new commerce was the same as the Church had taken, and was marked by a suspicion of the new enterprises, an attachment to the older order, an insistence on a right and just price, and even a demand that magistrates should fix the price and the denunciation of all usury (the demand for interest on loans).

(3) Far more important in the history of the application by the Church of the Christian ideal is John Calvin. His outward conditions were very different from Luther's, and very much more favourable to the exercise of his influence on practical affairs. (*a*) In 1530 Geneva freed itself from the "two-headed tyranny" of "duke and bishop" who "like Herod and Pilate stood united against the city." In 1536 the free city took the side of the Reformation. Within two months Calvin obeyed Farel's summons, and attempted to make Geneva a city of God, an example of a theocracy. Unlike Luther, Calvin required that the new faith should energise in a new order in the State as well as the Church; and he could not acquiesce in the world as it was. This new order must be the rule of God, the carrying out of His law in economics and politics no less than in individual character. Accordingly, for him the Bible, as recording the law of God, must be the guide in Christian practice in every sphere as well as in doctrine. The law thus interpreted from the Scriptures must be applied by the State; Church and State must be in accord as one soul and body. "Without the State," says Dr. Fairbairn,[1] "there would be no medium for the Church to work in, no body for the soul to animate; without the Church there could be no law higher than expediency to govern the State, no ideal of thought and conduct, no soul to animate the body. Both Church and State, therefore, were necessary to the good ordering of society, and each was explained by the same idea." To the State so directed by the Church the individual was entirely subordinate: it is a common error to assume that the Reformers stood for religious liberty and the individual conscience. Into the details of the application it is not necessary here to enter; the civil rulers were not always willing to carry out the behests of their ecclesiastical advisers; and Calvin had to leave Geneva for a time, but on his return he was master of the situation.

[1] Quoted in *Christ and Civilisation*, p. 349.

(*b*) Owing to the number of exiles for conscience' sake who found a refuge in Geneva, and came under his sway, his influence spread far beyond the city. Calvinism in a much wider sense became an international movement than ever did Lutheranism. "It was," says Mark Pattison, "the Calvinistic discipline that reformed Scotland, emancipated Holland, attained a brief but brilliant reign in England, and maintained a struggle of sixty years against the royal authority in France."[1]

John Knox aimed at making Scotland what Geneva was. His proposals in his *Book of Discipline*, drawn up in 1560, show how far-sighted a reformer he was. "The scheme proposed that the Church, in addition to the maintenance of public worship, should in every parish provide (*a*) that all unable to earn a living should be supported out of the public funds ; (*b*) that all able to work should be compelled to do so ; (*c*) that every child should be afforded an opportunity of education ; (*d*) that every youth of promise should have an open way to the universities through a system of high schools."[2] The greed of the Scottish nobles in appropriating for themselves the wealth of the Roman Catholic Church left him, however, without adequate means to carry out his project completely. And yet since his day there have been few (if any) countries in which the common life of the people has been more deeply affected by religion and education.

(4) A striking difference between Luther and Calvin is seen in their attitude to the rapidly developing commerce of their age. Luther was a peasant, and his outlook was that of a peasant ; he remained rooted in the soil. Calvin was a lawyer ; the government of a city was his concern. He broke the tradition of the Mediæval Church in admitting the legitimacy of interest ; because the society in which he found himself was not an agricultural community, where loans were asked to relieve necessity, but a commercial, where credit and banking, large-scale commerce and finance prevailed, where capital could be profitably used by the borrower, and so it seemed right and reasonable that the lender should share the benefit. To this large question of the relation of Calvinism to the new economic order it will be necessary to return in the next chapter ; here we need only to mention Calvin's attitude. As has already been stated, Luther was politically conservative ; even in the Church he was ready to recognise the authority of the prince. The

[1] Quoted *op. cit.*, p. 351. [2] *Idem.*, pp. 352–353.

tendency of Calvin was democratic, although the individual was subordinate to the law of God as interpreted by the Church and applied by the State. But, in its wider spread, Calvinism encountered despotisms, which tried to maintain the old religion, and so the struggle for freedom of conscience became a struggle for civil liberty, notably in the Netherlands. In the two spheres of economics and politics Calvinism contributed more to progress than did Lutheranism. It must be added, however, that the ethic was that of the Old Testament rather than the New, of law rather than grace. Calvinism produced stern but strong men; it promoted righteousness rather than goodness (as Paul distinguishes them in Rom. v. 7). Luther's was a more genial and attractive personality, but Calvin's a more effective and dominant; and Calvinism has influenced the course of human history more than Lutheranism has done.

(5) The reformers were in many respects still men of their own time, and the movement did not at once effect as great political, economic, and even moral changes as were the religious; the full effects followed slowly, and we may briefly summarise them. As the Reformation overthrew the monastic ideal, so it consecrated family life, labour, commerce, and civil life; enhancing the sense of the value of the personality, it promoted liberty, intellectual, social, and political. Involving the passing of the old things, and the coming of the new, it presented a new social ideal, as at Geneva and in Scotland; this included a suppression of mendicancy, with a proper provision for the relief of poverty, and a stimulus to education. "It is not till Calvin," says Troeltsch,[1] "that we can speak of Christian social reform and social construction, in so far as we mean the conscious work of Christian society." Towards the close of the Middle Ages, as a result of the development of industry and commerce, the middle classes were emerging; but the Reformation did much to advance their importance. As the movement found its staunchest supporters in these classes, so the changes effected were more in their interests than for any other class. Bishop Creighton admits of the Church of England what was more generally true—"the changes made at the time of the Reformation were too exclusively made in the interest of the prosperous middle class."[2]

For the present purpose no mention is necessary of the extreme movements, such as the Anabaptist. Wild social

[1] Quoted in *Christ and Civilisation*, p. 354. [2] Quoted *op. cit.*, p. 370.

schemes were advocated, and abortive efforts made to give them effect. Although the author adhered to the old religion, More's *Utopia* represents the noblest social dream of the period.

(6) The mention of this name suggests that the Reformation brought losses as well as gains. It brought division within the Christian Church, such as had not been known for centuries ; the dream of unity faded away, and only in recent years has there been some recovery of it. The commercial spirit, more closely allied with Protestantism than it had ever been with Catholicism, has brought with it a social problem which is the most urgent challenge to-day of the Christian ideal, and to this problem the next chapter will be devoted.

(7) Meanwhile, a brief glance must be given at the moral effects of the Evangelical Revival. The doctrine of that revival has often been blamed as centring unduly in individual salvation ; but in the experience of divine grace many men found a motive to philanthropy ; the love of God inspired love for men. It was a democratic movement, and reached the common people, changing their lives as neither Calvinism nor Lutheranism had done. It promoted education ; it condemned, and secured the abolition of, slavery. Remedial legislation was largely the work of evangelicals within the Anglican Church, notably Lord Shaftesbury. The modern missionary movement was inspired by the Evangelical Revival. The revival prevented in Great Britain a revolution such as France endured. Tested by its fruits, the Evangelical Revival proved itself in very deed a work of the Spirit of God.[1]

[1] See chapters ix. and x. in *Christ and Civilisation.*

CHAPTER IV

THE PRESENT CHALLENGE

A GENERAL consideration which was advanced at an earlier stage of this discussion must be recalled. We cannot separate morality from the rest of life, as it is a quality of all action. What affects life in any way will determine that quality. Even moral standards are influenced by the total conditions. As man is neither soulless brute nor disembodied angel, but body and soul in so intimate relations that some biologists who are theists refuse to accept the dualism, which psychology adopts as a working hypothesis, and confess themselves monists, they assert the inseparable unity of soul and body.[1] A religion or a morality which ignores this close relation is out of touch with the reality of life. While there are many factors which determine social development and its accompanying moral progress, the economic is one of the most potent. Man cannot ignore his physical necessities, and, in seeking to supply these, he must for effective labour ally himself with his fellows, so that even his social relations are influenced by his economic demands.

(*a*) While each age is in danger of exaggerating its own importance, its perils and promises, its gains and losses, its fears and hopes, yet an impartial survey of the course of human history justifies the assertion that the social problem is to-day more prominent in the thoughts of men than in any previous period, not merely because men have chosen to direct their attention to it more than before, but mainly because the social conditions are compelling that attention. When a man is well and strong, he does not call for his physician. When a society is anxiously taking its pulse, it must be really feeling feverish. There is a maladjustment in social relations to economic conditions and a maladjustment of moral standards to the social relations. To-day is a crisis, a day of judgment, a turning-point on the road. Without minimising the influence of the intellectual factor, the advance of science since the Renaissance, or of the religions, the changes of belief since the Reformation, we do not do injustice to these if, in discussing the realisation of the

[1] See *What is Man?* by J. Arthur Thomson, pp. 79–80.

Christian ideal with reference to the social problem, we lay emphasis on the *economic* factor, and, although subordinately, the closely related *political* factor.

(*b*) To revert to the terms used to distinguish the periods in the history of the Christian Church, the Modern Period has been described by the term *Emancipation* in contrast to the Mediæval as *Domination* ; and just as the second process had begun before the conclusion of the first period, so we may say another process had already begun in the second period. Emancipation alone is being felt to be not enough ; liberty by itself simply secures the opportunity, it does not impose the obligation ; it destroys the hindrances to progress, it does not create the resources of progress. Hence we are now feeling the need, and trying to find the means, of *Organisation.*[1] But in what direction our aspirations and efforts move will depend on which of the remaining terms of the motto of the French Revolution we use as our slogan. Shall it be equality or fraternity to which liberty will open the door?

(*c*) If we lay more stress on man's control over the resources of nature, and his direction of the labour which makes these resources available for human need, we shall probably be attracted by the principle of equality. Since, however, individual inequalities are inevitable, the effort to maintain an absolute economic equality would involve so rigid a political organisation of society that individual initiative would be suppressed, and a man, in being prevented from doing the best for himself, would fail to do his best for society, unless some other than the economic motive can be brought into play. All that can be demanded, if a social tyranny is to be avoided, is that, as far as is at all practicable, recognising these inequalities, to each will be given equality of opportunity to make the best of himself, and so do the best for society. A socialistic system, aiming at economic equality, could be maintained only by such a subordination of the individual to society as would amount to tyranny in the absence of an inner motive, which would make social service personal freedom. Whether ultimately there will be an approach to the Commonwealth of which the Socialist dreams is a question on which prophecy would be vain. What is certain is that no progress, embracing the whole life of man, and not regarding only his economic interests, is

[1] See *An Introduction to Social Philosophy*, by J. S. Mackenzie, discussed in Part IV., Introduction.

possible unless there is a proper adjustment of social relations, unless the economic dependence on which men stand to one another is transformed by some principle of social solidarity. The motto of the French Revolution names it fraternity; and, if it is taken seriously enough, the demands such a principle imposes can be met only by that equal love of self and neighbour which the absolute love of man for God, inspired by God's perfect love to man in Jesus Christ, in turn inspires. The solution of the social problem, prominent as the economic aspect is, lies in the realisation of the Christian ideal.

I

Any constructive effort must be guided by a historical review, as the present has its roots in the past, and the fruits of the present for the future cannot be severed from these roots. Inasmuch as the economic changes, to which the present situation is due, had begun before the Reformation, we must consider not only what these changes were, but also how the Mediæval Church faced these changes, and how the Churches of the Reformation dealt with them. A great deal of attention has been given to these questions in recent years, and mention may be made of three books especially; Weber's *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus* (The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism), Troeltsch's *Protestantism and Progress*, 1912, and Tawney's *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, 1926. The first I have not seen, but to the second and third I am mainly indebted in what follows.

(1) Tawney begins his discussion with the *Mediæval Background*. (*a*) As the term *Domination* indicates, the Church in the Mediæval Period dominated society in all its interests and activities more than in the previous period it had any power to do, or in the following period it desired to do. Even although the life of the monk or nun was distinguished as "religious" from life in the world, the secular (or civil) was less dissevered from the sacred (or ecclesiastical) than after the Reformation it came to be. The Church itself claimed to be a universal State, and hence the constant collisions of the Church and national States. So far from sharing the opinion, which became current in the Protestant Churches during last century, that the sphere of economics or of politics is independent, and that the Churches must not intrude any further than by instructing

and influencing Christian men to exercise their functions in the one sphere and the other in a Christian way, the Mediæval Church claimed to give counsel and exercise control in every sphere.

(*b*) The spirit and the mode in which it asserted its authority may be condemned ; the inadequacy of its equipment for the task which it undertook may be recognised ; its failure, because bound by tradition and convention, to meet the new economic and consequent social situation effectively must be admitted ; but its claim that the Christian religion must dominate the whole life of the Christian man, and that it is the responsibility of the Church to secure that dominance, is much to be preferred to the assumption that any sphere of life lies beyond the Church's competence to advise and direct in accordance with the principles of Christ as interpreted and applied by His Spirit in His Church. "Like the Church to-day in regions which have not yet emerged from savagery, the Church of the earlier Middle Ages had been engaged in an immense missionary effort, in which, as it struggled with the surrounding barbarism, the work of conversion and of social construction had been almost indistinguishable. By the very nature of its task, as much as by the intention of its rulers, it had become the greatest of political institutions. For good or evil it aspired to be, not a sect, but a civilisation, and, when its unity was shattered at the Reformation, the different Churches which emerged from it endeavoured, according to their opportunities, to perpetuate the same tradition. Asceticism or renunciation, quietism or indifferentism, the zeal which does well to be angry, the temper which seeks a synthesis of the external order and the religions of the Spirit—all alike, in one form or another, are represented in the religious thought and practice of the Middle Ages. All are represented in it, but not all are equally representative of it. Of the four attitudes suggested above, it is the last which is most characteristic. The first fundamental assumption which is taken over by the sixteenth century is that the ultimate standard of human institutions and activities is religion."[1]

The attitude of last century was not, as will afterwards be shown, that of the Reformers, who, in Luther in less degree, in Calvin in greater, accepted the mediæval view of religion as counselling and controlling the whole of life.

(2) What standard of morality did the Mediæval Church

[1] Tawney, *op. cit.*, pp. 18–19.

apply? "If the first legacy of the Middle Ages to the sixteenth century was the idea of religion as embracing all aspects of human life, the second and third flowed naturally from the working of that idea in the economic environment of the time. They may be called, respectively, the functional view of class organisation and the doctrine of economic ethics."[1] (*a*) Society is a body; each class is a member in that body, with its own functions. So priest, knight, tradesman, tiller must be content to abide in the place providence has assigned. This involved "class privilege, class oppression, exploitation, serfdom." The under-dog, as a rule with docility, accepted his kicks. As not only a human arrangement, but a divine order, this social organisation must be accepted. A moralisation was, it is true, attempted. "There is degree above degree, as reason is, and skill it is that men do their devoir there as it is due. But certaines extortions and despite of your underlings is damnable."[2] And this moralisation was by the influence of religion. "The property of the feudal lord, the labour of the peasant or the craftsman, even the ferocity of the warrior, were not dismissed as hostile or indifferent to the life of the Spirit . . . they were to be sublimated into service, vocation, and chivalry, and the ritual which surrounded them was designed to emphasise that they had undergone a re-dedication at the hands of religion. Baptised by the Church, privilege and power became office and duty."[3] This consecration by religion often meant little in practice; but at least a standard was maintained.

(*b*) In this social order there was one recalcitrant element, "the life of mere money-making" in commerce and finance; and to it a stigma attached. In the latter part of this period this element was increasingly prominent and influential; and alongside of feudalism capitalism was developing. Flanders in the fifteenth century was a centre of capitalised industry, and Florence of capitalist finance. Already the evils of the system showed themselves. "In the great commercial centres there was sometimes a capitalism as inhuman as any which the world has seen, and from time to time ferocious class wars between artisans and merchants."[4] Since the attempt has been made to idealise the Middle Ages under the dominance of the Catholic Church, and

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 21.
[2] Chaucer's "The Parson's Tale," § 66, quoted *op. cit.*, p. 23.
[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 23. [4] *Idem.*, p. 25.

to hold Protestantism responsible for the evils of capitalism, it is well to note the actual situation. "If capitalism means the direction of industry by the owners of capital for their own pecuniary gain, and the social relationships which establish themselves between them and the wage-earning proletariat whom they control, then capitalism had existed on a grand scale both in mediæval Italy and in mediæval Flanders. If by the capitalist spirit is meant the temper which is prepared to sacrifice all moral scruples to the pursuit of profit, it had been only too familiar to the saints and sages of the Middle Ages. . . . It was predominantly Catholic cities which were the commercial capitals of Europe, and Catholic bankers who were its leading financiers."[1]

(*c*) What was the theory which the Church opposed to this development? The common assumption was that the trader, who buys that he may sell dearer in order to get a profit for himself, was engaged in "a form of enterprise perilous to the soul"; but the inevitable economic evolution involved that this enterprise was essential to society. The solution found was this: that profit is a kind of wages for the labour which the buying and selling of goods involves, but to seek a profit beyond such reasonable remuneration must be condemned as extortion. The mediæval moralists were nearer the standpoint of the Gospel than most ethical thinkers of to-day in suspecting and condemning the greed of gain, the desire for wealth. A Schoolman of the fourteenth century (Henry of Langenstein) wrote what to most Christians would be most unpalatable doctrine to-day, but is not so remote from the mind of Christ. "He who has enough to satisfy his wants, and nevertheless ceaselessly labours to acquire riches, either to obtain a higher social position or that subsequently he may have enough to live without labour or that his sons may become men of wealth and importance—all such are incited by a damnable avarice, sensuality, or pride."[2] To meet the injustice to which this unworthy motive impelled, the moralist formulated a theory of the just price to be determined, not by economic expediency, but by moral principle.[3] Although there was difference of opinion as to all the considerations which must be taken into account, there was no doubt that such a price could be ascertained, and, when ascertained, it should be enforced by the public authority. A marked feature of

[1] *Idem*, p. 84. [2] Quoted *op. cit.*, p. 35.
[3] See articles on "The Just Price" in the quarterly *Stockholm* for 1929.

mediæval ethics was the denunciation of *usury*, by which was meant, not an excessive interest, but the claiming of any interest at all on a loan. In this there was moral justification in a state of society in which loans were sought only for the relief of personal necessity. But as industry and commerce developed, capital was needed, and loans were sought to be used profitably in business; the moral situation was changed, and the theory had to be modified in some particulars. The profits of a partnership might be taken, if the risks also were ; a rent-charge might be bought, since nature provided the means of payment, and not man's toil ; delay in repayment justified a claim for compensation for any loss incurred or gain prevented by the delay.

(*d*) But to the very end what is called "pure interest"—the fixed payment for a loan without any risk—remained unlawful, although, as might be expected, casuistry did discover means of evasion. The Church's own practice in financial matters was not, however, above reproach, and so lessened the authority of the standards she set up, although in the exercise of discipline she endeavoured to enforce what she enjoined. That the Church had success in realising the Christian ideal, or even that she was able to interpret that ideal in the economic situation aright, cannot be maintained. But that it recognised the obligation, and made so constantly and bravely the attempt to meet the moral demand of the world around, must be accounted to her for righteousness. In two respects she thus left us an example which we should try to follow—the insistence on the subordination of the whole life of man to religion, although for us that does not mean such a subordination to the claims of the Church as it was then held to mean, and the recognition, however inadequate, that while moral principles must ever be asserted in any sphere, their application must be varied so as to be better adapted to all the conditions of the times.

II

The effects of the Reformation in the economic and the political spheres were not so great at first as might have been expected from so great an inward change ; but what was involved only gradually appeared. To the economic revolution through which Europe was passing in this sixteenth century the Protestant Churches did not make an adequate

response in their social theory, for they adhered in many respects to the standards of the Middle Ages.

"The most systematic treatment," says Tawney,[1] "of economic questions was still that contained in the works of canonists, and divines continued to pronounce judgment on problems of property and contract with the same assurance as on problems of theology. Laymen might dispute the content of their teaching and defy its conclusions. But it was rarely, as yet, that they attacked the assumption that questions of economic conduct belonged to the province of the ecclesiastical jurist." The authority of theology in dealing with moral questions in every sphere was as yet unchallenged; and the responsibility of the theologian to acquaint himself with all the data of any problem so as to give a judgment adapted to actuality was as yet not recognised. In contrast to this, to-day theologians are fully conscious of their responsibility, but not so confident of their authority. Luther's conservatism has already been indicated. "Where questions of social morality were involved, men whose names are a symbol of religious revolution stood, with hardly an exception, on the ancient ways, appealed to mediæval authorities, and reproduced in popular language the doctrines of the Schoolmen."[2] The Reformation cannot be regarded as responsible, as some writers try to make out, for the economic individualism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, nor as opposed to the moral restraints on the commercial spirit then becoming dominant, which the teaching of the Catholic Church had imposed.

(1) Luther himself blazed out against the evils of this commercial spirit, and denounced the claim for freedom from the moral guidance of the Church in the economic sphere no less vehemently than he did the superstitions and corruptions of Rome. Indeed he, as many others, regarded the economic changes of the two preceding centuries as a relapse into paganism. He was enthusiastic about the simple virtues, as he imagined, of a bygone age; a prosperous peasantry was what he desired. But he would not have even such a state by force, and hence his shameful attitude in the Peasants' Revolt. On the question of usury he condemns even the necessary concessions made by the canonists. "The greatest misfortune of the German nation is easily the traffic in interest. . . . The Devil invented it, and

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 80. [2] *Idem*, p. 82.

the Pope, by giving his sanction to it, has done untold evil throughout the world."[1] In this opposition to casuistry, the endeavour to modify moral principles so as to adapt them to existing conditions, Luther took up an impossible position. He preached ideal moral principles, but refused to take the means of making them effective in the society as it then was; the believing man would yield to the constraint of love, and needed not the compulsion of law. As such Christians were rare, however, he relied on the civil rule as the refuge from anarchy. With his usual violence of language he says, "No one need think that the world can be ruled without blood. The civil sword shall and must be red and bloody."[2] Much in the history of Germany, which would otherwise be inexplicable, can be traced to the influence of Luther. The dominance of the State in the Church, and the impotence of the Church in exercising any guidance or control in the economic and the political sphere, have both their source in his teaching. There is an emancipation, however slowly, to be observed to-day.

(2) Calvinism presents a striking contrast to Lutheranism. Calvinism "became an international movement," and proved, wherever it came, "an active and radical force." "It was a creed which sought not merely to purify the individual, but to reconstruct Church and State and to renew society by penetrating every department of life, public as well as private, with the influence of religion."[3] Unlike Luther, who may be described as a romantic, Calvin was a realist. (*a*) His industrial and commercial environment compelled him to recognise that the morality of the feudal times must be altered so as to be adapted to the practical necessities of the world in which he found himself. Instead of simply denouncing, he endeavoured to moralise the new situation. He no less rigidly asserted the authority of the Church to direct and control the morality of every sphere, since for him the Church was the exponent of the will of God as disclosed in Scripture; nor did he for a moment admit its incompetence. He enforced a discipline far more strict than had ever been known before, and was ready to invoke the civil power for its enforcement. To hold him responsible for any encouragement of moral laxity in any sphere whatever is contrary to all the evidence. He had the wisdom to face facts, as Luther had not, and so to shape his

[1] *An den Christlichen Adel*, quoted *op. cit.*, p. 95.
[2] Quoted p. 101. [3] *Op. cit.*, p. 102.

practical policy as to maintain the Church's authority, and to prove its competence. How great the change of standpoint was the words of Tawney, which must be quoted in full, show. "Early Calvinism has its own rule, and a vigorous rule, for the conduct of economic affairs. But it no longer suspects the whole world of economic motives, as alien to the life of the Spirit, or distrusts the capitalist as one who has necessarily grown rich on the misfortunes of his neighbour, or regards poverty as in itself meritorious; and it is perhaps the first systematic body of religious teaching which can be said to recognise and applaud the economic virtues. Its enemy is not the accumulation of riches, but their misuse for purposes of self-indulgence or ostentation. Its ideal is a society which seeks wealth with the sober gravity of men who are conscious at once of disciplining their own characters by patient labour, and of devoting themselves to a service acceptable to God."[1] His teaching on usury results from this changed standpoint; but it is marked by the restrictions imposed rather than the liberty accorded. Tawney thus summarises his teaching: "That interest is lawful, provided that it does not exceed an official maximum, that—even when a maximum is fixed—loans must be made *gratis* to the poor, that the borrower must reap as much advantage as the lender, that excessive security must not be exacted, that what is venial as an occasional expedient is reprehensible when carried on as a regular occupation, that no man may snatch economic gain for himself to the injury of his neighbour—a condonation of usury protected by such embarrassing entanglements can have offered but tepid consolation to the devout moneylender."[2]

(*b*) Calvinism was thus a social revolution, no less than a theological and ecclesiastical. It exalted the middle classes, approved and sanctioned, while seeking to counsel and control, the new economic development, commended new moral values—the economic virtues—and so fostered a new social order. A system in which so rigid an ecclesiastical discipline of moral activity in every sphere was maintained cannot be charged with the individualism or the policy of *laissez-faire*, the outcome of that individualism, of later days, for which in praise or blame it is held responsible. It was forced upon it rather than desired or welcomed by it. This development was "accepted less

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 105. [2] *Idem*, p. 106.

because it was esteemed for its own sake than as a compromise fixed upon Calvinism at a comparatively late stage of its history, as a result of its modification by the pressure of commercial interests, or of a balance of power between conflicting authorities."[1]

(3) Of special interest for us is the development of Calvinism in English Puritanism, a subject with which an essay of Max Weber is concerned. What he attempts to show is that Calvinism, but especially English Puritanism, is mainly responsible for bringing about those political and moral conditions which have favoured the growth of capitalism, and this view is accepted by Troeltsch in his *Protestantism and Progress*; but Tawney in a note criticises Weber's contention on the ground that Weber ignores other factors of the development, and so unduly simplifies his problem.[2]

(*a*) The Reformation was, as has been shown, a movement of emancipation only partial, much more partial than many Protestants imagine, who ascribe to it directly much that gradually and indirectly emerged from it. In Geneva there was no liberty of conscience, but a dominating ecclesiastical authority, and such democracy as there was was tempered by an aristocracy of ecclesiastical and civil rulers. Yet the claim for religious liberty was made when Protestantism was suffering persecution, as in Holland, France, and England. This conception of liberty was gradually extended to the economic as well as the political sphere. The conception of democracy, which is not to be identified although it is closely allied with that of individual rights, need not now be pursued any further. Confining ourselves to the subject of individual rights, we may consider Troeltsch's conclusion. "Whence comes the idea of the right of the individual? Following out this question, Jellinek shows that it is derived from the Constitution of the North American States, and in part verbally taken over from them. And in the North American States themselves he derived these declarations from their Puritan religious principles which, not content with the old practical character of English liberties, regarded the freedom of the person, and especially of religious conviction, as a right conferred absolutely by God and nature, which is essentially inviolable by any State. It was only in virtue of being thus put on a religious basis that these demands became absolute, and

[1] p. 113. [2] pp. 319–320.

consequently admitted of and required a theoretic legal exposition.[1]

(*b*) The extension to the economic sphere was slow. It is not true, as has been asserted, that "the triumph of Puritanism swept away all traces of any restriction or guidance in the employment of money,"[2] since, although many of the older forms of restriction were swept away, "a godly discipline was the very ark of the Puritan covenant." "To the Puritan of any period in the century between the accession of Elizabeth and the Civil War, the suggestion that he was the friend of economic or social licence would have seemed as wholly inappropriate as it would have appeared to most of his critics, who taunted him, except in the single matter of usury, with an intolerable meticulousness."[3] The religious liberty he claimed was liberty of conscience to obey the law of God as interpreted and applied in this godly discipline. Calvin's condonation of moderate interest, for instance, was accepted with hesitation by Puritanism, but the habitual usurer was regarded as deserving of excommunication. Ames's *De Conscientia*, a practical guide to morals, accepted as a standard authority, is very conservative as regards interest, prices, land enclosures, etc. Baxter's *Christian Directory* is more realistic; it frankly recognises the changed economic situation; but the author refuses to regard the economic order as a mechanism beyond moral control (as was afterwards assumed by many theorists), and insists that the Christian must accept certain moral standards, and must be guided by them no less in the economic than any other sphere. He demands that business must be so carried on as not to injure others, and as to render a service to others. The ethical and economic dualism for which Puritanism has sometimes been held responsible has no sanction in his writings.

(*c*) Nevertheless, a more positive relation of Puritanism to modern capitalism can be shown. Capitalism did exist in the later centuries of the Middle Ages, and the spirit of capitalism was not born with the Reformation. And yet involuntarily Puritanism, by the virtues it practised, did contribute to the enormous accumulations of capital and to the dominance of capital in modern society. Troeltsch recognises that "the operation of other mental and spiritual

[1] *Protestantism and Progress*, pp. 119–120.

[2] Hering, quoted by Tawney *op. cit.*, p. 213. [3] *Idem*, p. 213.

influences is not excluded." But he sums up his assent to Weber's thesis in the following words : " When all is said and done, Calvinism remains the real nursing-father of the civic and industrial capitalism of the middle classes. Self-devotion to work and gain, which constitutes the involuntary and unconscious asceticism of the modern man, is the child of a conscious ' intra-mundane ' asceticism of work and calling inspired by religious motives. The ' spirit of the calling ' which does not reach out beyond the world but works in the world without ' creature worship,' that is, without love of the world, becomes the parent of a tireless systematically disciplined laboriousness, in which work is sought for work's sake, for the sake of the mortification of the flesh, in which the produce of the work serves, not to be consumed in enjoyment, but to the constant reproduction of the capital employed. Since the aggressively active ethic inspired by the doctrine of predestination urges the elect to the full development of his God-given powers, and offers him this as a sign by which he may assure himself of his election, work becomes rational and systematic. In breaking down the motive of ease and enjoyment asceticism lays the foundations of the tyranny of work over men. And from the fact that the produce of this work is in no way an end in itself, but advances the general well-being, and that all return which goes beyond an adequate provision for the needs of life is felt to be merely a stimulus to the further employment and increase of it, there results the principle of the illimitability and infinitude of work. On the basis of this economic attitude there arose the early capitalism of the Huguenots, of Holland, England, and America ; and even to the present day in America and Scotland, as well as among the English Nonconformists, the higher capitalism is clearly seen to be closely connected with it." [1]

(*d*) There is one qualification which Troeltsch does not make. What relieved this absorption in business, which characterised Dissent, due partly to its exclusion from public life, was its philanthropy. Not all savings were returned to capital ; but large sums have been given away in charity and for education and evangelisation. But that there is a great deal of truth, if not all the truth, in his contention must be admitted. Puritanism, then, fostered the development of capitalism on the one hand, and on the other indirectly promoted its release from ethical, ecclesiastical

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 135–137.

control. Neither result was its express intention. Puritanism insisted on individual responsibility more than on social obligation, the account a man must give of himself to his Maker rather than the claims others have upon him; as the theology was harsh, so often was the practice; as the economic virtues were prized, the absence of these in the poor and unsuccessful was severely judged. By the end of the seventeenth century, that ideal which characterised the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, of an individualism which divorced the economic and political spheres, if not altogether from religion, yet from the counsel and control of the Church, began to be dominant, although the outburst of industrial activity in 1760 accentuated the tendency. It must be frankly recognised that this development is a challenge—one of the most bold and dangerous challenges—which has come to the Christian Church; and this we must now confront.

III

During the eighteenth and, still more, the nineteenth, century there took place what has without exaggeration been described as the Industrial Revolution. As we have already seen, the later centuries of the Middle Ages even saw industrial development and commercial expansion, and this continued in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

(1) The economic conditions of to-day were determined by such discoveries and inventions as steam as a motor for machinery or for locomotion, and the manifold applications of science to industry and commerce. There had been capitalism, but in these two centuries there has been an evolution of this economic type such as the world has never seen before.[1] (*a*) By capitalism we mean that economic system in which capital becomes increasingly necessary for the most efficient employment of labour; and in which consequently the possessor or agent of capital gains increasing control over labour, apart from other factors which may limit that control. In the association of capital and labour, capital is the dominant partner. This affects human relationships; and it has hitherto been assumed that all human relationships involve moral direction and control. The dependence of labour on capital and the dominance of capital over labour, however, have gone on without adequate

[1] See *The Evolution of Modern Capitalism*, by J. A. Hobson.

moral intervention. The modification by trades unionism cannot be described as dominated by a moral interest. Hence a relation which might have been morally guided toward co-operation has been allowed to move onward toward conflict, and conflict of ever wider range and far-reaching effects. A dispute in the coal industry in 1926 affected the life of the whole nation. We are concerned only with the moral aspects of this situation, as we are trying to answer the question, How can the Church secure the realisation of the Christian ideal?

(*b*) It must be confessed that in these two centuries the Church virtually resigned its authority to control and direct the whole life of man. Its discipline, so far as it has been exercised at all, has been confined to flagrant moral offences, such as drunkenness or impurity. With fixing a just price, or a living wage, or a reasonable interest or rent, it has had no concern. The assumption made was that the Christian experience of divine grace, received in the exercise of human faith, would produce a Christian character, which in all human relations would be shown in right or good conduct. Individual virtues might be inculcated, but not their concrete expression in politics or economics. The result was this: that Christian men not only acquiesced in, but were even responsible for, conditions in industry which are now being recognised as intolerable by the Christian conscience.[1] A man like Lord Shaftesbury in his heroic sacrificial labours not only failed to get the support he might have expected from the Christian Churches, but was even regarded by Christian men, pillars of the Churches, as a reckless "troubler in Israel."

(*c*) Since the beginning of this century there has been a a rising tide of conviction that this attitude of indifference must not be, that the Christian ideal must be realised in business no less than in worship. There have been, however, and still are, economic Dame Partingtons who are trying to sweep back this tide. In the Middle Ages, and even during the century after the Reformation, the Church's dealing with these matters may have been resented, but its authority to deal with them was not challenged. It is otherwise to-day. It is said that business is business; and it must be left to men of business to determine how Christian principles are to be applied. The ministers of religion are

[1] See the books of J. L. Hammond and his wife, *The Village Labourer* (1911), *The Town Labourer* (1917), *The Skilled Labourer* (1919), *Lord Shaftesbury* (1923).

warned off this ground as interlopers. In reasserting the authority of the Church as the moral guide of society in industry as well as government the mistake of the past must not be repeated. The guidance that was given was not always competent guidance ; the situation was not fully known and understood, and the teaching was with justice discredited as unpractical. Luther's attitude on usury is unpractical in comparison with Calvin's. An authoritative Church must see to it that it is an instructed Church. There are details of practice in business with which the Church has no immediate concern, and has certainly no adequate competence to deal. But practice involves principles, on the moral value of which the Church has not only a right, but a duty to pronounce. Not every preacher has the knowledge which would give weight to his judgment. What seems to be necessary is corporate thinking among the Churches, not only among ministers, but also among experts in different spheres, who are also instructed in Christian ethics. Such corporate thinking would qualify the Church to give a common judgment which would have the authority of competence.[1]

(*d*) The contention of business men that they alone are practical may be met frankly and boldly by pointing out how disastrously this policy of *laissez-faire* has worked out, what bitterness and hatred it has produced in human relationships, what misery and waste, mental as well as material, it has involved. The widespread and long-continued unemployment shows a deep-seated maladjustment in the production, distribution, and consumption of wealth, which indicates the inadequacy of contemporary economics. If the end of industry is not merely the accumulation of wealth, but the development of human personality in its activities, and the satisfaction of human wants, not of the few, but of all, by its products, can it be claimed by any candid observer that the present system has proved itself practical? This aversion to the assertion of the Christian ideal in all spheres has met with a similar opposition in the sphere of politics no less than of economics. But the World War has convinced many doubters that international relations must be Christianised ; and a little reflection shows that these international relations depend on national policy even in domestic

[1] Such corporate thinking has been attempted in the Copec Conference (Christian Order in Politics, Economics, and Citizenship) of 1924 in Birmingham, and the Life and Work Conference of 1925 in Stockholm.

affairs. Mussolini may assert that Italy's treatment of the German-speaking people in the Southern Tyrol is a purely domestic matter ; but it does concern their kindred people in Austria. Failure is written over the attempt to ignore the Christian ideal in both these spheres ; and there is a greater readiness than there ever was before to acknowledge this failure, and to seek some other course.

(2) This practical policy has had its theoretical justification. Germany, which is always more consistently *doctrinaire* than Great Britain, has formulated a theory of both political and economic autonomy. (*a*) It was argued that the State was itself the highest moral entity, that the *salus nationis* was the *summa lex*, and that duty to the nation was ultimate, and could not be subordinated to any duty to mankind generally. Moral obligations within a nation need not be extended to the relation of nations. Similarly the question has been a good deal discussed, even among social reformers, whether the economic sphere has its own laws, as unalterable as the laws of nature, to which men must submit, whether conscience approves or not. Now it may be admitted that the principle of causality holds in the economic as the natural sphere. If less is produced, there is less to distribute. If resources are wasted on armaments, which are destructive and not productive of wealth, the average standard of living is lowered because the store of wealth on which that standard depends has been reduced. Idleness cannot bear the fruit of diligence, or extravagance of economy. A sentimentalist may imagine that he can eat his economic cake and still have it ; but a moralist who knows his business knows that he must take account of the relations of cause and effect, and will the means for the ends he wishes.

(*b*) But in two respects is this theory of economic autonomy in need of correction. In *the first place*, economic efficiency is dependent on moral qualities. A discontented and physically diseased worker will not be as diligent or efficient a worker as one who is well and happy. High wages are being recognised as a condition of high productivity. A man who is treated as merely a hand to tend a machine will not be as interested or as intelligent a worker as one whose personality can find a more adequate and independent expression of itself in what he produces. Whatever worsens human relations of employer and employed, buyer and seller, injures industry itself, and whatever betters these

improves it. The industrial process does not go on apart from human desires, motives, interests, and activities, and in all these there is a moral better and a moral worse.

In *the second place*, while a science like economics may, like any other science, abstract the sphere of the production, distribution, and consumption of wealth from the rest of man's interests and activities, and may set itself to show under what conditions the maximum result of satisfaction of human need can be secured with the minimum of human labour, it usurps an authority it does not possess as a science when it assumes that this end is superior to, must subordinate, and cannot be subordinated to any other ends. Science may apprehend facts, causes, laws ; it cannot appreciate values. "Man doth not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God" (Deut. viii. 3) : this is an authoritative judgment in the sphere of human values which challenges the claim of autonomy in the economic sphere. Economics may describe the mechanism, but it has not the last word regarding the product of the process for which the mechanism is adopted. Chemistry may direct how a laboratory shall be equipped and conducted ; but it does not determine whether the product shall be the poison gas which inflicts torture or the anæsthetic which relieves the pains of men. It is morality which determines what the human good is ; wealth is a condition of welfare, but not the only or the chief. Hence the science of wealth has not an authority that can overrule the superior authority of morals.[1]

A *third consideration* may be added, which is not in the region of science, but of religion. If there be a God in all, through all, and over all, and if, as in a former chapter was argued, man's highest good, his self-realisation through self-sacrifice, is also a participation in God's purpose, then that is ultimately most real which is most akin to God. It is a religious conviction, a moral certainty, that good ethics will in the long run and on the big scale also prove sound economics. Within narrow limits of experience honesty may not always prove the best policy, and wickedness may prosper ; but, "though the mills of God grind slowly, yet they grind exceeding small. Though with patience He is waiting, with exactness grinds He all." History in its long continuance does show that the Christian ideal can be

[1] The subject is further discussed in Part IV., chapter iii., "Industry."

realised, because behind it, and over it, and through it is the reality of God.

Though the cause of evil prosper,
Yet 'tis truth alone is strong;
Though her portion be the scaffold,
And upon the throne be wrong—
Yet that scaffold sways the future,
And behind the dim unknown
Standeth God within the shadow,
Keeping watch above His own.

—LOWELL.

To the present challenge of the Christian ideal, in the region of economics and politics especially, we can reply with the Crusader's cry : *Deus vult, Deus vult.*

PART II

ETHICAL

CHAPTER I

THE SUBJECT AND THE STANDARD OF MORAL JUDGMENT

When morality becomes reflective—that is, examines and criticises itself—the science of ethics begins. While doubtless men have always thought about their actions, yet so long as they thought only of a problem of individual conduct there was no science. Only when the universal principles of right or wrong, good or bad, came under unprejudiced and impartial discussion, did what can be called *Science* emerge.

Socrates is the first, not moralist, but enquirer in ethics. He did not ask what is the duty of this time and this place, as does the moralist, but what is *justice*, what is the quality of the acts that in common speech are described as just, what is the reason why the term is applied to them? Why did he enter on this enquiry? As long as moral customs are uncriticised and moral standards unchallenged, morality will remain unreflective. It is when the changed social situation results in a maladjustment of the morality to the moral needs of the hour that men are forced to think. The age of Socrates was an age of moral confusion, which the Sophists, by their way of discussing the *pros* and *cons* of moral issues, only increased, and from which Socrates sought this way of escape. In a like situation in the Hebrew nation, another door was opened. The prophets dealt with the moral confusion of their surroundings, not by reflection such as that of Socrates, but by a declaration of duty in the name of the Lord. Similarly, such monotheism as we can assign to Greek thought issued from philosophy; the monotheism in Israel was given by revelation through the prophets. Since morality is concerned with the judgment on the quality of actions, whether right or wrong, good or bad, it must attempt the answer to two questions. Is this judgment to be pronounced upon all actions, or only on a particular kind of action, and what is the standard of judgment which is to be applied?

I

The first question can be very briefly answered : Action must be conscious and voluntary to come under judgment.

(1) There is involuntary action, for which the agent has no responsibility, and for the quality of which he is not subject to judgment. Morality, therefore, presupposes liberty ; the agent is to be praised or blamed because he chose to act in one way when he might have acted in another. Where there is choice, there must be comparison ; the one course must appear right or wrong, good or bad, relative to the other. As a good man goes about his daily work he may not be conscious of any comparison or choice ; but still his action is subject to the moral judgment that the right action has become habitual to him, and that he is to be commended because the wrong course of neglect or slackness does not even present itself to him as a possibility. Morality is not to be confined to moral crises, but includes what may be described as moral routine. The question may be raised whether there are choices and comparisons in which no moral judgment is involved. Are there conscious, voluntary actions which are morally indifferent? It must be admitted that in much of our life no moral issue arises. Whether a man living in Hampstead, London, goes, for the walk he is entitled to take as healthful exercise, to Regent's Park or Hampstead Heath seems not to matter morally. Only if by going the one way he will exceed the time that he can spare from his work, as he would not going the other, does moral judgment arise. Ordinarily no moral issue may be involved in a minister's game of golf ; but if he should be visiting a sick member of his Church at the time, his presence on the golf-links falls under moral judgment. The time and strength given to walking or golfing relatively to the time devoted to duty is, however, a matter for careful consideration and decision. While there are " painful " consciences, needlessly anxious about the morality of their actions, it is probable that most people are not nearly sensitive enough in conscience, and do not exercise a sufficiently vigorous moral scrutiny. To distinguish action subject to moral judgment from other action it is convenient to use the term *conduct*. Morality is concerned with the *quality of conduct*.

(2) It is not necessary here to discuss the question of man's

freedom to choose, which must be dealt with in the psychological section, but a common misunderstanding must be removed: the alternative to the *determinism* which denies freedom is not the *indeterminism* which asserts volition without motive. (*a*) What we affirm is *self-determination*; it is the whole man who wills, and not a faculty distinct from others. When a moral choice has to be made, two and more objects are presented to his consciousness: each of these may appear to him desirable; he compares them, exercising such knowledge and judgment as he can to determine which will satisfy him, i.e. be in that situation at that moment *his good*; and what he regards as his good will depend on what manner of man he is. He identifies himself with one object; that is, he fixes his attention upon it; and the others fall into the background. The desire for the object then becomes his motive, and he acts accordingly. We may admit that volition depends on motive, so long as we make clear that it is the man who by identifying his good with one object makes the desire for it his motive.

(*b*) If the process is delayed or hindered, and the motive becomes a *resolution*, and does not pass into action, the question arises, Does the moral judgment fall on the resolution? If a man is hindered carrying out a bad resolution by anything other than his own choice, he may be blamed for it. If a man fails to carry out a good resolution through his own weakness, he cannot be praised for it. The degree in which the whole man is expressed in the resolution must measure the praise or blame, if action is hindered.

(*c*) We must further discriminate between *motive* and *intention*. The motive includes only the end to be attained by the action; the intention may include also the means by which the end can be attained, as well as such consequences as the agent can foresee. For instance, a man resolves to have a day in the country for rest and refreshment of body and soul; that is his motive; his intention includes all that is involved in his journey, the cost of it, and the giving up of such work as he might have been doing. The consequences he can foresee are that the money he spends on this pleasure will not be available for other purposes, and that the time so used excludes the accomplishment of other tasks. If his need of change is such as to justify this expenditure of time and money, his whole intention is not only not blameworthy, but may deserve approval. If through indifference he has overlooked his obligation to use this

money to meet a pressing claim, and this time to render a necessary service, he is to blame for not having foreseen these consequences. When evil results from an action, the excuse is often advanced : " I did not mean it." How far such an excuse is adequate for an acquittal depends on the care there has been in considering before action what its possible or probable consequences might be. For what a man, exercising such care, could not have foreseen he is not responsible ; but he is to blame in so far as he did not endeavour to foresee what the consequences would be.

(*d*) The familiar saying, " More harm is wrought by want of thought than even want of heart," implies an invalid excuse for harmful action ; want of thought shows want of heart ; for a man does not mean right who does not try to be sure of what is right. If, however, there has been as much forethought as the conditions allow, no moral blame attaches for unforeseen consequences. A historical instance may be given. Mr. Gladstone introduced grocers' licences for the sale of alcoholic liquors ; that his motive was good need not be doubted ; the consequence he foresaw was a diminution of drunkenness, as drinkers would not need to go to the public-house, where there was the inducement for them to remain drinking ; the consequence he did not foresee was the increase of drunkenness among women, whom a sense of respectability kept from entering a public-house, but who could now more easily get drink for indulgence at home. In all legislation this risk is always being run of unintended consequences. To ask, as is sometimes done, whether the judgment falls on the motive or on the consequences of action is to present a false antithesis, for a man's motive is not right unless the consequences of his action so far as he can foresee them, exercising due care, will be good. Moral judgment falls, then, on the whole intention of action, the end which is the motive, the means for the fulfilment of the end, and the consequences of the use of these means so far as these can be known. Thoughtless goodness may sometimes do as much harm as calculating wickedness. It is an evidence of the excessive individualism, characteristic of much current Christian morality and religion, that this wide moral judgment is not more adequately recognised.

(*e*) It is for this reason that in this volume on Christian ethics the largest section will be sociological in character, discussing the Christian ideal in its concrete realisation in

human society, the actual consequences in the many varied institutions of the application of Christian principles to them as they are, in order that they may become what they ought to be. This, from the standpoint indicated above, is a necessary complement to the psychological discussion of the reaction of conduct on character; both outward and inward consequences must be taken into account; the development of Christian personality and the progress of Christian society are both necessary to the realisation of the Christian ideal, and both mutually dependent and reciprocally active.

II

Having thus shown briefly the kind of action which comes under moral judgment, we must next ask ourselves: What is the standard to be applied? Before we attempt to describe the Christian ideal, we must consider what standards have been applied, and how far each and all may have permanent and universal validity.

(1) At an early stage of moral development, moral distinctions emerged in the form of tribal customs which were approved and violations of these customs which were condemned. Behind these customs, some of which now seem to us irrational and arbitrary, there was some human experience of what helped and what hindered the safety, the prosperity, and the general good of the tribe as it was then conceived, of what secured satisfactory relations among its members. While man has comparatively few instincts, and the conduct of even a savage tribe cannot be described as strictly instinctive, yet tribal custom had its roots in human nature, the impulses, appetites, emotions with which it is endowed, not unguided by emergent reason. Morality at this stage is what is commonly done, and immorality what is not commonly done. The whole system of *taboo*, which often seems unreasonable, has behind it a rudimentary reasoning with the data of knowledge available.[1] However different the content of the moral judgment from that of an enlightened Christian conscience, the capacity for moral development was already there at that early stage. When tribes grew into nations with the recognised authority of governors, laws took the place of customs. In each case the standard was external.

[1] Jevons, *Introduction to the History of Religion*, pp. 87–88.

(2) The objective, however, is reflected and reproduced in the subjective ; if hope of approval or fear of punishment was in many cases the motive of conformity to custom and obedience to law, that must not be regarded as the only motive ; the *herd* instinct (if it should be so called),[1] being gradually sublimated into human affection, must also be recognised. There came to be " a law written in the heart " ; a sense of right and wrong was developed in the individual consciousness ; pleasure in unrewarded goodness, shame for unpunished wrongdoing ; conscience emerged ; there was disclosed the capacity for moral discernment, which is distinctive of man, but may perhaps be anticipated in a rudimentary form in some of the gregarious animals, as in the dog in contrast with the cat, in so far as their conduct is not instinctive.

(*a*) If in the majority of men conscience remains an *echo* of social standards, there are individuals of keener discernment in whom it becomes a *voice*, declaring as wrong the accepted and as right the unattempted. Social moral progress would have been much slower than it has been had there not been the guidance and stimulus of individual moral discernment.[2] A man may be so far ahead of his time that his witness is rejected and resisted ; and the reformer may become the martyr. Socrates, the father of ethics as a science, was condemned as a corrupter of youth. Whence, it may be asked, does this higher truth come ? In Socrates it came by reflection ; in the prophets of Israel by inspiration ; but this antithesis is not complete ; for Socrates had his *daimon*, an inward monitor that restrained, and the prophets were men who pondered on men's ways and God's will.

(*b*) For the believer in a God who is in all, and through all, and over all, there is no antagonism between man's reflection and God's inspiration, between the development of reason in man and the progress of revelation to man. The individual conscience and tribal customs or national law alike are methods of the divine education of man, imperfect because the subject being educated is imperfect, and does not form an unimpeding medium for the divine communication. The revelation as the education is progressive ; and we may set aside as entirely speculative, and not at all historical, the view of *intuitionalism*—that man is endowed by nature with a complete mental outfit of moral

[1] See Part III., chapter i. [2] *The Evolution of Ethics*, edited by Sneath.

and religious ideas, of innate principles of faith and conduct. Even the reformer or the martyr has not apprehended absolute moral truth ; and his disclosures are *relative to his age, and conditioned by his environment.* A parallel is to be observed in the sphere of religion ; the mystic claims to be in immediate contact with the divine reality, and yet his disclosures, on closer scrutiny, are seen to be related to, and limited by, the beliefs of his surroundings. (How far our Lord is an exception will be considered at a later stage of the discussion.) The individual conscience does mark a stage of advance on tribal custom or national law in moral progress ; but its authority cannot be regarded as absolute, its judgments as infallible, and its dictates as final objectively, although subjectively it ought to be obeyed.

(3) What the individual conscience presents to us is a number of general principles, and a number of particular applications. It, as it were, legislates and administers the law. (*a*) It is *atomic*, and not *organic* ; hence situations present themselves when moral principles seem to contradict one another, and a conflict of duties arises. What is needful is some higher harmonising principle, in which these apparently contradictory principles will be brought into complementary relation to one another. Kant recognised this, and tried to provide a formula of universal validity. " I am required to act," he says, " only in such a way that I can will that my maxim (or subjective principle of action) should become a universal law." [1] This, however, is an abstraction which does not afford practical guidance.

(*b*) But not only is there need for some unifying principle in the individual conscience, when we compare the morals of different lands and different ages we find a most bewildering variety. We do not adequately explain this variety by the assumption that it is due to the different stages of development alone, and that in the same stage of development we should in each nation find the same moral code. While there are differences in social standards which it is comparatively easy to account for by the special historical circumstances, there are differences more deep-rooted and not so easily explained ; and we must recognise that the individual conscience no less than social standards is affected by the total conditions of life, and is relative to them. We cannot treat slavery and polygamy as due merely to moral aberrations, but must ask what were the

[1] See Caird's *The Critical Philosophy of Kant*, II., pp. 171 *ff.*

conditions under which they were a relative solution of a real problem?

(*c*) If the individual conscience finds such a discord in itself, and individual consciences are found to be in such opposition to one another, we must admit that we have not yet here found the solution of the problem of the moral standard. In both of these cases we may assume that within its sphere conscience is functioning properly. There are numerous cases, however, in which the individual conscience may be not ahead of, but lagging behind, the general moral standards. A conscience may be *regressive* and not *progressive*. Since, as has been shown, moral progress has generally been due to the testimony and influence of individual consciences in advance of the common opinions, in its own interests a society should be chary in suppressing such personal convictions; but it cannot allow every claim in the name of conscience. A monogamous community like that of the United States of America cannot be expected to tolerate the Mormon's claim to practise polygamy, for that represents a moral reversion. It must be admitted that the laxity of the divorce laws brings its theoretical monogamy dangerously near to practical polygamy. A conscience may be bad, not only in reference to its record of violations, but even in regard to the content of its legislation. Conscience must itself come under moral judgment.

(*d*) The education of conscience is necessary, and that education includes several factors. In *the first place*, even within the individual conscience there must be an endeavour to harmonise conflicting dictates, to bring the different principles in relation to one moral purpose for the life, a purpose so authoritative that the authority of these separate commandments will be subordinated to it. This was what Jesus did when He laid down as the sum of the law absolute love to God and equal love to self and neighbour. *Secondly*, while each man must aim at the fullest moral development of his personality, no man can be jack-of-all-trades without proving himself the master-of-none. No man can in character and conduct be everything-in-general; he must become something-in-particular. However widely the circle may be drawn, it must be described from one centre. A valuable contribution to the theory of morals is the idea of *vocation*. Each calling brings its own opportunities and imposes its own obligations. *Thirdly*, conscience must not be isolated from the rest of the personality. There are persons who

are morally lop-sided, because their interests are not wide enough, their intelligence is not keen enough, and their culture not adequate. A more fully developed personality would secure a more accurate and adequate moral judgment. *Fourthly*, man is neither soulless brute nor disembodied angel ; and while reason must remain directive in the theoretical sphere, and conscience authoritative in the practical, it must be recognised that, as Jesus said of the Sabbath, that it exists for man, and not man for it (Mark ii. 27), so conscience is not an end in itself but a means towards an end, the highest good of the whole man, in which undoubtedly moral goodness is an essential, but not the exclusive element. Benedetto Croce, the Italian philosopher, has placed the *economic* alongside of the *ethical* activity of man's practical reason[1] ; and it must be recognised that man's good does include, even if it be as a subordinate element, the provision for man's physical necessities. An evidence of the " sweet reasonableness " of the moral teaching of Jesus is that He did not require *asceticism* as good in itself, but only in so far as self-denial was necessary for a higher good. He did not bid His disciples have no regard to food or raiment, but forbade anxiety, because the Heavenly Father knew their need of these things, and would provide them. The same writer, Croce, includes *æsthetics*[2] as well as science in man's activities as theoretically rational : and Jesus' allusion to the beauty of the flowers of the field is an indication that He had a sense of the beauty of the world around. That truth is included in the good would be more readily acknowledged than that beauty and happiness should be ; and yet the good should be that of the whole man, economic and æsthetic as well as rational and moral, while undoubtedly truth and goodness have the higher place. *Lastly*, " no man liveth unto himself " : biology would describe man as a gregarious animal ; philosophy would assert that his personality is essentially social. His reason can develop only in a rational environment, and his personality completes itself as it contributes to the completion of other personalities. Accordingly, the good cannot be merely an individual good ; it must be a social good. And the individual in the education of his own conscience must give due regard to the moral principles dominant in the society to which he

[1] *The Philosophy of Benedetto Croce*, by H. Wildon Carr, chapter vii., pp. 119 *ff.*

[2] *Op. cit.*, chapter iii., pp. 40 *ff.*

Is

belongs. If he can move in advance of them, it is his obligation to try and bring the society along with him, even if that should involve self-sacrifice. He cannot plead conscience as a reason for falling behind them. A difficult question arises as to the compromise, the accommodation of the individual conscience to social standards, which is morally legitimate. The need of the education of the individual conscience in this respect leads us to recognise a wider and more enduring standard of moral judgment, which meanwhile we may call *the Good*. The common terms "good" and "bad" as applied to conduct or character themselves indicate that standard.

(4) As this is not a treatise in ethics, and we are concerned with the science only in so far as an ethical approach is necessary to the subject of the Christian ideal, the different theories of the good need not be dealt with in detail.[1]

(i) The most obvious is *that pleasure is the good*; that the moral value of an action is to be measured by the amount of pain it prevents, or the amount of pleasure it promotes; and the measure is quantitative and not qualitative. This theory is known as *Hedonism*. This was the Cyrenaic position: any action was morally good which secured pleasure. (*a*) But perplexities soon emerge in the application of such a standard; the intensity of a pleasure is often in inverse ratio to its duration. Which is preferable: a short intense pleasure or a more enduring, if less intense? Epicureanism was a modification of the Cyrenaic theory, and its view may be called Eudæmonism. The good life is the happy life, where the intense enjoyments which are swiftly followed by violent reactions are avoided in order that more enduring and more tranquil joys may be possessed. While Epicureanism thus modified the theory which exalted sensuous pleasure, its estimate was still quantitative, and not qualitative. The current morality, which had been formed under Christian influences, made it impossible for moralists of modern times to avoid, when reviewing the theory, the recognition of *qualitative distinctions* in pleasures. Jeremy Bentham still maintains only a quantitative distinction: "quantity of pleasure being equal, pushpin is as good as poetry." J. S. Mill recognises a qualitative difference, for some pleasures are on their own account preferable to others. While this recognition makes the theory appear less disreputable, it sacrifices its consistency; for it can never be proved that

[1] See Sidgwick's *The History of Ethics*.

the higher pleasures qualitatively are also the greater pleasures quantitatively. Another standard than that of the amount of pleasure must be applied. The guide to conduct which was accepted was the current morality. All that this modified Eudæmonism could offer was *sanctions* for the observance of the accepted standards of conduct. The sanctions to which various writers call attention are the following: (1) the *natural*, the pains which are the consequences of the violation of any laws of nature; (2) the *political*, the penalties which the law inflicts on any conduct which is injurious to the community; (3) the *social*, the pleasure which the approval of others gives, or the pain which their disapproval inflicts; (4) the *religious*, the fear of hell or the hope of heaven. According to Paley, God wills the happiness of all His creatures, and will reward or punish action as it helps or hinders that end. He defines virtue as "doing good to mankind in obedience to the will of God and for the sake of everlasting life"—a definition which has been fitly condemned as "the maximum of error in the minimum of space." In it there lurks the twofold error. He substitutes "the will of God" for the moral ideal which man's moral discernment can appreciate and approve; even although it can be shown that the will of God and the moral ideal are identical, the substitution is wrong. He offers to morality a wrong motive, a motive other than a moral, the kind of motive which Jesus denounced in the Pharisees as their hypocrisy, and the opposite of which He affirmed in the purity of heart, the unmixed motive, to which alone the vision of God is given (Matt. v. 8). While, as has already been shown, men must take into account the consequences to themselves and to others of their actions, even as these affect their own or others' happiness, yet the consequences cannot be the sanctions of conduct. A man may act morally from the highest motives, regardless of consequences. He may risk life at duty's call. He may obey God rather than man in the rulers of his nation. He may defy the frown, and disregard the smile of others. He might be willing to miss heaven and to find himself in hell, if that situation were conceivable, rather than approve in God what his reason and conscience could not accept as true and right.

(*b*) Again, pleasure and pain are individual experiences; and this theory, if consistent, must favour selfishness, and discourage unselfishness. Another man's pleasure cannot

give me more pleasure than my own, if to secure his I must sacrifice my own, and if no higher principle than pleasure is involved. When such motives as sympathy, affection, devotion are invoked, pleasure is left far behind. Hence the *Utilitarianism*, which made its motto "The greatest happiness of the greatest number," useful as it was as a rough and ready guide in social reform, adds another inconsistency, as regard for individual pleasure can never be the motive of care for the common good. If it be said that man is by nature sympathetic, rejoicing in the joy of others, and grieving in their sorrows, the statement may be true, but it is not relevant as justifying this extension of Hedonism into Utilitarianism. In this modern development, in both respects, the recognition of a qualitative difference of pleasures, and the extension of obligation from self to others, an existing moral order is presupposed ; and all that the theory can do is to offer the plausible reason that pain will be avoided, and pleasure promoted, by conformity to that order. It urges : "If you want to be happy, be good" ; but it cannot develop out of its principle any standard of goodness. So far as it has any moral life, it is as a parasite on a moral order developed out of an altogether different moral principle.

(*c*) The merit the theory has is as a protest against the *asceticism* which regards morality as primarily a negation of the natural desires instead of an affirmation of them in proper subordination to the whole purpose of human life. Jesus began the Sermon on the Mount with beatitudes, and, although the Greek word used does not itself justify the distinction, we may with Carlyle distinguish *blessedness* and *happiness*, and hold that while happiness cannot be the moral end, blessedness, the satisfaction of the fully developed human personality, may be, nay, must be the *accompaniment* of the attainment of personal perfection ; for the perfect is the ever-blessed God. As a psychological analysis shows us, pleasure, when sought as an end, cannot be secured ; it can come only as the satisfaction of the desire for objects which for one reason or another are deemed desirable. Blessedness may be described as the pleasure which comes with the realisation of the moral ideal. Further, although individual happiness cannot be the end which morality sets before itself, since blessedness can be only the result of the satisfaction of the whole personality, rational, moral, and religious, as well as emotional, the promotion of the

happiness of others in care for their physical necessities (food, clothing, shelter, health, recreation) is a duty, as Jesus taught so clearly in the Parables of the Good Samaritan (Luke x. 25–37), the Rich Man and Lazarus (xvi. 19–31), and the Sheep and the Goats (Matt. xxv. 31–46). Hedonism, Eudæmonism, and Utilitarianism are not wrong in giving to pleasure or happiness a place in the human good, but only in making it the whole human good.

(ii) As one-sided, although in a worthier way, are the theories of *asceticism* and *rigorism*. (*a*) Man's physical necessities, his animal appetites, unless kept under control by the will, guided by the conscience, can become a moral danger to him, can drag him down to ruin as a personality of which the body is but an organ, its animal inheritance being a raw material to be moralised. The problem, however, is not solved, but shirked, when the attempt is made to suppress these necessities, and to expel these appetites. We have learned in recent years that to allow the imagination to be possessed by the ideas of sensual gratifications in order to combat and to conquer them, as the ascetics often did, is not the way of moral holiness or bodily health. Aspirations must replace appetites, and love lust. To reduce the self to a minimum content is to depreciate the value of self-control itself. Morality is not meant to be an impoverishment, but an enrichment of the self. Mere negation of desire is not the moral end, for were it completely successful it would result in a moral vacuum. "Oh, to be nothing, nothing," the aspiration of a popular hymn, is neither good morality nor good religion.

(*b*) What has been called *rigorism* does not insist on the suppression of desire, but rather on the exclusion from morality of every other motive except respect for the moral law. The assumption here is that morality consists only in recognition and valuation of the categorical imperative, and not in the fulfilment of the whole human personality, of which conformity to the moral ideal is the necessary, but not the exclusive content; and, further, that man is so radically bad that he needs to be commanded by the authority of the law, and cannot be constrained by the attractiveness to himself of what the law enjoins. According to Kant, the psalmist expresses an inferior morality when he confesses:

> *I delight to do Thy will, O my God;*
> *Yea, Thy law is within my heart* (xl. 8).

"The moral purism" of Kant—that is, his anxiety to purge the motives of action from all the greeds of sense—ends thus in rigorism, or the gloomy view that duty can only be reluctantly performed. It is this exaggeration that is pointed to in a well-known *Xenium* of Schiller's. The following scruple of conscience, namely :

Willingly serve I my friends all, but do it, alas, with affection ;
And so gnaws me my heart, that I'm not virtuous yet,

Schiller answers thus :

Help, except this, there is none : you must strive with might
to contemn them,
And with horror perform then what the law may enjoin.[1]

There are appetites, affections, aspirations, which have a legitimate and necessary place in man, when kept in due proportion and proper relation to the whole human personality fulfilling its vocation in human society ; and to act from these as motives is in no way an inferior morality, even where there is no consciousness of the categorical imperative.

(*c*) It is in moral crises, when a choice has to be made between two courses of action, that morality alone needs to become self-conscious, so that the decision may be made for what in the situation appears without conditions of advantage or preference imperative. But even here it is not an abstract law that is to be obeyed ; a person, a cause, a danger, a sacrifice of a definite concrete character is to be preferred. The apostles had to decide whether they would obey God, who commanded them to witness to the Risen Lord, or man, the prohibition of their preaching by the Jewish rulers (Acts iv. 19). So the Roman matron had to choose between her loyalty to Christ even unto death, or life for her aged father and helpless babe. It may even be argued that the better a man becomes, the more habitual goodness is for him, the more fully the appetites, affections, and aspirations have been brought into harmonious unity, the less will morality be a problem for him, the less will he know a categorical imperative, for all which that enjoins is being spontaneously realised in him. Moral crises are an evidence of moral incompleteness. We may with all reverence ask : Was

[1] Schwegler's *History of Philosophy*, Eng. trans., p. 235.

that what Jesus was thinking of in view of His own temptations and trials, sorrows and struggles, in doing the Father's will, when He disclaimed the epithet " good "? (Mark x. 18). A man may reach such a moral character that some sins are a moral impossibility without any conflict, and some virtues a moral necessity without any compulsion. This, as will afterwards be shown, is the distinctively Christian life, in which goodness is the fruit of the Spirit within. We must, then, dismiss asceticism and rigorism as alike inadequate theories. There may be in moral development occasions for the suppression of desires, and crises in which the sheer sense of duty must determine the course of action which is chosen ; but moral life as a whole does not consist exclusively of such occasions or crises.

(*d*) All-comprehensive as is the moral outlook of Jesus, He recognises that these are aspects of the Christian life. He bids us pluck out the eye, or cut off the hand or the foot that is a moral offence (Matt. xviii. 7–9), and put the Kingdom of God before all else, even our bodily needs (vi. 33). Nevertheless, although it may seem a paradox, the conscientious stage of morality is inferior to what we may call the spontaneous : the man who does right because it is his duty, from a sense of duty, is less advanced morally than he who does it because his duty is his delight. Have we not known a conscientious philanthropy that was far less attractive than a spontaneous kindliness and goodness ? Was Paul thinking of such a contrast when he writes of the righteous man, for whom one would scarcely die, and the good man, for whom one would even dare to die (Rom. v. 7)? It is what a man makes himself by his conduct that is his moral end.

(iii) We are thus led to ask : Is *self-realisation*, then, an adequate formula for the human good ? It is difficult to accept this formula, as it may so easily be used as a disguise for a refined selfishness, an individual culture that is not adequate to the whole moral situation. " Self-knowledge, self-reverence, self-control " is a maxim adequate only if the self is taken out of individual isolation into the whole range of relationship to nature, to man, and most of all to God. Putting it in other words, the human good cannot be *a merely individual human good.* (*a*) Man has a relation to nature ; he can discover its laws and control its forces ; and the greater his mastery becomes the more liable is he to make it a ruthless and reckless tyranny. It is not his to use

and enjoy just as he pleases. It is not mere sentimentalism to ask : Has human industry a right to defile and deface nature as it has been doing ? Is not man himself debased in our modern civilisation when it defies nature's claim for the preservation of her beauty ? Again, nature is avenged when by over-cropping the soil loses its fertility. Noble as is the sentiment of the poet Gray, his appreciation of human greatness or goodness which poverty deprives of adequate opportunity, nevertheless there is betrayed a wrong attitude to nature in his lines :

Full many a gem of purest ray serene
The dark unfathomed caves of ocean bear ;
Full many a flower is born to blush unseen,
And waste its sweetness on the desert air.

—" Elegy," stanza 14.

There is here the false assumption that nature exists only for man's use and enjoyment. That the morality of man's relations to nature has not been worked out in details is itself an evidence of the same assumption.

(*b*) Still more hurtful for man's moral development has been the inadequate regard for his relation to the lower animals. Without raising the disputable subjects of vegetarianism or vivisection, can there be any doubt that cruelty to animals, by which we mean any infliction of pain for which no adequate moral reason can be shown, degrades man ; and man's amusement as in rabbit-coursing, fox- and deer-hunting, cannot be regarded as such a reason ; nay, to advance this as a reason increases the moral offence. Coleridge has expressed the truth, moral and religious, in the lines :

He prayeth best, who loveth best
All things both great and small ;
For the dear God who loveth us,
He made and loveth all.

—" The Rime of the Ancient Mariner."

The indignation with which some persons repudiate man's animal ancestry is an indication of a restricted moral

outlook ; his physical descent no less than his spiritual ascent imposes obligations ; he must regard the ape as well as the angel as having a moral claim upon him.

(*c*) In recent years there has been a necessary reaction against the individualism of last century. Man is a gregarious animal—so speaks biology ; man is a social personality—so speaks philosophy ; all men are children of the same Father-God—so speaks the Christian religion. The human good must be a social and personal good ; "each for all, and all for each" must be its maxim. It is in his relations as son, husband, father, worker, citizen, that man realises his personality ; it is in social institutions that moral virtues find their expression and their exercise : the sociological is the necessary complement of the psychological consideration of ethics ; and a man must be judged morally no less by what he makes of his human environment than of himself.

(*d*) Only atheism or agnosticism can justify the exclusion from ethics of a wider environment than the social and the natural, even the divine. If God exists, if He be in all and through all and over all, if in Him we live and move and have our being, if we are his offspring, if we are, as Christianity affirms, the objects of His love as well as His care and bounty, then the self must be realised in relation to Him as well as to nature and man. The good, in which the human good is an element, and of the realisation of which it is a factor, is universal.

(*e*) Before passing, however, to consider this universal good, there remains something more to be said about this formula of self-realisation as the moral end : to guard it against the perversion of selfishness, it is sometimes added that self-realisation is by self-sacrifice, or the words of Jesus are used that he that loses his life shall find it (Matt. xvi. 25). That man must abandon lower goods to gain a higher good, the gratification of appetites for the satisfaction of aspirations, is the common human experience. The reality and the intensity of the self-sacrifice involved must not be minimised. It may be the loss of all things, life itself. Nor must the formula self-realisation through self-sacrifice suggest that there is calculation of gain in the loss. If the gain is lowered to the level of the loss, earthly gain for earthly loss, then what is shown is prudence and not virtue ; the sense of utility masquerades in the disguise of morality. The gain must be of a kind which makes no appeal to selfishness. And, even

while the joy of a realised higher purpose may sustain endurance of the suffering which its attainment involves, that joy must not be so intense as to remove the sense of pain. The confidence Jesus had of His resurrection did not relieve Him of the agony of Gethsemane or the desolation of the Cross.

(5) From the ethical standpoint we may accept the formula of self-realisation through self-sacrifice as the human good, so long as we place the self in these wider relations : nature, the animals, society, and God. When we recognise the last relation, ethics is brought into close alliance with theology. Man's self-realisation through self-sacrifice must be interpreted as man's conscious and voluntary fulfilment of God's purpose for himself, nature, animals, and his fellows ; for the very conception of God involves that the relation to Him cannot be one relation, co-ordinate with others, but a relation to which all others must be subordinate. To define that divine purpose belongs to a later stage of this discussion : but there are these considerations which may at this stage be submitted.

(*a*) If the ideals of truth, beauty, holiness, love, are to exercise an absolute and not a relative authority over man, they must be conceived as eternal reality in God, not limited as they are in man's apprehension and appreciation of them, but as in his progress man is ever seeking and striving to discern and estimate them. The moral ideal is the perfection of God Himself (Matt. v. 48). Man's realisation must be conditioned by the difference of the relation between God and man, and the relation between man and God. While fully recognising so close an affinity between God and man as allows an intimate communion, we must not so anthropomorphise God as to empty the term of any distinctive meaning, or so theomorphise man as to make the creature equal to the Creator, the human child to the divine Father. Man cannot be as perfect as God is ; but his ideal is a human perfection which, in correspondence with man's relation to God, reflects in him that divine perfection. To speak of God's character would suggest that God is acquiring His perfection, and that would contradict all consistent theistic thought, but if, speaking after the manner of men of what is ineffable, we chose to think that God is ever willing what He eternally is, then in Him the distinction which we make in man of nature and character is lost in the unity of His perfection.

(*b*) Theology is to-day rightly emphasising the *immanent* and *dynamic* conception of God, not to the exclusion of, but as a complement to, the *transcendent* and *static*. With God in His transcendent nature we as men have not to do, despite the Calvinist's confident knowledge of God's secret decrees, except by inference. What concerns us is God's immanent purpose ; God is expressing His nature in the world and man ; His reality is being revealed in man's ideals and their realisations, and in what God Himself is doing by His Spirit in and through man. God's revelation of Himself is a revelation of truth in man's reason and conscience, and of grace in His enabling Spirit. He is not an idle spectator, but the directing actor in the drama of human history. What gives special value to the prophetic succession in Israel is that they make known that purpose in their speaking, with a background of history in the events of which they discover and disclose His working. It may not be possible for us to ignore the historical sequence as they sometimes do, or to discern the connection of all events with that divine purpose, as is their habit. Their imagination may go beyond our historical explanation or theological interpretation. But a broad survey of the course of human history does justify the conviction of an immanent, dynamic God.

(*c*) Man as the recipient and agent of that purpose necessarily by his receptivity and responsiveness conditions its fulfilment. One of the unsolved problems of theology is why God, the perfect God, fulfils His purpose in and through human imperfection. He has revealed Himself in divers portions and divers manners (Heb. i. 1), and in man's development it is often difficult to trace the divine working. Recognising as we must that tribal customs, natural laws, individual conscience, are all conditioned by the local and temporal circumstances, we nevertheless can discern that all is not arbitrary and artificial, but that " through the ages an increasing purpose runs." The rudiments of this world in religious beliefs and moral standards are tutors unto the full revelation of the truth and grace of Jesus Christ. (Gal. iv. 1–4). The moral end thus acquires a new significance and value ; self-realisation is the realisation in and through the self of the purpose of God. In what terms this purpose is to be expressed will be matter for subsequent discussion. To sum up what has been here discussed ; ethics is the study, scientific or philosophical, of morality ; morality is concerned with the quality, right or wrong, good

or bad, of human conduct, that is, conscious voluntary action ; the judgment includes not only motive, but intention, and also consequences of action, so far as they are foreseen, or can be foreseen, and the standard of judgment is not ultimately custom, law, conscience, but the good as end : and that end is not pleasure or happiness, suppression of desire or obedience to law, but self-realisation through self-sacrifice as participation in the fulfilment of the divine purpose.

CHAPTER II

THE HUMAN IDEALS

The moral standard which in the previous chapter has been discussed has been described as *self-realisation through self-sacrifice in participation with the purpose of God.* As complex as is the self, and the relations of the self to nature, animals, society, and God, so complex must be that self-realisation. We may approach the description of that complexity in several ways. We may consider the *ideals* of which man is aware, and which he is seeking to realise. We may take history for our guide, and recall the *virtues* which Plato has expounded in his *Republic* and which the Christian Church accepted, along with the three *graces*, as a moral guide. By each of these methods of approach we may give fuller content to the ideal in its unity and completeness.

The ideals which have found general recognition in the past are Truth, Beauty, and Goodness, and they are treated together in Cousin's work, *Du Vrai, du Beau, et du Bien.* Truth is the ideal of the intellect ; Beauty of the emotions, or a distinctive kind of emotions, the æsthetic ; and Goodness of the will. In so relating them more immediately to one aspect of personality we must not relapse into the old " faculty " psychology, but must always preserve the unity of personality in all its aspects, although one or another aspect may be in different conditions prominent. This generally accepted view has been recently challenged by Professor Mary Calkins, who regards " feeling, willing, and affirmation, all three, as distinct and basal types of valuing, occurring either singly, or in any combination."[1] If this means only that the pursuit of truth, the enjoyment of beauty, and the effort after goodness need not be simultaneous, no objection need be made ; but if it means that there can be thought without feeling, or feeling without thought, or willing without feeling, the assertion may be doubted. To give an adequate definition of any of these ideals is difficult, and yet it must be attempted.

I

(1) To define *truth* as the correspondence of thought with reality is to assume that thought can get outside of itself, can

[1] *Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 1928, p. 419.

apprehend reality as apart from itself, and can then compare the two : this is obviously absurd. The mind cannot get outside of itself, as the perception of the world, and the intercourse through hearing and seeing, speech and gesture, with that part of the world which is distinguished as other selves, are within the consciousness of the self, although distinguished from the unique self-consciousness ; but within consciousness there is always the contrast of the subject and the object, and as mind develops there is a clearer and firmer discrimination between the increasing objective contents of the mind and what is being added to it by the subjective activity. The tests of the objectivity of these contents may be regarded as the following : the coherence of the contents with one another, so that instead of a chaos of perceptions, images, concepts there is a cosmos, an intelligible unity, an organic whole of thought ; the correspondence between the contents of one consciousness and the contents of other consciousnesses as discovered in the varied forms of intercourse which mind has with mind by speech or literature ; the fulfilment in the perceptions within consciousness of anticipations of what will be on the basis of what already is within the consciousness, an evidence that reality as known in perception is as it has been thought. In these ways the individual mind finds itself in harmony with its own thought and with what others think of reality, and in so far with reality itself as to anticipate its course, and even gain a control over it. Thus is the ideal of truth realised.[1]

(2) The moral obligations which the ideal of truth involves may be described as threefold, of thought, of word, and of deed, or in its *discovery*, its *impartation*, and its *application*. It is impossible to give an exhaustive account of all that is involved in the practice of any moral principle ; we can only give a partial description at best. (i) The fundamental value in *the pursuit of truth* is (*a*) *sincerity*, that is, the desire to discover the truth, the whole truth, and the truth only, whatever sacrifice of presuppositions or disappointment of expectations the discovery may involve. Where the wish is father to the thought, there sincerity is absent. The intellectual sin is to believe what one wants to believe, and to shrink from the abandonment of views which one would

[1] This ideal of truth has its roots in man's animal ancestry, in the instinct of curiosity and the emotion of wonder, which, according to McDougall, many of the higher animals display, but which, as dangerous, remains feeble in most (*Social Psychology*, p. 57).

like to hold still, even although their falsehood is forcing itself on the mind. For instance, how many otherwise good Christian people are there, who believe that the faith in God which gives life its fullest meaning and highest worth is bound up with the superseded view of the verbal inspiration of the Bible, and who, therefore, refuse even to examine the grounds on which that view is being abandoned by instructed and intelligent believers? One can only pity them that the mistake which associates faith with any such view involves them, as it does, in sacrificing the virtue of sincerity.

(*b*) In the pursuit of truth further, there is ever the danger of bias, temperamental, educational, environmental, towards one conclusion rather than another; and accordingly there must be a constant rigorous self-scrutiny so that in any investigation there will be *impartiality*, the collection of all the data relevant to any enquiry, and the estimate of them which is unaffected by attraction to, or aversion from, any conclusion to which they may lead.

(*c*) To use the mind in the best way possible, so that it will become as effective an instrument of knowledge and judgment as its capacity allows, involves a certain mental discipline so that it acquires certain qualifications for its tasks. These may appear to be only intellectual qualities; but, if the pursuit of truth is a duty, a necessary part of personal self-realisation, then the acquisition of these qualities is a moral obligation. One of these qualities is *concentration*, the capacity to exclude from consciousness all that would distract and divide the mind, and to fix the attention exclusively, and to keep it fixed for as long as may be necessary on the one object of thought until it yields up as much of its content as the mind can receive, or for the purpose for which the investigation is made needs or desires to receive. Success in the pursuit of truth mainly depends on this quality. As Jacob wrestled with his unknown visitant until he won the blessing (Gen. xxxii. 24–26), so the thinker wrestles with the object of his thought until he wrings from it its secret.

(*d*) Only one other quality need be mentioned; it is *accuracy*, the mind's apprehension of the object of its thought as it is in its complete objectivity, as tested in the ways mentioned above. This quality is the opposite of that loose thinking which sees men as trees walking. By what methods of training the mind can acquire these and other qualities which make it the effective instrument of thought in the

pursuit of truth belongs to educational theory. What here needs to be emphasised is that such qualities of mind are a moral obligation in so far as by discipline they can be developed.

(ii) Men live in intercourse with one another, in interchange of thought ; and the pursuit of truth is followed by its *impartation*. (*a*) The fundamental virtue here is *truthfulness* or *veracity*, the correspondence of what is spoken with what is thought or felt or willed, the agreement of the outward expression with the inward content. This at first sight seems a virtue simple and easy to practise, apart altogether from any situation in which the communication of truth might be dangerous or painful to the speaker. But it is not so easy nor so simple. Although words are assumed to have the same meaning to all who use them, yet the intellectual content of the same word may be different to two persons speaking to one another. What is already in the mind of each will determine how much or how little the words may mean. There is what psychology calls the principle of *apperception*, namely, that the mind can assimilate only what has contact with what it already contains. The obligation of truthfulness involves that the words will not only express for the speaker what he is thinking, but will also convey the same thought to the mind of the hearer, so far as that mind can receive its content. Truth may be so expressed as to convey, not itself, but falsehood to another mind. To deny the doctrine of the verbal inspiration of the Bible may to a speaker mean intellectual emancipation ; to some of his hearers it may convey spiritual disaster. Inasmuch as a man is responsible for the consequences of his words and deeds, so far as he can foresee them, truthfulness demands that truth shall be so spoken that truth shall also be heard. A man cannot be held responsible for a misunderstanding through ignorance, prejudice, or malice, which he had no reason to expect ; but if he knows the mental capacity of his hearers he must take that into account in his method of expressing the truth. Hence plain prose to be literally understood may not be the best means of reaching the end of truthfulness. The "truth embodied in a tale" may "enter in at lowly doors," which would be barred to a definition or demonstration. This was the method of Jesus. He spoke in parables to the multitudes who would not at once receive His message. The story might be remembered, and might yield up its secret as the capacity

to understand developed. In imparting religious truth, which is concerned with God, the infinite and absolute, " beyond all knowledge and all thought " possible to man's finite mind, symbol must necessarily have a large place. The name Father, which Christ gave to God, is not a dogma, but a metaphor, yielding an ever richer content to the mind as it grows in faith in the grace of Christ. Hence Hegel was mistaken (and so is many a prosaic philosopher) when he supposed that the abstract idea of philosophy more adequately expressed reality than the concrete image of religion.

(*b*) While there is the obligation of truthfulness in speech, that does not involve that all that is true must be spoken. In determining what should and should not be spoken, we have to consider two virtues which at first appear as a contrast, *candour* and *reserve*, or *consideration*. The candid man imparts to others as much as for his own moral good as well as for theirs he can impart, and withholds only what it might be for his or their hurt if he uttered. There are men who make a boast that they always say what they think ; very often they are thinking of themselves or of others what they are under no moral obligation to think, what even a more sensitive conscience would forbid their thinking. And even if their thought be true after careful testing, it may not be best for their relation to others that they should utter it. There is a *reserve* in utterance which is imposed by self-respect, and a *consideration* for others which regard for them imposes. The man who carries his heart upon his sleeve, who is ready to talk about the sacred and precious intimacies of his relation to God and those with whom he has the closer bonds of distinctive affection, as of husband and wife, parent and child, friend and friend, is not to be commended. Browning truly says that a man " has two soul-sides, one to face the world with, and one to show a woman when he loves her " ; and he lacks self-respect, and regard for her, if, unless on an occasion that might justify his tribute to her worth, he lets the world know what should generally be their mutual secret.

" Faithful are the wounds of a friend " (Prov. xxvii. 6) ; but the faithfulness of a friend does not always require the inflicting of the wound. As in morals general principles need to be interpreted by concrete instances, the following illustration may be pardoned. The newly-wed wife of a young minister once asked an older minister whether it

was her duty to point out to her husband some peculiarities of voice and gesture which hindered the effectiveness of his preaching. He answered, "Yes, but not unless on the fit occasion, not when the gloom of despondency which falls on the preacher often or the glow of exaltation of mood which sometimes is given is upon him; only when his mind is relaxed, his heart less sensitive, can any counsel be wisely and kindly given." It may be cruel at times for us to tell others what we may be truthfully thinking of them, and only responsibility for the character of another can justify the words which wound. If they must be spoken, they should be spoken so tenderly as to soothe the pain. Truth must be spoken in love, in regard for another's good.

(*c*) This consideration for others raises one of the most serious problems of a legitimate casuistry, which, if not solved with scrupulous care, may lapse into an illegitimate. Putting the question bluntly: Can a lie ever be right? To withhold the truth, as has already been said, is morally legitimate, unless the person from whom it is withheld has a moral claim to hear it, as a parent of a child, or a teacher of a pupil. A more difficult question arises when the truth which is demanded is not about self, but about another. A tell-tale is not an attractive character. We are not morally required to approve Joseph when he "brought the evil report about his brethren to their father" (Gen. xxxvii. 2). A wise parent or teacher will, if at all possible, avoid the difficult situation in which child or scholar is forced to choose between truthfulness and consideration for others. To refuse an answer when that answer might be used for an evil purpose is a duty. But the refusal to answer may be often taken as virtually an affirmative answer; and the refusal may carry with it injurious consequences to another. A fugitive in hiding may be betrayed to his pursuer, who is the agent of revenge, and not justice, if an answer regarding his whereabouts is withheld. Again, life may be endangered, if a patient knows how serious his illness is; shall relative, nurse, or friend simply keep silence, when the silence may awaken the dangerous fears? There are moral situations in which evasion seems impossible, and the lie inevitable, if serious injury to others is to be avoided. It is right for a man to refuse to tell the lie if he alone is the sufferer from the telling of the truth; but when the suffering falls on others, the case is not so simple. It may be argued that truth in communication is a moral obligation only when

others have a right to demand it. The real intention of a murderer places him outside of the moral relation, in which truth is a duty. The dangerous condition of the sufferer puts him in his own interest also into a moral relation, where the withholding of the truth, or even a lie, becomes a duty. Even if a man's moral judgment approves such reasoning, yet if his conscience is sensitive, his moral sentiment will make him profoundly unhappy. If he can tell the lie without pain or shame, his moral character must suffer. Recognising the validity of the reasoning, my conscience revolts against the conclusion, and I pray that God may save me from the moral tragedy of having ever to admit that to tell a lie is right for me. If a man does not share that intense repugnance to falsehood of any kind in any circumstances, he has not truth in his inner parts.

(iii) Besides the pursuit and the communication of truth, there is *the application* of it *to life*. (*a*) This seems to be the most appropriate place to deal with the need and the duty of truth in the judgment of self and the judgment of others. Pope's couplet :

> *Know then thyself, and seek not God to scan,*
> *The proper study of mankind is man,*

may be accepted, not in its prohibition, but in its injunction. A man should know himself and his fellow men, if he is to deal rightly with himself or them. He should pursue the truth about himself and all with whom he has to deal. The *conceited* man thinks " more highly of himself than he ought to think," whereas his duty is " to think soberly, according as God hath dealt to each man a measure of faith " (Rom. xii. 3), or capacity, or character. To think *soberly* is to form as true a judgment as sincere scrutiny will allow ; a man should not depreciate himself in disregard of what he knows himself to be mentally, morally, spiritually. There is a morbidness of self-blame as well as a vanity or pride of self-praise which is equally contrary to the truth ; the difference between *vanity* and *pride* may be described as being this—that the vain man is not sure that others share his self-estimate, and so is easily offended, but the proud man does not care whether others think of him as he does of himself, and is regardless of their opinion. *Humility*, the Christian grace which must be based on truth in self-estimate, does not deny the *worth* a man has by nature,

development, effort, or grace (that is *mock-humility*), but it recognises his *unworthiness* as measured by what God means that he should be, and what he may by grace become. It does not require that, to quote a phrase once used by Dr. Fairbairn, a man should make himself a mat for other people to wipe their feet on. Humility does not exclude self-respect, and the expectation of respect from others. It is consistent with *dignity*. Penitence for the actual, aspiration after the ideal, the sense of worth, and the feeling of unworthiness, should blend in a man's estimate of himself according to the truth.

(*b*) The *censorious* man thinks less highly of others than he ought to think ; he does not think soberly of them, according as he can see in them what God has given them in capacity, character, or faith. Christian love does not ignore the faults of others, but it does not exaggerate them ; nay, it will minimise them as far as truth will allow ; it will generously recognise whatever there is good in others. Its admission of their unworthiness, where truth compels, will not suppress the appreciation of their worth, all that by grace they can become. The Christian will see in himself and others a child of God, for whom Christ died, in whom the Spirit strives and may yet fully dwell. Much that has in the past been regarded as piety of the highest order has not been according to truth in the estimate either of self or of others. To know God as He is revealed in Christ as Father is to know oneself as, not a worm, guilty and damned, but as a child being redeemed by grace for glory. While love demands more than law can, and must deepen the sense of unworthiness, love also can relieve the strain of self-condemnation. If a man is of the truth, i.e., judges himself by the standards of Christ, he can, even when conscious of this unworthiness, find assurance that because God has fuller insight than he can at any moment in any mood have of all he is and may yet become, God's judgment will be, not of law, but of love (1 John iii. 19–20). The saying that love is blind may be true of foolish fondness ; but the love of God, and man's love as it gains the quality of God's, has this more adequate discernment. In judgment of others especially is it needful, as Burns pleads, to remember not only the sins committed, but if we know them, the temptations resisted. This truth, allied with love, in the judgment of self and others is a condition of all right dealing.

(*c*) There must be not only knowledge of self and others

according to truth, but knowledge of the standards of judgment to be applied; what is the ideal to be realised in conduct and character? This is the function of what is generally described as conscience, and Kant designated the practical reason. The quality of a conscience which does properly discriminate between the moral truth and the moral error, and can give sure and safe guidance, is *wisdom*. It is the virtue which Plato assigns to the rulers of his ideal city in the *Republic*, and to the fuller treatment of it we must return when we deal with the cardinal virtues. What in this connection must be emphasised is that despite the bewildering and baffling variety of moral customs, standards, institutions, there have been in history moral seers, whose discernment rose above and reached beyond the morality of their own times and surroundings, to a moral reality, more permanent and universal. The apprehension of that reality is moral truth, and the application of it to the moral life is wisdom.[1] For the theist that moral reality is God; for the Christian that moral reality has not only been partially and gradually disclosing itself in man's moral development, but is made manifest, as far as the limitations of manhood allow, in Jesus Christ. Wisdom in the Christian setting becomes faith in Christ as supreme moral authority. His teaching, example, spirit, need interpretation; His general principles must be applied to the details of life. Christian wisdom is not the independent discovery of moral reality, but as faith in Christ the acceptance of that reality in Him, and an ever deeper and wider understanding of Him as the Truth. Such wisdom implies a twofold knowledge: on the one hand of the general principles to be applied, on the other of all the conditions in any moral situation relevant to the application in the particular instance. The tendency of Christian ethics hitherto has been too abstract; and consequently either Christians who tried to apply the principles in their lives, were not fully effective in action, or the Christian ideal was dismissed by persons who prided themselves on being practical as "too good for human nature's daily food." What the world needs is a proof that the ideal is true, *because it works*. In times past moral progress has largely depended on the wisdom of the few; to-day, when the problems to be solved are of an extent and complexity for which individual action is not

[1] For a discussion of the relation of man's consciousness to the divine consciousness see Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics*.

adequate, but corporate action is necessary, we must rely more on what we may call collective wisdom, the conclusions of earnest and intelligent men in conference to discover what is God's will, and what it is their duty to do.

(*d*) From wisdom we may usefully distinguish *prudence*. This is not concerned with the ends of morality, but with the means. When wisdom has shown the direction of the onward march, prudence must prepare the way. It must by scrutiny of the whole situation anticipate what risks must be run, and how dangers must be averted ; what price must be paid in labour or gifts, and how both may be most effectively used without any waste. It is unfortunate that wisdom and prudence do not always dwell together in the same mind. The *doctrinaire* may hold the true principles ; but he does not know how fully to apply them ; the *opportunist* knows what the time and the place allow and call for, but ignores the principles which should be applied. Lord Rosebery described Oliver Cromwell as a *practical mystic*, and this " formidable combination " is necessary for right action ; wisdom and prudence must go together, the discernment of the true ends, and the discovery of the right means. In the sociological part of this volume the guiding rule will be this combination of principle and its application.

(3) In closing this section on *truth* it seems necessary to add that, as a rule, in dealing with morals the claim of this ideal is not adequately recognised. The exaltation of the heart over the head, the depreciation of thought in comparison with action, the greater rewards the world offers to the practical men rather than the searchers after truth, are all tendencies to be deplored. To the complete human personality the realisation of the ideal of truth belongs. It is science, the pursuit of truth in the realm of nature, which has made possible man's progress in civilisation, his command of material resources. It is the neglect of an equal devotion to, and success in, the pursuit of truth in the realm of moral and spiritual reality, which is the reason for the failure of this progress in civilisation to solve the problems of personal relations and social institutions, which is the distress and the danger, and it may be the doom, of this age.

II

The second ideal to be realised is *beauty*. In the exposition of morals, however, little attention has been given to this subject. But since there is so much beauty in nature, which

man has the æsthetic sense to appreciate ; and since in art man has been able to produce beauty, not merely as an imitation of nature, but as an expression of himself, it deserves some consideration.

(1) While we associate the word beauty more closely with the sense of sight than with any of the others, here we are concerned with it in the widest meaning ; it may be found in the rhythm and the imagery of poetry, the blending of colours in painting, the moulding of lines, curves, surfaces in sculpture and architecture, the gleam of dawn and the glow of sunset, the human face and form. Although we associate beauty with our senses, should not the term, even if figuratively, be applied to a satisfying presentation of truth, or " the beauty of holiness " (a happy mistranslation of what should probably be rendered " holy attire," R.V. marg., Ps. cx. 3). Ruskin gives the term the wider meaning ; and although probably many exponents of art to-day would consider him as discredited as an art-critic because he was so much of the moralist, yet one may venture in a book on morals, with which none of his contemners is likely to make acquaintance, to refer to him. He describes four sources of beauty in his *Modern Painters*, Vol. II. : " the record of conscience ; the symbolising of divine attributes in Matter, the felicity of living things ; and the perfect fulfilment of their duties and functions." According to Ruskin, " in all cases Beauty suggests something Divine ; External Nature is glorious as a symbol of God's Nature ; the felicity of animal life is evidence of ' His kind presence ' ; excellent working is evidence of obedience to His will ; and conscience is His approving voice."[1] With the theistic inference we are not concerned, nor need we approve his rather indiscriminate use of the term beauty. We may so far agree with him as to maintain that beauty may be appreciated in the expressions of man's inner life as well as in sensible objects.

(2) The fundamental element in the conception of beauty is difference-in-unity, such a combination of varied elements as satisfies because the impression made is one, and not manifold ; the mind finds itself not distracted by the particulars, but harmonised in their totality. Further, while there are combinations of sounds, colours, shapes so adapted to the senses that the sensible medium, whether of music, painting, or sculpture, itself gives a satisfaction, a further

[1] This summary is quoted from A. Caldecott's *The Philosophy of Religion*, pp. 190–191.

satisfaction is experienced, that is the beauty is enhanced, by expressiveness, if the medium, whatever it may be, carries as its meaning the harmony of God, nature, and man. Whatever the art critics of to-day may babble about art for art's sake, and even if they claim as highest art only combinations of the sensible elements, which convey no such meaning, one cannot but agree with the place which Hegel assigns to art as the manifestation of the Idea or the Spirit in sensuous media.

(3) Tastes regarding the beautiful differ in individuals, and from age to age and land to land ; they are affected by education, and even fashion. Because the appreciation of beauty has not been so necessary to the preservation and progress of society as the recognition of goodness, there has not been the common thorough culture of the æsthetic sense as of the moral sentiments ; and that culture has, therefore, tended to become the esoteric possession of cliques, and an exotic, not the expression of the whole of life. What must be emphasised here is this—that if the moral good is self-realisation, the complete human personality, the culture of the æsthetic sense, should not be so restricted, but should be made a possibility for all ; an appreciation of beauty in nature and in art should be cultivated in all. Probably the assumption would then be disproved that this æsthetic sense is an endowment peculiar to the comparatively few. If easy access to the country, to parks, museums, galleries, libraries, were even more widely secured than now is the case in most communities, and if this kind of culture were regarded as a necessary element in education, as by the provision of beautiful schools, and in them beautiful walls, pictures, music, song, and poetry, at least no child who possesses the capacity for such appreciation would be deprived of the full opportunity for its development. This culture may be claimed for its own sake ; but the claim is enforced by the consideration that human personality is a unity, and that the neglect of one of its capacities is an injury to the whole.

(4) It is being recognised that beautiful surroundings have an influence on mental capacity and moral character. Beauty is not a minister of vice, ugliness does not promote virtue, as an extreme Puritanism seems to have assumed. The cultivating of the æsthetic sense in isolation from, and it may be even defiance of, the moral conscience, has led to moral deterioration ; but it is not the æsthetic sense in itself

that is the cause, but the exclusive dominance which has been assigned to it. The phrase "Art for art's sake" is true in so far as the artist must make the creation of beauty, whatever medium he employs, his exclusive object; but it does not mean that as a human personality he may ignore moral obligations and social relations; the surrender of the whole man to the one object is a sacrifice to an idol. On the other hand, we may raise the question whether the sense of beauty in the wider meaning of the term mentioned above has found the recognition which it deserves in the formation of moral character. Is there, or is there not, "a beauty of holiness"? Is there a combination of moral qualities which can bring the same feeling of satisfaction as the contemplation of a beautiful scene in nature, or a work of art? How often the character of the good man even is lop-sided, lacking elements to its completeness, or inconsistent, the excellences not harmonised—excess of one, defect if not absence of another. One man is upright, but harsh; another is kind, but shifty. A righteous man may repel; and a man of less virtue attract. How significant is the double sense of the Greek word χάρις, or even our use of the English word grace. Should not God's grace in a man's heart give grace to his morals and manners in word and deed? Polished manners cannot compensate for loose morals; but a saint is less a saint if he is rude. The manner of giving may make a gift an insult; or it may make its acceptance appear a favour. This subject cannot now be pressed further; but I am confident this aspect of morals deserves more attention than it usually receives. For the attractiveness of goodness is one condition of its effectiveness.

(5) Is there a standard of beauty; or must we assume that there is no accounting for tastes? Is the standard subjective, determined solely by individual preferences, or is it also objective, depending on some higher reality than man? As regards beauty in the lower sense, the sensible satisfaction art may give, apart from its expressiveness, there is probably some psychological explanation. But with this we need not concern ourselves for our purpose. Does not the beauty which nature discloses offer a standard, especially if, as theism believes, that Beauty is, even as Truth and Goodness, a disclosure of the reality of God? Will not the artist who keeps closest to nature preserve his standard of beauty more than the artist who allows himself to be dominated by the passing fashions of a school? That does not involve that art must

be simply a copy of nature, that the more like a photograph a picture is, the better ; for art is an expression of human personality, and the artist even in a landscape or a seascape may express himself, and so contribute something original to human life ; and that expression is for others his personal interpretation, so that they may see more than they could see before. In the measure the artist reaches beyond his own individuality, and becomes an organ of universal human life, will his picture gain in expressiveness ; he may convey to others far more than the eye alone can see, " thoughts too deep for tears." In music no imitation of nature is attempted, unless as a jest, but the expression of the personality of the musician can be, and often is, an interpretation to the hearers of universal life. Many an artist, and still more art-critic, would be saved by a sense of humour from taking himself so seriously, and would, either in the creation of beauty, or the appreciation of beauty in art, contribute far more than either now often does to the general diffusion of the æsthetic sense, and the more general enhancement of human personality by giving in its development its proper place to beauty.

(6) The appreciation of beauty in nature has been in some of the great poets closely associated with the religious sentiments. Shelley does not give his adoration of nature a theistic interpretation ; but it is akin to the religious sentiments.

Earth, ocean, air, beloved brotherhood,
If our great mother hath imbued my soul
With aught of natural piety to feel
Your love, and recompense the boon with mine.

. . . . . .

Mother of this unfathomable world !
Favour my solemn song, for I have loved
Thee ever, and thee only.

—" Alastor."

In Wordsworth, through nature God is reached ; for in her fellowship he felt—

A Presence that disturbs us with the joy
Of elevated thoughts ; a sense sublime
Of something far more deeply interfused,
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean, and the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man.

—" Tintern Abbey."

The Cambridge Platonists recognised beauty as a revelation of God. "Those scattered rays of beauty and loveliness, which we behold spread up and down over all the world, are only the emanations of that unexhausted light which is above."[1]

Jesus shows an appreciation of nature, and a sense of God's presence in nature as one element in the completeness of His personality. Here Paul shows his limitations; he has an interest in human life in its various phases, but not in nature. We may fitly raise the question whether religion has not often followed too closely in the footsteps of Paul in too exclusive a concentration of interest on human sin and divine grace, although these must always be at the centre of a Christian theology, and has failed to go in the path of Jesus in not preserving more of what we may call natural along with its historical religion. May not the attraction for many minds in Protestantism of Catholicism (Roman or Anglican), with its richer sensuous symbolism of the divine reality, making appeal to the æsthetic sense, be due to the too barely intellectualist presentation by preaching of the truth and grace of Christ in Protestantism. Although I do not myself feel that attraction, I recognise how wide-spread and strong it now is.

(7) If, as has just been maintained, nature, and God in nature, may offer a standard of beauty, and if the appreciation of that beauty is an essential element of human culture and may be closely associated with religious sentiment, the development of the whole personality, is it not a duty that beauty should be preserved? The industrial development has involved the defiling of the face of nature. Morally, the men degraded themselves who so recklessly, and it almost seems wantonly, sacrificed beauty to utility as they conceived it, for it is probable that that sacrifice involved the sacrifice of much that is valuable in human life. Happily improved industrial methods hold out the promise that this thoughtless and heartless insult to God, the giver of beauty, and injury to man, whom the gift enriches, will not be continued on the same scale. It is not contended that the beauty of nature must never be sacrificed to utility, if the contribution of that utility to the common human good were more valuable than the preservation of what is but part of it. As has been argued in a previous chapter, human

[1] John Smith, *The Excellence and Nobleness of True Religion*.

self-realisation must be in true and right relations to nature, animals, man, and God.

III

(1) The third ideal, that for the will, is usually described by the term *Goodness*; but it seems to me, in expounding the Christian personality, to be better to use the term *holiness*.[1] This term holy, which originally describes God's difference and separation from man, the *numinous* of Otto's book *Das Heilige*,[2] has gradually received a moral content, as God's nature, character, and purpose has been moralised in "the ethical monotheism" of the prophets, and the revelation of God as Father in Jesus Christ. It can now express for us God's absolute moral perfection. If from its original meaning it still conveys a sense of God's transcendence of man in His perfection, it no less presents the reality of that perfection as man's ideal, the realisation of which for man himself was a "forlorn hope," but which by the grace of God has been made a hopeful aspiration. The law said to the chosen people in its summons to separation, ritual and moral, from other nations, "Ye shall be holy, for I the Lord your God am holy" (Lev. xix. 2). The Gospel says to the Christian disciple: "Ye shall be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect" (Matt. v. 48) in an impartial goodness that giveth sunshine and shower to all men alike. The derivation of the word *holy* from the Anglo-Saxon *halig*, whole, perfect, healthy, from the root *hal*, sound, whole, through which it is connected with the words hail, heal, and whole, justifies its use. The connection between the original and the derived meaning of the word is not obvious. In Murray's dictionary it is suggested that the connection may be as follows: "Inviolate, inviolable, present whole or intact, that cannot be injured with impunity." We are entitled to carry into the conception of holiness the content of health and wholeness. The holy man is the normal, the complete man. It is interesting to compare the Greek ὅλος, whole, entire, complete, with the Latin equivalents *solus*, *solidus*. It is the Greek word which has led General Smuts to describe his philosophy as *Holism*: the principle of the evolution of the universe is the tendency to make wholes; in other words the movement is *organic*.

[1] Heb., *qadosh*; Gr., ἅγιος; Lat., *sacer*.
[2] Translated into English under the title *The Idea of the Holy*, by J. W. Harvey.

Holiness is self-realisation, normal and complete, through self-sacrifice in self-knowledge, self-reverence, and self-control, and this self-realisation is not in isolation, but in relation to other wholes—family, city, state, humanity, man as the family of God. Thus holiness expands itself—and realises itself more fully in love. The apprehension of truth and the appreciation of beauty are aspects of holiness, as is the achievement of the perfect moral character and the perfect social relations with man and God.

(2) As aspects of *holiness* we may distinguish *righteousness* and *goodness*, following Paul's example: "Scarcely for a righteous man will one die; for peradventure for the good man some would even dare to die" (Rom. v. 7). The righteous man is one who conforms to the law; the good man is one who is moved to seek another's good. Righteousness is preservative and protective morality; goodness is expansive and communicative. Even where there was no hypocrisy, Pharisaism was marked by righteousness and not goodness. Saul, before his conversion, was "as touching the law, a Pharisee," sincere and earnest, and "as touching the righteousness which is in the law, found blameless." (Phil. iii. 5, 6). The Servant of Yahveh in Isa. liii. is God's "righteous servant"; but his righteousness is more than conformity to law; it is not only generous goodness, but sacrificial love; and so is "the righteousness of God" in the Pauline Epistles. Although such ethical terms are not used with rigidity, it is well, however, to distinguish the two aspects of holiness, as illustrated in James's definition of the "pure religion and undefiled before our God and Father, to visit the fatherless and widows in their affliction, and to keep himself unspotted from the world" (i. 27); and the terms righteousness and goodness by their derivation are fitted to do this. They correspond to the distinction, discussed in a previous chapter, between the moral standard as *law* and as *good*; and as the second is the more adequate standard, so is goodness a more excellent virtue than is righteousness, although inevitably the one is depreciated in value by the absence of the other. The man whose kindness is not accompanied by uprightness may do moral injury to others by the object and the method of his dealing. The conscientious man whose conscience is not only a torment to himself, but a nuisance to others, does not promote but rather retards the moral progress of others. What a man gives to others depends on his own worth; and the value to

himself of his character is enhanced by the influence which he can exercise over others. As we shall see afterwards in discussing in the sociological section the relation of the individual to society, individuation or the realisation of personality, and socialisation or the progressive relation to others go together.

If the righteousness is conformity to a law which no longer interprets truly and fully the obligations which the existing situation imposes, then it will be not in accord with, but contrary to, the demands of goodness, the furtherance of the moral interests of others. To give a concrete illustration, the righteousness of many leaders of industry during last century, their practice of Christian principles as they apprehended them, was inconsistent with goodness, the regard which they should have had for the interests of others. Accordingly, a man must be constantly revising his standard of righteousness to secure that it does not challenge, but confirms, the claims of goodness upon him.

(3) This contrast and connection of righteousness and goodness leads us to the consideration of the duty that a man owes to himself and the duty he owes to others. Jesus required equal love to self and neighbour, and in the Golden Rule made a man's expectations from others the measure of his obligations to others.

(*a*) A man has a duty to himself to become the best man which it is possible for him to be—not another's best, but his own best. Guided by self-knowledge, moved by self-reverence, he must always be exercising his self-control for this end. A healthy body, an intelligent mind, a sensitive conscience, an affectionate heart, a steadfast will—as complete and normal a personality as the raw material of his nature allows him to make himself—this is the duty he owes to himself. He has a right to expect from others furtherance and not hindrance in the pursuit of this purpose. Such self-culture is not selfishness ; for the best a man can give to others is his best self.

(*b*) What he may claim as a right from others, to be allowed and helped to be his best, he must recognise as a duty to others, so that they shall be furthered and not hindered by him in being their best. This ministry to others may involve, as it did for Christ, giving life as a ransom—that is, self-sacrifice. It is not always easy to determine the limits of self-culture and self-sacrifice. If a man by the nature and the method of his service finds himself reduced

in his moral value in that service, he may pause and consider if he is really doing his best for others by allowing himself to become less than his best. An illustration may make this consideration clearer. A worker in the slums of a great city found relief and refreshment in attending an orchestral concert of the highest quality on Saturday. Moved to pity by the squalor and misery which he saw around him, he felt it was self-indulgence to spend even the half-crown which had to be paid for admission to the concert, and so gave up this pleasure. But he soon discovered that he could not do his labours of love on Sunday with such cheerfulness, courage, and even confidence in God, as when he allowed himself for a few hours on the wings of music to be borne into the supersensible world of divine reality by the sensuous medium. While it is better to deny the claims of self-culture in service of others than to shirk the duty of self-sacrifice for one's own good, yet holiness, wholeness, does demand as accurate an adjustment of love for self and love for others as wisdom, inspired by love, can discover.

(*c*) And this adjustment will depend on the subordination of both to that love of God ; self-love is not self-indulgence in safety, ease, comfort, but the fulfilment of the claim of entire self-surrender to God. Love for others is not indulgence of their self-love in safety, comfort, ease, but a furtherance by example and influence of their entire self-surrender unto God. While Christian duty demands care for the bodily needs of others, so far as we can make provision for them, if they cannot meet their own wants, it does not involve the support of the idler or the waster ; this is a compassion which may be morally injurious to them. The impulse to comfort and help would lose its Christian grace if always accompanied by careful calculations as to whether such injury might follow ; and yet a reflective charity which does not use reflection as an excuse for selfishness is necessary, if good intentions are not to have bad results. It is no Christian obligation to help another to become rich, or popular, or powerful, although he may desire such help from us ; the obligation is to do all we can to enable another to become his best self—the fully God-surrendered self, as we strive in like manner to be our best selves. As the fulfilment of God's purpose involves a variety of functions for men as his fellow-workers, the absolute love to God does not demand the hopeless attempt, the impossible task, of any man's being everything righteous

and good of which mankind is capable, but only all that he, with his capacities, opportunities, and relations, can be. A man loves God in the measure in which he fulfils his own vocation. But it must be added, to avert a too common misunderstanding, the fulfilment of his vocation by any man does not include only the moral conduct his situation demands from him, and the moral character resulting from that conduct and fitting him further for the fulfilment of his vocation ; it includes also the maintenance of a personal relation to God, which will supply the standard, the motive, and the power for that fulfilment. Even if the conduct of the elder brother in the parable (Luke xv. 29) was all he claimed, he failed to be the son the father's heart desired.

(*d*) There is a duty to God, apart from the fulfilment of duty to self and neighbour, which, as God is ultimate moral authority, is also a duty to Him. To the detailed discussion of duty in its threefold aspect we shall return in the next chapter, in dealing with the cardinal virtues and the Christian graces. In the purpose of this chapter it is enough to have defined in general terms the ideal of holiness, or moral wholeness, in its aspects of righteousness (conformity to law) and goodness (fulfilment of end).

IV

Although not usually included among the ideals, attention should be called to a principle which is necessary for the practical guidance of human conduct, namely *utility*. (1) As has already been mentioned, Croce includes economics along with ethics as aspects of reason as practical. And, however inadequate as a theory of the moral ideal, *utilitarianism* in English ethics must be recognised as having exercised a beneficent influence on political action. We are escaping the dualism which has often, if unconsciously, influenced Christian moralists. Even if in theory we remain dualists, and distinguish soul and body, yet in practice we cannot separate them, as in our present life body affects soul and soul body. *Mens sana in corpore sano* is a needful moral maxim. It is a moral duty to care for the health and happiness of others. Jesus' own example in healing and feeding the multitudes as well as His parables—the Rich Man and Lazarus (Luke xvi. 19–31), the Good Samaritan (x. 25–37), the Sheep and the Goats (Matt. xxv. 31–46)—enforce this obligation. The story of asceticism affords many examples

of perversion of the soul by suppression of the body. It is recognised to-day that the moral problem is a social problem. individual character being inextricably bound up with social relations; and that the social problem is an economic problem, social relations being inevitably determined by economic conditions. It is the industrial revolution which has so affected human society that the moral problem has become so acute and urgent. What many enquiries are being directed to, what many minds are pondering to-day, is the application of this principle of utility. What are the economic conditions, and what the social relations which will most promote the health and happiness, not of the few only, but of all? While sorrow, suffering, struggle, do serve for moral discipline, and do promote personal development, the nature of man and the constitution of his world will afford adequate occasions for these, without an increase of them by bad economic conditions or wrong social relations. The infliction of pain, where there is no justification for it, is cruelty, and cruelty is a most detestable vice; and the indifference to removable pain is also blameworthy cruelty. If a man may choose for himself a higher than happiness, even the blessedness, which may include satisfaction with sacrifice, he has no moral right to withhold happiness from another, if it is in his power to bestow it; for this blessedness must always be self-chosen, and can never be imposed on another. God having made man what he is, health and happiness are parts of the complete human good, and are not to be regarded merely as conditions of the realisation of the moral good, or holiness, supreme as the claim of that is, and must ever be. The study of such a question of utility as this—how, with the least expenditure of time or labour, can the most wealth to meet human needs be produced?—is not without moral value. Within what limits of time must continuous labour be confined to avoid the physical evils of fatigue—not the fatigue from which a night's rest will restore, but the fatigue which is steadily lowering the vitality? What are the amounts and kinds of food, and what is the kind of cooking which will afford most nourishment to the body? These are not questions to which the Christian moralist can be indifferent as beneath his notice. What is urgently needed, and is being recognised as needed, is as complete a theory of utility as our knowledge will allow. To reduce pain to the possible minimum, to promote happiness to the possible maximum, not for self only—which would

lead to moral disaster—but for all, is not an immoral object ; and in doing our duty to our neighbour, we must always keep these ends before us, with just that entire subordination to the supreme end of duty to God which has already been discussed. Throughout this volume it will be assumed that utility in this wide interpretation of its content is a practical guiding principle.

(2) Some of the qualities which this principle leads us to recognise as valuable are the following :

(*a*) Care for one's own health, and consideration for the health of another, must take a foremost place, as the *corpus sanum* is of very great importance. Because there have been saintly invalids, because great achievements have been carried through by sickly bodies, this is no reason for indifference to health, or the neglect of the means of its preservation. There is the danger of hypochondria, valetudinarianism, an absorption of interest and effort in one's own bodily condition ; and it is to be feared that so much writing about health encourages such a tendency. Although ill health can be so endured as to become a means of fulfilling God's will, it is itself not according to God's will ; and the man disobeys God's will who disregards the laws of health. Just as a man may sacrifice in the interests of a worthy cause even his own life without any encouragement to suicide, so a man may expose himself to the risks of disease in the service of God and man ; but even so he is not justified in neglecting any available means for lessening those risks. The body is a trust to be so cared for, and used, as will make it the most efficient organ of the spirit.

(*b*) The body is dependent for its health on food, clothing, shelter, the provision which nature makes for human needs. This provision must be used without waste. *Thrift* is often spoken of disparagingly, and confused with meanness. To the Scottish people this quality is often assigned. While meanness—the refusal to meet one's own or others' needs from the resources at one's command—is a repellent quality, and when it becomes a ruling passion, as in the miser, even a despicable vice, thrift itself is a virtue, and an excellent virtue. Since man creates nothing, but only appropriates, adapts, and applies to his own uses what is ever coming from God's creative hand, it is ingratitude to squander any of His gifts.

It is being recognised that our industrial system, as hitherto conducted, has been wasteful in the extreme ; our

coal resources have been, and still are, recklessly squandered. The thrifty man can be the independent man, bearing his own burden, and not letting it fall on others, and the generous man, able to bear the burdens of others, too weak to bear their own. If thrift involves self-denial, it becomes a motive to what is a valuable self-discipline. Luxury is injurious to him who indulges himself in it, and economically hurtful as diverting both material resources and human labour into channels of less utility for the community as a whole. To take care of the pence, which might be spent without any appreciable increase of good to self or others, is to have the pounds, which may be a real personal or social benefit. When there is so vast and clamant a need for the generous support of many religious, moral, and social causes, the thrift which allows a response is a virtue to be commended, and not despised.

(*c*) The wealth which sustains human health and happiness must be produced by human labour ; God does not drop His gifts into folded arms. It is a curious misunderstanding of the teaching of Jesus in Matt. vi. 19–34 to suppose that it is intended to discourage labour and commend idleness. The illustrations themselves, more closely scrutinised, do not sustain that assumption. The fledglings in the nest are fed by the parent birds ; but these parents must go foraging for food. The food is there, but it must be sought. How wonderful a process of appropriation, assimilation, transformation of all that soil, sunshine, and shower offer, is constantly taking place in every plant ! What co-operation, too, between insects and plants ! Where nature is prodigal, and man's needs are easily met, civilisation and culture are arrested. Nature's severity is a challenge to man's effort, the response to which lays the basis for industrial and social progress. Labour is not man's primal curse ; it is his constant blessing. Jesus' parables show the interest He had in all the manifold forms of human toil around Him ; and there is never a depreciation of industry. What is condemned is anxiety ; what is required is to subordinate all other interests to the supreme interest of the Kingdom of God. That concern about daily bread no less than desire for abundant goods might hinder devotion and service of God He did recognise ; but asceticism, mendicancy, monasticism, have no encouragement in His teaching. What justification can be put forward for the " ca' canny " policy of labour will be considered in dealing

with industry as a social institution ; but that it is a deplorable necessity, if necessity it be, from the standpoint of industry as a desirable human quality must be maintained.

(*d*) If labour is to be efficient, other qualities are necessary, such as *punctuality* and *regularity*. It is as sinful to waste one's own or another's time as to neglect health, squander wealth, or stint labour. The man who does not order the use of his time with care will not be able to make fullest use of it, and he will hinder others in so using it. To keep another waiting, unless there is adequate justification for the delay, is to be wasteful of one of his valuable resources, to interfere with his industry, and the benefits that industry might bring him. A wise man will certainly keep an account of how he spends his money ; would he not be equally wise to keep record of how his time is spent ? " Don't delay till to-morrow what you can *equally* well do to-day " is a maxim the following of which will enable a man to do a great deal more than might at first seem possible, and will give him time to meet a fresh emergency, or accept a new responsibility. It is the busiest man who orders his time aright, who can find time for an extra task. " Give as little trouble as you can, and render as much service as you may " is another maxim of wise love. It imposes such a prosaic habit of *regularity* as enables others to know that the man will fulfil any expectations which he has allowed others to cherish ; his appointments will be unfailingly kept ; his letters will be promptly answered ; he can be trusted to do the proper thing at the proper time, even as men rely on the regularity of nature. These qualities must not be dismissed as " minor morals."

V

Although holiness includes goodness, and no man can complete his moral personality in isolation from, but only in relation to, others, and so holiness must expend itself in love, it is desirable to go beyond the recognition of benevolence as a necessary moral quality in relation to others in the individual character, and to put in the forefront of Christian ethics the completing ideal of love. What Jesus taught about love has already been discussed in a previous chapter ; love as a Christian grace will be considered in the next chapter ; in this chapter on the human ideals it must at least be briefly mentioned. A man cannot realise

the human ideals in himself apart from society. But even this realisation of them is completed, as he realises them in himself, only as he imparts them to others, and makes their realisation possible for others. Now love is just this full self-realisation in self-impartation to others. In love a man gets only as he gives ; he gains his higher self—the self of the ideals—only as he loses his lower self—the self of individual gains—in the common good of himself and others. Hence the moral standard is not, and cannot be, " self-realisation " only ; it must always be qualified by the added words " by self-sacrifice," as the surrender of this lower self for the fulfilment of the higher. Love's gifts are satisfying ; but its demands are exacting ; and the Cross is its symbol.

CHAPTER III

THE CARDINAL VIRTUES

(1) The comprehensive ideal is *perfectionism*, the highest good, the realisation, according to the divine purpose, of the whole manhood of all mankind. As man is a complex personality in complex relations to his fellow-men, that ideal includes the ideals which are the ends of different interests, activities, and relations in man ; with these the previous chapter has dealt. While holiness as the individual and love as the social aspect must be regarded as the dominant primary moral end, it is to make the ideal too narrow if truth and beauty, and even, as has been argued, utility are not included in the comprehensive ideal of perfectionism, for that whole range of interests, activities, and relations which we can cover by the term utility belongs to self-realisation. What must be insisted upon is that, while we may more closely connect some moral qualities with truth, beauty, and utility, we must not regard these as merely means to these ideals as ends ; they are ends in themselves as belonging to the perfect man, man conceived in his ideal completeness. It seemed appropriate to deal with these qualities along with the ideals with which they can be more closely associated ; but in this chapter we are concerned with the further treatment of the human excellences which are essential elements in holiness, as these have been discussed in Ancient and Christian morals.

(2) At this point it seems necessary to distinguish terms used in ethics. We have already adequately for our purpose discussed what we mean by *ideal* as *law* or as *good*. *Duty* is the moral obligation which the ideal imposes as a condition of its realisation ; but the word itself associates that obligation with the law as obedience to it, rather than with an end. *Right* is the obverse of duty. A *right* is what one member of society can expect from other members individually or corporately as their *duty* to him ; and, in accordance with the Golden Rule, a man should recognise as his *duty* to others what he claims as his *right* from others, allowance being made, as has already been argued, for difference of function within the social organism ; the qualification can be expressed in the phrase, if he were in their, and they in his, position. *Virtue* is any *quality* of character which enables a

man to discharge the corresponding *duty*. The initial capacity for responding to any moral demand is developed by the reaction of conduct on character, and thus practice makes perfect. Exercise produces excellence in virtue.

(3) Human life seems so infinitely varied that it would seem scarcely possible to enumerate and to describe the human virtues, or responses of character to the moral demands made upon it. And yet there are uniformities in human nature, relations, and situations ; and accordingly while it would be impossible to exhaust the abundant vocabulary of ethics, to discuss all the terms which denote the varied human excellences, moralists have attempted to classify these qualities. As it is well, unless there is adequate reason to the contrary, to be mindful of and respectful to the knowledge and the judgment of the past, the discussion here will be guided, if not bound, by that description of the virtues which is associated with the name of Plato, and which was adopted by the Christian Church. Jesus Himself declared that He was not come to destroy, but to fulfil law and prophecy (Matt. v. 17), and the ethical monotheism of the prophets is the background of His teaching. Paul does not require his converts at Phillipi to confine themselves to what they both " learned and received and saw in " him, but also to think on these things which the morality of their environment presented to them : " Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report, if there be any virtue, and if there by any praise " (iv. 8-9).

(4) Plato's description of the virtues is based on his analysis of the soul (his ethics on his psychology).[1] Besides the rational element, he distinguishes two non-rational, the " appetitive " (τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν) and the " spirited " (τὸ θυμοειδές or θύμος). The first term, *appetitive*, explains itself; by the second, which is probably the best which could be chosen, is meant a group of emotions which modern psychology does not bring together, but which have this in common—that they stimulate to action, such as anger, shame. (*a*) The four virtues recognised by the moral consciousness of Greece, and expounded in the Republic, are wisdom (φρόνησις or σοφία), courage (ἀνδρεία), temperance (σωφροσύνη), and justice (δικαιοσυνη). Aristotle distinguished φρόνησις as practical wisdom from σοφία as speculative, but, consistently with his bent, Plato does not recognise the

[1] See Sidgwick's *History of Ethics*, pp. 43, 44.

distinction. The first word may be represented by our word *prudence*, which in the previous chapter has already been distinguished from *wisdom*. In Plato's Republic the characteristic virtue of the rulers is wisdom, and of the guardians courage ; temperance is not assigned specifically to the working classes, but it stands for their subordination to the rulers and the guardians, such as that of the appetites in the individual man. Justice or righteousness is the harmonious co-operation of the different classes and individuals, each keeping his own place and doing his own work.

(*b*) This description of the moral life was reproduced by Cicero in his *De Officiis*, and through him was received by Ambrose,[1] to whom we owe the descriptive epithet of these virtues as " cardinal " or hinges, on which the moral life hangs and turns. For Ambrose, wisdom depends on God and is grounded in faith ; courage is shown in resisting temptation, but, in view of the influence of the Old Testament, has not lost all reference to war ; temperance is moderation in all things, but is blended with the Christian grace of humility ; and justice or righteousness is raised to the level of Christian philanthropy. What was borrowed was adorned by the influence of Christ. Augustine leads all these virtues back to the one motive of the love of God.

(*c*) Aquinas[2] connects prudence with the rational, temperance with the concupiscible, and courage with the irascible elements of human personality ; but he adds a fourth, the volitional (*voluntas*), and with this he connects justice. With these cardinal virtues he associates, but as superior to them, the theological virtues ; the three Christian graces of faith, love, and hope. The ten virtues of Aristotle's[3] enumeration Aquinas subordinates to the Platonic four ; the additions made by Aristotle are worth mentioning. In the use of wealth may be exercised *liberality*, where the possession is moderate, or *magnificence*, where it is abundant. In the pursuit of honour, *high-mindedness* may be displayed ; as closely akin to vanity or pride this virtue is in marked contrast to the Christian ideal. But an approach to the Christian view is found in the virtue of *gentleness*, the restraint of anger or revenge. *Friendliness* is the mean between severity and rudeness in social intercourse. In speech there should be *truthfulness* and *decorous wit*.

(*d*) It must be observed that in Greek thought on the one hand virtue was closely associated with knowledge, and thus

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 133. [2] *Idem*, p. 141. [3] pp. 62–63.

wisdom is the most important of the virtues, the assumption being that if only the right can be known, it will be done ; and on the other hand the ethical and the æsthetic are blended together, as is shown by the description of the Greek gentlemen, καλο-κάγαθός; good manners are good morals. We have in our language a very varied and extensive ethical vocabulary, expressing many slight shades of difference in moral qualities ; but the Platonic four may still serve as guiding principles in the description of moral life. Tennyson's triad, " self-knowledge, self-reverence, self-control," is included, except self-reverence, and this addition is due to the heightening in Christianity of the value of human personality, and may be included in self-love. Wisdom will embrace self-knowledge ; and self-control is presented under two aspects, as temperance in relation to the desires and the pleasures, and as courage in relation to the perils and pains of human life. Tennyson here takes no account of social relations ; but these can all be included under justice, as enlarged and deepened in the Christian's equal love for his neighbour as for himself. The Greek moralists do not take any relation to God into account ; but that is covered by the three Christian graces. The four cardinal virtues will engage our attention in this chapter, and the three Christian graces in the next.[1]

I

(1) In dealing with the ideal of *Truth* we have already been led to refer to *Wisdom* as the virtue to be exercised in the application of it to life ; but the discussion there was intentionally brief, as the fuller treatment has been reserved for this place. The prominence and dominance which this virtue has in Plato must command our attention for it. What Socrates set himself to do in all his conversations was not primarily to commend or enforce morality, but to discover its principles ; he was in the pursuit of truth, by the exercise of wisdom, moral discernment. For Plato, wisdom has a still wider reference ; it is speculative as well as practical ; the wise man is the philosopher, the lover of wisdom, who makes all knowledge his province. This extension is essential for Plato ; a man will not order his own life rightly

[1] Green, in *Prolegomena to Ethics*, Book III., chapter v., makes an interesting comparison of the Greek and the modern conceptions of virtue.

(practical wisdom) unless he rightly apprehends reality (speculative wisdom). The governors of the ideal State must possess this wisdom, both practical and speculative, and the education which is prescribed for them is intended to equip them fully in both respects. Remote as much that he writes may appear from our modern standpoint, in two respects his treatment deserves attention. In politics and economics there has been a tendency to exalt "rule of thumb" "common sense"; and, when difficulties and losses have emerged, to find excuses for "muddling through." What has to be insisted in is the need of *Wisdom*, moral discernment, a quality which is not acquired by happy accident, but which is developed by severe intellectual discipline, in the governing of a nation or the ordering of industry. Further, Plato was profoundly right in his close association of practical and speculative wisdom. Morality is not merely a human interest and activity, to which the universe is indifferent, although it may appear to be so. If this were the case, then a worldly wisdom, the vulpine intelligence of which Carlyle speaks, might avail for guidance. But if in the personal ideals reality fully discloses its secret, then these ideals must be seen in relation to the nature of things; or, for religious belief and Christian faith, the purpose of God.

(2) As regards the virtue, we must take into account how it can be secured. (*a*) We must first of all recognise that there are differences in mental endowment—that some men have the capacity for moral and religious discernment in a very much higher degree than most of their fellows. These seers of the divine reality, these sages in moral idealism, are the pioneers in the progress of the race in the ways of wisdom. If we do not assign so great an importance to education itself as did Plato, yet nurture must develop nature, if it cannot replace it, since no amount of teaching or training can make a poorly endowed mind rich. A moral and religious environment will develop what capacity there may be. The development does not depend entirely on the original capacity; the formation of character is an essential condition. It is as a man does the will that he discerns the doctrine; obedience to the light already possessed increases the gift of sight. Sincerity of motive stimulates powers of perception; the pure in heart see God (Matt. v. 8). In Christian experience the capacity grows, not by human influences and endeavours only, but the Spirit of God enlightens the reason

which apprehends the divine reality, and quickens the conscience which appreciates the human obligation. Those who by faith receive the grace of Jesus Christ are enabled by that Spirit to know, and, knowing, to do God's will. The mind is renewed, its discernment is restored and increased by the Spirit, so that it approves what it discerns as the will of God; and consequently the character acquires an essential likeness (is *transformed*) to the character of God Himself, and ceases to follow the fleeting fashions (to be configured) with the world or human society as indifferent or even opposed to God (Rom. xii. 2).

(*b*) The development of the capacity of discernment and the formation of the character act and react on one another, and accordingly wisdom is not merely a mental quality, exercised in the moral sphere; it is a moral attainment, and from the Christian standpoint possible only through the religious endowment which comes through faith in the Spirit's activity. It may be objected, however, that such a virtue is not necessary in the Christian religion, as Plato recognised the necessity in his philosophy. Do not the teaching and example of Christ so fully present the Christian ideal in its completeness that all man needs is to learn and to obey? We may answer: Jesus was not a lawgiver, formulating a code of morals; still less was He a casuist, providing guidance for all cases of conscience. He taught in a particular place and at a special time; and consequently His concrete instances, whether in deed or word, are relative to the immediate situation, and cannot simply be transferred to another. Christian wisdom thus has a double task, first to detach the permanent and universal principle from the concrete instance, and then, in view of the other situation, discover what the application relative to it is. What would Jesus do? is no easy clue in the perplexities of human conduct. If the individual conscience answers that question sincerely, the action may be morally commendable; yet the judgment may be far from the judgment which wisdom would reach.

(3) For wisdom implies not only judgment, but judgment based on knowledge. There must be self-knowledge to begin with. A man must know his own limitations, capacities, relations, and the obligations which consequently arise. He needs to know others, as, while moral principles must be applied without prejudice or partiality, the method of the application must be determined by as full and as thorough a consideration as possible of the character of the person with

whom he is dealing. The total situation, economic and social as well as personal, may sometimes need to be taken into account. When the total situation is relatively stable, and relations are governed by a standard generally accepted, there may not be necessary such judgment based on knowledge ; but the customary may meet the obligation. But when, as in our own day, many changes in all spheres of human relationship are taking place, there is urgent need for wisdom, judgment based on knowledge. For Christian wisdom there must be knowledge, not of self and others only, but of God. God has a constant purpose towards man and for the world ; but its realisation is progressive, and a Christian moralist must be able to read "the signs of the times." He must try to know what it is that God is doing in his own day, he must give such moral guidance as will enable his contemporaries to become fellow-workers with God. Paul exercised Christian wisdom as well as worldly prudence when he put some restraints on the freedom of public appearance and utterance which the women in Corinth were claiming (1 Cor. xiv. 34-36) ; the same quality he showed in the Epistle to Philemon, when, instead of proposing to overturn the institution of slavery, he pleaded for Christian love in the relation of master and slave. It is at least questionable whether, however inconsistent war may be with Christian love, the pacifist is taking the wisest course to-day in the solution of the problem ; whether, instead of dividing opinion and feeling in the Christian Church on the question of individual duty, if a Christian may or may not fight, he would not be wiser in using his influence to concentrate interest and effort on the prevention of the conditions which provoke war, and the promotion of policies which maintain peace. Conscientiousness must always command respect ; and it is not so common that familiarity could breed contempt of it ; but an ignorant and perverse conscience may be a moral danger and injury in a community ; for conscientious men have committed crimes which men not nearly as earnest morally have had knowledge and judgment enough to condemn. Religious liberty is not due to zealots for religion. Although history refutes the assumption of the Greek moralists that to know is to do the good, yet no less does it prove that a conscience which gives safe guidance must be informed and intelligent. The Holy Spirit's illumination is not a substitute for judgment based on knowledge, but its complement.

II

(1) There can be no denial of the assertion of science that man has had an animal ancestry, and that there are appetites, impulses, instincts in his racial inheritance which go back to that ancestry. As a material organism, he has physical necessities which clamour for satisfaction, and may sometimes be a hindrance and a challenge to his distinctively human obligations and aspirations. The facts which history attests regarding the stationariness of animal, and the progressiveness of human, life show that he has a unique original endowment, rational, moral, spiritual, raising him far above and beyond his animal kindred. In the human evolution this distinctively human endowment has but gradually become manifest and dominant ; and in the individual development this process of the subordination of the animal to the human must take place. Indeed, the human endowment may reinforce the animal tendencies. Man has memory of past experiences, and anticipation of future experiences, and these may strengthen the appetite for a present gratification. Lust in man may become a much more unruly and dangerous passion than the sex-instinct is in animals. But to base psychology on biology, as the new psychology tends to do, and to exalt what is common to man and animals as more potent than what is unique in him, is to ignore the differences which man's whole evolution has proved to be the dominant factor. In another chapter of this volume the question of the place of instinct in man's life is discussed. Now we must recognise as the raw material of the moral life of man, appetites, impulses, instincts from his animal ancestry, out of which his human character must be formed. If a man has the *self-knowledge* which recognises the duality of his nature, as one who can sink below the brute in subjection to his animality, or who can soar towards the angel in the dominance of his affinity with God, and if he has the *self-reverence* which moves him to prefer the higher to the lower self, he will need *self-control* to bring all desires, impulses, and emotions into subordination to his ideals. One form of this self-control is *temperance*, another *courage* ; the one rules the pleasures and the wishes, the other the pains and dangers, of life.

(2) Modern psychology has made a very great difference as to the way in which we must regard this virtue of temperance. The older moral method was to withstand temptation

in order after a struggle to overcome it. That method may still be necessary in some of the tragic crises of life. But the newer method is diversion of attention from the object which causes the temptation, and substitution of another object for it. Volition follows attention, action imagination. Let a man keep his attention fixed on some form of evil, it will tighten its hold upon him ; and even if by resolution he breaks its bonds, he has made the struggle more severe than it need be. Let him direct his interest to some good ; and the temptation loses its attraction for him. Too often has the conception of virtue been too negative—the resistance of the evil, and not the realisation of the good. There are acquired depraved tastes ; but these natural appetites and impulses are not in themselves evil, but have had in man's ancestry vital functions, and may be subordinated to the ends of human life itself. The vital energy which goes with these natural desires need not be suppressed ; but may be directed into other channels, by what is known as the process of *sublimation*. As man is a social being, these appetites and impulses may come into conflict with the obligations his relations to others impose on him. Mere suppression is not the most moral way, since the moral good is the self-realisation of the complete human personality. The human dignity may demand the restraint of the animal tendency ; but the less that restraint is mere repression the better. The love of man and woman in marriage and parenthood sublimates the sex appetite. The herd impulse may be sublimated in rational sociality. If marriage is impossible, the vital energy may be diverted by a creative art, a public service, a religious enthusiasm. The mother-heart of the childless woman may find satisfaction in loving care of motherless children. In the last section of this volume the problems of the family which modern society imposes upon men will be more fully discussed ; but these references may serve as illustrations of the thesis which I desire to maintain that morality is not, as asceticism assumes, suppression, but it is fulfilment of the whole self, sometimes by the socially beneficent gratification of a legitimate appetite, such as that of sex, and sometimes, when social obligation forbids, the diversion of the vital energy into other channels of interest and activity. But we may look a little more closely at the raw material which by the exercise of the virtue of temperance must be made into character.

(3) The animal organism for its *self-preservation* must resist

in its environment, inanimate or animate, all that hinders or endangers its life. This impulse survives in the human infant, and shows itself very plainly in the child. Uncontrolled and undirected, it may develop into an immoral selfishness, an anti-social disposition ; but it is not merely to be suppressed, but to be harmonised with social position and function. The teacher or parent who wants to break the self-will of the child merely, if successful, produces a moral weakling ; for in the moral struggle even force of will is a necessity. The mother's darling, when the moral support of his mother is withdrawn, collapses morally. There is a self-regard which is a protection for personality with its proper liberty and responsibility ; there is a self-reverence which is the condition of moral progress ; Jesus Himself made self-love the measure of love to others. This individuation must proceed *pari passu* with socialisation, a man must realise himself in his relations to his fellow-men. What temperance enjoins is the control of the impulse to self-preservation by the recognition of obligations to others ; and this impulse may be so developed that a man finds his self-realisation in self-sacrifice for God or man, a course which becomes dearer to himself than life itself.

(4) Wm. McDougall includes among instincts much which J. Arthur Thomson declines to describe by that term.[1] Whether we use the term instinct or not, there are impulses and corresponding emotions which are closely associated with this legitimate moral principle of self-preservation, self-regard, or self-reverence ; for each of these may distinguish a stage in its sublimation. There is, according to McDougall, the instinct of *flight* and the emotion of *fear*. " The instinct to flee from danger is necessary for the survival of almost all species of animals, and in most of the higher animals the instinct is one of the most powerful."[2] The accompanying emotion is fear. Courage is the virtue which restrains this instinct, and overcomes this emotion, and to it we must shortly return.

(*a*) Of more immediate interest in the present connection is " the instinct of *pugnacity* and the emotion of *anger*." McDougall himself admits that this is not an instinct in even his own definition of the term in the strictest sense, for " it has no specific object or objects the perception of which constitutes the initial stage of the instinctive process. The condition of its excitement is rather any opposition to the

[1] See Part III., chapter i.

[2] *Social Psychology*, pp. 49–50.

free exercise of the impulse, any obstruction to the activity to which the creature is impelled by any one of the other instincts."[1] A thwarting of one's wishes, a hindering of one's purposes, an obstacle to the relation to others one desires, as a harsh word or rude action of another, may produce the reaction of the self in anger, which, to use a metaphor, may blaze up for a moment, or smoulder for a long time. In common speech we call this temper, quick or sullen. Man as a social personality cannot leave this impulse uncontrolled. Self-interest, apart from higher moral considerations, may demand that even when the anger is felt, it shall not show fight in word or deed. It may be simply suppressed, but then it may do moral and even physical injury, as when a grievance long nursed becomes a diseased obsession. It may be diverted from one person to another, as when the long-suffering wife has to endure vicariously the irritation or indignation which some business transaction has excited in her husband. It may be sublimated in tolerance, patience, even forgiveness ; the vital energy which might have discharged itself in curse or hurt may find outlet in blessing or help (Rom. xii. 20–21). Anger may be regarded as the root of *envy*, displeasure at another's possessions ; *jealousy*, displeasure at affection given to another ; *revenge*, the purpose to inflict injury for whatever hindrance self has experienced in another's words or deeds. Self-control must constantly be exercised over all these impulses, if a man is not to become an Ishmael among his fellows. Although the virtue of temperance is not usually associated in common speech with this form of self-control, yet in bringing the survey of moral life under the rubric of the cardinal virtues this seems to be the most fitting place to mention the control of temper.

(*b*) In considering the virtue of temperance as control of temper, we must distinguish between a natural defect and a moral achievement. There are natures in which this reaction is very feeble, who are poor-spirited and not poor in spirit (Matt. v. 3), who seem to resent no treatment, however bad it may be. This is not virtue. There is moral value only when there is the emotion, but it is kept under control ; where the wrong is felt, and it may be very deeply, but where resentment is restrained from expression in word or deed. While from the standpoint of Christian morals, in which love is the fulfilment of law, there should not be the hardening of the temporary emotion of anger into the permanent mood of

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 59.

hate, where the occasion of the anger is a moral wrong done by the aggressor there may be need and reason for some expression to the anger. The merely personal feeling must be kept in bounds ; but the moral judgment on the act may be made manifest in rebuke, or even, if necessary, punishment. Difficult as it may be to keep personal resentment in check, and to show only moral judgment, there are situations in which it is a duty. Wrongs would not be righted, if indignation were never felt. Here, as in many other parts of the moral life, virtue is not mere repression, but sublimation ; the anger must be raised into a moral solicitude for the wrongdoer, and even rebuke and punishment must have that in view. There may be a religious motive for the restraint, not only of the emotion of anger, but even of any expression of it. The sufferer may commit his cause unto God, and leave to Him the vindication of the right. This is the quality of *meekness* ; it is this disposition which Paul enjoins in his words in Rom. xii. 19, " Give place unto wrath." " Stand aside," he says, " and let God's wrath avenge your wrong." This counsel, however, is liable to misunderstanding. It does not mean that a man shall abstain from vengeance in order that he may have the even greater satisfaction of his malice in seeing God's punishment of the wicked, coals of fire heaped upon the head of the wrongdoer. Even if the words quoted in the context suggest such a thought, it is in flagrant contradiction to the Christian spirit, and even the words that follow. This would be a defeat, and not a triumph of good over evil. There must be the hope that God's dealing will lead to repentance, and that the return of good for evil by the wronged will be one of the means God will use to bring about that repentance. The vital energy which would have been expended in anger can be diverted to, and expended in, the committal of the wrongdoer to God, and in doing him such kindness as the occasion may allow. This problem must be considered again in dealing with crime and war.

(5) Next to the impulse to *self-preservation*, of which the instincts of flight and fight, or the emotions of fear and anger, are complementary aspects, there must rank the impulse to the *preservation of the race*, the impulse to reproduction, with which is bound up the appetite of sex. (*a*) McDougall distinguishes the parental instinct and the tender emotion from the sexual instinct or instinct of reproduction, but recognises that there is an innate connection between them, as

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" in all (save debased) natures it seems that the object of the sexual impulse should become also the object in some degree of tender emotion."[1] " The biological utility of an innate connection of this kind is obvious. It would prepare the way for that co-operation between the male and female in which, even among the animals, a lifelong fidelity and mutual tenderness is often touchingly displayed." In certain conditions, the proportions, as it were, of the tender emotion accompanying the one instinct or the other vary. In Great Britain one might be justified in saying that the husband feels more tender emotion to his wife than to his children ; in China not improbably the reverse would be true. J. Arthur Thomson[2] refuses to regard both these natural impulses as instincts, since their operation is too uncertain. Men and women make mistakes, and go wrong in their sexual relations and their parental obligations, just because there is no unerring, irresistible instinct. Much more will need to be said about these impulses in the sociological section in dealing with marriage and parenthood ; but here the sex appetite must be mentioned, as one of the strongest of all natural impulses, over which self-control must be exercised.

(*b*) Abused, this impulse may sink to be a lust, which makes man more brutish than the beasts, just because his distinctive human endowments of memory of past and anticipations of future gratifications may give the appetite a dominance which it has not in animals. Wisely and rightly directed and controlled, the appetite may soar to a love which raises many to the highest levels of personal development. The moralist must recognise the tragic peril and the glorious promise. While there are persons, probably more in the female than the male sex, in whom the impulse is relatively weak, yet in most normal human beings the sex desire is strong enough to make a demand for a large measure of self-control. It is well that the habit of self-control should be cultivated in the child from the earliest years as regards the enjoyment of food or other means of pleasure, in order that when, in adolescence, the sex impulse begins to assert its dominance, there may be the moral reserves of self-control. It is at this period that habits may be formed, such as self-abuse or masturbation ; we may even say, a sex-obsession may begin, which will greatly increase the subsequent struggle for continence. To be forewarned is to be forearmed ;

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 82. [2] *What is Man ?* pp. 109–110.

and parents or teachers are under a moral obligation to impart as much knowledge as may be necessary to prevent abuse of the appetite, and to inspire an appreciation of the value of the impulse for individual character and social relations. The presentation of the ideal of marriage and parenthood should prove a stronger constraint to self-control than the restraints of warnings about the evil consequences of self-indulgence.[1] There is difference of opinion as to the time at which such instruction should begin.[2] Some hold that some knowledge should be given as soon as curiosity is shown about the fact of the birth of a child in the home, or of some domestic animal, and that whatever is said, however incomplete, should have no taint of make-belief or falsehood about it. Through biology—the fertilisation of plants, for instance—a gradual approach may be made to the human facts. Before the fact of sexual relationship is mentioned, the fact of parenthood may be explained, especially the intimate relation of the mother to the child before birth. In this early instruction the knowledge will come more naturally, and there will be less shock than if the instruction is reserved till the time when the impulses are already being experienced. There is difference of opinion on the time, but not on the need of some instruction, among all who realise how great is the danger of ignorance, or of a knowledge which comes, as it is almost sure to come, in illegitimate, demoralising ways.

(*c*) It is not only a physical danger, but also a moral loss, that economic and social conditions are depriving so many men, and still more women owing to their larger number in most civilised communities, of the proper satisfaction of their impulses in marriage and parenthood, since the vital energy which has now to be expended in restraint might be used in the realisation of the relations of husband and wife, parent and child. That marriage has also to be delayed is regrettable. Still more deplorable is it that even within marriage the impulse of parenthood has to a large extent to be restrained. All these as social problems will claim much fuller treatment in the last section.

[1] See *Instead of Wild Oats*, by Winfield Scott Hall ; *What a Boy Should Know*, by Dr. A. T. Schofield and Dr. P. V. Jackson ; *From Girlhood to Womanhood*, by Dr. E. S. Chesser ; *Preparation for Marriage*, by Walter Heape ; *What it Means to Marry*, by Dr. Mary Scharlieb.

[2] See *Sex Teaching*, by A. Herbert Gray, M.A., D.D. ; *How to Enlighten our Children*, by Dr. Mary Scharlieb ; *How shall I tell my Child?* by Mrs. Woodallan Chapman ; *Life and its Beginnings*, by Dr. Helen Webb.

(*d*) Here, where we are dealing with the natural appetite as the occasion for the exercise of the virtue of temperance, two considerations must be advanced. Within marriage itself there must be self-restraint in the interest, not only of health and happiness, but even of the moral character, and the mutual personal affections of husband and wife. Unbridled lust is the foe of disciplined love. In those who are denied the privilege of marriage, there is the task of constant self-control. Any self-indulgence involves not only self-degradation, but also the degradation of another. If the common judgment has hitherto condemned the sin of the woman more severely, for nature inflicts on her the severer penalty, Christian morals demand that the moral obligation of the man shall not be regarded as less than that of the woman ; nay, the degradation he inflicts on her adds to his self-degradation.

(*e*) In this connection, however, I do not like the current phrase, " An equal moral standard for men and women," for the term equal is a quantitative term, and as such inadequate ; it may be, and is being, interpreted as justifying a lowering of the standard of virtue for women instead of a raising of the standard for men ; it is often associated with an extreme and extravagant feminism, which ignores the inescapable natural fact that men and woman are different, and that that difference must always be recognised. While the indulgence shown to men as regards their sex relationships has been a moral disaster, and deserves only condemnation, the judgment on the woman, cruel and harsh as it was, expresses inevitably a racial appreciation of the importance of unpolluted motherhood. One might say that a moral wrong has been done to man in that the moral safeguard which this often blundering social judgment gave the woman has not been his also. There has been injustice in the condonation in the man of what was condemned in the woman ; but, on a deeper view, there has been injustice more in the licence given to him than the restraints imposed on her. While every Christian who has the spirit of Jesus must be moved by the deepest compassion for the woman prostitute, and by the most earnest desire for her recovery, that Christian disposition must not blunt the edge of our horror at prostitution. The man who buys is as morally guilty as is the woman who sells her body. To make a living by such continuous self-degradation is a moral outrage and a social danger, which the demand for an equal moral standard must never lead us

to minimise, as I cannot but feel that some feminists show an inclination to do. Chastity is an absolute moral obligation on man as it is on woman, and any breach of this law deserves condemnation ; but it will not be wisely or rightly judged in the heated atmosphere of any sex-antagonism.

(*f*) This absolute obligation being recognised for both sexes alike, a few words may be added as regards the best way of meeting the demand. It is certainly not by a concentration of attention on the temptation that victory can be secured. The records of monks are quite sufficient to show that withdrawal from the world for solitary conflict with this foe can lead only to disastrous consequences, even if apparent victory is achieved. It is by diversion of interest in varied social relations and social services. Despite the impression that the novel and the drama give, sex is not the only interest of life, and need not be the dominant one ; even in marriage it is disastrous if it is allowed to become so. As St. Francis made poverty his bride, so the man who for any good reason cannot marry may become wedded to " some great cause, God's new Messiah," and the woman who has no children of her own may mother children who need a mother's tender care.

(6) It belongs to self-preservation that the body should be nourished ; hunger and thirst are the sentinels who give the warning if the bodily needs are not being met. (*a*) At one time *gluttony* was a common vice, and so temperance in food needed to be enjoined as a virtue. Excess in quantity is now not common, and is generally regarded with disgust. There may be intemperance as to the kinds of food taken, and the reasons for taking them. The object of feeding is to maintain health and strength; the appetite is abused if food be taken which is injurious. Doctors differ so much as to what they commend as healthy, and constitutions also differ, that it is probably a man's wisest course to observe himself, and discover what food does not agree with him. However great may be his liking for that food, temperance enjoins that he should abstain from it. Again, while pleasure is intended to be an accompaniment of taking food, to make pleasure the end, and to select food with that end in view, is to be intemperate. Luxury and ostentation in the choice of rare and expensive foods is also to be condemned as immoral.

(*b*) The greater danger, however, comes from the use of intoxicating liquor. Without denying the possibility of a moderate use, or judging those whose consciences justify

such a use, I must express my conviction that, in view of the greatness of the danger of passing insensibly from moderation to excess, and of the large numbers who fall in this way, the consistent application of the principle of temperance is found in total abstinence. *Firstly* in the use of alcoholic beverages, as in the case of no other kinds, the danger of forming a habit of self-indulgence, which becomes a self-enslavement, is not imaginary, but real. Gratification of this appetite does not allay, but arouses it. These liquors are properly called *stimulants*, because they stimulate the desire for more. The danger is the greater because it is so hidden. The man who is slipping down the slope of indulgence is quite sure of his own moral footing, often until it is too late. He deceives himself, as he seeks, when he has made the discovery, to deceive others. No man can be so sure of himself as to be justified in saying that his own safety is here assumed. "Let him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest he fall" (1 Cor. x. 12). Even if a man can and does practise moderation, he is encouraging habits in others, and maintaining customs of hospitality which are full of danger. His example may encourage weaker men to feel secure, when the peril is real for them. While other interests have undoubtedly diverted many from this form of self-indulgence, and there has been a decided change for the better, the witness by teaching and especially example still remains urgently needed. The use of these liquors, unless in quite exceptional cases, is not necessary for health, the habitual use (not to say the excessive) decreases industrial efficiency, and degrades moral character. For a sensitive conscience the case for total abstinence should need no further demonstration.[1]

(7) There are two prevalent habits—smoking, and gambling and betting—which also involve moral danger, and demand the exercise of temperance. (*a*) I have never yet heard or read an adequate proof of the necessity of the habit of smoking, or of benefits it secures which could not be obtained in some other way. It is a useless self-indulgence and can gain such a mastery as a habit that it becomes a vice. That its dangers are not so great as those of drinking may be conceded; but the fact that its consequences, physical, economic, and moral, are not so disastrous as those of drunkenness should not conceal from us that actually the habit may become enslaving, so that a man is miserable and restless

[1] It is to myself a satisfaction that the first book which I wrote is entitled *The Ethics of Temperance*, and that in it I set out the argument for *Total Abstinence*.

when this gratification is denied or delayed. Some men, to avoid such bondage, abstain from the indulgence for a time, e.g. during Lent ; but if they can do without the indulgence, why do they deliberately return to it again ? If one regards the habit as deplorable in men, it is no denial of the equality of women to regret even more that this male weakness is finding so widely female imitation. In view of the abounding need and misery in our own land, the hindrance and delay of many kinds of service of the common good because of inadequate financial support, can the increasing expenditure on tobacco be justified to a sensitive Christian conscience ? I am quite aware that I shall probably be dismissed as a crank because of this protest against a prevailing passion, but nevertheless I record this judgment in all sincerity and seriousness.

(*b*) In betting and gambling various motives blend—the greed for easy gain, the pleasure in excitement, the lure of the uncertain, a perversion of courage in readiness to run risks.[1] The extent of the evil needs no demonstration ; the economic loss, the moral deterioration, the social wrong which it involves are known to all whose eyes are open to what is going on around us. There are Christian men (even some bishops) who maintain that there is nothing inherently wrong in this practice, if a man keeps within his means and does not go beyond them. Such a plea can be advanced surely only for the rich ; how many men in the working and middle classes have incomes so large that what they waste in this way does not considerably lower the standard of living which wife and child have a claim upon them they should try to maintain ! I have no hesitation in asserting that in my judgment this practice, apart altogether from its evil consequences, is inherently wrong. To take another man's wealth, unless it is a reward for service rendered to him, or a gift which he desires to bestow from some personal interest or affection, is dishonest ; and the greed which prompts such action is wrong. To give to " chance " any place in the ordering of our lives is to dethrone reason and conscience as the guides of our living. To desire and expect to gain at another's loss, even if the possibility of losing is recognised, is anti-social conduct. This practice discourages industry and thrift, as wealth is sought without labour or saving. The moralist may here go beyond what he is entitled to urge in regard to the

[1] See *The Ethics of Gambling*, by W. D. Mackenzie, for a moral exposure of this vice.

use of strong drink ; there is no legitimate moderation for which a moral plea can be advanced. The duty of temperance is the entire suppression of this desire ; within no limits may it be indulged, but must be excluded altogether.

(8) While the desires and habits just mentioned may be taken as the most conspicuous instances in which there is a need of the exercise of the virtue of temperance, it must be added that the range of exercise is as wide as human desire. (*a*) The desire for *wealth*, in so far as by means of it the legitimate bodily needs are met, and provision is made for self-culture, the development of the whole human personality, and the pursuit of it in a socially necessary and beneficent employment, are not to be condemned, so long as the measure of the desire, and the method of its pursuit, is consistent with Christian love to God and man. In the miser there is excess, and a means of life becomes an end of living. *Avarice* needs to be prevented by temperance.

(*b*) In the same way it is not wrong for a man to care for his own reputation, to desire influence among his fellow-men, to aim at a position of honour and authority, so long as the danger of egoism is avoided and altruism is maintained : but the *ambition* that seeks to rise above, and gain power over, others is an evil tendency which temperance must hold in check. The two vices—avarice and ambition—may go together. Many men desire wealth, and pursue it, because of the name and fame, the power and privilege, it may bring them. There are some men who get little pleasure out of their wealth, except the satisfaction of being able to control other lives. Domination over others in any relation or sphere is not a legitimate desire for any follower of Him who came not to be served, but to serve.

(*c*) Play has a large part in the life of a child, and a necessary function in his vital development. Even in the adult recreation, the relief from the strain of toil, the interest which comes from change of occupation, the pleasure which the manifold forms of art afford in gratifying the æsthetic taste, the sense of humour, have a rightful place. But amusement,[1] when not kept in a subordinate place, and allowed to become a primary object of living, is a moral danger, and those who have the leisure for, and the means of, such self-indulgence have need to exercise the virtue of temperance. Then there is also a law of decreasing increment. The habitual pleasure-seeker gets less and less satisfaction out of

[1] See Part IV., chapter iv., for a fuller treatment.

each pleasure which he adds. Other instances might be given ; but these will suffice to show that all human desires and habits must be kept under control, so that the indulgence and pursuit of any one of them shall never be allowed to become disproportionate to the harmonious development of the whole human personality. Temperance in this wide sense of complete self-control is a condition of human perfection.

III

The virtues may be distinguished, but cannot be separated. In the exercise of temperance, *courage* must often be exhibited. Danger may be risked, and pain endured, in controlling desires. Scorn and suffering may be the lot of the man who refuses to follow the evil fashions of the time and the place. (1) As described by McDougall, fear escapes danger or pain, if possible, by flight ; but courage shows fight. As has already been shown, there are moral situations in which fear and flight do not show cowardice, but may even involve courage. To refuse to expose oneself to a temptation, even if the refusal brings mockery, may be a display of courage ; to court a temptation is not courage, but foolhardiness. It is courage " to know what is to be feared." In estimating this virtue we must take account of natural disposition. There are men who seem to know no fear ; they delight in danger, and pain is no deterrent from the pursuit of any object. Others there are who are timid ; these are constantly apprehensive of danger, and acutely sensitive to pain. In the first kind of man, courage has little moral merit, however much its display may command admiration, and legitimately, for our admiration need not be measured by our moral judgment. In the second kind of man the courage, in which the willing spirit masters the weak flesh, is a virtue, which deserves moral approbation. A moral and a religious motive may enable a man to triumph over his natural disposition. It is often assumed that it is in war that men find the fittest sphere for the exercise of courage ; and, condemn as we may the objects and the methods of war, we should be guilty of a moral wrong if we withheld our appreciation of the bravery which has been shown on the battlefield. In teaching children and young people, while there must be care to impress the Christian view of war, we cannot debar ourselves from telling the story of such bravery. But happily

there are many " moral equivalents of war," and we should discover them if we only opened our eyes to the common life around us. The mother who suffers pain and risks her life in giving birth to her child, the fireman who faces the flames, or the lifeboatman who faces the billows to rescue life, the miner whose daily labour involves him in constant danger, the explorer who exposes himself to he knows not what in the regions beyond—all these are instances of the same virtue. There are adventures, perils, and sacrifices in the region of the mind and the soul. The man of science has often a price to pay for widening the bounds of human knowledge. The martyr writes his witness in his blood. To remove wrongs, to assert justice in the economic sphere, the social order, must involve sacrifice, taking risks incalculable, and paying a price unfixed to produce a future good out of present conflict and confusion.

(2) There are two directions in which the Christian man needs to exercise courage. He is not to be conformed to the world which is crucified to him by the Cross of Jesus Christ, and what it means to him and makes of him; and he is to be so transformed in the likeness of Jesus Christ that he will with Him be crucified unto that world (Gal. vi. 14). (*a*) While the days of persecution are over, the days of resistance of the evil influences of the world are not gone. Many Christians escape the conflict, because they live by a lower than the Christian standard. Probably in domestic relations and in the activities of the Church most Christian men recognise a higher standard than they at present do in the spheres of economics and politics. In secret and subtle ways devotion to the Mammon of business or party interferes with their services of God. It does still demand courage to withstand the lower standards which pervade industry and government. To follow Christ closely here may even now involve self-denial, and the taking up of the cross of sacrifice of reputation, influence, power, or wealth. It takes a brave man to stand alone with Christ against the still prevailing evils in the world.

(*b*) But the Christian's attitude is not merely negative—noncomformity ; it is positive—transformation. While this Christian ideal has been present and active as a leaven in the lump of our society, the whole has not been influenced either extensively or intensively. The Christian man needs, despite his moral environment, to develop beyond and above it, in the outward range of the duties he recognises and the

inward reach of the motives from which he acts. This will, in the measure of a man's fidelity, involve taking risks, enduring losses, giving up much of the world for Christ. He cannot be content, however, to concern himself only, however faithfully, about his own character to conform it to the likeness of Christ : he must endeavour by his influence to transform his environment. Not only can he not be his Christian best in a society non-Christian, but he must desire all his neighbours to become Christian, and consequently he must labour for such conditions in society as will not be hindrances, but prove helps to the conversion and consecration of individuals to Christ. Such necessary economic and political changes will necessarily involve risks, and losses, on a far larger scale than any individual Christian is called to face. To advocate and promote such changes, despite all they may involve, demands courage. It will surely need the deepest wisdom to discover, and the highest courage to apply to society the principles of justice.

IV

(1) Although we cannot sever the individual from his environment, and such virtues as temperance and courage, which at first sight have a distinctively individual reference, must find their field of exercise in society, justice is the virtue which on its very face bears a social character. It was to discover what justice is that Plato set out on his quest in the Republic. Justice is the cement which holds the social structure together. There will be general agreement that Plato's Republic does not exhibit to us a society in which justice is from the Christian standpoint realised. The members of the society are subordinated to the society in a measure which the Christian estimate of the value of each man to God as potentially a son of God cannot admit as desirable or legitimate. The membership in a Christian society must be a conscious, voluntary one, in which the individual does not find his personality repressed, but developed. But, as the present condition of our society shows, the liberty of the individual, unrestrained against abuse, may lead to so great irregularities of condition as challenge the sense of justice. Luxury at one end and penury at the other end of society, the accumulation of vast fortunes " beyond the dreams of avarice," and dependence on

an insufficient weekly wage with the haunting shadow of unemployment—that is the challenge of justice. What justice demands is that to each member of the society shall be given the opportunity of the fullest individual development which its resources allow, and which is consistent with the obligations of each to all. Communism maintains that this demands an equal distribution of wealth by the abolition of private property. Collectivism does not go so far, but demands that the means of producing wealth, the capital employed in industry and commerce, shall be controlled by the community, local or national. There is difference of opinion as to the rate at which, and the methods by which, this transfer of control shall take place. Some preach the class-war, and an economic revolution as its end ; others admit " the inevitableness of gradualness." The Christian conscience, as such, in its pursuit of justice is not, and cannot be, committed to any economic theory as such : a Christian man must satisfy himself whether such economic change is the only and the best method of realising the ideal of justice. Many Christians will agree that whatever changes come must come gradually, and never by violence in any form ; but by a growing and spreading conviction of what is desirable and even necessary. They too will argue that an economic system which treated men as puppets, and not persons ; which repressed individual initiative, and lowered individual responsibility ; which hindered individual development, would not correspond with the Christian ideal. Accordingly, they will hesitate about committing themselves to socialism, however generous their social aspirations may be, and will prefer such a regulation of industry by the community as will allow the largest measure of individual liberty consistent with the full recognition of social obligation to maintain a like liberty for all. What can be demanded is that for each child shall be provided the educational opportunity for the fullest developent of whatever capacity may be possessed. The Christian as a citizen is under obligation to resist all measures which to him appear inconsistent with the principle of justice, and to support all measures which accord with it. But, without ignoring or neglecting the ideal of utility, he will be always very much concerned about the social conditions which promote the realisation of the ideals of beauty, truth, and goodness.

(2) While in the organisation of social relations this principle of justice, affording each man the enjoyment of his

rights, and requiring of each man the fulfilment of his duties, must be maintained, in the Christian's individual relation to his fellow-men, justice must be transformed into love, the greatest of the three Christian graces, and each Christian must endeavour to derive all his conduct from that source. This does not mean treating all men alike, for in the first place all have not the same function in society ; and within the common membership of the one society there are degrees in the intimacy of the relation. To give an extreme instance, a man would soon forfeit his reputation if he showed the same affection to all women as to his own wife, and a woman would certainly have ground for complaint if her husband were just as reserved with her as with other women. The true mother's heart will go out with interest and concern to all children ; but we must not forbid her greater tenderness for the children she herself has borne. Not only kinship establishes these more intimate relations ; in friendship there can be more unrestrained expression of regard. A common Christian faith should, although in the Church to-day it does not, afford a reason for intimate relation. In the *philadelphia*, the love of the brethren, the *philanthropia*, the love of all men, may find a concentration. The relations which are constituted by the State, in which Christians and non-Christians have a common interest and obligation, do not allow the full expression of Christian love, and thus justice cannot be superseded as a guiding principle, although the Christian's double purpose will be to do justly from the motive of love, and to bring the requirements of justice within the society into closer conformity to the constraints of love.[1]

[1] The whole of Part IV., dealing with Social Institutions, is an exposition of what justice, sublimated by Christian love, demands in the recognition of the *rights* of others, and the corresponding *duties* to others, in accordance with the Golden Rule.

CHAPTER IV

THE CHRISTIAN GRACES

THE three Christian graces are an indication of the inseparableness in Christianity of morality and religion, as each of them has a moral as well as a religious reference. It would not be true to regard them as wholly an addition made by Christianity to human morality ; because the existence of human society depends on mutual faith among the members ; men must believe in and trust one another to live together ; because the progress of human society depends on the inspiring hope of the pioneer that improvement will be secured ; because even in pre-Christian times we can observe a widening of the range of the human relations, into which love enters. But, because these graces are directed towards God, their human influence is deepened and enlarged. The relation to God, which is constituted by faith in God, hope in God, and love for God, is a religious relation ; so far as it is by the grace of Christ, and the presence and activity of the Spirit of God, that man exercises faith, nourishes hope, and grows in love, faith, hope, and love are graces, gifts of the Spirit of God. But in religion man is not passive ; and herein *quietism* errs ; for his receptivity for, and responsiveness to, grace is an activity. The hand must be outstretched to grasp the gift ; it is not dropped into the lap. As in breathing and in eating there must be an activity of the organism, so in the presence and activity of the Holy Spirit within the soul. If there is an activity, however dependent on God, there is an obligation to exercise that activity. Accordingly, religion as the relation to God is a part of morality ; while faith, hope, love are gifts of God, yet they are also duties of man. The completion of morality must be the human activity which is the condition of receiving and responding to the divine grace which constitutes man's relation to God. A danger which is to be avoided, on the contrary, is what has been called *activism*—the reliance on man's doing without dependence on what God in His grace does. When in self-confidence a man declares that he can do his duty, and thinks only of his own capacity, he either overrates his own resources or under-estimates the obligations which rest upon him. When Paul said : " I can do all things," he added,

" in Him that strengtheneth me " (Phil. iv. 13). While, as the term itself indicates, it is in these graces that man's dependence on God is recognised, yet we must extend the reference to the whole of man's moral life, no less to the virtues discussed in the previous chapter. It is through faith, hope, love towards God as God's gifts, that man will be able to exercise the virtues of wisdom, temperance, courage, and justice towards his fellow-men. Before considering this reference to God in these graces, we may briefly discuss their application to man.

I

(1) As has already been indicated, without faith in man human society would be impossible. (*a*) Within the human family there must be the mutual trust of husband and wife ; and a similar confidence must mark the relation of parents to children, and children to parents. The unity of a tribe must rest on the belief in one another of the clansmen ; and a chief can sustain his authority, unless his is a rule of violence, only if he is believed capable of protecting and preserving the interests of the tribe. Men emerge from savagery, in which every man's hand is against his neighbour, or tribe is at constant war with tribe, as the range of faith widens. Tribes can settle down quietly beside one another only as they come to believe that the one is not waiting to injure the other. In our advanced civilisation, industry and commerce depend on credit. How small a proportion is the gold which passes from hand to hand of the total financial dealings within a nation, or between two nations ! To accept a cheque in payment of goods or services is an act of faith. What hinders the process of disarmament among the nations is the lack of faith. Despite the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Locarno Treaty, the Kellogg Pact, France so distrusts Germany that it maintains armaments beyond any present need. War between the United States of America and Great Britain is said to be unthinkable ; and yet both nations have found it difficult to come to an agreement about the number of their cruisers. Employers so distrust the employed that a scheme of consultation and conciliation is viewed with suspicion. Jesus might rebuke the classes and the nations to-day with the words : " O thou of little faith, wherefore didst thou doubt ? " (Matt. iv. 31). The apologist for war declares that human

nature cannot be changed, assuming that human nature is necessarily pugnacious. The instinct to fight may be part of man's natural inheritance from his animal ancestry, and may have been necessary to self-preservation. But there are gregarious as well as solitary animals ; and the herd impulse no less than the sex impulse has survived in man. Man has interests and impulses which, directed and controlled by nurture, can so modify his nature in his character that goodness and not badness will be the result. Faith in the capacity of human nature to develop into human character, worthy of confidence in all human relations, is not a defiance of facts, as man's history has disclosed them ; the general worth justifies a trust which individual unworthiness may challenge. The cynic or the misanthrope is not as " knowing " as he thinks he is.

(*b*) For the Christian such faith is not only possible, but even obligatory. If he believes in God, he must believe that He has made man for goodness ; and, recognising fully how much sin has marred God's workmanship in many men, he can still believe that the Creator can be the Redeemer, that " where sin abounded, grace did abound more exceedingly " (Rom. v. 20). Jesus had faith in men, and most in those whom the good and the godly men of His day most distrusted—the outcasts of Jewish society. Surely it was His faith in the sinful woman, shown in His attitude of grace to her, which so aroused in her faith in herself as not beyond saving, and in Him as Saviour (Luke vii. 36–50). It is the belief that the most degraded savage is potentially a son of God, capable of fellowship with, and likeness to, his Father, which sustains the missionary in his often seemingly fruitless labours and sorrows. This faith must be in constant exercise if the Christian life is to be most fully lived. Again and again come crises in human relationships when the treatment of another must be determined by trust or distrust. Should a wrong be punished or forgiven ? The good of the wrongdoer may sometimes appear to demand the one rather than the other. Shall the restraint of law or the constraint of love be more effective for moral amendment ? There must be faith in men to prefer love to law. Only as this Christian estimate of, and confidence in, man prevails can the prejudices, suspicions, and enmities which divide the nations, a constant provocation to war, be overcome. Whatever be the value of the international machinery for the prevention of war and the promotion of peace, it will

not function with full effectiveness unless it receives the driving-power of this Christian faith in man as not only created by God, but as redeemable by Christ as Saviour and Lord. Hence it is an imperative duty of the Christian Church to display that faith in the relation of the churches, into which the Church is unhappily divided, to one another, and to influence the Governments of the nations to exercise such faith in one another. That such a faith has been sometimes deceived and disappointed is not a reason which would justify the abandonment of this attitude. It may be necessary to exercise Christian wisdom in a judgment on all the relevant facts. It is certain that the progress of mankind has been much more helped than it would ever be endangered by the exercise of faith. Even though the one generation rewarded the faith of Jesus in man with a Cross, the succeeding generations have been increasingly assigning to Him a Throne. Conduct is not distinctively Christian unless it is of faith—faith in man, inspired and sustained and restored, after defeat, by faith in God as Creator, and in Christ as Redeemer of man (cf. Rom. xiv. 23).

(2) It is not possible to draw any hard-and-fast distinction between faith and hope. Hope is faith directed towards the future ; and the expectation of hope for coming good must rest on faith. " Faith is the assurance of [is *the giving substance to*, R.V. marg.] things hoped for," because it is " the proving of things not seen " (Heb. xi. 1). Giving its more Christian content to this description, we may say that faith makes the future good certain because it makes God real. Hope for man rests on hope in God. This grace is as necessary to the full Christian life as is faith. Man needs the assurance that his labour for the good of his fellows is not vain ; that he shall see of the travail of his soul and be satisfied ; that, even if he sow in tears, he shall reap in joy. The exposition of the content of the Christian hope belongs to Christian dogmatics, and not ethics ; but the influence of the hope on Christian conduct and character may be taken account of by ethics. Even if we doubt the apostle's conclusion that without the Christian hope the probable course of man would be to " eat, drink, and be merry " (1 Cor. xv. 32), and prefer the poet's conclusion that the only reward virtue desires is to be allowed to go on, that very desire itself is a call for the Christian hope. The moral task for the individual is not ended with death ; it demands immortality for its completion, the reward of " going on

and still to be." A man can plan his life on a larger scale, by a loftier standard, if he has the assurance that his labour in striving after perfection is not vain ; but that the sowing here will reach its full harvest hereafter. As we strive for the moral improvement of another, we exercise faith that he *can* amend his ways, and hope that he *will* ; the belief that he *can* would not be enough without the trust that he *will*. But we must take into our regard the race as well as the individual. Is the world getting worse and worse until the final imminent catastrophe of the divine judgment, or is it getting better until the final consummation of the divine redemption ? If we believe the former, we shall indeed be anxious to pluck as many brands as we can from the burning by individual conversions. If we believe the latter, we shall not indeed neglect individual conversion, for a redeemed society must be constituted by saved men, but we shall extend our interest and activity to institutions as well as to persons, to morals and manners as well as to beliefs, to the mutual relations of individuals, classes, and nations as well as to the relation of each man to God. Whether the Kingdom of God in its full manifestation is possible under earthly conditions or not is a matter for Christian dogmatics to consider.[1] Our labour for human improvement here on earth, however, needs to be sustained by the hope that there is progress towards the full manifestation of the Kingdom, and such a consummation on earth of God's redemptive purpose as is at all possible under the conditions of time and space.

(3) In the Historical Section, in dealing with the teaching of Jesus, love as the supreme principle of religion and morality, with its two distinctively Christian applications, the forgiveness of wrongs and service unto sacrifice, has already been fully discussed. Here the more detailed application may be attempted. (*a*) We must first of all recognise that the content of the obligation of love must necessarily be affected by the relation, natural, economic, social, in which two persons are placed. While Jesus requires that the imitation of the Heavenly Father's perfection shall transcend any of the recognised relations among men (Matt. v. 46–48), and demands that even the most intimate human affections shall be subordinated to His own claims (xix. 29), yet His teaching on marriage and the relation of children and parents shows that He recognised the distinctive mutual

[1] See the " Conclusion " of this book.

obligations which the family relations involve. The love of husband and wife, or parent and child, is not deprived of its special quality because of the universal love enjoined. The attitude of Jesus Himself to the Jewish people, finding its tragic expression in His tears over Jerusalem (Luke xix. 41) and the willingness of Paul to be accursed, if that were possible, for the salvation of his countrymen (Rom. ix. 3), show that the love of mankind need not lower the temperature of patriotism. The New Testament distinguishes between *philadelphia*, love within the Christian community (Rom. xii. 10), and *philanthrophia*, the general human love. We must, then, recognise not only degrees of intensity in the emotion, but also differences of duty in accordance with the particular relationship. Confucian ethics, though on a lower plane, deserve study in regard to this necessary moral discrimination. In the last—the Sociological Section—this discussion must be further continued.

(*b*) Can we place ourselves under better guidance in tracing the variety of love's qualities than that of the Apostle Paul in his hymn in praise of love (1 Cor. xiii.), of which it would be easy to believe the verbal inspiration? Love makes a man modest in his estimate of himself, and consequently humble in his attitude to others. He does not exalt or assert himself; he is neither conceited nor censorious. In his estimate of others he does not find pleasure in depreciating, in finding out their faults, but rejoices in the progress of the Gospel in them. He does not seek to take any selfish advantage, nor grudges another his advantage; temper is under control, and wrongs are patiently borne; love is active for the good of others. These verses are, indeed, a work of literary art, and a commentator's analysis of them deserves reproduction. The Hebraic rhythm, the distinctive feature of Hebrew poetry—parallelism—prevails, as this translation shows:

Love suffereth long, shows kindness.
Love envies not, makes no self-display;
Is not puffed up, behaves not unseemly;
Seeks not her advantage, is not embittered;
Imputes not evil, rejoices not at wrong,
But shares in the joy of truth.
All things she tolerates, all things she believes,
All things she hopes for, all things she endures.

The comment runs as follows : " The first line supplies the general theme, defining the fundamental excellences of love, her patience towards evil, and kindly activity in good. In the negative movement, the first half-lines set forth love's *attitude*—free from jealousy, arrogance, avarice, grudge-bearing ; while the second member in each case sets forth her *temper*—modest, refined in feeling, placable, having her joy in goodness. The third movement reverts to the opening note, on which it descants." [1] Love has faith in man, and hope for man, and consequently forbearance with the wrong which it may suffer. Here is expanded the teaching of Jesus in the two aspects of love—as forgiveness and as service, which is what God's love in Christ is.

(*c*) It is this attitude, temper, disposition, which gives to love its place as the supreme principle of all Christian morality. All moral traditions, conventions, customs, standards, laws, must be brought to this test : for the Christian does not set aside the moral inheritance of his social environment, the growth of many years, the gain of many labours ; but he fulfils it ; that is, corrects its errors, supplies its deficiencies, and develops its demands to bring the whole into accord with the supreme principle. It is the conscience which love has sensitised which can discriminate the permanent and the temporary, the universal and the local. Love will not always give the same decision, when a choice has to be made, for it will distinguish between one situation and another, and seek to discover what is the best to be said or done in each. Love may be severe as well as kind ; it may suffer the punishment to fall, as well as pass over the transgression; it may rebuke sin or shame into penitence by silent endurance. Jesus was not always " meek and mild " ; He could be angry and show scorn (Matt. xxiii.). But whatever He said or did, or refrained from saying or doing, His purpose was ever the same—to bring sinners to penitence and faith. While we cannot imitate Him with prosaic literalness, yet the principle of love loses all vagueness and uncertainty when we see it illumined in His attitude to, and action (which included passion) for, sinful men. All the virtues—wisdom, temperance, courage, justice—are sublimated by love. Love is not blind, but has a clearer vision. Temperance is not a harsh self-control, but a joyous self-surrender to the new affection for God and man. Courage dares and endures all things for love's sake.

[1] *The Expositor's Greek Testament*, ii., p. 899.

Justice ceases to be a careful balancing of rights and duties ; for love inspires a readiness to forgo rights and to accept duties. In the Christian life, love is no merely human aspiration and endeavour ; it is God's own character and purpose reproduced by His Spirit in man.

II

Faith, hope, and love are graces, not only in human relations, but even in the relation of man to God. On the one hand, the duties can be done only as grace is given ; and thus morality is dependent on religion. On the other hand the human receptivity and responsiveness to grace is a duty to be done ; and so man's relation to God in religion falls within the range of morality. For what from the one point of view may be regarded as a gift of the Spirit may from the other point of view be regarded as a quality of human conduct. So inevitably and inextricably are morality and religion, man and God, inter-related. Before dealing with the three Christian graces in their reference to God, we may recall the truth, already discussed, that religion is a moral obligation. No relation of human personality can be in itself, as in its influence, more important than the relation of man to God. A man has not completed his manhood unless he lives with and for God. The tendency to treat a man's attitude to God as a matter of relative indifference in comparison with his action among men is a fatal error. No part of Christian ethics can be more significant than the discussion of the three graces in reference to God.

(1) In the New Testament the word faith has varying meanings : and a consideration of these will lead us to a more adequate conception of it. (*a*) The description in the Epistle to the Hebrews has already been referred to. Faith makes the invisible, the divine reality, real ; it changes the probability of God's existence for human thought into the certainty of the divine presence in human experience. While religion at second hand may believe on the testimony of others, or on the cogency of an argument, there is first-hand religion only as God is experienced as real. For the writer of this epistle the experience of God's reality carried with it the assurance as regards future destiny, the fulfilment of man's hopes for himself and the race. Not only does the fulfilment of hope depend on the reality of God ; but there

is a further link ; the fulfilled hope is the reward of a relation to God which God approves. "Without faith it is impossible to be well pleasing unto Him ; for he that cometh unto God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that seek after him" (Heb. xi. 6). What is well-pleasing to God is not the exercise of faith alone, but the life which results from such exercise, as the illustrations which follow show ; risks are taken, dangers are faced, struggles are waged, and sacrifices are made because there is this faith in God. The faith this chapter illustrates is not the barren belief in God, shared with men by devils, of which the Epistle of James writes (ii. 14–26). If this passage, which contrasts faith and works, is directed against Paulinism, it is a Paulinism misunderstood or misrepresented. Paul contrasts Christian faith with the works of the law, the motive of which was fear of punishment or hope of reward. For Paul there are works which are the fruit of faith ; for faith becomes active and energises in love (Gal. v. 6), and love is the fulfilment of the law (*v.* 14). We cannot conclude that there is no disagreement of Paul and James, for there is a difference of emphasis. For James, at least as he contrasts it with works, faith is not the spontaneous, inevitable source of the deeds of love, as it is for Paul. Although James recognises that faith may bear works, he conceives the possibility of faith remaining barren, as Paul did not, and could not. This difference is due to the difference of the object, and the consequent nature of faith, as Paul conceived it. It is not merely the divine existence, as with James ; it is Jesus Christ as Saviour and Lord, who for Paul is the immediate object, and God in and through Him. Faith is for him so sure a dependence on, so absolute a confidence in, so complete a surrender to Christ, as to become a union, which rises into an identification of himself with Christ ; this, however, is not an absorption in Christ, as, however close the union, he retains his own identity and the relation never loses its moral content of a transformation of character to likeness to Christ, to whom he is thus united. "I have been crucified with Christ, and it is no longer I that live, but Christ [R.V. marg.] liveth in me, and that life which I now live in the flesh I live in faith, the faith which is in the Son of God, who loved me, and gave Himself up for me" (Gal. ii. 20). Assuming that this his characteristic experience is common to all Christians—"we were buried therefore with Him through baptism into death ; that like

as Christ was raised from the dead through the glory of the Father, so we also might walk in newness of life" (Rom. vi. 4)—he finds here the convincing argument against any continuance in sin that grace may abound (*v.* 1). It is this view of faith which we must carry back into the preceding argument about the faith which justifies. God reckons the man who believes righteous, not for what he merits in exercising faith, nor yet for what he by the exercise of faith will yet become (these are not Pauline thoughts, and we do him wrong in reading them into his statements), but wholly and solely for what Christ is, suffers, and does, for salvation is all of grace. Nevertheless, Christ being what He is, such a faith in Him spontaneously and inevitably brings moral transformation. The contrast between the meaning which Paul puts into his quotation from Hab. ii. 4—"the righteous from faith shall live" (i. 17)—and the sense of the original passage—"the just shall live in his faithfulness" (R.V. marg.)—is not so great as at first appears. Faith begets faithfulness, and faithfulness begets righteousness. He whom God reckons righteous because of his faith in Christ, becomes righteous because his union with Christ results in conformity to Christ.

(*b*) This exegetical discussion is no digression from the purpose of this volume, as Christian morality loses its distinctiveness, its motive, and its power if it is not rooted in such a personal relation to God in Christ as Saviour and Lord. This belief and trust in God, and surrender to Him, is exercised by the Christian no less in the sphere of the Divine Providence than of the Divine Redemption, which at first sight may appear separate, but on closer scrutiny must be seen to be inseparable. Ritschl's [1] doctrine that the Christian gains dominion over the world but repeats the assurance which the Fourth Gospel ascribes to Jesus Himself: "In the world ye have tribulation; but be of good cheer, I have overcome the world" (John xvi. 33), and which is echoed in the Epistle: "For whosoever is begotten of God overcometh the world; and this is the victory which hath overcome the world, even our faith. For who is he that overcometh the world, but he that believeth that Jesus is the Son of God" (1 John v. 4–5). Faith in Christ inspired Paul with a like confidence: "We know that to them that love God all things work together for good, even to them that are called according to His

[1] *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, iii., pp. 160–172; Eng. trans., pp. 168–181.

purpose" (Rom. viii. 28). He was confident also that the relation to God on which this confidence rested could not be destroyed by any or all opposing forces. Nothing anywhere at any time "shall be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord" (*vv.* 37–39). This faith that he who has been delivered from the bondage of sin, and has become a child of God, can turn all the circumstances and experiences of life in the world to good, and that God wills that it should be so, is far removed from the shallow optimism which so freely uses Browning's words, which, dramatically appropriate, do not sum up his philosophy: "God's in His heaven; all's right with the world." There is much wrong with the world, and it is being put right only by or for those who accept God's purpose; those who disobey God's moral order will discover the truth in the poetic phrase: "The stars in their courses fought against Sisera" (Judges v. 20). There is abundant evidence of God's impartial goodness, to which Jesus witnessed (Matt. v. 45). Nevertheless, a generalisation such as this, that "the universe is friendly," is not true. "There is no peace to the wicked" (Isa. lvii. 21) and "The wages of sin is death" (Rom. vi. 23). Even for the righteous the friendliness is not pleasant good-nature. Sorrow, struggle, suffering, loss, bereavement, death, are real for the saints as for the sinners; only faith can transmute everything that seems dross into the gold of closer communion with, and increasing resemblance to, God in Christ. To the term *optimism* as expressing the Christian attitude I prefer that of *meliorism*. The world is not yet the best; it is being made *better* for faith in the individual life, and in the world-wide redemptive process. This faith, however, is not yet sight; it passes, and necessarily passes, into *hope*; and in the Christian salvation by faith there is also implicit hope. Paul, who so stresses faith, writes: "By hope were we saved" (Rom. viii. 24).

(2) If morality be not merely a law to be obeyed, a static view which would attach it to the past; but an end, a dynamic view which connects it with the future, then hope has necessarily a place in it. If the individual man is imperfect personality, and only through a gradual development can become perfectly personal, the personal ideals realised in him; if human society is but slowly evolving out of chaos into cosmos, a perfect community, in which each is for all, and all are for each, then there must be, if human aspiration and effort are not to be regarded as a

"forlorn hope," the faith that progress is possible, and the hope that the consummation of that progress will yet be actual. (*a*) This expectation, whether realisable on earth or only under the more favourable conditions of the future life, does involve hope towards man: that man has the capacity to become, individually and socially, what the highest good demands, and that his capacity will be duly exercised; but this hope by itself could not inspire the sustaining and triumphant confidence for the most heroic and sacrificial endeavour. There must be an assurance that there is not so great a disharmony between mankind and the universe as may turn man's victory, if achieved, into a disaster. Comte's ambition was to get inspiration for man's progress in a religion without God. Adoration of God was, in his view, ingratitude to humanity, to which alone all the benefits which men have gained are due. He failed to recognise that man is dependent on nature, and that even by the struggle with what sometimes seems nature's hostility he develops his knowledge and skill. In thinking of what man can believe as possible, and expect as actual, this relation to nature cannot be left out of account. History has given adequate evidence of a correspondence which inspires a large measure of confidence. Man has wrested, and is wresting, her secrets from nature, and has harnessed and is harnessing, her forces to the chariot of his advancement, not only material, but also mental, moral, social, as in that process he has been developing his own capacities and relations. This confidence may degenerate, and has degenerated, into a self-sufficiency which is perilous; and he needs the sense of his dependence on God to maintain the harmony between the gains of his outer and the growth of his inner life. It does not seem a false diagnosis of the present distresses and disillusionments to ascribe them to a material progress which has outrun the moral and the religious advance that alone can make the material progress fully advantageous to all men. To give only one instance: our moral standards as regulating our social relations have not yet been adjusted to our economic conditions. Hence not only material hardships, as of unemployment, but moral evils, such as conflicting interests and hostile classes. The Great War shattered many an illusion regarding man's unimpeded and assured progress; and many are realising that the moral conscience must be in control of economic and social changes if many evils are to be avoided. Many,

too, are recognising that the moral conscience needs the reinforcement of its authority by the religious consciousness. Hope for man that is not also hope in God is an unsubstantial vision. While our faith in God sustains the hope that nature will not defeat man's endeavour though it may test his endurance, what is still more important is the hope of the coming good for mankind, which the grace of God in the goodness of man may yet secure.

(*b*) If nature cannot prevent, but must subserve, God's purpose, can the sin of man challenge the hope? There are serious, earnest Christians who do not believe in a human progress toward "the far-off divine event to which the whole creation moves"; but hold that the world is getting worse and worse, ripe for the judgment of the divine intervention in the Second Advent of Christ. Their habits of mind, however, are such that it is not unfair to assume that their view is not a reasoned conclusion from an impartial survey of all the facts, but rests on a mistaken interpretation of certain portions of Scripture. We may set aside their views as not deserving further consideration. To recognise that sin may and does hinder and delay the fulfilment of God's purpose, and that God cannot deal with sin in any other way than by moral and religious means, the constraint of His holy love in the thought and life of men, does and must moderate our expectations of a speedy or easy solution of the world-problem. But our hope need not thereby be put to shame. If God be, as He is revealed in Christ, the Father of all mankind, redeeming men from sin and reconciling them unto Himself, we may be confident that He, knowing how far sin might hinder or delay His purpose, yet knowing also the resources in Himself as God, would not have created a race which He could not redeem and reconcile. That does not guarantee the salvation of every human soul, for it is rash to draw such an inference, yet it does assure us that God's purpose will be fulfilled, and that the Father of all will do for every soul the best which even He can do, so far as that soul allows. If we can cherish such a hope —and as in Christ it is offered to us, it is our duty to welcome it—it will make a great difference to the spirit in which we engage in the development of our own personality, and in the advancement of our fellow-men towards that coming good for all mankind.

(3) Can we love God, and ought we to love God? As for Christian faith God is in Christ, we may rather put the

question : Can we properly speak of love to Christ? The Psalms are a witness to the devotion of the saints under the old covenant to God as the Covenant-God of Israel. How much more, would it seem, can God as He is seen in Jesus Christ claim the heart of man !

(*a*) Yet Ritschl offers the following objection : " Love to Christ," he says, " is less definite than faith in Him. In that formula it is not decided whether one places oneself on an equality with Christ, or subordinates oneself to Him. Faith in Christ, however, includes the confession of His divinity and His Lordship, refuses accordingly the possibility of placing oneself on an equality with Him."[1] While one can sympathise with the motive of this statement, a well-grounded aversion to the mediæval familiarity with Christ as the bridegroom of the soul, and can find a partial explanation of it in Ritschl's own austere disposition, to which all religious emotionalism was uncongenial, yet the objection cannot be accepted as decisive. To the application of all terms of endearment to Christ, the use of the sensuous language of the Song of Solomon, any reverent spirit must share Ritschl's aversion. Christ is too great, too far above and beyond us, in His worth for love-making to be anything else than irreverence. Paul, who uses many phrases of affection for his converts and fellow-workers, never uses any such words of Christ. There cannot be the familiarity of human relationships, even although there may be an even closer intimacy with Him than with another human soul.

(*b*) If we describe love as a judgment of value, a sentiment of interest, a purpose of good for another, a giving of one's life to another, and a finding of one's life in another, then surely we may think of love to God. Has He not the supreme value for us, can any other interest compete with that which He may claim, can any good be compared with the fulfilment of His purpose in our lives? Is there not the fullest blessedness of which the human soul is capable in submission to His will, consecration to His service? Ritschl could not object to the judgment of value of Christ as absolute, or the purpose to make His good—the Kingdom of God—one's own ; the objection alone could lie against the sentiment, the affective aspect in the relation. Unreasoned and uncontrolled emotion is bad ; but the value of an emotion depends on the reason for it, and the result of it. To feel intensely in the relation to Christ seems almost

[1] *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, iii., p. 560 ; Eng. trans., p. 593.

inevitable, if our estimate of His worth to us is adequate, and the conduct to which it moves us is, according to His will, worthy of the relation into which by His gracious condescension we have been brought to Him. We need not hesitate, then, in recognising love to Christ, to God in Christ, as one of the Christian graces, the greatest of the three.

(*c*) We may even, greatly daring, approach the subject from the divine side. Does the revelation of God in Christ warrant our assumption that God desires the love of man; that, generous as that love is, bestowed even on those who are unworthy of it, yet it is gratified by the gratitude of human love? Jesus desired and welcomed human love; the anointing in Bethany by Mary, the sister of Lazarus, was a welcome token of her devotion to Him (Mark xiv. 6–9). It is not the highest type of love, which is content with bestowing benefits, and desires no response in personal relationship from those on whom those benefits are conferred. That is goodness; it is not really love; for love values the other highly enough to desire the return of love. God would set a lower value on us as persons if He only loved us, and did not want and welcome our love in response to His love. Love is a mutual relation; it is a personal exchange; it is a getting as well as a giving, a finding as well as a losing of oneself in another. Our obedience to God would lack something in satisfying God, unless love were its motive, and love made His service freedom. May we not venture to affirm that God created the world with the possibility of sin; He preserves the world with its actuality of sin; that there might be, as its consummation, persons capable of receiving and responding to this love, as shown, not in Creation and Preservation only, but, because of sin, supremely in Redemption and Reconciliation?

(*d*) But another objection confronts us. Can love be a duty? We cannot force our emotions, it is argued. We cannot produce the *sentiment* of love at command; but what we can do is on the one hand to keep before our minds the absolute value of God in Christ by concentrating our attention on what He has suffered and has done, and still is for us; and that impression will be followed by the appropriate affect, this sentiment of interest. While we muse, the fire of devotion will burn. "We needs must love the highest when we see it." We can by study and meditation make Christ real to ourselves in His truth and grace; and when we see Him as He is we cannot but love Him. Again,

not only shall we keep His commandments if we love Him ; but, in keeping His commandments, love will come. A human analogy may confirm this statement. I have known marriages in which, to begin with, there was no very warm attachment, but on both sides a sense of duty ; and the common life, dutifully lived, brought forth a growing love and happiness in that love. If Wm. James's theory that emotion follows action—for instance, that we feel sorry when we cry, not that we cry because we feel sorry—be true or not, there can be no doubt that action reacts upon the actor. Love for Christ will grow as we live for Christ. So in the same way we cannot force faith or hope, but, if God reveals Himself to us in Christ, faith and hope are evoked and sustained by that revelation.

(4) There is a common misunderstanding as to the permanence of faith and hope as well as love in the Christian life. (*a*) This misunderstanding has been enshrined in one verse of a well-known hymn :

Faith will vanish into sight ;
Hope be emptied in delight ;
Love in heaven will shine more bright ;
Therefore give us love.

Only an inadequate conception of faith on the one hand and an incomplete content for hope on the other can justify such a statement. The relation of man to God will still be that of faith, dependence on, confidence in, and submission to Him ; there will be progress towards perfection, and thus room for hope, in the future life, or any life worthily conceived from the Christian standpoint of God's relation to man. Paul expressly contrasts the permanence of the three graces with the temporary character of the spiritual gifts (1 Cor. xiii. 13). We cannot conceive Christian personality reaching beyond faith, hope, love.

(*b*) It is worth asking the question why Paul thinks of love as the greatest of the three graces. The answer is not far to seek. Faith and hope are receptive, are getting ; love is communicative, is giving. Jesus Himself said, " It is more blessed to give than to receive " (Acts xx. 35). We cannot conceive God as in His own life exercising faith or hope, although relatively to man, under time-conditions, we might possibly think of God as exercising faith in, and hope for, man ; but we can think of God in His eternal

reality as love, and it is the conception of love that gives the fullest content we can give to the conception of God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. It was thus that Augustine construed the doctrine of the Trinity.

(*c*) If love as the self-communicating perfection of God be the loftiest and largest conception which we can form of the reality of God, we cannot think of a higher or broader ideal for man than love, each giving and finding his life in others. And inasmuch as this human love has not only its example, but its motive, in the divine love through the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ, the Christian life becomes, not an outward imitation of the life of God, but an inward participation in that life ; communion with God (the religious highest good) and conformity to God (the moral highest good) are only one Supreme Good. Not only does this principle of love give coherence and consistency to the Christian ideal for man ; it unifies that ideal with the Christian reality of God ; the love of God through the grace of Christ in the Spirit constituting mankind a community of men with one another, and of all men with God.

(5) This personal relation to God of faith, hope, and love will spontaneously express itself in *worship*, private and public, in words and deeds. The practice of the presence of God, meditation on the verities of the Gospel, the study of the Holy Scriptures, prayer and praise in personal devotions, regular attendance at church, and participation in all the words and acts of public worship there, as means of expressing and so developing this relation to God, are moral obligations as well as religious privileges. No less may be urged the keeping of the Lord's Day holy for the worship of the sanctuary, for the witness of the Gospel, for the work of the Kingdom. Holy, too, should the place be kept where this worship is offered. This brief reference shows no depreciation of the importance of this subject, but rather such an appreciation as forbids the necessarily restricted treatment among so many other subjects.[1]

[1] See my book, *The Christian Preacher*, pp. 317–324, for a fuller discussion.

PART III

PSYCHOLOGICAL

INTRODUCTION

In the first part the history of the Christian moral ideal was sketched ; in the second, the moral standard as formulated by ethics was discussed. As morality is concerned with the quality of conduct or conscious and voluntary action, a consideration of the moral agent, the human personality, necessarily follows.

This is the more imperative as the two branches of modern science—biology and psychology—tend by the emphasis which they lay on man's evolution out of lower forms of life, his animal ancestry, and his consequent resemblance in nature to the other living creatures, to give a conception of man so different from that which ethical reflection has hitherto assumed, that morality itself is emptied of its distinctive content. With biology itself we are not here directly concerned, but with the biological basis of a good deal of the current psychology, especially what calls itself the " new psychology " ; and we can, therefore, almost entirely confine our regard to it. While there cannot be any doubt of the value of psychology, the study by as exact methods of science, as the matter will allow, of the *psyche*, or soul of man, all his mental processes, as presented in his consciousness or made evident in his behaviour—cognitive, affective and conative ; yet, on the other hand, there are some cautions as regards the use of this science in forming a conception of human personality which it is necessary to offer, not in depreciation of any positive contribution it may make, but rather to exclude certain metaphysical conclusions to which some psychologists have unwarrantably committed themselves.

(1) While it may be freely and fully conceded that much has been, and much more will be, gained by the investigation of mental, even as of vital and physical, phenomena by the methods of science, observation, experiment (when that is possible), generalisation, and correlation, in the application of the method the distinctive features of the phenomena must be recognised ; and the limitations that this difference may impose on the conclusions reached must not be ignored ; for in the effort to unify our knowledge, there is the subtle and secret temptation to exaggerate the

resemblances, and minimise the differences: and it is imperative that as much attention should be given to these features in which man is unlike the lower animals as to those where the likeness appears; nay, should not more attention even be given to these as distinctive, and so essential to any adequate conception?

(*a*) The tendency of the new psychology is to lay stress on man's animal ancestry, his descent from lower forms of life, while offering explanations of his higher activities which are really attempts to resolve them into lower, and so to depreciate their significance. Biologists generally do not resolve vital into chemical or physical phenomena, but recognise that they have a character of their own, even if they do not accept the theory of *vitalism*, which asserts a distinct vital force. Psychologists, too, generally admit that psychical phenomena cannot be reduced to organic, and that physiology cannot resolve the problems of psychology; yet the new psychology is ever seeking to represent primitive man as bestial, and then to minimise the difference between such a man and the animals. In discussing *heredity*, especially *instinct* in man, it will be necessary to deal more fully with the second point, but the first—the assumption that primitive man was bestial, represented by the lowest type of savage—here demands consideration.

(*b*) Evolution may under unfavourable circumstances involve degradation instead of progress. The savage has as long an ancestry as the civilised man. Among some tribes are found traces of a higher previous condition. There are instances of civilised man lapsing under the conditions of the savage into savagery. The primitive man had in him the possibilities both of savagery and civilisation; and the total conditions of life determined in his descendants whether the upward or the downward path was taken. Dr. J. Arthur Thomson, than whom on such a subject no higher authority can be cited, disagrees with those who reflect "modern slum or depressed savage conditions on primitive man."[1] While he insists on the continuity of the process of evolution, yet he maintains, as we shall see afterwards, that instinct has a relatively subordinate place in the life of man, and that its place is taken by intelligence. "The big differences seem," he says, "to be man's capacity for looking at himself objectively, for framing and experimenting with general ideas and controlling conduct in relation to them, and for

[1] *What is Man?* p. 52.

expressing judgment in language."[1] Great as must have been this initial difference to allow man to start on the upward path, the potential differences must have been greater still ; for no animal species has made the progress man has. To minimise the vast gulf between what man has become in civilisation, culture, morals, and religions, in understanding of and control over nature, in social institutions, in his constantly upward urge, and what the animals have remained from their beginning, because the contrast at the beginning may plausibly be made to appear less than it actually was, is sophistry and not science. Recognising all that the study of animal behaviour may teach us about the raw material out of which human personality must be formed, psychology must not be allowed surreptitiously to rob man of his unique pre-eminence among God's creatures.

(2) The subject of psychology—the mind—involves a distinction from all other subjects, which must not be ignored. In consciousness there is always the subject-object relation, the subject who thinks and the object which is thought : man is not merely conscious, but self-conscious ; and his self is not an idle spectator witnessing the drama of instincts, impulses, appetites, sentiments playing their own parts without any direction or control ; but the self is an interested actor without whom the drama could not be carried on. This self is not only conscious of the unity of all the content of consciousness as related to the self, thinking, feeling, willing ; it is also conscious of a continuity between past, present, and future contents, the identity of the self through all changes, shaping the future by the conduct, conscious and voluntary, of the present, and responsible for the results of the conduct of the past. It may be convenient for the immediate purpose of science to abstract the variety of the object of consciousness from the unity and the identity of the subject, to treat this content as consisting of distinct *units*, and to record resemblances, co-existences, successions, etc., in order to reach a synthesis by way of analysis ; but any conclusion reached must always be corrected by recognising that the self is there as the unity and the identity which so directs and controls the units that such a synthesis is at all possible. Just as in physics the separateness of the atoms is connected by the continuity of the ether, so here man's consciousness cannot be thought of as a sum of units

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 76. See my book on *The Doctrine of the Godhead* for a fuller discussion of the relation of God to man, pp. 255–285.

but as variety-in-unity. Accordingly, for ethical reflection the *observational* psychology must always be supplemented by the *reflective* ; the inner witness must be added to the outer evidence. In other words, the *psychological* standpoint of the observer must be associated with the *psychical* standpoint of the experient or the agent. The experience has its significance for *me*, the action its value for *me*, because it is *mine*.

We may even go further, and insist that the subject, for which all the content of consciousness, which science observes and explains as object, cannot be treated as only one of the objects, to be put on a level with them, or to be derived from them. However insignificant man's place in the universe may appear when we regard him only as a part of nature, dependent upon it, and limited by it, when we remind ourselves that it is his mind which measures, numbers, weighs, explains, relates, and interprets that universe, then it becomes more evident how abstract—that is, inadequate, and misleading if it is taken as adequate—is the standpoint of any science which treats man only as object. Man as subject is the most significant element in the universe.

(3) Another defect in the psychological method remains as regards, not the subject, but the object of consciousness. The explanation of the mental process by psychology may make the impression that the thought of man is wholly subjective, without any objective reference. Whether the object is real or not is a problem which psychology cannot solve, but which belongs to metaphysics.[1] A difference must here be recognised between the object of outward perception and the object of inward reflection. The appeal of the senses is so clamant that the majority of persons never suspect that there can be any doubt about the reality of the external world. It is not so with moral ideals and religious ideas ; they do not possess the evidence of universal consent as do material things ; and it appears much more easy to reduce them to subjective illusions, individual opinions, the rationalisation of instincts and impulses, which man shares with his animal kindred. Yet, as the religions of the world testify, man has never been able to escape the consciousness of supernatural and superhuman existence, a supersensible reality that fills him with dread, and yet casts a spell over him.[2] The evolution of this consciousness from

[1] See Selbie's *The Psychology of Religion*, pp. 21–22.
[2] See Otto's *The Idea of the Holy*.

the sense of power and the feeling of wonder in man's attitude to the world has gone on, fitting at each stage into the context of his experience, until the idea of one God has been reached, an idea which gives a more fitting setting to man's thought and life than any other, as Lord Balfour in his Gifford Lectures has shown.

The moral ideals, even as the religious ideas, confront the mind of man with the same objectivity. The ideals of truth, beauty, holiness, love, which have been discussed in a previous chapter, however inadequate at any stage of man's development their realisation may have been, command the reason and conscience of man with an authority, which he cannot challenge because only his own. The appreciation of values is as objective for man's consciousness as the apprehension of facts. There has been an evolution of morality in the individual and the race ; but to trace its course is not to reduce human morals to human invention.

Here too there is a fitting into the whole context of human experience. Science, philosophy, art, morals, and religion can be brought into an intelligible unity which guarantees the objectivity of each of the elements. An illusion of the mind of man here and a delusion there might be credible ; but not that such a coherence of so varied elements, covering so wide a range of human experience, can be essentially false, unless we so distrust the mind of man as to involve ourselves in general scepticism. Morality and religion have a correspondence with reality, for they work, not in the pragmatic sense that they are true only because they work, but in the sense that the realisation in experience does not disappoint. The venture of faith in God and for goodness is verified in its results. When thus tested in experience, their claim is not contradicted. This excursion into the realm of philosophy, brief as it has been, has been necessary as a warning against the false impression that a psychological discussion may make, if the necessary limitation in its method is not recognised. Psychology can neither affirm nor deny the objectivity of what gives content to human consciousness.

(4) In the new psychology there has been a tendency also to exalt the subconscious or the unconscious activity of mind above the conscious, to make character a product of complexes in the region below consciousness rather than of choices and conduct in the region of consciousness. It does not seem possible to deny the existence of such subconscious

mental processes without denying the continuity of the mind, the identity of personality, and limiting mind to conscious states. What takes place in subconsciousness would then be only a functioning of the living organism. There is too much evidence in memory and character of such subconscious processes to justify us in denying *mental latency*, as Sir Wm. Hamilton called it. That human conduct is affected by what lies beyond consciousness cannot be denied. It is one of the limitations of human freedom ; it is one of the hindrances of human development ; it is one of the obstacles which involves conflict in human morals. That disease and depravity have their roots in this subsoil of the unconscious cannot, it seems to me, in face of all the evidence available, be denied ; and the moralist must take account of this datum in dealing with the problem of human personality. But even in this new psychology, when practically applied in the treatment of mental disorders, the complex has by psycho-analysis to be brought into consciousness before it can be effectively dealt with. There must be a personal contact between the healer and the patient, a consent to be so dealt with that the hidden things may be revealed, and thus the fear of them be allayed and the power of them be conquered. So far from this method of psycho-therapy proving that the subconscious is more important than the conscious, it seems to show that it is within the consciousness of man that the guidance of his whole life must lie ; in the dark cellar may lie much of the raw material of human character, but it can be made only in the lighted upper-room. So important is this subject for thought to-day that we must return to it in dealing in a following chapter with the Formation of Character.

(5) Closely associated with this tendency, as depreciating conscious volition, is that which lays stress on the part that *suggestion* plays in human life. This suggestion may be from the self, and then it is called *auto-suggestion*, or it may come from another, and then it is called *hetero-suggestion*. When a man is convinced by his own reason, or by the reasoning of another, he is not yielding to suggestion ; but only when he persuades himself, or allows another to persuade him apart from the scrutiny of reason. "Every man," says McDougall, "is to some extent suggestible ; everyone is a little inclined to believe a proposition which is confidently made to him ; and if the same proposition is made to him by a hundred or a thousand men, it becomes difficult for

him to retain a critical attitude towards it."[1] This suggestibility McDougall regards as one of the dangers disclosed by the crowd psychology. But it is now being advocated as affording the basis for a method of treatment of physical diseases and mental disorders. A crowd is not necessary for this *hetero-suggestion* ; if the healer so gains the confidence of the patient as to dominate, his suggestion becomes effective. This method assumes also the decisive importance of the subconscious or unconscious. A suggestion that all is well and that health is certain is presented to the imagination ; on this suggestion the attention is fixed to the exclusion of other contents of consciousness ; the subliminal agency does the rest ; the object thus presented to the imagination is realised ; the distressed mind is relieved ; the diseased body is restored. With the medical aspects of this subject we are not now concerned : what is the range within which such treatment can be effective, or how durable the effect can be. For our purpose, what is important is that imagination associated with the subliminal process is exalted above conscious volition. What must here be emphasised in qualification is the consideration that we do not thus get rid of volition. There must be a choice of the object which will possess the imagination ; the direction of the attention must be fixed. If the patient does not *will* the method of cure in the subliminal, he *wills* the condition of quiescence, submission to the auto- or hetero-suggestion. If this method of treatment throws some light on the mechanism of volition in the concentration of attention on an object with the corresponding result, it does not contradict or challenge the reality of man's liberty and responsibility in his conduct. The two methods of psycho-analysis and of auto- or hetero-suggestion are thus complementary. In the one case the complex is brought out of the subliminal consciousness to be dealt with in consciousness : in the other case the suggestion is conveyed to the subliminal consciousness, where the object is realised. In dealing with the formation of character it will be necessary to return to both of these subjects, but mention of both was here necessary to prove that caution must be exercised in using some of the conclusions of psychology in forming a conception of the moral agent.

(6) There is a danger of psychology becoming metaphysics, of the science forgetting its own necessary limitations, and attempting to solve the problems of philosophy.

[1] *Psychology : the Study of Behaviour*, pp. 239–240.

It has already been mentioned that the psychologist generally recognises that physiology will not solve his problems, and that the biologist does not borrow his conclusions from the physicist and the chemist. (*a*) The hypothesis with which psychologists have been content to work is that of the *psycho-physical parallelism*, a correspondence between brain processes and mental changes. The term itself would suggest that there can be no interaction ; and certainly the mode of interaction is inconceivable. But some interaction there must be ; for how on the one hand could a physical stimulus of a sense organ, such as the eye or the ear, have as its consequent (to avoid the question-begging term " effect ") a perception of an object in consciousness ; or how on the other hand could a volition within consciousness be followed by a movement of the body to realise the object willed ?

(*b*) Further, although it is necessary not to confuse psychology and physiology and not to attempt to resolve psychic into organic processes, yet it is increasingly impossible to establish a scientific frontier between life and mind ; for vital processes are purposive even as are psychic ; and it seems impossible to eliminate, even from plant life, the factor of mind, selecting and adapting in the relation of the organism to the environment. " Animal evolution," says McDougall, " however it may have been with plant evolution, has been the product of the struggles of the animal, of their purposive efforts to survive ; for the factor determining survival or destruction in chief measure has always been success or failure of the purposive activity of the animal ; to this all other factors have been subordinate. Thus the main stress, the brunt of the work of evolution, has been borne by the mind ; the mind has been the pioneer of bodily evolution ; the bodily organs and functions have been merely the instruments through which the mind has accomplished its purposes." [1]

(*c*) Opposed to this view is " the conscious automaton theory," which has been discussed with his usual mastery by Dr. Ward in his Gifford Lectures, entitled *Naturalism and Agnosticism.* [2] According to this theory, while a casual connection between the physical and the psychical series is denied, the psychical is treated as a " collateral product " or *epiphenomenon* of the physical, a statement which is itself self-contradictory. If mind be thus impotent to control matter, the assumption that mind is an efficient factor in

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 176. [2] II., pp. 35–64.

biological evolution must be denied, and also the physicist's admission that the laws of matter alone will not explain life. If the automaton (the physical mechanism) is primary and independent, then the psychical activity, of which man is conscious in his volition, is illusory. But according to the mechanical theorists matter is not essentially active. There is, therefore, no activity anywhere. How, then, is even the illusion of activity possible? Without following the close argument further, the striking analogy in which it is summed up may be quoted. "On the psychical side, according to them, all our volitions are like those of the paralytic; on the physical side all our overt movements are like those of the epileptic. A conscious automaton is thus like a paralytic and an epileptic rolled into one, the impotent volitions of the first keeping step with the motor discharges of the second."[1] Professor Huxley, according to Ward, contradicts himself, for while on the one hand he maintains that volition is only feeling, and not the cause of the "voluntary act," only "a symbol of the state of the brain," he elsewhere admits that "our volition counts for something as a condition of the course of events." As the mechanical theory cannot explain psychical activity and the consciousness of it, we must turn to the teleological, and affirm that volition counts not only for something, but for a great deal. Mechanism is a means for purpose, for there is "an effective dominance of the mechanical factors by purposive guidance towards a specific end or goal."[2]

(*d*) The relation of the physical and the psychical series leads us to the metaphysical problem of soul and body. Dr. McDougall has written *A History and Defence of Animism*, in which the distinction of soul and body is maintained. This view also is asserted by Sir Oliver Lodge in his book on *Life and Matter*. The same side is taken by Wm. James in his Ingersoll Lecture on *Human Immortality*: "My thesis now is this," he says, "that when we think of the law that thought is a function of the brain we are not required to think of productive function only; *we are entitled also to consider permissive or transmissive function.* And this the ordinary psychophysiologist leaves out of his account."[3] With this statement J. Y. Simpson agrees: "The brain stands in no directly productive relation to mind." "What the nature of the interaction between spirit and matter is, we do not

[1] *Op. cit.*, II., p. 56. [2] McDougall, *op. cit.*, p. 29.
[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 32.

fully comprehend."[1] To this dualistic view is opposed the monistic "that the mind and the body (or the brain) are two aspects of one reality—sometimes Body-*Mind*, sometimes *Mind*-Body." J. A. Thomson[2] states that both views are held by "men of scientific distinction and noble outlook." He himself seems to incline to the monistic view, but agrees "*that the scientific man has no right to close doors dogmatically.*" "As men of feeling," he continues, "our prejudices tend to be in favour of the dualistic view; as students of science our prejudices tend to be in favour of the monistic view." The moralist or the theologian will be inclined towards the dualistic view; and if that enables him to interpret morals and religion more adequately, then science does not forbid his making that his working hypothesis.

(*e*) If we start with the dualistic hypothesis, it is easier for us to understand the survival of the body by the soul, as in the Greek conception of immortality; but then the problem of the origin of the soul emerges. The three solutions which have been offered—that the soul pre-exists, that God creates a new soul as each body is conceived (*creationism*), and that the parents reproduce the soul, even as the body (*traducianism*)—need not now be discussed.[3] But it is to be observed that, while the Old Testament distinguishes the spirit of God from the body of dust into which the spirit is breathed, it is the embodied spirit which is the *living soul* (Gen. ii. 7), the man. Accordingly the Old Testament doctrine is the restoration of the whole personality from death by resurrection, since what survives is not the *soul*, but the *shade*; and this doctrine the New Testament takes over. Even when Paul wavers in his hope of being alive at the general resurrection (2 Cor. v. 1–10), he still desires not to be unclothed (bodiless), but clothed upon with a habitation which is from heaven (a heavenly body). What, for our ethical reflection, is in this connection of crucial importance is that we fully recognise the intimate relation of soul and body, so that on the one hand in our judgment of any moral agent we shall take fully into account the influence of physical conditions on the development of human personality, and shall not expect from man, hindered and hampered by body, the easy victory we might expect from

[1] *The Spiritual Interpretation of Nature*, p. 270.
[2] *What is Man?* pp. 79–80.
[3] See my book, *The Doctrine of the Godhead*, p. 266.

a bodiless angel, if we can conceive such a being ; and that on the other hand, as has already been indicated in discussing *utility* as one of the ideals, we shall include in our moral standard as an essential obligation care of our own bodies, and regard for the bodily needs and pains of other men. While there is a Christian asceticism which aims at complete self-control, the subordination of body as well as mind to the end of personal perfection, the asceticism which ignores the claims of the body, and despises it as inferior, and even evil, must be condemned by Christian ethics. Even the monistic view need not in itself be an insuperable barrier to the ethical estimate of man. Should life and mind even in its earlier phases be so closely associated with body as to be inseparable, the theory of *creative*, or *emergent*, evolution would allow us to conceive of a stage at which life and mind might rise above and beyond the necessity of the body as we now know it for its development, and might attain a relative independence, even the possibility of association with an organ of activity of higher potency than the body as now constituted is ; all that we need contend for is that man's personal development be not explained mechanically from without his consciousness by the observer, but be interpreted teleologically from within consciousness by the experient.

CHAPTER I

THE FACTORS OF HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

HAVING discussed the qualifications with which any contribution of biology and psychology to our conception and estimate of human personality must be received, we can now consider the factors in human development. These may be described in the terms *heredity*, *environment*, and *individuality*.

I

(1) In his heredity we may distinguish man's human parentage and his animal ancestry, the first is the special and the second the general heredity. In the consideration of the heredity of the individual man, what confronts us is on the one hand resemblance to, on the other difference from, his parents (or variation). (*a*) The theory of heredity as formulated by Mendel, undertakes to explain the differences, no less than the resemblances; for qualities latent in one generation may become patent in another; a child may resemble his grandparent or even more remote ancestor in a character, in which he differs from his parents. Where a parental character appears in an offspring, that character is said to be *dominant*, where it does not appear it is *recessive*. Mendel's experiments were made on plants especially, but experiments on animals have led to the same conclusions as those on plants. Another method by which the facts of heredity have been proved is the *biometric*. The two methods can be thus distinguished: "We may either choose a character and observe or measure its development in a large number of parents and in their children, and so deduce the average extent of resemblance between parents and children for that character" (the biometric method); "or we may consider a number of individual cases separately, and endeavour to discover the manner in which the character appears in the children who have parents or ancestors possessing it" (the Mendelian method).[1] When "there is considerable range of variation," the variation "is spoken of as continuous, and every gradation occurs between," but

[1] *Heredity in the Light of Recent Research*, by L. Doncaster, p. 32.

when "individuals of two kinds occur which are not connected with intermediates" the variation is said to be "discontinuous."[1] "The first method is clearly adapted especially to characters which vary continuously and which can be measured; the second to characters which vary discontinuously and can be sharply separated into classes."[2] It has been observed that on the average the divergence from the "mean" character in the population generally of the sons is about half of that of the fathers. "This fact is called regression." This "does not mean that all sons of tall fathers will be shorter than their fathers; some will be as tall or taller, but the sons of a number of fathers of given stature will vary about a mode lying between the fathers' stature and the mode of the whole population."[3] The intensity of inheritance is in inverse proportion to the amount of regression; the more the regression the less the inheritance. Valuable as this method is "when applied to considerable populations, it gives us no clue to the physiological processes which determine the transmission of characters from one generation to another."[4] For that we must fall back on the Mendelian method. "The statistical method is frequently the only one which is available when experiment is impossible and when our knowledge of the facts is based solely on numerical data from observed cases, and this of course applies especially to inheritance in Man, where experimental evidence is not available."[5] "By collecting family histories of distinguished men, Galton showed long ago that exceptional mental qualities were inherited." "Great men are far more likely to have exceptional sons than mediocre men, and if the mother is also exceptional in the same direction this probability is greatly increased."[6]

(*b*) About the inheritance of mental capacity there can be no doubt. But we are justified in being sceptical about the extension of the method to moral characters when we examine more closely the data of the investigation by Professor Pearson. "Characters were chosen such as vivacity, popularity, conscientiousness, temper, ability, handwriting, which were estimated by reports from school-teachers on the children in their schools; and also intellectual ability as shown in university examinations or by the position in a public school at a particular age." The conclusion is therefore reached that "not only bodily characters, but

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 9, 10. [2] *Idem*, p. 33. [3] *Idem*, p. 35.
[4] *Idem*, pp. 43–44. [5] *Idem*, pp. 47–48. [6] *Idem*, pp. 48–49.

also those of the mind, are essentially determined by the hereditary endowment received from the parents."[1] It is to be observed that in these children *nurture* (education and environment) had already been a factor of development as well as *nature* ; and to ignore the former, and take account only of the latter, seems anything but a strictly scientific proceeding ; and yet it is on such reasoning that the method of eugenics is opposed to that of social reform.

(*c*) That there are exceptionally good stocks, the transmission of which should, if practicable, be encouraged ; and bad stocks, which should, if possible, be restrained from reproduction may be admitted ; but as regards the bulk of the population, it may be maintained that science does not warrant the assumption that "if, as the study of heredity suggests, though it would be rash to say it is proved, man is almost entirely the product of inborn factors which are hardly affected by environment, then improved conditions may only encourage the propagation of the degenerate, and the race as a whole may go back rather than forward."[2] What right have we to assume that it is only bad stock which is at the bottom of the social scale, and only good stock which is at the top? Economic conditions and consequent social position are not the results of inherited character only, but many other factors must be taken into account. Some of the ablest and worthiest men have come from the homes of the poor, and to remove hindrances to their advancement is to confer a public benefit. Children of bad parentage, if removed early enough from an evil environment, unless there be some distinct physical or mental defect, by good nurture have shown excellent mental and moral qualities. From before birth, even in the embryo through the mother, the development of the child is being affected ; and the social obligation, recognising the importance of bad and good character, is to provide the conditions under which the development of the bad character will be restrained, and of the good character be encouraged. None is good enough or wise enough to determine that a stock is so bad that it cannot be restrained from absolute degeneration, or so good that it will assert its quality, however adverse the conditions imposed. Equality of opportunity for deliverance from the worst, and attainment of the best possible in the heredity, is the duty of a society to every child that comes to it as a trust and task, a peril or a promise.

[1] *Idem*, p. 49. [2] *Idem*, pp. 113–114.

(*d*) To this biological determinism we may oppose a spiritual interpretation of the fact of heredity, by J. Y. Simpson. "The study of heredity shows that each individual is a bundle of possibilities, predetermined in the germ-cell it is true, but yet of incalculably wide range; the actual personality that he becomes depends in greatest measure on himself and the environment.... Heredity may modify and condition responsibility; it cannot destroy or disannul it in the normal individual. . . . At the same time heredity introduces shades of responsibility so subtle and delicate, that the more we study men as we see them around us, the more impossible it appears for us to be able to judge any man the more we feel that God alone can judge righteously."[1] In moral judgment of our fellow-men we must recognise the help or the hindrance to the moral life which the heredity offers, but we must refuse to regard heredity as the sole determining factor. That physically the heredity may be the decisive factor we need not in any moral or religious interest contest, and that mentally differences of capacity are largely determined by heredity we must also admit. But since character is the product of conduct, and conduct is conscious, voluntary action, it is in the highest degree improbable that moral qualities can be transmitted in this way, although the influence of physical condition and mental capacity in the formation of character must be recognised.

(2) We must not overlook the fact that Christian theology has taught a more hopeless hereditary determinism than modern biology in its dogma of original sin and total depravity, derived by the whole race from the solitary transgression of its first ancestor.

(*a*) This "monstrous doctrine" asserts not only that every child inherits a wholly corrupt nature, but even that it is held guilty of Adam's transgression, as the covenant of works into which he entered was not only for himself, but for all his descendants. Modern theology has for the most part discarded this dogma. The account given of the Fall in Gen. iii. is interesting as an early mythological solution of the problem of the origin of sin, and in its stress on disobedience as the source of sin has some ethical value; but it becomes ridiculously inadequate if we turn myth into dogma. The Old Testament teaches the universality of sin, but, apart from this story, offers no theory of its origin in the race, excepting its stress on human frailty. It is in the apocryphal literature

[1] *The Spiritual Interpretation of Nature*, pp. 198–199.

that the connection is first made between Gen. iii. and man's sinfulness ; and even in this literature there is no general agreement on this matter. Paul does connect the entrance of sin and death into the world with Adam's transgression ; but he does not distinctly teach that human depravity—the flesh—is an inheritance from Adam, for Romans v. 12 was misinterpreted by Augustine. Dr. Tennant has rendered a real service to Christian theology in his two books, *The Origin and Propagation of Sin*, and *The Fall and Original Sin*, in tracing the history of the doctrine as the judgment of it, the disproof of the validity and finality of the doctrine as part of the Christian Gospel. Much of the same ground has been covered by Dr. Williams in his book on *The Ideas of the Fall and Original Sin* ; but his own theory that the sinful nature which man has had from the beginning, but not as a result of Adam's fall, is due to the pre-cosmic fall of the world-soul must be dismissed as mythological speculation. Although it will be necessary at a later stage to deal more fully with the development of sin in the race and the individual, yet here a brief indication may be given of the direction in which the solution of the problem may be sought. *Firstly*, man's higher endowment as man in his self-consciousness and self-control makes his natural inheritance from his animal ancestry a moral peril to him, as these impulses are not to the animal which lacks his higher endowments, and that for two reasons, because the memory of past, and the anticipation of future, gratifications intensify the present desire, and even evoke it, and because, as intimately related to his fellows in society, the gratification of the individual desire comes into conflict with his social obligations. *Secondly*, these natural impulses assert themselves, and gain a dominance before conscience to condemn them, and will to control them, emerge in his development. *Thirdly*, in the social environment with its inheritance of customs, standards, and laws, evil as well as good, are to be found the stimulations of these natural tendencies towards evil. We need not assume any inherited bias towards evil in the human race apart from these factors.

(*b*) This conclusion has the support of biological science. The conduct of Adam, assuming for the sake of argument the historical character of the Story of the Fall, was voluntary ; it reacted on his own character, and on all with whom he morally came into contact, but would it bring about so great a change of nature as to affect all his posterity ? At its

worst it was what the biologists call an *acquired character*, and so, according to the general view among them, it was not transmissible. The theory of Darwin required that even small variations, advantageous to the organism in adapting itself to the environment, could be transmitted. Huxley held that larger variations, or mutations as these have been called, must have been operative. "It is admitted," says Doncaster, "that the process of evolution would be more easily comprehensible if the inheritance of acquired characters were a fact, but it is clear that no absolute proof of its existence can be based" on the available evidence.[1] "On the whole," he concludes, "the hypothesis of the inheritance of acquired characters must be regarded as 'not proven,' and our increasing knowledge of the behaviour of germinal characters makes it improbable that it can be a factor of great importance in the constitution of the individual, or to the course of evolution."[2] "The importance of nurture," says J. A. Thomson, "is conceded, but what of its importance for the race? Here we come up against the question of the transmissibility of individually acquired modifications, the direct results of peculiarities of nurture. If those are not transmissible, then modifications have no direct racial importance, and it is in this direction that the bulk of the scientific evidence points. There are only a few cases that suggest the other answer, so that we cannot count on this. Without foreclosing the question, we must act as if individually acquired modifications were *not* transmissible as such, or in any representative degree."[3] The application of the principle in this passage is to modifications—for good or ill—of the body. But as has been above suggested, physical and mental heredity is much more probable than moral; and if acquired physical characters are not transmissible, much less are moral. We need not contend for an explanation of the origin of sin in the world, when the weight of evidence is against its possibility, especially as sin can be accounted for in other ways, and the theory is not consistent with the conception of God as Father, to which the revelation of Christ is leading our theology. It is not necessary for our present purpose to pursue this subject except to mention that this denial of the transmission of acquired characters is based on Weisman's theory that "no external conditions acting on the body which contains and nourishes the germ-plasm can

[1] *Heredity*, p. 93. [2] *Idem*, pp. 95–96.
[3] *What is Man?* pp. 139–140.

have effects which are transmitted unless the germ-plasm itself is altered."[1]

(*c*) While thus agreeing with Tennant generally in the conclusions reached in his two books, already mentioned, in regarding man's natural inheritance as itself morally neutral and never to be described as moral corruption, natural depravity, I should emphasise much more than he does that man's inheritance as man includes other elements than those found in his animal ancestry, even his higher endowments, which cannot but be affecting his whole development, even before conscious volition appears. Self-knowledge and self-control may emerge into consciousness at a later stage than these impulses and appetites become manifest, but must not the possibilities of them be included along with these other possibilities and as modifying them in the *tout ensemble* of what the human babe is? It is not normal for him to be only an animal or a mere savage. Further, may not the human environment (even of the babe in the womb) from the very beginnings encourage or restrain this or that possibility? While we must admit that *nature* provides the *raw material*, and in so far limits the possibilities of the finished product (to use the homely illustration, "you cannot make a silk purse out of a sow's ear"), nevertheless it would seem that nature is least determinative in what concerns the moral development in comparison with the physical and consequent mental; and here *nurture* counts for more. And this nurture comes through the environment, the second factor in human development: but the consideration of this must follow after the discussion of the *animal ancestry* which comes to each child through the human parents.

(3) From human parentage, and the Christian doctrine which has been based on racial heredity, we must turn now to the *animal ancestry*, to which increasing importance is being attached by science in the large place now being assigned to instinct in human behaviour. (*a*) As has already been shown, conduct as the subject of moral judgment is conscious, voluntary action. Here it must be added that all conscious action is not conduct. *Reflex actions*, such as winking the eye at a sudden flash of light, or starting when a sharp sound is heard, although conscious, as involuntary do not come under moral judgment generally. Must we not, however, add that even such actions may under certain circumstances be restrained; and whenever any volition is at all

[1] *Heredity*, p. 121.

possible, there moral judgment enters. If a flashlight photograph is being taken, there will be the effort to prevent the winking of the eyes ; at a sick-bed where quiet is essential the start may be avoided. Next to *reflex action* comes *instinctive*, and in the new psychology so important a function is assigned to the instincts that it will be necessary to deal with the subject more fully.

(*b*) The definition of instinct by Dr. J. Arthur Thomson may be given. " Instincts," he says " are inborn or hereditary capacities for doing apparently clever things—they need no learning ; they are shared equally by all members of the species, except that there may be differences between the two sexes ; they are always related to particular circumstances which are of vital importance, and thus they are apt to be futile if the circumstances are slightly altered." He accounts for the existence in the following way. " Instinctive behaviour considered physiologically corresponds to a long chain of reflex actions ; but there are facts which suggest that, in many cases at least, there is dim awareness and a strong background of endeavour—in other words cognitive and conative factors." In respect of man he says that " the word instinct is used in a fallaciously loose way." Intelligent behaviour " differs from instinctive in requiring to be learned, in not being as such hereditary, in varying notably among individuals of the same species, and in being plastic." While intelligent behaviour, common in man, is only occasional in animals, in man there is behind it reasoning with conceptions ; in animals there seems to be no more than *perceptual inference*.[1]

(*c*) Before dealing with Thomson's criticism of McDougall we may quote his definition of instincts. "We may, then, define an instinct," says McDougall, " as an inherited or innate psycho-physical disposition which determines its possessor to perceive, and to pay attention to, objects of a certain class, to experience an emotional excitement of a particular quality upon perceiving such an object, and to act in regard to it in a particular manner, or at least, to experience an impulse to such action."[2] Thought, feeling, will, are involved, and " it is a common mistake to ignore the cognitive and the affective aspects of the instinctive mental process," and a worse mistake is to assume " that instinctive actions are performed unconsciously." These

[1] See *What is Man?* pp. 61–65.

[2] *Social Psychology*, p. 29.

instinctive processes may be modified by experience, and in man the modification is often so great as to obscure "the essential likeness of the instinctive processes in men and animals." The complication of these processes may be fourfold : (1) the ideas of the objects may replace the objects themselves ; (2) the bodily movements may be variously modified ; (3) several instincts may be exerted together ; (4) the instinctive tendencies get organised round certain objects or ideas. The instincts can be differentiated by the emotion excited. "Each of the principal instincts conditions, then, some one kind of emotional excitement whose quality is specific or peculiar to it ; and the emotional excitement of specific quality that is the affective aspect of the operation of any one of the principal instincts may be called a primary emotion."[1] The instincts and their corresponding emotions as enumerated by McDougall are : the instinct of flight and the emotion of fear ; the instinct of repulsion and the emotion of disgust ; the instinct of curiosity and the emotion of wonder ; the instinct of pugnacity and the emotion of anger ; the instinct of self-abasement (or subjection) and of self-assertion (or of self-display), or the emotions of subjection or elation (or negative and positive self-feeling) ; the parental instinct and the tender emotion ; the instinct of reproduction ; the gregarious instinct ; the instinct of acquisition ; the instinct of construction. As one surveys this list, one cannot but feel a doubt whether all these emotions can be regarded as primary ; but McDougall is at pains to prove their primary character (from the self-feeling onwards).

(*d*) Dr. J. Arthur Thomson, however, criticises this statement. He insists that man's conduct in face of danger is so varied that we cannot here speak of an instinct. The human mother "learns what to do intelligently or imitatively, and the fact that she has no limits to her tender care does not prove that her behaviour is instinctive."[2] "One of the reasons why man often goes wrong in connection with sex is because he has so little in the way of definite sex-instinct ; he is inadequately aware of what he may or may not do ; and the sex-urge is stronger even than hunger."[3] He sums up his criticism of McDougall's extension of the term instinct in relation to the life of man in the following statement : "Our plea is that the term 'instinctive behaviour' has a definite meaning in regard to animals, and that we

[1] *Idem*, p. 47. [2] *What is Man?* p. 109. [3] *Idem*, p. 110.

should keep to that meaning when we are discussing man. We should think that it made for clearness to say that man had certain primary urges or appetites—hunger and love ; that he had a number of definite reflexes such as those illustrated in jerking away from the painful, or in coughing, or in sucking ; that he had a number of unregistered capacities, such as those of speech and locomotion ; that he had many inborn special tendencies towards certain types of reaction, such as running away from danger, actively resenting interference ; but that he had very little capacity for instinctive behaviour in the strict sense of the term."[1]

(*e*) Dr. Shand, in his valuable work *The Foundation of Character*, to which we shall return in the next chapter, seems to hold an intermediate position. Among the forces to be considered in the formation of character are the primary emotions, of which he says, " Fear, anger, disgust, curiosity, joy, and sorrow include instincts or innate tendencies in their systems."[2] From these he distinguishes appetites, such as hunger and sex. " An appetite is aroused by internal rather than external stimulation, has a greater regularity of recurrence than an emotion, and becomes more urgent the longer it remains unsatisfied ; but in other respects the psychological difference between them is unimportant."[3] Besides emotions and appetites there are impulses, needs, or wants, such as the impulses for repose and exercise ; for self-display and self-abasement, " all of them include instinctive tendencies and pursue innately determined ends." Shand thus gives the term instinct the same extension as does McDougall, and Thomson's criticism must be recalled.

(*f*) This is not a mere dispute about words. What the word instinct does suggest is the inevitable sequence of an object perceived or imagined, an emotion experienced, and a determinate reaction. By the extension of this conception of instinct as a factor in human development the mechanical character of man's life is exaggerated ; and the place of deliberation and decision, consciousness and volition, is unduly restricted. His ideal of " self-knowledge, self-reverence, self-control " is lowered ; and, under the plea that he is following his instincts, the capacity and the duty of man to guide his conduct by his intelligence, and control it by his will is challenged. We must recognise as innate in man, derived from his animal ancestry, much more than

[1] *Idem*, pp. 110–111. [2] *Op. cit*, p. xvi. [3] *Idem*, p. 28.

moralists have often been inclined to admit ; but it tends only to confusion to apply the term instinct to all that is innate or inherited. The word instinct should be used only when there is this inevitable sequence of impression, affect, expression ; and from the few instincts man has we should distinguish primary emotions, appetites, impulses, needs, and wants, where such necessary sequence is not always found.

(*g*) We may before going further take stock of the " raw material " of character as McDougall and Shand describe it, although with the *caveat* that the action which follows the primary emotion is not always an instinctive reaction, e.g. a man may be afraid and not run away, or he may be angry and yet stay the blow. Fear, disgust, wonder, anger, self-abasement or self-assertion, subjection or elation may without question be accepted as primary emotions, although the second four imply a degree of self-consciousness which the animals do not possess. But when McDougall goes on to speak of the parental instinct and the tender emotion, the instinct of reproduction, the gregarious instinct, the instinct of acquisition, and the instinct of construction we cannot follow him. There is no inevitable sequence in these instances. To speak of self-, sex- and herd-instinct in man seems a mistake. Man has a variety of impulses of self-preservation and self-assertion : in sex there is not merely the animal appetite but also the tender emotion, and is not the parental affection an extension of this tender emotion of sex ? Can the social impulse generally be so sharply distinguished from the sex and parental ? The contrast seems to be between innate tendencies of which self is the centre, and those directed towards another or others, between the egoistic and the altruistic. And even between these we must not too rigidly distinguish ; for man is so constituted that he can realise himself only in social relations. The impulse to acquire and to construct are man's reaction to his environment to possess and to adapt it for his own needs and the needs of others. Shand adds to the primary emotions joy and sorrow, which are not necessarily impulses to action at all, but only the emotional reactions to the varying experiences, pleasurable or painful, of human life. Such is the raw material out of which human character is made.

(4) There is another factor in human development to which Shand calls attention, and about which Miss Bloor has written a whole book—*temperament*.[1] " By temperament,"

[1] *Temperament, a Survey of Psychological Theories*, by Constance Bloor, M.A.

says Shand, "we mean that part of the innate constitution of the mind which is different in different men, so far as this refers to their feelings and perhaps also to their wills; but that part of their constitution which is the same in all of them we do not call their temperament." The term *temper*, he continues, we "incline to employ in a more restricted sense, as something affecting a particular emotion, especially anger, and 'temperament' in a more comprehensive sense, as something affecting the emotional nature in general. Thus we speak of calm, excitable, and violent temperaments —these qualities being referred to the emotions in general— but of an irascible temper."[1] The classical doctrine of the temperaments has been based on physiology, as the names indicate—the *sanguine*, the *choleric* (bilious), the *melancholic* (nervous), and the *phlegmatic*. In the exposition of this theory there has usually been exaggerations, and it is much more in accord with experience, Shand argues, to regard all real temperaments as made up in varying proportions of the four pure temperaments. Temperament and temper both affect the development of the emotions, and the sentiments. Valuable as is Miss Bloor's discussion of the subject, for the present purpose it will be enough to quote her classification. "Using for convenience the old terms sanguine, choleric, phlegmatic, and melancholic with the 'cautious' contributed by Ach, the resulting classification would be somewhat as follows:

"*Sanguine Temperament*: high sensitivity, low persistence, outward direction, weak emotionality with little inhibition.

"*Choleric Temperament*: high sensitivity, low persistence, both outward and inward direction, strong emotionality with little inhibition.

"*Phlegmatic Temperament*: low sensitivity, high persistence, little outward or inward direction, weak emotionality with considerable inhibition.

"*Melancholic Temperament*: low sensitivity, low persistence, inward direction, strong emotionality but great inhibition.

"*Cautious Temperament*: high sensitivity, high persistence, both inward and outward direction, moderate emotionality and inhibition. (In respect of emotionality and direction the judgment on the cautious temperament must be purely speculative.)"

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 129.

Simplifying these classifications, she offers this table :

	Initial speed.	*Duration.*
Sanguine....	High	Low
Cautious....	High	Low
Phlegmatic	Low	High
Melancholic	Low	Low [1]

She omits the choleric temperament as its position is not clear, and admits that this simplification is speculative. What she insists on, however, is that what must be important is the question of speed and time. She connects temperament with the functioning of "the endocrine glands." But into this physiological *hinterland* we need not follow her. The terms she uses above carry their own meaning : but we may try to sum up more simply. People differ as to the speed of their response to any experience, and the time during which it affects them. Some feel keenly, others feebly ; some control their emotions, others give rein to them. Some turn their minds outward, others inward, in other words, perception dominates some, reflection others. The first class has been described by the term *extroverts*, the second by the term *introverts*. The *unstable* man allows himself to be easily influenced by his environment, the *stable* is the opposite of this : the one is controlled, the other controls himself. Another innate distinction may here also be mentioned, that between the *sensory* and the *motor* type ; the one is easily affected, the other is ready to act. So varied is the make-up of man.

(5) The tendency in much recent psychology is to lay stress on instinct, emotion, appetite, impulse, the non-rational and non-volitional aspects of human personality. As moralists have sometimes been inclined to represent man as if there were only reason to direct and will to control conduct, it is important that we should fully recognise the limitations and hindrances in man's moral development. Sometimes moralists, while recognising these diverse elements of man's nature, have been tempted to simplify the problem unduly by the opposition of reason and passion, and by making suppression of the affective or emotional appear as the moral end. We must admit fully that these elements are natural, legitimate, necessary as the raw material, out of

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 142–143.

which character is to be formed. We must, however, emphasise the pre-eminence of reason and will in man's moral life. The psychic process consists, as has been already shown, of impression, affect, expression, or perception, emotion, action. Behaviourism would treat the last element as alone the significant and subordinate the other two to it. The observed impression on the organism and the observed expression by the organism with the necessary psycho-physical mechanism between them—that is all we need regard. The physiological bases of mental activity, according to Tansley,[1] are the sense organs—the afferent nerves—the nerve ganglis (brain)—the efferent nerves—the muscular movements. While in this psycho-physical process knowledge and feeling do emerge ; yet all this exists only for doing things. We must, however, refuse so to minimise the function, and to depreciate the value of mind. Important as is man's outer life—the impressions he receives from the outer world, and his reactions upon it—"*his* mind *his* kingdom is," a realm of ever-widening range, a rule of ever-rising worth. Beyond perception lie memory, imagination, reflection, understanding, and reason. For our present purpose it is especially important to distinguish *understanding* and *reason* (Kant's *Verstand* and *Vernunft*). Without committing ourselves in details to Kant's *Kritik*, and without denying that reflection may help us to trace the process by which his *intuitions of sense* and *categories of understanding* have become explicit in human thought,[2] we must insist that the mind of man has a definite constitution, which determines the limits and the conditions of the development of his capacity for knowledge. Rooted in his very nature as man, and not implanted by any process of evolution, are his ideals—truth, beauty, holiness, love ; pitifully inadequate may be his first recognition of them, and lamentable his first realisation, slow his advance in appreciation and application of them, but the innate possession of them distinguishes him from his animal ancestry. Man from the beginning had the capacity, though unactualised, to become what he now is, what he will yet be. As innate too seems to be, not religious ideas, as intuitionalists have maintained, but the capacity, nay even the necessity, of reacting on the world as he does in religion,

[1] *The New Psychology*, p. 42.

[2] See G. Croom Robertson's *Elements of General Philosophy*, Lectures XIII–XVII.

reaching out above and beyond the sensible to the supersensible, the natural to the supernatural, the human to the superhuman. It is as this reality, the *numinous* of Otto, which both attracts and repels man, lays him low and lifts him up, is identified with these ideals, that religion and morality are harmonised. The ideals which man's reason appreciates give absolute value to the reality which religion apprehends and religion invests these ideals with the absolute authority of correspondence with reality. By faith man gains the assurance that the supreme values are absolute reality.[1] The ideals are as real a part of man's equipment as the instincts, the aspirations as the appetites, although emerging later in his development ; and the primary emotions and the vital energy which accompanies them can be directed from the lower to the higher aspects of personality.

(6) This direction of vital energy lies in the *will*. Man has the fatal dower of freedom. There is no invariable, inevitable sequence between impression and expression or emotion and action. Instinct in the sense of such sequence plays quite a subordinate part in the life of man as rational and moral. As he can arrest the psychic process at the first stage, and from perception upward develop his inner life of thought ; so he can restrain emotion, and direct the energies that these command into another channel than what would be the instinctive. " The energies," says Hadfield, " which give the driving-force to our lives are not derived from the will, but from another source ; they will be found to have their origin in the instinctive emotions. The function of the will is to direct and work in conformity with the potent forces derived from the instinctive emotions, and to regulate the release of these forces waiting ready for action."[2] These forces he holds are psychic rather than physical in character ; and can be diverted from instinct to ideal, appetite to aspiration. This process is called *sublimation*. " It is the intellectual and the moral privilege of the human being that he can similarly raise the energy contained in the instincts, the radical fault in the most of which is their selfish and egocentric character, to higher potentials—that is to say, by transforming the *quality* of the energy he raises its power to accomplish his ends, as sexual passion has been transformed into love ; and by changing the *direction* of the energy he

[1] See Inge's *Faith and its Psychology*.

[2] *The Spirit :* Essays edited by Streeter, p. 87.

endows it with a greater effectiveness of *purpose*. By doing so he retains the power or force of the instincts, but directs that force to greater purpose. Furthermore, directed to altruistic ends, these individual instincts will no longer clash with the social instincts and thereby be deprived of strength, but, co-operating and working in harmony with the social instincts, they will be magnificently reinforced and their power multiplied."[1] Without endorsing the looser use of the word instinct, which has already been criticised, in this passage, we may note its import : not only is each force increased in its higher use, its sublimation ; but, as that higher use of the different forces transcends their opposition, there is no waste through conflict. Will is man's capacity thus to direct and control these varied energies. Man as self-conscious is aware not only of the varied content of his consciousness, appetites and aspirations, desires and obligations ; but also of self as a unity, the good of which lies in the unification of his inner life by the harmonising of these varied elements. He can compare the quality of these elements, determine their value as lower or higher, as opposed to or congruous with this good for himself as unity. The gratification of the lower impulses involves the disintegration of his personality, their dominance as single elements of his life over his self as unity ; the satisfaction of the higher the integration of that personality, since these can be harmonised in the unity of self ; e.g. the drunkard becomes the slave of one passion, the temperate man keeps all his appetites in due subordination to the good of the whole self. Volition is the identification of the self with the particular desire which then becomes the motive to action : this identification may be mistaken, e.g. the drunkard may with dulled conscience think of the indulgence as for him at the moment at least his good, although on reflection he may bitterly regret his folly. When the choice is made, this identification of the self with one of the competing desires, the attention is concentrated on the object of the desire ; and it is by this concentration of the attention that the will directs the energy, psychic and in bodily movement physical, which results in the appropriate action to realise the object. It must be recognised that for the most part the life of a man is not consciously willed. Once willed, reactions to his environment become habits, and he responds without deliberation or decision. And it's well that it is so, for how much hampered and hindered man's varied activities would

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 97.

be were it necessary for each action to be preceded by such a mental process as has been described. What must, however, be insisted on in any account of what man's natural endowment for the moral life is is his capacity, when the occasion arises, for such deliberation and decision, such direction of the energies of his life by his will, not as a power other than himself but as himself controlling his own conduct and the formation of his own character as resulting from that conduct.

II

It has been necessary to discuss heredity at so great length, because of the tendency in recent years to exaggerate the decisive influence of this factor in human development to the exclusion of liberty and responsibility, and so of morality in the sense in which morality has always been conceived. Much less need be said about the second factor, environment ; but two questions regarding this subject need to be answered, the range of the environment, and its content, and the degree in which environment is a decisive factor. (1) If we take the dualistic view of man as body and soul, we may think of the body as the most immediate environment of the soul. So intimate and constant is the relation that some thinkers hold a monistic view and would make *body*-soul, or soul-*body* the unit. Whichever view we take we must recognise, as moralists have often failed to do, that the moral life of man is being constantly and potently affected by his organism ; its disease has mental and moral results, its health is a condition of normal mental and moral development. While we cannot with Paul identify the *flesh* with sin, there are appetites and necessities of the body which are frequently the occasion of sin. *Mens sana in corpore sano* is an end to be sought for self and others. Through the body the material world around influences human life as a help or a hindrance. The pain inflicted by or the pleasure derived from the world around is a factor, and often a very potent factor, in making or marring men. Physical conditions—food, clothing, shelter—may increase the severity of the moral struggle, or relieve its strain. Saintliness is difficult, if not impossible, in a slum. Insufficiency of food saps mental and moral energy. On the higher than the bodily plane, nature influences man ; its wonder evokes his pursuit of truth, its beauty satisfies his æsthetic sense, the seeming cruelty and

severity of nature so challenges him that it stimulates his development ; he seeks to understand its laws, and to control its forces, that it may not harm him, but do him good. Who can estimate how much man as a rational and moral personality owes to this demand of nature ? Man becomes intelligent as he makes the world intelligible, he grows in self-mastery as he gains mastery over the world. From the environment which the moralist should take into account I should not exclude the lower animals. Kindness and care towards them ennobles ; indifference and cruelty debase man. It is human society, however, which is the most potent factor. It is through society that the inheritance of human progress comes into the individual life. Each child does not recapitulate the history of the race, for, although there may be an analogy between racial evolution and individual development, the child in a civilised environment need not pass through the savage phase : he is asssimilating that environment in his development. Probably much of the resemblance between parent and child is due less to physical heredity, and more to social inheritance, than the biologist with his unconscious bias often admits. When this social environment is consciously directed towards the development of the individual we may speak of education, or nurture. But the human is not the highest environment. Religion assumes that there is a higher, and brings the influence of that higher to bear on man's life. In God we live, and move, and have our being. Not all are consciously receptive of, and responsive to, the divine environment ; but it cannot be left out of account even if there is no consciousness of it. Whether there be indifference, hostility, or submission, God cannot be excluded from the life of men, of whom He is Creator, Ruler, Father.

(2) There is much dispute on the question whether heredity or environment, nature or nurture, is the more potent factor ; and impartial scientific judgment is often hindered by the practical interests involved. Not only is the biologist likely to emphasise nature, and the educator, moralist, or reformer nurture ; but the opponent of social reform is ready to snatch at the support biology can give him, and its advocate prone to disregard the *caveat* it may offer. That there are bad stocks physically, and that the physical defect involves mental and moral, must be conceded. That there are good stocks, where mental ability of a very high order is a common characteristic, is proved by a number of

family histories. But that the majority of men are from birth predestined to fitness or unfitness, goodness or badness, is too sweeping a generalisation for the facts. That bad stock is generally found in the slum, and good stock in the palace, is an unsupported assumption. May not adverse circumstances hinder the development of capacity, even as favourable help it? The reasonable and righteous assumption is that it is our duty to provide for every child such an environment as will restrain whatever evil tendencies he may have inherited, and encourage all the good. Is not the inherited nature a possibility not actualised, involving the peril of evil development, and the promise of good? If, when we have done everything which can be done to secure by environment and the nurture it brings an equal opportunity for the desirable development, there are discovered stocks which will not, or cannot, respond to the favourable conditions, then only shall we be justified in saying, but of them only, that nature has triumphed over nurture. Of most men can we cherish the hope that nurture will enable us to make the best of the nature possible. In any case, we can control nurture as we cannot nature. The remedy of eugenics is very much more difficult of application, and very much slower in result, than the method of social reform. We need not prevent any efforts, which do not offend the moral sense —as the treatment of mankind as a stud-farm would—to improve nature; but such efforts must not be accepted as an alternative to the method of nurture.

III

(1) Heredity and environment are not, and cannot be, regarded from the standpoint of morals as the only factors in human development. What a man is is never merely wholly inherited, for not only is the combination of qualities in each individual unique, so that it is never true even of twins that they are as like as two peas in a pod, granted that this is fact; but there is as the endowment of each man the capacity of self-knowledge and self-control. No sophistry of science or philosophy will persuade the common consciousness that there is not a self other than a bundle of qualities, or a string of experiences, which is engaged ever in making itself, being helped or hindered by its inheritance. No less emphatically must we deny that cirumstances necessarily determine character. Great as is the influence of environment, human

personality can rise above, or fall below, what its normal influence would be. A man not only can adapt himself to his own environment, but also his environment to himself. Mentally, morally, and spiritually a man makes his own world, as it affects his thought and life. He is not merely borne along the stream of circumstance, as the straw on the river ; he is not merely a link in the chain of causality. His theoretical reason, his practical reason, his spiritual reason are, in relation to phenomena, transcendent. If we think of what thus makes each man different from his fellows, despite a common inheritance and a common environment, we may speak of his *individuality* : but I prefer to describe this uniqueness as *potential personality*, for man's development is not from real, but towards real personality in " self-knowledge, self-reverence, self-control."

(2) I do not believe that the Mendelian theory, worked out in relation to peas and mice, can by a manipulation of hereditary *dominants* or *recessives* explain this individuality exhaustively. The personality is a potentiality, which cannot be measured by inherited qualities, or environmental influences. Such a conception, as has recently become current, *emergent*, or *creative evolution* is here applicable, although we cannot stop short at the conception, since evolution is descriptive of a process, but not constitutive of a power. Religion can go beyond science and philosophy, and say, God wills what emerges ; God creates what is new. Man's religious consciousness of personal relationship to God, the Christian consciousness of that relationship as filial, warrants the assumption that somehow each individual is not only inexplicable exhaustively by his heredity and environment, but that as potential personality, capable of perfection in perfect relation to his fellows and God, he has infinitude as well as eternity at the very core of his being. The self which wills action choosing the desire that becomes the motive to action, has not itself been determined by inheritance and circumstance, and even the character which it by previous conduct has made, but remains—unless it brings itself into bondage—an unexhausted potentiality, an unmeasured reality, with incalculable reserves in itself and infinite resources in God.

(3) If such a claim seems too great in view of what men actually are, we may reply that we are not concerned merely with actuality, what most men make of themselves, but with possibility—what by the grace of God men may become, and

some have, if not yet perfectly, become. There is One among men who was all that men may become. He, and not the most bestial savage, reveals what human personality fully developed is, and so what each man potentially is. Willingly and gratefully we learn from the psychologists and biologists all that they within the limits of their methods can discover and disclose. But we refuse to follow them when they challenge the facts which are revealed in man's rational, moral, and religious consciousness, when it is at its best, as manifest in Jesus Christ our Lord.

CHAPTER II

THE FORMATION OF HUMAN CHARACTER

HAVING considered the factors of human development, heredity, special and general, human and animal, environment, and individuality or potential personality, we may now examine how the raw material is made into the finished article—the formation of Human Character.

I

A very valuable contribution to the discussion of this subject has been made by Shand in his book *The Foundations of Character*. (1) The problem he states thus : " There are in all of us two kinds of forces or activities, the one making for organisation, the other for disorganisation ; the one making us free in the higher sense, or free from slavery to impulse, the other making us free in the lower sense, or free from disagreeable restraints. These forces are referred to in the popular distinction between Principle and Inclination. We shall interpret them by the distinction between Sentiment and Emotion. . . . *Mental activity tends, at first unconsciously, afterwards consciously, to produce and to sustain system and organisation.*" [1] This law of organisation, he argues against Mill, often counteracts the laws of association, by which the empirical philosophy seeks to explain the development of knowledge from the data of sense.

(*a*) The material out of which character is to be organised consists of the primary emotions, appetites, impulses, which, as having been discussed in the previous chapter, may be assumed. From the primary elements Shand distinguishes the *Sentiments*, which are " greater systems of the character which organise and direct them," and even create new ends, other than those of the primary emotions. " Man, as he evolves," he says, " invents other ends than the preservation of life, and develops also sentiments directed to them. Besides the love of life, he has the love of power, the love of property, the love of reputation, the love of pleasure." These sentiments involve " an innate organisation of fear,

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 20–21.

anger, joy, and sorrow."[1] He classes parental love, not, as does McDougall, among the instincts, but among the sentiments : " When we come to examine the instinct, or more strictly the behaviour in which it is manifested, we find that its behaviour cannot be attributed to a single instinct, however complex, because it consists of different kinds of behaviour manifested at different times and in different situations."[2] The outstanding sentiments are love and hate, and neither can be reduced to a single emotion. The sentiments most commonly found among men are self-love, sexual love, family affection, friendship, patriotism. We may also recognise " a sentiment for some game or sport, and for some science or art." Most important of all are the moral and the religious sentiment. The system which has unique importance is " respect for conscience," which is " ever contesting, both the supremacy of self-love and the attractiveness of the present inclination, and in most men it is combined with the religious sentiment." In it are found the same four fundamental emotions as in all varieties of love. " That there is a calm joy in fulfilling the dictates of conscience, and a peculiar sorrow in our failure to fulfil them, is familiar to everyone. When we rebel against it, and persevere in our evil courses, this sorrow becomes remorse. Its fear is that apprehension of punishment which follows the violation of its laws ; and its anger is known as ' righteous indignation.' Two other sentiments closely connected with one another belong to this same class, self-respect and respect for others."[3]

(*b*) Shand does not, however, as do some psychologists who lay stress on instinct, ignore mind and will as constituents of character ; for each sentiment contains not only the affective, but also the cognitive and conative aspect. Neither does he, while seemingly personifying the sentiments as actors in the drama of the formation of character, intend to substitute them for " the total self to which they belong."[4] It is an advantage to neglect the constant reference to the self ; but the neglect is not a denial on his part. In working out the science of character, however, he assumes that " *all intellectual and voluntary processes are elicited by a system of some impulse, condition, or sentiment, and subordinated to its end.*"[5] For even a scientific investigation has as its motive the sentiment —the love of truth, or the emotion—the sense of wonder. We get to know that to which we attend, and we attend to

[1] *Idem*, p. 206. [2] *Idem*, pp. 38–39. [3] *Idem*, p. 57.
[4] *Idem*, p. 65. [5] *Idem*, p. 67.

that which has some interest for us. The angler and the artist as such know each a different aspect of a river bank. It is mainly the sentiments which constitute the character. We cannot observe the qualities of the character ; we can only infer the qualities from what we see in the conduct ; and the two are so closely related that we cannot distinguish the qualities of the one from those of the other. " Character is not constituted of the emotions and sentiments alone, with the will and intelligence as their instruments. It has other and very numerous and important constituents." [1] But all qualities of character "belong either to the lesser systems of the impulses and the emotions, or the greater systems of the sentiments."[2] The sentiments are systems of growing complexity. " *Every sentiment tends to include in its system all the emotions, thoughts, volitional processes and qualities of character which are of advantage to it for the attainment of its ends, and to reject all such constituents as are either superfluous or antagonistic.*" [3] As an illustration of this law, reference may be made to Paul's phrase : "The love of Christ constraineth us," 2 Cor. v. 14, or the title of Chalmers's most famous sermon : "The Expulsive Power of a New Affection." If we translate this statement from psychological into ethical terms, it will run thus : "*Every sentiment tends to acquire the virtues and vices that are required by its system.*" [4] Much of this development may be described as spontaneous ; men become better or worse without deliberation or decision.

(*c*) But moral progress demands that the spontaneous stage should give place to the reflective : the *virtues* imperfectly possessed now are conceived in their perfection as *ideals*. When their authority is recognised, the peculiar moral quality of 'rightness,' the ideals present themselves as *duties*, accompanied, when fulfilled, by their complementary emotions of self-approval, or, if neglected, of self-reproach. Sentiments thus mark a stage of moral development. " The function of the relative ethics of the sentiment is, first, to awaken the ideals of its virtues ; secondly, to provide and elicit the special emotions acquired by these ideals—aspiration, admiration, or enthusiasm, self-reproach, and self-approval ; thirdly, in situations of doubt and conflict, to evoke the ideas of its duties, and through them to arouse the highest will of its system, that which, acting after reflection and deliberation, has to guide it to its destined

[1] *Idem*, pp. 103–104. [2] *Idem*, p. 105. [3] *Idem*, p. 106.
[4] *Idem*, p. 110.

end."[1] To put the process more simply: first the knowledge of the ideal, next the motive to its realisation, then the sense of obligation, and lastly the volition which realises the ideal. A man's character is made up of many sentiments; how can they be harmonised? The relative ethics of any sentiment, such as family affection or patriotism, must be subordinated to the general ethics of the conscience; for "as it has no private object, so it has no private end; its end being to superintend and regulate other systems, to encourage some, to forbid others, to temper all, to approve or disapprove of their action."[2] Thus a man may be required to forsake home and kindred to carry the Gospel abroad: it may be required of him to condemn and oppose the policy of his country when it challenges human rights. The sentiments are subject to the direction of conscience. But even conscience, as has already been shown in a previous chapter, has its limitations and imperfections, and needs education and illumination. It must be subordinated to the progressive revelation of the divine purpose in human history. These systems of sentiment by their distinctive qualities qualify the character as a whole. Hence the dominance of any system tends to produce the corresponding type of character. Literature abounds in illustrations of such distinctive types. For instance, avarice produces the miser, ambition the social climber, greed the glutton. The dominant system excludes increasingly the other systems and their corresponding qualities: a man becomes the slave of a vice; for a good man many temptations are a moral impossibility. Such differences in type of character are affected by the *temperament*, or *temper*, of which mention was made in the previous chapter.

(2) While Shand's book is mainly concerned with the sentiments, he treats also the *System of Desires*; and his treatment must be briefly examined. Desire is distinguished from impulse in this respect. There is not only, as in impulse, the consciousness of an end or result which would bring satisfaction, but also of an obstruction to its attainment. If a man feels hungry, and can at once sit down to a meal, he escapes the mental tension of desire; but he does experience it if no food is available. The desire leads to deliberation as to the mode of removing the obstruction, or realising the result, the means towards the end. Desires may be described as of three orders, as arising from the impulses, the

[1] *Idem*, p. 118. [2] *Idem*, p. 119.

appetites and emotions, and the sentiments. "Desire," says Shand, "has a very complex emotional system, which includes actually or potentially the six prospective emotions of Hope, Anxiety, Disappointment, Despondency, Confidence, and Despair."[1] All these emotions not only affect the desire, but in many ways react upon the character, as, for instance, "Hope restores the courage of which despondency deprives us." As desire is thus dependent on emotions and sentiments, the study of character cannot begin with the desire, but must include all the primary and the developed constituents of it.

(3) This book of Shand's is on its subject a classic; and the moralist must feel deeply indebted to it. There is an impression which it may leave which needs correction, and the author himself recognises the need. Character is made to appear as the product of an impersonal mechanism of instincts, emotions, appetites, impulses, combining themselves into the systems called sentiments; whereas throughout there is personal activity. Here the moralist must correct the psychologist. The psychologists can here, however, correct the moralist, who assumes that in personal activity there must always be deliberation and decision, whereas most of it is spontaneous. The sentiments realise their ends without any conscious choice or volition; and if the education has been fitting, and the proper sentiments have been developed, the conduct is right and the character grows good. Life does not consist of moral crises; the highway of duty does not always lead down to the valley of decision. In dealing with the formation of character, we must, however, take up the tale where Shand ends it. When the end of a sentiment is obstructed, desire emerges. If a number of desires invade consciousness, then there must be deliberation and decision. As has already been indicated, the desire with which the self identifies itself as congruous with what it regards as its good becomes the motive. The self is not moved by the desire as by a physical force, although the word may suggest this; but wills—that is, concentrates—attention on the object of the desire, now become the motive, and, if there is no hindrance or delay, the action which realises the object results; if there be hindrance or delay, the volition becomes a resolve, or an intention to act as soon as possible, or to seek and use the means which may be necessary as intermediate to the final realisation of the

[1] *Idem*, p. 463.

end. Such conduct, as conscious voluntary action, always reacts on character, and the repetition of acts forms habits of action ; we need not place these habits of action alongside of, or in opposition to, the systems of sentiment which Shand describes, but as the conative aspects of these systems. By so complex a process on the foundation of the sentiments there rises the structure of the character ; it is thus that the moral agent is formed.

II

We must recognise, however, that there is another view of the formation of character which is presented to us in what calls itself *The New Psychology*. The book of A. G. Tansley under that title is probably the best exposition which we have. The addition in the title of the words " and its relation to life " shows that the book takes the " biological " view, as represented by Dr. McDougall in his *Introduction to Social Psychology*, and it combines with it " the concepts which we owe mainly to the great modern psycho-pathologists Professor Freud and Dr. Jung."[1] He insists that " we are driven to consider the psychical sphere separately from the physical sphere, as a distinct field for scientific investigation, with data, concepts, and laws of its own."[2] But he maintains that in both the principle of causality is applicable. " We may admit, perhaps, that there is at present less evidence for the hypothesis of universal determinism in the psychical than there is in the physical sphere, but there is certainly enough to make it a reasonable working hypothesis, and without such a hypothesis we cannot proceed at all."[3] While it may be freely conceded that in the greater field of psychic processes there is determinism, and psychic effect regularly follows psychic cause ; yet in the narrower field of morals and religion, when men are conscious of deliberation and decision, conscious of their liberty and responsibility, the hypothesis of determinism must be abandoned, except in the form of self-determination, which involves a much more complex conception than that of causality, as applied in the physical and greater part of the psychical sphere.

(1) Without committing himself to the metaphysical assumption of a causal relation between the physical and

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 16. [2] *Idem*, pp. 26–27. [3] *Idem*, p. 28.

the psychical processes, Tansley fully describes *the physical basis of mental activity*. This activity is not confined to consciousness, and the new psychology attaches great importance to what lies beyond consciousness. Impression lapses into memory ; and if the memory trace is early recalled, it lies in the *fore-conscious* ; but if it is not recalled, it falls into the *unconscious*. Some of the elements which might rise into consciousness are *repressed*, hindered by various barriers (the censor) from emerging. A sexual desire may be repressed by the sense of shame. The varied elements of the mind do not remain apart, but become combined. The contents of the mind are a *network of mental elements*. And any such network may be described as a *complex*. In a complex the bond of the associated mental elements is their common *affect* ; when the bond is purely rational, there is no complex ; but a common affect may be developed in connection with a rational system, and it then acquires the character of a complex.[1] Such complexes are the ego-complex, the sex-complex, the herd-complex. They belong to the structure of the normal mind, and are not necessarily pathological. But, if repressed, the complex is separated from the rest of the mind, driven into the unconscious, and becomes autonomous. It remains there undetected as a disturbing factor to bodily health and mental soundness, and needs to be dealt with by the method of *psycho-analysis*, by which it is brought back from the unconscious to the conscious, where the appropriate treatment can be applied to it.

(2) To each complex there is attached a certain amount of *psychic energy* ; and "the nature and the strength of the affect in the complex is an index of the amount of psychic energy which goes into the conation."[2] Jung, who has developed this theory, calls the psychic energy which attaches to the great natural complexes *libido*. Freud limits the term to the sex-complex ; and, by the exaggerated importance which he attaches to this complex, he has probably needlessly provoked prejudice against this theory. When the emotion belonging to such a complex is successful, it is accompanied by a feeling of pleasure. The emotions that are necessary to life are accompanied by intense pleasure, e.g. the sex-complex. There is a danger of this pleasure being detached from its proper end, and made an end in itself, as when a man eats, not to satisfy his bodily needs, but for the sake of tasting good food. When this takes place, there is a *psychical displacement*,

[1] *Idem*, p. 60. [2] *Idem*, p. 74.

a moral evil. The psychic energy may, however, be diverted from a lower complex, a primitive instinct, to a higher or moral purpose. Such a diversion is called *sublimation*. The psychic energy of the sex-complex may be diverted into the channels of artistic creation, social service, etc. The moral task is to avoid such displacements, to secure such sublimation, and so to maintain the equilibrium of the mind. "In the primitive condition," says Tansley, "man finds perpetual satisfaction, and, therefore, happiness, in the constant opportunity of satisfying his various instincts. But in the developed state in which the mind is dominated by ideals involving the most long-continued intricate and varied conations the instincts are subordinated to these ideals, finding their satisfaction, as it were, incidentally, and only in this way can happiness be attained."[1] For instance, the self-complex can be sublimated in "self-knowledge, self-reverence, self-control," the sex-complex in the home affections, the herd-complex in patriotism or love of mankind.

(3) The mind as an organism is affected by its environment, but not all minds are equally receptive. *Suggestibility* is the readiness to receive and to adopt, as part of its content, impressions and impulses of all sorts, whether from within or without (*auto-* or *hetero*-suggestion).[2] Suggestion is not an appeal to reason; it is a non-rational process; and has a great influence on the complexes. Two contrasted types of mind in this respect present themselves; the *extrovert* turns to the world around, the *introvert* turns in on himself: the *stable* mind does not allow itself to respond to, or be influenced by, the world easily, the *unstable* is sensitive, and reacts readily. "Such extreme types are," says Tansley, "of course the exception. Most people have a tendency to the one or the other member of each pair, but more or less considerably modified in each case by the opposite tendency. The ideal mind would be introverted, but with complete powers of extroversion, and would combine the perfect sensibility of the unstable with the energy and resolution of the stable type."[3] The method of suggestion has been extensively used by M. Coué at Nancy in therapeutic work; and of this the book of Baudouin just mentioned gives a full account. In this book it is insisted that the essential process

[1] p. 82. Tansley uses the word "instinct" in the looser sense already discussed.

[2] See Baudouin's *Suggestion and Auto-Suggestion.*

[3] *Op. cit.* p. 107.

in all effective suggestion is auto-suggestion ; in other words, that whether the suggestion originates inside or outside the mind is a matter of indifference, provided the intramental process which is essential to the effect is successfully carried out. The patient must have confidence in the physician ; in a quasi-hypnotic or quiescent state, from which independent mental activity is absent, " any desired suggestion can be assimilated by the mind, and new emotions in accordance with it initiated," not in " the superficial conscious activities," but in the " deep-lying unconscious activities." When the suggestion has been consciously received, the rest of the process falls to the subconscious activity. Tansley is doubtful " whether some of the extreme claims made [for this method] will eventually be substantiated."[1] The affinity of this method with " faith-healing " and Christian Science is obvious ; but M. Baudouin offers " a genuinely scientific, if only partially successful," explanation. Mention has already been made of the method of psycho-analysis, and " the relation of auto-suggestion to psycho-analysis in therapeutic treatment " is an interesting question on which we require further light. M. Baudouin states that in cases where a morbid system is due to suggestion by a " simple idea," psycho-analytic treatment can never compete with auto-suggestion in rapidity of cure, but, where it is due to a complex, psycho-analytic treatment may be necessary. The danger here is in mistaking the causation of a symptom, which may superficially appear to be due to a perfectly " simple idea," when in reality it is inextricably bound up with a deep-lying complex.[2] In other words, psycho-analysis may be necessary to discover if the cause is a " simple idea." It is worth while adding a summary of the laws of suggestion, to which experience of this method has led Baudouin. (1) " The idea which tends to realise itself in this way is always an idea on which spontaneous *attention* has been concentrated." (2) " When, for one reason or another, an idea is enveloped in a powerful *emotion*, there is more likelihood that this idea will be suggestively realised." (3) " When an idea imposes itself on the mind to such an extent as to give rise to a suggestion, all the conscious efforts which the subject makes in order to counteract this suggestion are not merely without the desired effect, but they actually run counter to the subject's conscious wishes, and tend to intensify the suggestion (Law of Reversed

[1] *Idem*, p. 100. [2] *Idem*, p. 101.

Effort)." (4) "When the end has been suggested, the subconscious finds means for its realisation." (5) "Spontaneous auto-suggestion is a phenomenon of everyday occurrence." (6) "In practice we should turn our minds away from 'undesirable' things" by "reflective suggestion." With reference to (3) the words of Coué may be quoted: "When the will and the imagination are at war, the imagination *invariably* gains the day."[1]

(4) Reverting to Tansley, his exposition of the subject must be further examined. When the psychical energy is hindered from discharging itself along the normal channel, it *regresses* to a channel which belongs to an earlier phase of development, or the energy takes the line of least resistance. Tansley gives a Limerick in illustration:

There was a young lady of Bicester:
One day, when her lover had kissed her,
She felt much perplexed,
And to show she was vexed,
She gave such a slap to her sister.[2]

It may not be possible always to harmonise complexes. Their antagonism may produce *acute* conflict in the consciousness, or *chronic*, which even when unconscious is no less real, and injurious. Affection and ambition may be opposed to one another, e.g. shall a man marry the maiden of his youthful love, or the woman who offers him wealth as her portion?[3] As one complex is stimulated, the other is retarded. Should the complex prevail which calmer reflection might condemn, it is *rationalised*: the worse is made to appear the better reason. This is called a *defence reaction*. The politician may plead the country's need of him as a reason for clinging to office, even when that involves sacrifice of principle. The conflict may be avoided by the repression of the complex which is the obstacle. The worldling forgets his early idealism. A complex, even if repressed before it reaches consciousness, does not lose its vitality, but may remain as a disturbing factor in life. The consequences of such repression belong to pathology rather than normal psychology. Freud has tried to account for

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 114–118, 125.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 110.

[3] The illustrations are mine, and not Tansley's; and are offered to make the exposition clearer.

dreams as the symbolic expression of a repressed complex, since the *censor* will not allow the complex to rise into consciousness "naked and unashamed." This is an extension of the theory which has no present interest for us. Another way of dealing with the complex is by *projection*. Parts of the mental contents are transferred to another person. "People who possess some fault or deficiency," says Hart,[1] "of which they are ashamed are intensely intolerant of the same fault in others." To this Tansley adds: "In blaming these others they are indirectly blaming themselves, and thus betray an effort on the part of their unconscious to compensate for their own sins." Closely allied to *projection* is the process of *identification*, "in which our own desires are projected upon occurrences in real life or in fiction, and our own personality temporarily identified with one of the actors in these occurrences." To give an instance: a man unconsciously moved to an act of violence, but hindered through incapacity, may "accuse himself of having committed a murder which has actually occurred, but with which he has no connection whatever."[2] A fault of the human mind which leans to virtue's side is *idealisation*. It is an ideal of personality which is projected on another person—the hero or the beloved: but nevertheless there is a confusion of ideal and real. On the other hand, what is one of man's most valuable endowments is the capacity man has of *idealism*, the creation of purposes and values above his instincts. Tansley treats the belief in God as the supreme instance of this idealisation. "It cannot be doubted," he says, "that God has been a necessity to the human race, that He is still a necessity, and will long continue to be so."[3] The last sentence suggests disbelief in the reality of God; for it asserts that a time may come, or even will come, when man's development will reach a stage when God will no longer be necessary. It is asserted that "religious truth is incommensurate with scientific truth," and the view of truth indicated is the pragmatic. Here the psychologist is straying into the province of the metaphysician, and his eminence in the one sphere gives him no authority to be heard in the other.

(5) In the process of mental development there must be *a progressive integration* of the complexes; a unity must be

[1] *Psychology of Insanity* (chapter ix.), quoted by Tansley, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

[2] *Idem*, p. 156. [3] p. 161.

given to life. One of the complexes, hindering this integration, may be *segregated* from this whole and repressed. Or the complex itself may be broken up into the cognitive, affective, and conative elements. The sentimentalist detaches the affection from the conative element; he finds pleasure in dreaming instead of doing. The detachment of the cognitive element, however, is not a fault, as thus is begun the intellectual life (of this a previous section gave a fuller treatment). But Tansley insists that it must still be maintained that it is primarily for action that the mental mechanism has been developed. Admitted that from the causal point of view this has been so, may not the teleological correct the limitation of the causal? May not this evolution have been *emergent*; in the ideals of truth, beauty, love, may not absolute values have been created; and not merely means towards man's practical ends? Returning to the course of Tansley's argument, in justice to him it must be pointed out that he does not reduce the activity of reason in human life to what has been named *rationalisation*, in which the mind is used to provide another reason for a course of action than the actual motive, as when the politician represents himself as solely animated by patriotism, when ambition is what is moving him. It might happen that reason might justify his action; he might have the qualities necessary in the situation for securing the safety or progress of the country. There is the use as well as the abuse of reason; for reason is the selective agency which can choose between conflicting impulses, inhibiting some and releasing others. The ultimate authority must be in the individual mind, *the ethical self*. While reason cannot initiate action, it is indispensable as the co-ordinating and harmonising agency. Wisdom, freedom, and value can thus be made one. "We must be free," says Tansley, "from the unchecked sway both of our instincts and of all external moral codes before we can set reason free to do its work in the ethical sphere. Only when it has done its work in the experience of life do we attain anything like wisdom. And only when harmony of mind and conduct is attained is the higher virtue realised."[1] As this sentence shows, the conclusion of this section of the book brings us nearer the general moral consciousness than one might have anticipated. Tansley goes on to discuss the ego-, herd-, and sex-instincts (in Thomson's judgment falsely so-called). It is admitted

[1] *Idem*, p. 198.

that, great as is the psychical energy which is said to accompany each of these instincts, there may be a *sublimation*; the psychical energy can be directed towards ideal ends. Into a detailed criticism of this section it is not necessary to enter, as what has been said at an earlier stage may be here recalled. In much of this new psychology there is the bias towards a lowering of man to the level of the lower animals, and towards a depreciation of the higher distinctive aspects of human personality. Yet in the admission of the function of reason, and the admission that instincts may be sublimated, there is a bridge thrown across the seemingly growing gulf between the opposing estimates of human nature.

III

(1) It has been said that what in the new psychology is new is not true, and what is true is not new. This is far too sweeping a judgment; for it is a very great advantage to have fresh points of view before us. Even where a hypothesis is of doubtful validity, it may call attention to phenomena hitherto not adequately investigated. The more accurate observation, the more exact description, and the more definite terminology, avoiding the ambiguity of current speech, put us on the way to truth, even if it is not always reached, or only partially. The Christian moralist must take account of all that psychology, new or old, has to tell about the raw material of character, the mental mechanism of personal development, correcting where necessary any materialistic bias. On closer scrutiny, much that appears new is new only in name. Christian theology has gone further in the assertion of the corruption of human nature, its total depravity, than this new psychology goes in ascribing animal instincts, impulses, and appetites to man; the difference being that this theology explained by Adam's transgression the same facts as psychology traces to animal ancestry. The theory of complexes is only another way of explaining bad habits, while ascribing to processes in the unconscious much that was held to be enacted by deliberate decision within consciousness; and the modern analysis is probably nearer the truth than the old. Indeed, the new psychology offers a less hopeless view of man than did the Augustinian and Calvinistic doctrine of the will, impotent

or potent only for evil. If that old doctrine could, despite the inconsistency, preserve the belief in some kind of moral responsibility for man, the new psychology still leaves room for conscience and volition, despite its acceptance of determinism as a working hypothesis. As we reject the Augustinian and Calvinistic doctrine, so may we by a criticism of the new psychology show the possibility of a doctrine which does not deprive man of his liberty and responsibility.

(2) The two books which have been more closely examined in this chapter do undoubtedly compel us to modify the teaching of the moralist who confines his regard too closely to his own sphere. Whether we consider Shand's *formation of sentiments*, or Tansley's *formation of complexes*, or the development of character as indicated by both, we must recognise that the greater part of the moral life is *spontaneous*, even although we correct the abstraction of mental processes from the subject by remembering that a self is developing. Choice is not so constant an experience as the moralist from his own distinctive point of view represents it. The self is not determined by its surroundings ; and yet its responses are not all consciously voluntary, a decision after deliberation. The sentiments or the complexes move to action which is not contrary to conscience, but without any conscious voluntary assertion of the authority of conscience. Love constrains a large part of human life without any consideration of moral principle, and conformity to it. The mother cares for her babe, not because it is her duty, but it has become her delight. Indeed, so long as morality is still a duty, the character has not been conformed to the ideal ; the better a man is, the less will he act from duty, as obedience to law, because his sentiments have become what they ought to be. The legal view is lower than the Christian, in which love, which Shand reckons among the sentiments, prevails. Kant, with his emphasis on the categorical imperative, and respect for the law as the only moral motive of obedience, was still moving amid abstractions. When inclination and principle conflict, then duty must be done because it is duty, however uncongenial it may be. But moral life does not consist of such crises ; and, as personality becomes fully moralised, will consist less and less of crises. The importance of this modification of a too abstract moralist standpoint cannot be exaggerated.

(*a*) The recognition of this fact of *spontaneity* in the moral life is full of significance for the method of education. To

place a child in a moral environment, under the moral influence of persons to whom his affection is drawn, is the better method of stimulating and directing this spontaneous moral development than by formal moral instruction with the sanctions of rewards or punishments. To encourage the good moral sentiments is better than to inculcate the right moral principles. The environment, to which the developing personality responds without conscious deliberation and decision, is the most potent factor in education. This is only an extension of the familiar saying : " Example is better than precept." Before the individual reason emerges to direct the development, such an environment can give a good start. Nurture can secure the best use being made of nature.

(*b*) It is shown by the psychological analysis that the moral life has difficulties and dangers not only from the inherited nature, but also from the formative or deformative environment ; and thus we must not unduly simplify the problem as though it were only knowing and choosing between right and wrong. Even if we may still hold the conviction that physical heredity and social inheritance do not destroy the higher potencies of human personality, we should be readier than moralists have sometimes been to recognise the severity of the struggle, and the cost of the victory. We must remind ourselves that the whole moral drama is not exhibited to us on the stage of consciousness : we may see the fall before temptation, but we do not know the resistance which may have been offered, or all the conditions which have increased the strength of the temptation. We do not fully know ourselves, and cannot offer an infallible judgment on ourselves ; still less can we know, or ought we to judge, others. In social relations it is necessary to form an estimate of the conduct and character of others for practical guidance in our treatment ; but we must never assume that estimate as a final judgment on their worth. Solicitude, tolerance, sympathy, magnanimity towards other men, is what this closer scrutiny by psychology should bring.

(*c*) There are some more specific lessons to be learned. *First*, as regards the method of dealing with temptation, what Coué says about *the law of reversed effort* deserves attention. To keep the object which tempts in the centre of our consciousness, in order that we may fight until we have overcome, appears the more heroic course, but it is often the more dangerous. The concentration of the attention,

the absorption of the interest in it, means a diversion of the vital energy towards it. To dismiss it from the centre of consciousness, to substitute for it another object of attention and interest—that is the discretion which is the better part of valour. The records that monks have left of their sensual temptations are an evidence of the danger to be avoided : the mind's obsession by some form of evil, which in a life of wider interests and more varied activities would have been less likely. The counsel of James (iv. 7) : " Resist the Devil, and he will flee from you," is not psychologically sound, if it means the direction of the mind towards the antagonist ; it becomes sound only in conjunction with the first part of the verse : " Be subject therefore unto God," if taken in the sense of fixing the mind on God. A wisdom which the science of the mind to-day confirms is Paul's advice to his Philippian converts (iv. 8) to fill their minds with the thought of all things good.

Secondly, closely associated with this lesson is the other : that complexes which conscience condemns should not merely be repressed ; but that the vital energy which attaches itself to these instincts, appetites, and impulses should be directed into other, or sublimated into higher, channels. A precept will not expel a passion ; but a sentiment will. Instances of such sublimation of the three chief complexes have already been given. To-day, when the disproportion of the sexes is preventing many women finding the normal satisfaction of the sex-complex in the home affections, is there special need for putting within their reach interests and activities into which this *libido* can be directed. A recent prohibited book warns us of the danger of moral perversion if this is not accomplished. A moral principle can become effective only as it finds a place in the system of a sentiment, or acquires an affective accompaniment ; and this is not likely so long as it remains in an abstract statement, but only when it is translated into a concrete instance, for the imagination evokes emotion as the intelligence does not. Patriotism to command service and sacrifice must become love of England, France, or Germany. Love of mankind leads to action in love of the neighbour. For this sublimation not an abstract ideal can serve as potently as even the partial realisation of that ideal in a person. Hence it is that the love of Christ expels sin, and impels to goodness.

Thirdly, what place in moral life should be given to psychoanalysis ? The prominence that Freud has given to the

sex-complex has provoked a justifiable aversion. And there are well-meaning practitioners of the method who seem to be obsessed by this complex. A minister, dealing with the religious doubts or difficulties of a young woman, is taking a very grave risk if by asking questions about her sex life he suggests to her what may not have a place in her conscious mind at all. If there is good reason for assuming a connection, a medical man of wide experience should be consulted. Twice I have had to deal with women who believed themselves to have committed the unpardonable sin ; in both cases there was reason to believe that physical conditions—disturbances of vital processes connected with sex—were involved. But I was not fool enough to carry out the psycho-analysis some would advocate. I saw the mother of the young girl in the one case, got permission to consult the family doctor, and was guided by his advice in my further treatment. In the other case that course was not possible ; but the suggestion was made that medical advice should be sought. The greatest care must be exercised in not suggesting as actual what may only be possible. Some knowledge of this method may be useful in " the cure of souls," most useful in preventing a rash use of it. When there is ground for believing that the use might be an advantage, a fully qualified psycho-therapist should be consulted. I cannot advise a general use, especially not by young ministers.

Fourthly, M. Coué recognises that the method of *suggestion* is not only a curative, but also an educational method. Confidence in a teacher is the condition of influence over the scholar. A story of heroism suggests like conduct more effectively than a discourse on courage addressed to the intellect. The difference of suggestibility must be recognised. The child who responds readily to the teaching in the Sunday school will respond just as readily to the adverse influence of an unfavourable environment ; where the response is slower, the result may be more permanent. To persuade a man that he is capable of overcoming a temptation or discharging a duty is to stimulate his power to resist or to achieve. To depress men by keeping their minds fixed on the thought that they are bad, hell-deserving sinners, is to weaken them morally ; to encourage them by helping them to believe that they are God's children moving heavenward is to make them stronger. The assurance of the forgiveness of sin is one of the conditions of moral renewal. These

considerations, however, lead us beyond the sphere to which psychology generally confines itself, although there is being developed a psychology of religion, even of the Christian religion.

Lastly, Shand recognises the importance of the religious sentiment in alliance with the moral ; and Tansley the necessity of the idealisation of man's best—God—for the life of man. Psychology can describe only the subjective side of the mental relation of God and man. It may recognise the value of faith as a potent factor in the moral life. The objective side of the relation—the divine grace—does not fall within its sphere. Here theology must take up the word ; and give the assurance that there is the objective reality of grace corresponding to the subjective activity of faith, and not a mere idealisation of the human as divine. Inspired and sustained by divine grace, man can know his ideal as well as his actual self, and in reverence for that ideal self can so control the actual that it will more and more closely approach the ideal, until divine grace and human faith complete his development in likeness to, and fellowship with, God. The next chapter will deal with this redemption of human personality.

CHAPTER III

THE REDEMPTION OF HUMAN PERSONALITY

In the *Introduction* to this volume the relation of morality and religion was discussed ; and it was shown how religion gives morality what it would otherwise lack. We must in this chapter more particularly apply that general statement, and consider how divine grace uses the factors of human development, and guides and controls the formation of human character so as to secure the redemption of human personality.

I

(1) That human personality needs redemption is not now a thesis generally contested, although there is difference of opinion regarding the method. Shand recognises that in man are forces of disintegration as well as powers of organisation. The biological view gives to the animal inheritance a very great, if not the greatest, influence. The complexes of the new psychology are by no means all beneficent ; some are injurious. While biology forbids our maintaining the doctrine of original sin in its old form, yet a writer like Tennant, who has done more than any other to disprove that doctrine, and to put in its place a view in accord with modern thinking, states regarding the beginnings of moral life in the child : " The moral life is a race in which every child starts handicapped. The pleasures of forms of conduct which are destined to be forbidden him have been tasted and known ; pleasure-giving actions have already become forged into chains of habit ; the expulsive power of the new affection which is to establish another rule cannot at first be strongly felt. When will and conscience enter, it is into a land already occupied by a powerful foe. And, in the primary stages of the moral life, higher motives cannot, from the very circumstances of the case, appeal so strongly as the lower and more accustomed already in possession. Into 'the seething and tumultuous life' of natural tendency of appetite and passion, affection and desire, is introduced the new-born moral purpose, which must struggle to win the ascendancy."[1] While this statement

[1] *The Child and Religion*, p. 178.

is broadly true, it does need, in view of what the new psychology has taught us about the influence of suggestion in the unconscious mental life, to be modified. A bad environment stimulates the evil possibilities of the inherited nature. The grace of God in the influence of Christian parents and teachers may even from the beginnings of life restrain the evil natural tendencies, and constrain the good. While the moral life is for all a struggle, even from childhood, all have not the same handicap ; it is much greater in one case than in another. What Augustine called *prevenient grace* may come to a child from his mother's womb.

(2) As the start is different, so is the course. A child born and brought up in a bad environment may from earliest years be undergoing a process of steady moral deterioration, although no environment is likely to be so bad that some good is not stimulated. " There is honour among thieves." There is a moral code, although perverted, recognised even by the depraved. Dickens is often praised for his recognition of good in evil men. But a greater than Dickens went to the outcasts of Jewish society. There are unexhausted reserves of good in bad men, which, on fitting occasion, divine grace may draw upon ; " the greatest sinner may return." By conversion, seeming dross can be changed to real gold. In a good environment the development may be progressive in goodness. While human frailties do remain, and influences of evil do sometimes prevail, nevertheless the life may be transparently and consistently Christian from the beginning ; not perfect in the exclusion of every fault and failure, but in its dominant affection, its absorbing interest, its prevailing purpose. It must be sorrowfully confessed that children brought up under the most favourable conditions do sometimes fall away from goodness and grace in after years, and do persevere in the evil way, despite all Christian influences. In many the Christian training does produce a good character, but no definite religious response ; when adolescence is reached, however, a decision for Christ may be made. Great as is the variety of human developed, the truth that was taught to Nicodemus remains : " That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is Spirit " (John iii. 6). There is a goodness, which we must not depreciate, due to human nature and environment, in which no higher influence of God is recognised ; in which even there is a conscious human self-sufficiency, no confession of the need,

and no desire for the gift, of the divine grace. Such a life, however admirable in many ways, is incomplete, for the relation to God is a necessary element in the realisation of human personality—nay, not only an element, but the element the dominance of which can alone secure the highest possible human excellence. We are not concerned here with the goodness which ignores or neglects divine grace, even although God in His mercy may be imparting gifts where they are not asked or desired, or even known as His. Our present interest is in the divine grace as the source of human goodness. That grace comes in manifold ways and by manifold means ; it is mediated by the environment, by teaching and training, by example, by all the channels through which human personality can be reached and influenced. It comes to some so constantly from earliest years that the whole Christian life is a gradual progress, without any crises. To others it comes with a special urgency in a definite experience of decision for Christ, confirming the previous tendencies towards Him. To others still it breaks in with seeming suddenness, with overwhelming power, and conversion is conscious and manifest. What alone matters is that grace prevails.

(3) The grace of God, or God's personal action in love for the sinful in Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit, has a double aspect, which may be described by the terms reconciliation and redemption, or the cancelling of guilt and the freeing from bondage ; the one is the more distinctively religious, and the other the more distinctively moral ; the one is concerned with the relation of man to God, the other with man's own character. When sinning man becomes conscious of disobedience to, and defiance of, God, his personal relation to God is disturbed ; distrust takes the place of trust, and estrangement of fellowship. How can the relation to God be restored ? The answer lies in God's forgiveness as imparted in the Lord Jesus Christ as Saviour, and Saviour in His sacrifice. God's love overcomes distrust and estrangement ; and man knows himself again as the child dear to God's heart. The other aspect of salvation is the change which is wrought in the man himself, when forgiven. He ceases to be a bond slave of sin, and becomes free by the enlightening, strengthening, and renewing of the Holy Spirit. The one aspect is more prominent in one type of experience, and the other in another type. In Rom. i.–iii. Paul is primarily concerned with the cancelling of guilt, in

Rom. vi.–vii. with the freeing from bondage. His confession in Phil. iii. shows how earnest he had been in keeping himself blameless ; but in Rom. vii. what he confesses most fully is his sense of enslavement, the impotence of his will. For Augustine it was the bondage which was felt most keenly ; for Luther it was the guilt. Wesley, as Luther, rejoiced in forgiveness. Both aspects are real, and neither is illusive. Conscience does not err when it apprehends the divine judgment on sin ; and forgiveness is not a matter of course, or of little moment for God. Heine's flippant words : " Dieu me pardonnera ; c'est son métier," are rebuked by the Cross of Jesus Christ as God's costly way of forgiveness.

While for our present purpose we are mainly, if not solely, concerned with the second aspect, the intimate relation of the cancelling of guilt and the freeing from bondage must be recognised ; for the burdened conscience means the enfeebled will. Confidence in God as forgiving brings not only peace of conscience, but power to the will. To think of God as displeased is to suffer such depression of spirit as will arrest the release of power for the moral struggle ; to be sure of God's favour brings such exultation of mood as lays low the barriers to the outflow of inward power. In the joy of the Lord there is literally strength. For the moral life it is well that sin should be judged with the seriousness which Christ's Cross enforces, and that the sense of forgiveness should, by stimulating the sentiments of affection, gratitude, and devotion to God, set free power and increasing power, by the exercise of which the bondage may be ended. It is not, however, by the reserves of man's power that the emancipation can be completed ; but only as thereto are joined the resources of God's might.

II

In all ages and all lands men have had the experience of redemption in Christ ; and, despite varieties of type, gradual development or sudden crisis, imperceptible influence or conscious accession of divine grace, the insufficiency of man for complete moral recovery and the sufficiency of God for perfect moral restoration have been proved.

(1) Modern psychology does not affect the reality of the experience, but does illumine the mode of the human receptivity and responsiveness of faith. The doctrine of the

Spirit, and the working of the Spirit in the inner life, are put in a clearer light. Mystery there remains, and must remain where there is the contact of God and man; the divine agency we cannot detect and describe; but the human process we can observe and record. In the volume of essays on *The Spirit*, edited by Canon Streeter, an account is given of the presence and activity of the Spirit of God in the inner life of man in terms of modern thinking. Morality and religion both demand a transcendent God, a God the perfect reality of man's ideals, a God above human limitations of time and space, finitude and imperfection, a God on whom man can confidently depend, and to whom he can entirely submit. But no less do both demand an immanent God, active in the moral order, present to the religious need of man. This divine immanence in nature and man generally is the Spirit of God, as distinctive in the Christian experience and character, the Holy Spirit.

(2) This presence of God with man is an activity in man, not supernatural, as contrary to the conditions of man's normal spiritual life, but natural, as in accord with the laws of man's personal development. Miss Lily Dougall claims that the four forms assumed by this divine activity in man —inward illumination, inspired utterance, unusual power of resisting temptation or of influencing other minds, the reception of specific benefits in answer to prayer[1]—can all be shown to be in accord with known psychological laws. To sum up the explanation which she offers: man's mind is larger than his consciousness; he is being ever affected by the subconscious, which is not directly controlled by the will, but can be controlled, and educated by "mental suggestion," which works most powerfully when the mind is quiescent, not dull, but in repose, as in sleep, or under hypnoses. Devotional exercises can produce such a state of quiescence and consequent suggestibility. It is such a state which the Spirit uses for the exercise of His beneficent power. For that power is ever used for good, and not for evil, and the universal good for which the Spirit works in man is man's perfect correspondence with environment, i.e. the Kingdom of Heaven, which depends on the free choice and the sacrificial service of man. Jesus Christ discovered and proclaimed the power of the Spirit to enhance and harmonise all life, and so to bring in the Kingdom of Heaven. The mystery of the Kingdom, which He disclosed,

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 35.

was His insight into the very core of the relation of life to its proper environment, such as enabled Him to see the goal from the starting-point, to see the far-off divine ideal to which the whole race must move. To Him the method was very simple ; it was the opening of the heart to the creative Spirit, who not only teaches love's attraction, but also shows how life may be transformed thereby. What does this mean but that man does not, and cannot, make himself holy by his own efforts, his striving and struggle, but that his purification and sanctification, no less than his justification, are by faith, his claiming and using the powers of the Spirit, which God in His grace through Christ freely offers ? For the redemption of his personality, his deliverance from the bondage to sin, man must become as a little child (Matt. xviii. 3) or be born of the Spirit (John iii. 5), there must be confidence in, and submission to, the God who in Christ offers Himself as Saviour ; such confidence and submission are the same as quiescence and suggestibility, which, according to the modern psychologists, are the conditions of the operation in the subconscious of the vital energy which heals the body, of the divine activity which recreates the soul. The theology of Augustine and the Reformers distinguished *prevenient*, *efficient*, and *co-operative* grace ; but simpler is it to think of the constant activity of the selfsame Spirit even before there is any conscious response, in the conscious response, be it almost imperceptible, or very manifest, as in conversion, and in the continued progress in the holy life.

(3) Of the sufficiency of grace to perfect human weakness by divine strength psychology also can offer some assurance. Dr. Hadfield in the same volume develops *the psychology of power*. In contrast to the physicist, who on the analogy of physical energy regards man's psychic power as strictly limited, and, therefore, as needing to be husbanded with care, the psychologist holds with the religious man " that the chief cause of fatigue is not exhaustion, but stagnation." Man has resources of power of a psychic kind which he cannot measure, available and usually not applied. There are, however, special conditions under which " extraordinary expenditure of energy can take place without equivalent fatigue." " When our minds are depressed," he writes, " with the idea of weakness, our strength may be diminished by two-thirds, whereas if we have the stimulus of a great inspiration our strength may thereby be increased

by one half"—"Once let the mind lose confidence in its strength, and its energy flows away like water."[1] This energy is not derived, however, from the will, the function of which is to direct it, but from the conditions which Hadfield describes as instinctive; but, as he recognises that this power can be sublimated, i.e. directed into higher channels we may assume that what he says of it may be applied to the sentiments, as Shand describes them. There is an expulsive and an impulsive form of love of incalculable measure. So significant for the purpose of this chapter is the following statement by Hadfield that it must be again quoted in full. "It is the intellectual and the moral privilege of the human being that he can similarly raise the energy contained in the instincts, the radical fault in the most of which is their selfish and ego-centric character, to higher potentials—that is to say, by transforming the *quality* of the energy he raises its power to accomplish his ends, as sexual passion has been transformed into love; and by changing the *direction* of the energy he endows it with a greater effectiveness of *purpose*. By doing so he retains the power or force of the instincts, but directs that force to greater purpose. Furthermore, directed to altruistic ends, these individual interests will no longer clash with the social instincts and thereby be deprived of strength, but, co-operating and working in harmony with the social instincts, they will be magnificently reinforced and their power multiplied."[2] By such sublimation not only is power increased, but all waste of power in conflict avoided, and all power harmoniously employed. A higher purpose entering into a life may have this liberating and invigorating effect; but from the highest purpose which can come into life we may expect most. "In its fundamental doctrine of love to God and man," says Hadfield, "Christianity harmonises the emotions of the soul into an inspiring purpose, thereby abolishing all conflict, and liberating instead of suppressing the free energies of men. In its doctrine of the Spirit it emphasises the element of power in religion."[3] For we may add that religion as a personal relation to God not only releases the reserves of human power in the process above described, but puts at man's disposal the resources of divine power, and brings those states of restfulness, cheerfulness, and confidence which are the conditions of receiving that power. Even as a curative agency, psycho-therapists recognise the value of

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 78–79. [2] *Idem*, p. 97. [3] *Idem*, p. 111.

religion. "The Christian religion," says Hadfield, "is one of the most valuable and potent influences that we possess for producing that harmony and peace of mind and that confidence of soul which is needed to bring health and power to a large proportion of nervous patients."[1]

(4) The supreme historical instance of the divine resources at the disposal of human faith is the experience of the primitive Christian community at Pentecost. It was when, by prayer and meditation in common fellowship, the Church realised as certainty the truth that Jesus Christ had risen, lived, and reigned, that the conditions were present for the fulfilment of Christ's promise of an endowment of power from on high. Dr. Anderson Scott deals with this baptism of the Church, the parallel of that of Jesus Himself. The miraculous features in the story are explicable, argues Scott, along two lines: the traditional accompaniments of the Spirit, fire and sound, are reproduced, and the abnormal psychical accompaniments of great emotional disturbances are observed. It is now recognised by scholars generally that the speaking with tongues was not the use of foreign languages, but an ecstatic speaking and hearing, to which religious revivals offer parallels. What for our interest is here important is Paul's emphasis on the Spirit as the power of moral renewal in the dominance in Christian life of the sentiment of love, making the Christian Church a body the members of which, possessing different gifts, became organs of that body in varying functions (or ministries) for the common good (1 Cor. xii. and xiii.). Scott emphasises fellowship, as shown in the sharing of the common loaf, as the primary result of the coming of the Spirit. The "common possession" of the Spirit made believers a community (the word *Koinonia* means both, and much besides). As this volume aims at replacing the individualism of much of the current Christian ethics by showing that Christian personality is essentially social, that the Christian redemption is transformation from egoism to altruism, special attention may be called to the fact that the possession of the Spirit means *power* and *fellowship*.

(5) As much of the dispute among Christians regarding the *sacraments* and orders is due to a quasi-physical conception of *grace* as of a thing of varying quality, measure, potency, it is well to note the contention of Mr. Emmet that grace is not some mysterious metaphysical entity, *sui*

[1] *Idem*, p. 113.

generis; but is similar to the influence which one human personality can exercise over another. For instance, the special presence of Christ in the Eucharist must be psychologically and not metaphysically explained. Christ cannot impart anything more or greater than Himself in personal communication. False are the lines of Newman in an otherwise beautiful hymn,

And that a higher gift than grace
Should flesh and blood refine,
God's Presence and His very Self,
And Essence all divine.

There is no higher gift than grace, for in the grace of Christ God Himself comes and gives Himself personally to man. The greater receptivity and responsiveness of many Christians to the divine presence in the Eucharist are due to the tender and tragic significance of the words, the acts, the elements, and the corporate character of the ordinance, where fellowship in the Spirit quickens individual faith.

(6) I have elsewhere objected to the description of conversion as a miracle, not that I would deprecate the wonder of God's doing, but because such a term suggests that there is something abnormal in man's turning from sin to God, whereas it is a recovery from the abnormality of sin to the normality of man's relation to God. Hence I agree with Emmet's contention that we must not contrast grace and nature as good and evil. Man's nature is not evil, but sin is an aberration of it, and grace restores nature. If grace be love in exercise in a personal relation, the opposition of grace and freedom loses all meaning. He who receives and responds to grace does not lose, but enhances, his freedom. The measure in which grace is thus being given by God, and gained by man, is not to be limited by man's consciousness of it. "The reality and closeness of our contact with the Divine Personality," says Emmet, "does not depend or always closely vary with our emotional sense of this contact," but the final test of such communion is to be found in its effects on the life and character.[1] God's personal activity in man in His Spirit has been experienced not only in the transformation of character but also in illumination, the discovery of truth. We do not now identify inspiration with psychically abnormal conditions, as, for instance, when

[1] *Idem*, pp. 191–192.

Saul also was found among the prophets (1 Sam. x. 10–13), but with such a stimulation of the normal personal activities of man as bring the intuitions of truth, which prophets have claimed. If in the prophetic consciousness there was the certainty of having received a divine communication—thus saith the Lord—we must not assume that there was no human psychical mediation. We cannot always distinguish, and we should never oppose, divine revelation and human discovery. It is not the method in which such an intuition —a thought which brings its self-evidencing certainty—comes that matters, but its *truth*. On those who receive the truth must always rest the responsibility of judgment. The capacity to receive a divine communication depends on the personality in its manifold aspects, not apart from, but as related to, society. "The measure of apprehension," says Emmet, "depends partly on the spiritual atmosphere of the whole community, partly on the preparedness of particular individuals within the community. The genius can never be independent of the atmosphere, nor can he be indefinitely in advance of it."[1] While he admits that Christ is the supreme instance of inspiration, he contends that here we find no abnormal means of intercourse with God, no special knowledge of facts, and no writings to stereotype the revelation. He insists that inspiration is not peculiar to a few persons or confined to the sphere of religion ; for in other realms of thought and life God is teaching by such intuitions, but all these must always be tested by reason and conscience. I cannot but feel that the writer of this essay, in his anxiety to correct the error of an extreme supernaturalist theory of inspiration, has not adequately recognised the uniqueness of the prophetic consciousness, with its certainty of distinct divine vocation and commission, still less the uniqueness of the self-consciousness of Jesus Christ as the Son knowing and revealing the Father, and even the uniqueness of the religious consciousness as constituted by a sense of personal relation to God of mutual communicativeness. Two other observations may here be added : *firstly*, we must recognise the mutual dependence of the transformation of character and the illumination of reason and conscience. If he who does the will will know the doctrine, whether it be of God or not, no less must the doctrine be known that the will may be done. Knowledge and obedience go together, and react on each other. *Secondly*, even if we recognise more fully

[1] *Idem*, p. 218.

than does Emmet personal uniqueness, yet he is right in emphasising the dependence of even the great thinker on his surroundings. It is not improbable that the conditions of to-day offer us fewer exceptionally great men, far above their fellows, to be teachers and leaders, but a higher level of judgment and purpose generally. The thinking necessary for human progress under the divine guidance is more likely to-day to be corporate, in study-circles, in commissions, in conferences, and is not this more in accord with Christian fellowship that men should think as well as do together?

(7) It is not necessary to follow the discussion in this volume any further; but it may be closed by calling attention to Canon Streeter's contention that Christ is both the portrait of God, revealing Him as Father and the portrait of the Spirit, as showing what mankind will become as led by the Spirit; and that, as Christ was both a critic of tradition and a constructive thinker, the Spirit will lead the Church, breaking the bonds of the past, to constructive thought and creative effort. The present volume is an attempt, however inadequate and imperfect, to pass on this challenge.

III

It has seemed desirable and profitable to present thus fully the contribution of this important volume, as showing how modern thought does not contradict, but confirm, Christian experience of the redemption of human personality from bondage to sin by the grace of God in the giving of His Spirit to and in man.

(1) The Christian grace of faith as the condition of receiving and responding to the divine activity has necessarily been thrown into prominence, although the grace of love has also been mentioned. What ends the inner conflict and brings inward peace, what gives unity and consistency to character, is one dominant interest, one prevailing sentiment. Such an interest, such a sentiment, might be partial, and so lead to a one-sided development, an incomplete personality; but Christian love—absolute towards God and equal to self and neighbour—involves no such danger. It is comprehensive enough to embrace all that has worth, and gives worth to man, for God is the reality of all ideals, and men are regarded and treated, not in their imperfect actuality, but as destined for the realisation of these ideals.

This principle has been adequately treated in an earlier section. What remains to be added here is this—to call attention to the way in which this principle becomes sovereign in thought and life. Paul discloses the secret : " The love of Christ constraineth us " (2 Cor. v. 14) ; that is, Christ's love for us in giving Himself to death on our behalf takes possession of us, evoking our responsive love, and bringing our whole life within the limits His love sets to it. So also the writer of 1 John : " We love, because He first loved us " (iv. 19). It is gratitude for grace which is the motive of love for God and love for man. Accordingly, it is essential for Christian morality that this motive be sustained, and not decreased. Admiration for the wisest teacher, or affection for the kindest friend, cannot become so potent a motive as this gratitude for the sacrifice which saves. There have been, there still may be, theories of the atonement which offend the moral sense. But Christian ethics will suffer loss if Christian theology does not continue to give the central place to the Cross of Christ. Devotion to Christ as Saviour can become what the psychologists tell us is necessary for the unification of personality, the dominant interest, and the prevailing sentiment. It is this complex of thought, feeling, and will that can release the vital energy, which makes a man more than conqueror over his own sins (Rom. viii. 37), and gives him the victory which overcometh the tempting world around him (1 John v. 4).

(2) According to Shand's analysis, " desire has a very complex emotional system which includes actually or potentially the six prospective emotions of Hope, Anxiety, Disappointment, Despondency, Confidence, and Despair." [1] Desire itself is distinguished from impulse in that it contains an obstruction to the satisfaction which must be removed. Where the emotions of hope and confidence are present, then the only obstruction to satisfaction which remains is the time necessary for the realisation of the object. What the Christian desires is self-realisation in truth, holiness, love, blessedness in the clearer vision of, the closer communion with, and the more complete resemblance to God ; the obstruction to the desire lies in death, but the hope in Christ entirely removes that obstruction. As for faith, the invisible God is as real as the visible world, so for hope the future good is as certain as any present goods. Not only did Christ give man such a conception of God as Father

[1] *The Foundations of Character*, p. 463.

and man as child as makes incredible even the assumption that death can end all, and renders certain the assurance of eternal life : but in His victory over death He gave man the pledge of such a victory, and by His loving presence with the believer He makes the eternal life present. He is the firstfruits of them that sleep (1 Cor. xv. 20), the foretaste of their glory and perfection in what He is in the believer. Were such a hope detached from the religious experience of communion with Him, and the moral character which His indwelling Spirit produces as the fruit, it might encourage relaxed effort and lost interest in this life, with its claims and trusts ; but, truly conceived as a hope the future fulfilment of which is measured by the fullness with which the eternal life has been here experienced and expressed, it is a relief from anxiety, disappointment, despondency, and despair, and develops into confidence. It is one of the necessary psychic conditions for the release of the reserves of human power, and the reception of the resources of divine power. So great is the influence of hope on life that Paul can say truly that we are saved by hope (Rom. viii. 24).

(3) Thus the three Christian graces, man's dependence on, devotion to, and confidence in God combine as psychical conditions for the redemption of his personality by the grace of Christ. As Christian love expands from God to man so does faith in man, and hope for man. The Christian is redeemed, not as an individual in isolation, but as a member of a society ; and at every stage is his development conditioned by the social relations in which he finds himself. Accordingly, we are inevitably led from the consideration of the moral agent to the moral sphere, from the psychological to the sociological treatment of the subject of the Christian ideal, which can be fully realised individually only as it is being realised socially. Christian character creates Christian institutions, and Christian institutions promote and preserve Christian character. Character creates and institutions conserve moral values.

PART IV
SOCIOLOGICAL

INTRODUCTION

MORALITY as a quality of conduct presupposes relations to others. Without at present considering the question whether there are duties which a man owes to himself, we may affirm that the greater part of man's conduct affects others, and not himself alone ; and that even what might at first sight appear to affect himself alone does affect his membership in a society. The isolated individual is an abstraction which need not be taken into account. Man is a *gregarious animal*, like the dog, and unlike the cat. The sex relationship involves a social relation, which the prolonged infancy of human offspring makes more permanent. Two of the distinctive endowments of man can thus be developed—the capacity to speak and the capacity to walk on two limbs only, setting the other two free to develop as hands, in the use of which man's industrial progress has its beginnings. Man's higher nature involves that as the animal sex and parental instincts become personal affections, less instinctive and more voluntary, so the herd-instinct develops into tribal loyalty, national patriotism, and human sentiment. Man is essentially a social personality ; and his moral conduct results in not only his personal character, but also his social institutions. And since, as we have seen in the ethical treatment of the subject, morality is concerned with consequences as well as motives, we must deal with our subject not only psychologically in regard to what man makes of himself, but also sociologically in regard to how he relates himself to his fellows.

I

We cannot discuss social relations *in vacuo*, since their characters will be determined by the total conditions of the life of a community. When tribe was at war with tribe or nation with nation, tribal or national solidarity was essential, and the individual was rigidly, ruthlessly subordinated to the community. Injury to a tribesman was avenged on the whole tribe to which the wrongdoer belonged. Achan's trespass involved his whole family in the punishment (Joshua vii. 24–26). From this standpoint no difficulty was felt in

the doctrine that Adam involved all his posterity in his guilt ; or that Christ assumed the penalty for all mankind (Rom. v. 12–21). The messages of the earlier prophets were addressed to the nation ; national transgression brought national judgment, and national repentance would gain national deliverance. Isaiah's doctrine of the remnant (x. 20–23) is the beginning of another view. It was, however, the destruction of the nation that led Jeremiah to conceive the new covenant (xxxi. 31–34) in which God's relation would be to every individual within the restored nation ; and in his teaching among the Exiles Ezekiel (chapter xviii.) carried this individualism to an extreme, so that even the continuity of the individual life was denied. That sublime poem about the Suffering Servant in Isa. liii., however, assumes this solidarity. That Jesus taught the infinite value of a single soul in the Parables (Luke xv. 1–11) of the Lost Sheep and the Lost Coin was due not only to the immediate occasion, the need of justifying His ministry to those outcasts of Jewish society ; but this truth is rooted in, and grows out of, His revelation of God as Father. The Christian religion means a personal relation between God and man. Rightly understood, this does not, however, result in individualism. Each man is a child of God as the universal Father ; he is the member of the human family with closer, more intimate relations than those of kindred, tribe, or nation. Love is the universal law of this new community among men. It was Christianity which gave a fuller conception, a higher estimate of personality. Greek philosophy, influenced as it was by a political community in which slavery was recognised as reasonable and lawful, and citizenship did not involve the individual freedom we should now think necessary, had no adequate terms for personality, when Christian theology tried to adapt its terms to the definition of the nature of the Godhead, and of the person of Christ ; for *hypostasis* was originally a synonym of *ousia* (*substantia*), and *prosopon* (*persona*) meant far less than what we mean when we use the term person. The Renaissance and the Reformation were movements towards the liberation of the individual reason and conscience. Luther was untrue to his fundamental convictions when he assented to the principle *cujus regio, ejus religio*, and so invested the civil ruler with authority in the Church. Calvinism was more insistent on the independence of the Church from the State ; although not unwilling to use the State as a servant

of the Church in the repression of heresy. The reformers, sensitive about the liberty of their own consciences, were not as solicitous about the consciences of others. And we cannot say that toleration was one of the gifts of the Reformation. Despite the inconsistency of the leaders of the Reformation, that combined with the Renaissance did result in growing tolerance, in a return to individualism. The individual's function in, and subordination to, society needed to get a theoretical justification. Theories of the nature of society appeared.

II

Plato's *Republic* and Aristotle's *Politics* show that ancient thought had been interested in the question ; More's *Utopia*, Bacon's *New Atlantis*, and Campanella's *City of the Sun* are proofs that thinkers were concerned about the solution of the problems of society. But with these we need not now concern ourselves. As thought depends on life, and the conditions which affect life are manifold, any theory usually reflects the intellectual tendencies of the age, and is responsive to practical needs. (1) These influences we may observe in the first of the theories we have to consider, that of *Thomas Hobbes*. The political troubles of his own time led him to feel the need of a political theory ; amid anarchy he wished to see clearly what the governing power should be. He had been much influenced in his thinking by the " mechanical philosophy " of Galileo, and he sought to find in motion and the laws of motion a guiding principle of thought ; thus he tried to explain knowledge in terms of motion. In his *Leviathan*, religion was reduced to a department of the State, and the State was defined in terms of force. This theory is a political absolutism. The state of nature is a state of war (of conflicting forces). Men by a kind of contract surrender their individual rights (their power of exercising force over others) to an absolute sovereignty (a force so superior that all other forces can be subjected to it). Only thus could he see a security for good government. Man in this view is not a gregarious animal, but a predatory, preying, unlike the other animals, on his own kind. Individuals are not only independent of one another, but antagonistic to one another. This theory has with some modification been revived by Nietzsche, who assigns dominion to supermen over the servile natures.

(2) From the same soil of individualism springs the theory of *Rousseau*. He too assumed that society was not a natural necessity to man, but an artificial device. The theory is expounded in his book on the *Social Contract*. The state of nature prior to all culture and civilisation he exalts above man's present condition. Nevertheless, to secure defence and safety, each individual in an original compact surrendered his own freedom to the common will, as expressed in laws to which the assent of all had been given. He gave to the French Revolution the watchword of "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity." To that watchword it will be necessary afterwards to recur.

(3) It was *Comte* who gave to the study of society a new impulse. He believed himself to be both the Aristotle and the Paul of his age. In his *Positive Philosophy* he expounded the theory that nothing can be known but phenomena, their resemblances, differences, co-existences, and sequences; the principle of causality, even, he rejected as a survival of metaphysics. This positive or scientific stage is the last of the three stages of human thought, superseding the metaphysical, as the metaphysical superseded the theological. Arranging the sciences in the order of their complexity, he placed biology at the summit of the already recognised sciences; and proposed to add the new science, to which he gave the name *sociology* (a hybrid word consisting of the Latin word *socius* and the Greek word *logos*, a combination which he regarded as significant of the need of combining the theoretical genius of the Greek with the practical of the Roman). His own views of how society should be constituted he gave in his *Positive Polity*.[1] To secure an adequate motive for the altruism his scheme required, he invented the religion of humanity, a personification not of all men, but of all who might be regarded as benefactors of the race. The past of humanity is, for a man, symbolised by his mother, the present by his wife, and the future by his daughter. Many thinkers who accepted his philosophy regarded his polity as an aberration. Mill had already been advocating an application of the methods of physical science to the study of the human mind in its varied manifestations[2]; and he heartily welcomed the new science. It was not, however, till Herbert Spencer published his book, *A Study of Sociology*, that wider currency was given to the name "Sociology."

[1] See *The Social Philosophy and Religion of Comte*, by Edward Caird, LL.D.
[2] *System of Logic*, Book VI.

(4) For the *individualist* or *mechanical* theories of Hobbes and Rousseau, *Spencer* substitutes an *organic*, although he does not consistently carry out this idea. Society, he argues resembles an organism in four respects : (1) there is growth —increase of population ; (2) there is increasing differentiation of functions and structure—division of labour : (3) there is corresponding increase in mutual dependence of the parts on the whole—of the individuals on society : (4) the whole (the society) survives the parts (the individuals). But, following his biological analogy too closely, consistently with his sensational psychology, and influenced by the prevailing individualism, Spencer stopped short of drawing the inference that is generally drawn from the organic conception of society ; he asserted that society, unlike the body, has no common consciousness, no central sensorium (the brain) ; that individuals alone can feel pain and pleasure, and that, consequently, individual happiness must never be sacrificed to the supposed common good.[1] In his *Man and the State* he waged warfare against the growing tendency to regulate the more complex social relations of modern society by the legislative or administrative activity of the State. He proved himself a Dame Partington, trying to sweep back with a broom the advancing tide. While the practical application of this negative conclusion has been generally disregarded, that conclusion itself points to the inadequacy of the biological analogy, and compels thinkers to find for society a unity, other than physical, which can hold the corresponding position to the brain in the human body. The criticism of the organic conception, which is still often assumed without any recognition of its inadequacy, must be reserved till we discuss a more adequate conception.

(5) In view of such a conception of human society, based on biology, inadequate as it is, we must turn aside to consider how the conception of society is affected by the biological theory of the survival of the fittest in the struggle for existence.

(*a*) If we were to draw the conclusion from Darwinism, which is represented by Nietzsche, although he denied any direct dependence, we should have to abandon any " organic " theory of human society. We should then have among men " the law of the jungle " : " Every man for himself, and the Devil take the hindmost." Darwin, insisting as he did on man's animal ancestry, himself denied the

[1] *The Principles of Sociology*, I., pp. 475 *ff*.

application of the principle to human affairs. Huxley, in his *Romanes Lecture*, frankly and boldly asserted a contradiction between the law of vital evolution and man's moral progress. Wallace was so impressed with the difference between man and beast that he assumed a special creation of man's distinctive endowments.

(*b*) Henry Drummond could not acquiesce in this dualism of thought, and he tried to show, in his *Ascent of Man*, that human love is anticipated in the earlier stages of the evolution. He probably over-stated the case ; but animal care for offspring (especially mother-care) does give an anticipation of man's development in society. Prince Kropotkin has collected many instances of co-operation among animals. A birds' nest, a bees' hive, a beavers' dam, are all prophetic.

(*c*) Benjamin Kidd has been more daring ; out of the eater he bringeth forth meat, and sweetness out of the strong. In his *Social Evolution* he argues that the principle of survival must not be applied to individuals within a society, but to societies in their relation to one another. The security of any society depends on the subordination of egoism to altruism ; and such subordination can be obtained, not by reason (reasoning), but by religion, which provides a suprarational sanction. He elaborates this thesis in his book, *Principles of Western Civilisation*, when he states the law of progress as the subordination of the individual and the present to the universal and the future. In his *Science of Power* he assigns this function to woman especially. Without attempting any criticism of the details of the exposition, although there is ground for it, we may welcome this reinforcement from the side of social science of the " organic " view of society. Further, may we not ask whether gregariousness among animals is not itself a reason for qualifying the theory of survival as applied so often mistakenly to individuals only ?

(6) We may pass over the metaphysical theory of the State as a form of the Absolute Spirit, a realisation of reason, as favouring an acquiescence in the *status quo*, as a deification of the authority of the State, which has been very ably criticised by L. T. Hobhouse in his book on *The Metaphysical Theory of the State*, and continue our discussion of the nature of society, after this necessary digression, as it is presented to us from the standpoint of idealist philosophy by J. S. Mackenzie. His first book, which is a most interesting and attractive volume, is entitled *An Introduction to Social Philosophy*.

In his second he maintains the same standpoint ; but takes full account of the advance of thought on the subject ; it is entitled *Outlines of Social Philosophy*.

(*a*) In the first book he retains the conception of an organism, but gives it a different content from Spencer's. He assigns three reasons for adopting this conception : (1) the intrinsic relations of human beings to society ; (2) the growth of society through individual development ; (3) the need of a rational environment for man's rational progress. Here he is, while still using the term " organism," advancing to the more adequate conception.

(*b*) He also gives a suggestive account of the development of modern society in three stages. The first stage from the Fall of the Roman Empire to the Renaissance and the Reformation was a period of *subjugation* of the new nations by the Church, which thus carried over the civilisation and culture, morals and religion, of the ancient world into the modern. The next stage, from the Renaissance and Reformation onward, was the stage of *emancipation*, when an authority, which had been necessary at one time, was still seeking to keep men's minds and souls in bondage. That movement of liberation extended to all spheres, economic, political, national. But it was being discovered during last century that *liberty* is not enough. And so an effort has been, and is being still made at *organisation*, an effort to secure some of the equality as regards the privileges of membership in the society to which human personality gives a title. In this movement, however, there are many obstacles of individual interests ; and to secure that *equality* two ways are being proposed. Some seek to impose that *equality* by legislative and administrative action, by the socialisation of industry, the public ownership of the means of production (capital), collectivism, or socialism. Others recognise that it is the spirit of man that needs change, and they turn from liberty or equality as an exclusive principle of social evolution to *fraternity*, which relies on inward constraint rather than outward compulsion for the organisation of society.

(*c*) There are three objects which society sets before it—the subjugation of nature, the culture of the individual, the right social relations. For the pursuit of the first object *liberty* has been emphasised : *laissez-faire*—let each follow his own interest, and the greatest common good will be thereby secured. To secure *equality*, as has been indicated, socialism advocates a limitation of liberty in subordination

to the community and seems to sacrifice the individual. The right adjustment of individual culture and social relation lies in the ideal of *fraternity*, which means not only the proper adjustment of the individual to the society, but also of the different functions of society to one another, such as the conquest of nature and the culture of the individual. I have tried in the above paragraph freely to reproduce the thought of an interesting book, which, at the time of its publication, might be regarded as a pioneer, and to which I owe a great deal in my thinking.

(7) In this connection, as defining the objects of society, notice may be taken of a recent book, *Essentials of Civilisation : a Study in Social Values*, by Thomas Jesse Jones. "The purpose of this book," says the writer, "is to ascertain the *essential values of civilisation.* As society functions through government, industry, education, religion, philanthropy, and art, it is necessary to find the basic objectives which are common to all of them. To make that task possible we must begin our search with a study of society in its simpler forms."[1] An examination of primitive society as represented by the African villages, with which the author is specially familiar, leads to this conclusion : "These, then, are the essentials of primitive society : (1) health and sanitation ; (2) appreciation and use of environment, material and human ; (3) effective development of the home and the household, the chief factors for the transfer of racial heritage ; (4) the process of re-creation—physical, mental, and spiritual. They are undoubtedly essentials of civilised society as well."[2] This analysis may be compared with that of Mackenzie : (1) would belong partly to the subjugation of nature, and to individual culture ; (2) partly to subjugation of nature and to right social relations ; (3) partly to individual culture and to right social relations ; (4) entirely to individual culture. In Jesse Jones's analysis there seems to be no guiding principle as in Mackenzie's—self, others, the world. "Others" would include not only fellow-men, but God also ; and the relations to others involve religion, as well as morality. While offering such an *analysis*, Jesse Jones insists on the need of *synthesis*—what Mackenzie describes as fraternity of functions. "All these expressions of re-creation are interwoven in the unity of life. The athletic enthusiast may be nothing but a strong animal ; the mental specialist may be only an intellectual

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 5. [2] *Idem*, p. 10.

machine ; the spiritual devotee may be only a recluse or a fanatic. True re-creation combines body, mind, and spirit. Only so can the individual and society attain the ideals of civilisation." What is true of one of these essentials is true of them together. They " are interwoven through practically every form of human society." [1] The tendency to isolate these essentials from one another, and study them apart, must be corrected. " *Consciousness of community* is the key to any effective survey of any social organisation." [2] The social organisations recognised are " governmental, economic, educational, religious, philanthropic, and art." The purpose of the book is to show how these " four essentials " " have been actually realised, and as they should be realised by each type of organisation." [3] For the present purpose this detailed discussion need not be followed further.

(8) Probably one of the most valuable contributions to the study of the nature of human society is that entitled *Community, a Sociological Study*, by R. M. Maciver. (*a*) He criticises and rejects the " organic " view for the following reasons. (1) In agreement with Spencer, he emphasises the fact that society has no centre or unity of life. (2) He finds no help in understanding society in this conception, as in our conscious participation in society we understand more clearly what society is than what is an organism. (3) He holds that this view often leads to a confusion of society and State. There is another view he also criticises and rejects—what he calls the *psychic*. He dissents from Durkheim and McDougall's view that, because community is a union of minds, therefore it is a mind. A society, he argues, lacks the integrity, isolation, and unity of volition which are essential to mind ; and the influence which society exercises on individual minds does not prove that it is a super-mind. All that, in his view, is meant by the will or mind of the community is that the members of it, as social, think, feel, and will alike ; and this accord is due to their interdependence, their common needs, traditions, etc. He sets aside the mechanical view also that a society is greater than the sum of its parts. " Let us not conceive community," he says, " either as mechanism or as organism or as soul ; for the unity of which we are thinking is not mechanic or organic or even psychic ; it is properly named only with its own name—*communal*." [4] He rejects these views on the

[1] *Idem*, p. 30. [2] *Idem*, p. 32. [3] *Idem*, p. 31. [4] *Op. cit.*, p. 89.

ground that they lead to false consequences, such as the antagonism of the individual to society, or the subordination of the one to the other, or the exaltation of the one over the other. "Society is nowhere but in its members, and it is most in the greatest of them."[1] This criticism of the organic view seems to me to fail in recognising adequately how great an improvement it was on the *mechanic*; and the rejection of the *psychic* seems to me to be too dogmatic, in assuming that the only possible form of mind is individual mind, attached to an organism, and thus isolated from other minds. As we reach the higher ranges of the activity of mind, especially in affection and aspiration, we do seem to be getting above and beyond this individual, organic isolation. The Christian doctrine of the Holy Spirit seems to me to carry us into a region of reality that Maciver's reasoning cannot reach.

(*b*) His analysis of social relations is very valuable. *Society* is the term he uses of widest range, for it exists in less or greater degree wherever living beings enter into, or maintain, "*willed* relations"; the emphasis is on the *willed*. "The ultimate social laws are those which reveal the inter-relations of the purposes of living beings, their conditions and their consequences. The fundamental social laws are thus individually determined."[2] A *community* is an area of common life: common convictions, interests, purposes, constitute a number of individuals into a community. When, because of such community, these social beings become organised for a common object, there is an *association*. If the common object is permanent, so will the association be. The doctrine which makes the *State* the limit of community, and makes all other associations but elements of the State, is contrary to the facts, especially in modern times. Many associations, the common interest of which is art, science, literature, sport, etc., are quite independent of the State, and come within its cognisance only in so far as they may affect public order, that is, only in so far as their activities clash with other activities, which have a claim for consideration and protection. A community, as that of the Christian Church, may include many nations. For the sake of public order, the harmonious pursuit of common interests by all the associations within the society, the State has the power of *compulsion*; but this compulsion has value only as it is willed by the citizens. The resort to force is the proof of how far the State

[1] *Idem*, p. 94. [2] *Idem*, p. 21.

has failed to command the assent of any of its citizens. Subjection to the laws is a political obligation, the reverse side of political right,[1] the claim the citizen has to the protection of the State. But in recent years the functions of the State have been more positively conceived. The State should not only allow as much freedom to the associations within it as public order will allow ; it should preserve and promote the interests of such associations as are for the common good by such resources as it can command.[2] It exists not only *to protect life*, but also *to encourage good life*. The Hegelian identification of the Spirit with the State must be rejected, as a wider ideal of community than that possible within any one State is to-day on the horizon of men's thoughts. The State is the organ of certain common interests, one of which is that the conflicting interests of different communities will be harmonised ; it has so to organise the associations that they will not clash with one another. While the Government in the State is the *legislative sovereign* (including administration), yet it is the will of the people that is the *ultimate sovereign*. As it is but rarely (if at all) that a people will have one will, it is the will of the majority which is taken to be the will of the people. The *legislative sovereignty* will be precarious, if it does not correspond with the *ultimate sovereignty*, and in the exercise of the ultimate sovereignty the majority must so act as to command at least acquiescence from the minority. In order to realise the objects of the community, the association which results from it establishes such *institutions* as may be necessary. If the object is simply the relation of these social beings to one another, the institution will be different than if the association is due to some purpose other than that relation itself. The association of man and woman, resulting from the natural community of sex, will assume the form of an institution in marriage. The association of a number of persons whose community lies in their interest in popular education will result in the institution of a library or courses of lectures, etc. The institutions are the means whereby a common interest of an association is realised. The community of the Spirit produces the association of the Church (*ecclesia*) ; and the ends of the Church are realised in the

[1] See also T. H. Green, *Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation.*

[2] So complex have become the functions of the State, that Rudolf Steiner has advocated a *threefold State*, an organ for each of its functions, cultural, economic, and political.

institutions of the preaching of the Gospel, the observance of the sacraments, the discipline by which the standard of Christian living is maintained.

(*c*) As society is composed of persons, the development of the community must depend on the development of the persons composing it. "*The laws of community*," says Maciver, "*are laws revealing the connection between evolution of social forms and the increase of human life and personality.*"[1] The increase of personality is the test of the social evolution. That community is most advanced in which the persons are most fully developed. When a society clings to the past, its customs and traditions, there is *stagnation* ; when it lapses to an earlier stage, there is *retrogression*, and when that lapse is a conscious effort there is *reaction* : when the life of a community relaxes, there is *decadence*. Although all these features of society may be illustrated from history, history does not justify the conclusion that there is any law of communal decay and death. A society may renew its life, as the individual organism cannot.

(*d*) Progress is possible, if not inevitable, and its fundamental law may be stated thus : "*Socialisation and individualisation are the two sides of a single process ; sociality and individuality develop pari passu.*"[2] This individualisation does not mean individualism, or this socialisation socialism, as these describe extremes which are opposed to one another. In this progress the functions and their corresponding organs of community are differentiated. Family life, while in most respects more dependent on society around, develops the community of personal affection in the home. Religious life, while seeking more fully to permeate all life, is focused in the manifold interests and activities of the Church. Potitical life, while enlarging the range of interests in which it is concerned, finds a new distinct expression and exercise in the State. The social structure becomes more complex as the range of community widens, and the co-ordination of the different communities, domestic, economic, cultural, within one society becomes a more serious problem, so that each shall hold its own place, and play its own part in the harmonious evolution of the whole society. The same problem emerges as regards the individual : the more varied his interests and activities, the more personal he becomes, the greater the task of securing the unity and the consistency of his personality. The goal of social evolution is the

[1] *Idem*, p. 173. [2] *Idem*, pp. 214–215.

co-ordination of all natural or social groups into the *one human race*. The goal of personal development is the individual's ethical autonomy : " Self-knowledge, self-reverence, self-control." The personal development is within the social evolution ; and in this process there needs to be constant adjustment. " No social claim," says Maciver, " is absolute. It is an estimate of values. No one form of society is adequate to the fulfilment of personality ; therefore none has an absolute claim."[1] If I may give an instance of the possible conflict of an ethical and a political claim, i.e. a dictate of conscience and a command of law, during the Great War pacifists refused military service, and some even any kind of national work which subserved the purpose of the war. But unless with some of the fanatics, this did not involve a general rejection of the authority of the State. " Considering the functions of the State and its fundamental importance," says Maciver, " the cases where disobedience would be the greater loyalty may well be rare ; but considering the difficulty of realising self-government, the cases where obedience finds its ethical justification only in a consideration of the greater as opposed to the lesser good may not be inconsiderable."[2] Such conflict of claims may arise between this common interest as, for instance, the family and the Church. Should a son or daughter obey the call to the mission-field despite the wishes of parents ?

(*e*) The second law formulated by Maciver is described as follows : " If we use the term ' economy,' " he says, " in the widest sense to signify the conservation of values, not only material but spiritual, the conservation of life itself, the conservation of the means of life, and the conservation of personality, the intrinsic value of life, we may call the principle which these changes [of social forms and interests] reveal the *principle of communal economy*."[3] Socialisation is the movement towards co-operation, and the factors of its success are psychical, institutional, and material. The more socialised these factors are, the greater the economy. " The division of labour," says Maciver, " is in itself both a form of social economy and a factor of socialisation : it serves at once the development of personality and the solidarity of community."[4] The immense incompleteness of our social economy is only too apparent. " Every development of industrial power makes possible either (*a*) the increase of luxury or refinement, or (*b*) the diminution of poverty, or

[1] *Idem*, p. 301. [2] *Idem*, p. 315. [3] *Idem*, p. 321. [4] *Idem*, pp. 351–352.

(*c*) the development of cultural interests."[1] The problem of the adjustment of these is not insoluble.

(*f*) The third law of communal development, according to Maciver, is *the correlation of socialisation and the control of environment.*[2] As community develops, environment is transformed, for life has a basis in nature. An organism is not only affected by, but also affects, its environment. All social development must not, however, be explained by the influence of the environment, however important that may be. The fuller the development of life, the greater is the control of the environment, and the increase of this control depends on the increase of social co-operation. The higher the life the less dependent does it become on the environment, and the more does it control that environment. As society develops, the struggle of the individual for life is lessened ; for, with progress by control of the conditions on which values depend, these values are secured for the individual. The principle of natural selection also is modified in the course of the social evolution. For the natural solution of the death-rate, eliminating the unfit, there comes the voluntary solution of the birth-rate, so that the excess of reproduction over survival is steadily diminished. While the future course of social development cannot be forecast, the present duty is to promote every practicable improvement. The test of the ethical value of any society is the personal development of its members, for " *the actual development of personality, attained in and through community by its members, is the measure of the importance these attach to personality, both in themselves and in their fellow-men.*"[3] Thus psychology and sociology bring us to the same goal : the social good and the personal good are one.

(9) In most of these theories of society it is assumed that there is a social ideal which can be formulated, and that it is in the realisation of that ideal that social progress consists. It is also generally assumed that there can be, and has been progress, and a progress to which different peoples have contributed, and in which all peoples will one day have a share : many dare to think of, and hope for, a *human evolution*, or, in the language of religion, the Kingdom of God on earth. (*a*) This assumption has been challenged in Spengler's *Decline of the West.* To indicate his position briefly : first of all he breaks up human evolution into a number of distinct and separate *world-cultures*, and, secondly, he assigns to

[1] *Idem*, p. 353. [2] *Idem*, p. 359. [3] *Idem*, p. 409.

each of these cultures as its inevitable destiny, or *Shicksal*, decay following growth, its spring and summer followed inevitably by its autumn and winter. "The task of the true historian," says Dawson, in an exposition of Spengler's theory,[1] "must be to write the biographies of the great cultures as self-contained wholes, which follow a similar course of growth and decay, but are as unrelated to one another as different planetary systems. These great cultures are eight in number: Egypt, Babylonia, India, China, the Maya culture of Central America, the culture of Classical Antiquity, the Arabian culture, and the culture of western Europe. There are, in addition, a few cultures which have failed to attain full development, such as those of the Hittites, the Persians, and the Quichua."[2] This theory is but a symptom of a widespread tendency of thought. "During the last ten or twenty years there has been a general reaction against the old absolutist view of civilisation and against that unquestioning faith in the transcendent value of our own Western culture which marked the nineteenth century. There are civilisations, but no *Civilisation*; and the standards and achievements of each culture are valid only within the limits of that culture; they possess no absolute significance."[3] Of the theory Dawson offers a criticism. Against its isolation of cultures from one another he asserts that "this idea is irreconcilable with the whole course of human history, which is nothing but a vast system of inter-cultural relations."[4] He argues "that in order to explain the life of civilisations, it is not sufficient to possess a formula for the life-cycle of individual peoples, we must also understand the laws of cultural interaction and the causes of the rise and fall of the great cultural syncretisms, which seem to overshadow the destinies of individual peoples."[5] His final judgment of the theory is that "the relativist philosophy of history ends by denying the very existence of relations, and dissolves the unity of history into an unintelligible plurality of isolated and sterile culture processes."[6] The purpose of his whole book is to justify the belief in progress, and to show that the Christian religion has been its most potent factor.

(*b*) Before indicating the course of his argument, reference may be made to the more general theme of inter-cultural relations, which Dawson discusses in his third chapter. The

[1] *Progress and Religion*, pp. 31–43. [2] p. 34.
[3] *Idem*, p. 38. [4] p. 40. [5] p. 41. [6] p. 43.

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anthropology of last century, under the dominance of the Darwinian theory, assumed that the uniformity of human nature in its development was sufficient to account for the resemblances to be found in different cultures, and denied that there had been any borrowings. At present there is a reaction in favour of the historical method, which assumes contacts of peoples in prehistoric times, and asserts borrowings of cultures. " The conversion " of Dr. Rivers " to the historical method was due, not to theoretical considerations, but to the evidence of his own researches into the social organisation and development of the Melanesian peoples. He came to see that a primitive culture was not the result of a simple straightforward process of evolution, as he had been taught to believe, but that it had behind it a long and complex history. In order to understand the culture of a Melanesian tribe, it was necessary to reconstruct their social past, to unravel the tangle of their customs and institutions, strand by strand, and to trace each element to its ultimate source. By this process of analysis he proved that the apparent uniformity of the culture veiled a whole series of movements of diffusion and assimilation, and that these outlying regions had received cultural influences from the centres of higher civilisations in the past. His disciples, Professor Elliott Smith and Professor Perry, carried this principle still further, and have attempted to show that practically every element of the higher civilisation, wherever it may be found, has originated from a common source, and that this original centre of diffusion is to be found in ancient Egypt."[1] The American school of anthropology avoids this exaggeration, and " fully recognises the complexity of the problems of cultural development, and resists the tendency to oversimplification which has been the bane alike of the evolutionary and the historical schools."[2]

(*c*) Dawson awards high praise to Le Play, whose great work, *Les Ouvriers Européens*, he describes as " the first thoroughly objective study of human life in relation to its geographical environment and its economic functions."[3] " The fundamental types " of " the primary nature occupations which are the foundations of all material culture " are " six in number : first, the hunters and food-gatherers ; secondly, the pastoral peoples ; thirdly, the fishermen of the sea-coasts ; fourthly, the agriculturists ; fifthly, the foresters ;

[1] *Idem*, pp. 50–51. [2] *Idem*, p. 52. [3] p. 53.

and sixthly, the miners."[1] His views have been developed by Professor Geddes and Mr. Victor Branford, and through them exercise a dominating influence in the Sociological Society of Great Britain. *Place, Work, and Folk* mutually affect each other (corresponding to Environment, Function, and Organism). In the Western hemisphere there are four racial types, with corresponding cultures : " the negroids of the tropical forests, the Mediterranean race in the warm temperate zone, the Nordic race in the cooler latitudes, and the Lapps of the Arctic regions."[2]

(*d*) While recognising the value of Le Play's analysis, so far as it goes, Dawson holds that it is not environment alone which determines a culture, the mental and moral factors must be taken into account. Religion especially as a sense of dependence on superhuman powers may be regarded as " the womb of civilisation." On this point he is in agreement with Benjamin Kidd, different though his philosophy may be. In his fifth chapter, on " Religion and the Origins of Civilisation," he abundantly illustrates and successfully demonstrates his thesis. " If the rational and spiritual elements in a culture are those which determine its creative activity, and if the primary manifestation of these elements is to be found in the sphere of religion, it is clear that the religious factor has had a far more important share in the development of human cultures than that which has been usually assigned to it by the theorists who have attempted to explain the phenomena of social progress."[3] From the ancient but now extinct religions, since " their fixed ritual order condemned them to final stagnation, e.g. Ancient Egypt," he turns to trace the rise of the world-religions in Persia, India, China, and Greece. While these religions marked an advance in thought and life, yet the mental cultures that are based on them " tend to become stationary or retrograde."[4] Even in Greece the cyclic view of existence tends to pessimism and fatalism. The Hebrew religion is unique in character in this respect—that there is an absence of metaphysics, and the reality and value of time and history are recognised. In Judaism, history is regarded as " a single and unique process," of which " the goal is the establishment of Jahveh's world-wide Kingdom." This tradition was developed in Christianity. The doctrine of the Incarnation

[1] p. 54. [2] p. 55.
[3] *Idem*, p. 95. [4] p. 138.

became " the source of a new humanity and a new world-order." To this unique consciousness Christianity owes its exceptional powers of expansion and conquest : while much of the Eastern world, under the dominance of Islam, reverted to a lower type of religion, and consequent culture, the West offered a soil more favourable to the growth of " an original and creative Christian culture." Consequent on the Renaissance and the Reformation there was a secularisation of Western culture : and within it arose what may be called a Religion of Progress, which sought to find a basis in reason, and not revelation. In his ninth chapter, Dawson shows how, despite the extraordinary advance in the nineteenth century in science and industry, this religion of progress declined, and the spirit of disillusionment spread. As religion lost its vitality, so confidence in man's advance waned. In the conclusion he insists that the only alternative for Europe is either, if it gives up Christianity, an abandonment of faith in man and his progress, or a return to the historic Christianity, in which he has sought to show are laid the religious foundations of her culture. Such a return would not involve the loss of any of the gains of science, as a harmony of reason and religion is possible.

(10) It is evident from these discussions that social theory is always closely related to the intellectual tendencies of the age, and these are dependent on the total conditions ; this correlation may be indicated—the period of *emancipation*, of which Mackenzie speaks, corresponds to the period in which physical science was busy reducing all things into atoms and their combinations. The mechanical theory was in correspondence with both these features. The period of *organisation* corresponds with the period in which biology was concerned with the evolution of the living organism, and here is the similar correlation. Although Mackenzie does not envisage a stage beyond that of organisation, and is content with the analogy of the organism, yet as he, consistently with his idealist philosophy, regards the relations within society as personal, he partially anticipates the theory of Maciver. Although Maciver expressly repudiates the idea of a common soul, a *psychic* theory, yet it is significant that, in the analysis of society he gives, psychology, the dominant scientific interest of the hour, plays a prominent part.

Such being the correlation of these theories with the other factors of progress, it is the more significant that the inspired genius of a Paul did in his descriptions of the Church

anticipate these theories. The *mechanical* is seen in his description of the Church as a temple. In Jesus Christ "each several building, fitly framed together, groweth into a holy temple in the Lord : in whom ye also are builded together for a habitation of God in the Spirit" (Eph. ii. 21-22). The two metaphors of *body* and building are mixed in Eph. iv. 16. The *organic* view is presented in Rom. xii. 4-5 : "We who are many, are one body in Christ, and severally members one of another." It is more fully developed in 1 Cor. xii. 12-27. In *v.* 26 he goes beyond the individualism of Spencer, and anticipates the conception of community of Maciver : "And whether one member suffereth, all the members suffer with it ; or one member is honoured, all the members rejoice with it." The love of God through the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ is realised in the *community* (*Koinonia*) of the Holy Spirit. If the common life of the Christian Church is by the presence and operation of the Holy Ghost, may we not advance beyond Maciver, as from his psychological and philosophical standpoint he could not : in the community of a society in the higher, the personal regions of truth, holiness, and love, there is a higher than human, even a divine unity. When God is, through Christ, all things in all men, there will be perfect individualisation and perfect socialisation.

III

The reasons for this sociological approach may now be discussed. (1) The ethics of the Christian Church, especially during last century, were too *individualistic* ; morality must recognise more fully each man's dependence on, and function in, society, and must become more *social*. It is not enough to cultivate the Christian character by the testimony and influence of the Church apart from consideration of the total conditions under which that character is to be conserved and advanced. Intolerable evils were tolerated, and imperative duties were neglected during many decades on account of this false emphasis : and we are to-day reaping the results of these lost opportunities. The Conference at Birmingham in 1924, generally called *Copec* (the initials of Christian Order of Politics, Economics, and Citizenship),[1] and the Conference at Stockholm on Christian *Life and Work*

[1] See *The Proceedings of Copec and the Reports I.–XII.* (Longmans, Green & Co.).

in 1925,[1] were a summons to the Churches to realise that Christian morality is not only concerned with the virtues or vices of individuals, but necessarily also with the right or the wrong of social relations, the goodness or the badness of social institutions. While this volume was projected before either of these Conferences, as the writer has, during all his ministry, held this wider view, yet much in the contents is due to the information gained and the stimulus given on these two occasions. The two subjects mentioned in Copec, politics and economics, have especially been regarded as quite beyond the range of the Church's interest and effort. Yet, as the previous discussion has shown, social progress—and that means personal development—depends on the subjugation of nature, the control of environment. It is with the human effort to provide for man's physical needs from the material resources of nature that the science of economics is concerned. Every man has these needs, and should in some form or another render that labour, or deserve the name of a social parasite. His personal character depends on how he meets these needs, and how he renders this labour. Ethics cannot be separated from economics. In the previous discussion, too, the State as co-ordinating the various interests and activities of the members of a society has been shown to be necessary to this social evolution and personal development. No man can stand outside the authority of the State ; and every man should contribute what he can to secure that that authority will be exercised for the common good. Deplorable as are the associations of the word politics, nevertheless the Christian cannot escape these obligations of citizenship in the forming of his Christian character.

(2) In this more social and less individualist treatment of Christian ethics, we shall find an advantage in keeping before ourselves some of the results of the previous discussions. It is, *firstly*, essential that we should always have in view the " communal " theory of society, as so ably expounded by Maciver. Neither is the individual apart from the society, nor the society apart from the individuals, a reality ; altruism and egoism are alike moral abstractions, for self and others cannot be separated and opposed to one another : individual development and social evolution are necessary conditions the one of the other : character makes institutions and institutions shape character.

[1] *The Stockholm Conference on Life and Work*, by Bell (Oxford University Press).

Secondly, we must always maintain the *dynamic* as against the *static* view; there is deterioration or progress in moral customs and standards: and this depends not only on moral activity, but is, through influence on that activity, dependent on the total conditions of life. Such a generalisation as that of Mackenzie, *subjugation*, *emancipation*, and *organisation*, has a wider application than in his historical survey he makes of it. This thesis, antithesis, and synthesis of moral movement is everywhere discernible. Tyranny will everywhere provoke revolt; but the destruction wrought by revolt evokes the effort at reconstruction. Within the individual development or the social evolution there are correctives of defects, remedies for diseases. The loss in the destruction may be great, as is the cost of the reconstruction. To translate this principle into the terms of religion: sin evokes sacrifice; sacrifice secures salvation; this is not a facile *optimism*, that ignores the loss, but a serious *meliorism* which counts the cost.

Thirdly, this principle will deliver us from so hopeless and helpless a theory as that of Spengler, that decay inevitably follows growth, and this is the end. We can oppose to his seasonal account of cultures the poet's words: "If winter comes, can spring be far behind?" Recovery is no less possible for a society than an individual. *Fourthly*, the discussion of the objects of a society, such as Mackenzie offers, or of the essentials of civilisation, as Jesse Jones gives it, reminds us that we must make our moral outlook comprehensive, recognising the correlation of all the elements which make up the life of man as a whole, and the variety of the activities in which human personality can realise itself and develop towards perfection. *Lastly*, the thesis of Dawson (which has support also in the invention of the Religion of Humanity as necessary to his *Positive Polity* by Comte; and the interpretation given of Social Evolution by Benjamin Kidd, that religion has been a potent factor in cultural development) that it is the Christian religion which alone holds out the promise and the pledge of progress for mankind is the sure foundation on which the following discussion must be built. Our social institutions will endure and advance only as in them the Christian ideal comes more fully to be realised.

(3) We must accordingly, in seeking to describe the Christian ideal, deal with the social institutions which are the permanent organs by which associations realise the community of persons. Without discussing the question whether

promiscuity in sexual relations came before some form of permanent relation between man and woman, we are justified in assuming the contrary.[1] We may start, therefore, with the *Home* (the institution of marriage, which moralises sexual relations, and parenthood, in which procreation is moralised) as the fundamental social unit. In the home there goes on in a primitive society such teaching and training as the child receives ; and most of the industry—the labour to meet needs—is carried on, as the word *spinster*, and possibly *wife* also, indicates. As industry is not directed merely to the provision for the immediate needs, but man appropriates from nature resources not only for future needs, but the means of making future provision, the problem of *Property* emerges. When, however, education is taken out of the home, we pass to the institution of the *School*, using that word in a wide sense for all educational effort. *Industry* is increasingly passing out of the home, and the entry of girls and women into work outside of the home is an inevitable result of this transference, and is reacting on the home. There is now little spinning of yarn, weaving of cloth, making of garments in the home ; the mill, factory, workshop, are taking its place. What has been described as the Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth and especially the nineteenth century has so affected human relations that in no sphere are problems so acute and so general as in the sphere of economics. But education and industry cannot engage all the energies of human personality ; there must be *leisure*, affording opportunity for *culture* as well as *amusement*. How leisure is employed is as vital for the moral interests as how education is given, or what are the conditions of industry. The play of the child is spontaneous, and has an important influence on his development. The amusements of a complex society, however, are highly organised. The Christian moralist cannot dismiss them as waste of time ; he must recognise their influence, good or bad, on character ; and must, from the Christian standpoint, estimate their value or worthlessness. To the use of leisure for culture the Church should give encouragement and help to a far greater degree than it has hitherto done. In school, industry, amusements, each person comes into contact with other persons, and forms more or less intimate relations, inimical, amicable, or indifferent.

[1] J. Arthur Thomson, in his book, *What is Man?* gives instances of monogamy among mammals, and, with Westermark, regards some form of marriage as primitive among men.

These social relations (using the term here in the more restricted sense) might be grouped under the heading of *Neighbourhood*. These may be merely voluntary, as in ordinary social intercourse or *Friendship*, or they may be obligatory, as in *Citizenship*, using the term in the wide sense of the rights a man may claim, or, as their counterpart, the duties he owes (for this man's rights are that man's duties, and *vice versa*) within village, town, or city; the extension of citizenship is in the *patriotism* of which the nation is the object. In this connection, full consideration must be given to the subject of the *State*; the functions which it is desirable that it should exercise, the obligations it may rightly impose, the limitation as well as the sanction of its authority. When the demands of the State are disregarded, and its commands are disobeyed, *Crime, with its Treatment*, emerges as not only a legal problem, but as one to which the Christian ethic needs to be applied. We have left behind the theory to which the Hegelian philosophy afforded a basis—that the State is the ultimate moral entity, and patriotism the highest moral obligation. The relations of nations are now so intimate and comprehensive that, through international relations, institutions of wider scope than any nation, such as the League of Nations, or the International Court at the Hague, are being founded as organs of the association of mankind and the community of humanity. As this movement has just begun, we must still speak of *International Relations*, as we have not yet one institution that embraces all men. In contrast to this ideal the still existing evil of *War* must be discussed. Man does not live by bread alone, and, important and imperative as are the material interests, the mental, moral, and religious interests are higher values. These mental interests can be discussed in connection with education and culture; the moral interests must pervade the whole discussion, as morality is concerned with the *quality* of all human conduct in all relations. The religious interest, while it, too, as has been shown, must be all-pervasive in inseparable association with the moral, has an organ of its own in *the Church*. The Church has not only a *religious good*, the community of the Holy Spirit, possessing a common life in the life of God in man, the association of those who have received the divine revelation and the human redemption in Jesus Christ the Lord in their personal relation to Him in faith, hope, and love; but it has a *moral task*, for that common life is not realised in men subconsciously or involuntarily,

although it may reach into unfathomed depths of the soul, but consciously and voluntarily. There are moral obligations of the individual members of the Church within it, and there are moral obligations of the Church corporately to the world without. The Christian moralisation of human society must be by the testimony, influence, and service of the Church, and, when the Church has accomplished its task in the world, man's progress will be consummated and God's purpose fulfilled in one complete humanity, the family of God in which God will be all things in all men, the whole manhood of all mankind as the community of the Spirit, the body of Christ, and the temple of God.

(4) In dealing with these institutions a limitation must be observed. There are aspects of each of them which do not fall within the province of Christian ethics ; and, although it is often very difficult to fix the boundary of the moral interest, since morality is affected by the total conditions of life, yet so far as is possible the following pages will be confined to what necessarily falls within the purpose of this volume—not only the description of the Christian ideal, but also the conditions and the methods of its realisation. There are, then, four main questions to which we must seek an answer. *First of all*, we must examine what influence these institutions exert on individuals, how far they promote or retard, benefit or injure, personal character, making men better or worse. In answering this question, we must not take the narrow moralist's view, since, as has often been already indicated, the ideal is a common good, comprehensive in its content. *Secondly*, we must consider what are the moral obligations that membership in any of these institutions imposes. The Christian virtues and graces are not to be exercised in a social vacuum, but in a great variety of personal relations, and in each of these institutions personal relationship assumes a distinctive character, which must determine what the task may be. *Thirdly*, just as individual conduct reacts on individual character, and a man becomes better or worse as he does rightly or wrongly, so the fulfilment by individuals of their tasks within an institution affects the character of that institution for the institution does not exist apart from, independent of, men and women, but is being constantly modified by their individual actions in their mutual relations. It is the duty of the individual not only to preserve the institution from deterioration, but also to promote its progress. He

is always doing this unconsciously and involuntarily, but he becomes an agent for the realisation of the ideal as he both knows and wills the character and the direction of his influence. *Lastly*, it is becoming always more evident that many of the tasks involved in the realisation of the Christian ideal in both individual character and social relations are beyond the capacity or the opportunity of individual action, and demand the corporate activity of the community, whatever its common interest may be. A common assumption must in this connection be challenged. Instead of assenting to the dictum that society should do for the individual only the necessary minimum which he cannot do for himself, we must maintain the principle that as the highest good is the common good, and the common good includes the individual good, society should, as it can command the resources, do for its individual members all that it can do better, more economically, and efficiently than they could do for themselves individually or even by partial voluntary associations. This need not weaken individual initiative and independence, but only direct them into channels of corporate service. In the Christian ideal the individual loses his life, and finds it again, in the society, the child of God in the family of God.

CHAPTER I

THE FAMILY

ANTHROPOLOGISTS may dispute whether the earliest form of sexual relations was promiscuity or some kind of marriage, and the first social unity was the family or the tribe ; what has emerged in human evolution as the fundamental unity is the monogamous family.[1] (*a*) From the Christian standpoint no other is even conceivable. It has been well said that the foundations of national greatness are laid in the homes of the people. For in the home there can be developed the sentiments and habits which are essential to social solidarity, spontaneous and not artificial, the subordination of egoism to altruism, or, rather, the reconciliation of the regard for self and the regard for others. In the family, love can have a fulfilment such as no other sphere offers ; in the home, personal differences can be harmonised in the mutual affection of husband and wife, parents and children, brothers and sisters, and the strangers who as friends are brought within the gate. The differences of sex and of age here become complementary and not conflicting, if in any measure the common dwelling is a home. Here the man or the woman can withdraw as into a sanctuary from the business and the struggle of the world ; here the child can be taught and trained to play a fit and worthy part in that world. Great as was the moral change which the Christian faith involved, in no sphere was its transforming power made manifest so rapidly or so conspicuously as in that of the home. Judaism had a noble record as regards the family, but in respect of the rights accorded to wife and child in the home it fell short of what the influence of Christ in human hearts secured. It must be conceded that in the history of the Christian Church the ideal has not been completely achieved, or even consistently maintained. But we are now concerned, not with the past failures, but with the present opportunities for the realisation of the ideal.[2]

(*b*) It must be confessed that the times do not in all

[1] The subject has been treated in its history and in relation to the modern situation by Mrs. Bosanquet in *The Family*.

[2] See *Copec Reports : III. The Home*.

respects appear propitious. Without being alarmist, or censorious of one's own age, one is compelled to admit that some of the signs of the times are even ominous. The Industrial Revolution, of which we have already had, and will still have, occasion to speak, has influenced the home as all other social relations. Industry, which was once domestic, is now transferred to mill and factory, for we can reckon the small workshop attached to the home as domestic. Food and clothing prepared in the home are now bought in the shops. The daughters who helped the mother must now go out to earn, so as to swell the family budget, in order that those purchases for family needs may be made possible. All the labour-saving appliances are so reducing the work in the home that many women have so little to do that they must seek occupation, or in many cases, rather, distraction outside. While there are undoubted advantages in this, and no one would desire the woman in the home to be a drudge, there is a psychic consequence which cannot be ignored : a common *interest* in the home is being lost, and that loss does subtly affect the sentiments of the family. That so many girls and young women prefer work in shop or factory to that in the home as domestic helps is necessitating those changes in the house arrangements which lessen this common interest. A mechanical gain may involve a moral loss. The Great War has increased the disproportion of the sexes, and there are many women who will not be settled in homes of their own. Some are making a virtue of necessity, and are declaring that they do not, as did the benighted Victorian woman, want a husband ; they prefer a career. How far that language is sincere we need not enquire ; but it is an influence which makes for the depreciation of the home. With many married women work outside their home is a lamentable necessity ; but there are some who, even where there is no need, are claiming the right to follow their profession when married. Be they right or wrong, their attitude reacts adversely on the influence of the home. If they leave husband and children almost entirely to a stranger's care, the home ideal will not be realised. With the economic independence of so many women their political enfranchisement became imperative. If their interest is thereby diverted still more from the home there will be corresponding loss. For who can doubt that hitherto it is the woman who has been chiefly the home-maker, and who can doubt that she is specially fitted physically and psychically for that

sacred task? I believe in woman's economic independence and political enfranchisement as not only inevitable, but as desirable; but I should like to see that advance achieved, as far as possible, without changing her interest in, and influence upon, her home. That so much amusement is being sought outside of the home, and not always by the family as a whole, but by its members separately, parents and children apart from one another, is also to be reckoned a factor in this social evolution adverse to the home. The motor-car is leading many to be away from home a great deal more than they once were; if it bears a whole family party, then its influence need not be deplored; but does it not often encourage the individual search for pleasure? One of the newest inventions, the wireless, whatever other effects it may have, as on church-going or on reading, tends to keep people at their own firesides. There is no use "crying over spilt milk," or trying to put back the clock of change, but it is needful to recognise what makes for, or against, the realisation of the Christian ideal of the family.

(*c*) For our solicitude in this respect we have the highest warrant. Jesus in His own time discerned dangers to the family in the lax interpretation of the law of divorce, and in the casuistry by which a son, under cover of dedicating his property to God, might endeavour to evade his obligations to his parents. It is significant that while He refused to be a social reformer, or to become a political leader, He did so emphatically assert the divine intention in the relation of husband and wife, of parent and child (Matt. xix. 3-9, xv. 3-6). His treatment of, and speech about, women and children also mark an advance in the sentiments and habits of His age and people. While the Christian Church should not only welcome, but even further as far as it can, social progress, while it should not fear, but seek to direct, inevitable domestic, economic, or political changes, it has a trust committed to it in regard to the preservation of the family which it will neglect at its peril. A large and lofty ideal of the family is enshrined in its theology. Even if the name "Our Father, which art in heaven," is a symbol for a reality which the human mind cannot fully grasp, it is a significant symbol. If our thought cannot rise in its flight to God above this family relationship, must we not learn to think of the relationship in such a way, and make good our thought in deed, that the symbol will not seem unworthy of the reality? As has already been indicated, it seems to me more fitting

to leave behind the description of the Christian social ideal as the Kingdom of God, and to describe it as the family of God. If so, how necessary for us to form an adequate ideal for the human family which is to be an analogy for the divine !

I

(1) The family is, as has already been indicated, made up of several relations ; the primary is that of man and woman, or, within the institution of marriage, of husband and wife. While sex is not in any way to be depreciated as belonging only to man's animal inheritance, as it is the necessary natural basis for one of the best human relationships, it needs within marriage to be moralised and spiritualised.[1] (*a*) Life is continued by reproduction from life. There may be asexual reproduction, as when a part of the parent organism is separated from it to become an independent organism. But reproduction is generally sexual ; two parent organisms are combined in the formation of the new organism. In man the male and the female elements are in separate individuals ; for the act of reproduction the two organisms must be brought into contact. What must at once be insisted on, however, is that the reproduction of their kind is not the sole function of man and woman in their relations, but that as rational moral and spiritual personality each is an end and not merely a means. In each there is a promise of full manhood or womanhood to be realised ; and in this relation, if it is not to be degraded into the gratification merely of an animal appetite, the personality of the one must be so recognised and respected by the other that its possibilities will not be thwarted, but achieved. When there is only a bodily union, there is legalised prostitution, even if the rites of the Church have been observed ; only when there is a personal union in mutual love is there in the full sense marriage ; and the sexual act then becomes an expression, desirable and satisfying, of this love. The relation so constituted is so intimate that it must be exclusive ; monogamy is the only form of marriage in which this personal relation can be fitly and worthily sustained. A woman can give herself only to one man, and a man can give himself only to one woman in this personal union, including mind, heart, and soul as well as body. When dealing with parenthood,

[1] See *Copec Reports : IV. The Relation of the Sexes.*

we shall again consider whether reproduction is, or is not, the sole justification of the sexual relation ; but I want here to emphasise as strongly as I can that the sexual act must not be isolated from the whole of the personal content of the mutual relations of husband and wife to one another. As a human act, it must contain (to be all it can be) the full content of human thought and life.

(*b*) In the next place, what needs to be said, and said carefully lest it should wound any sensitive persons, is this—that as man is the complement of woman, and woman of man, each needs the other for full development of human personality in each. There is a common human endowment, but that human endowment is not only supplemented, but itself modified, by the differences of sex, which are not merely in the physical organism, but affect the whole personality. Just because of the differences as complementary is a personal union in marriage possible which differs from, and excels, the friendship possible between members of the same sex. Because, as a polygamist, David could not know such a relationship was it possible for him to say of Jonathan's friendship :

> *Thy love to me was wonderful,*
> *Passing the love of women.*
> —2 Sam. i. 26.

Browning, whose marriage is a modern idyll, utters the truth when he says that a man " boasts two soul-sides, one to face the world with, and one to show a woman when he loves her." If this ideal is not realised in many marriages, it is approached much more than the cynic would be ready to admit, or even the superficial observer to recognise. If the marriage rests on mutual love, each is better with the other than if apart. If this be true, then there follow two practical consequences.

First of all, we cannot but regret the growing tendency among some women, on the plea of equality, of trying to be as like men as they can be, claiming the same indulgences, such as smoking, attempting the same athletic feats, seeking an entrance into every calling in which men are employed, and the conditions of which are such as obviously to be more suitable for them. I myself am very doubtful whether the same education should be given to girls as to boys ; let it be as good an education, but it may be as good without being

the same. It may be we shall need to experiment until we find out how equality can be maintained while difference is preserved. It is not certain that a girl who is a "good sport" will make a good wife. The difference of the sexes is their mutual attraction, and enriches and enlarges their personal union in marriage.

Secondly, we should not be content with the economic or social conditions that make marriage more difficult, and delay the formation of homes. There is sublimation of our instincts and impulses ; and a man may find an outlet denied to him in a home in social service, or a woman in the care of another's children ; and we must gratefully acknowledge how much our homes owe to men and women who have not had homes of their own in the full sense of the experience of the personal relation in marriage. But still, for the greatest fullness of human life we want as many men and women to possess the treasure which mutual love in marriage offers to both sexes.

(*c*) In this connection I deprecate the word *equality*, as it is a quantitative conception, and does not recognise the qualitative difference of the functions of husband and wife in society : I prefer the word *reciprocity*. Applying the Golden Rule in this connection, a man as husband should act to his wife as he expects her as wife to act to him. A man, unless morally depraved, would not wish to marry an unchaste woman ; he has no right to offer any woman an unchaste husband. If on either side there has been a moral lapse before marriage, it should be confessed, and forgiven, if the marriage is to begin with the right moral relations. Monogamy demands premarital *chastity* on both sides. Within marriage, too, there must be *continence* in the sense that there shall not be so excessive indulgence in sexual relations as would be either injurious to health, or would lower the mutual respect of husband and wife. In giving or withholding, love must be preserved as the personal relation of both at their best, and must not be degraded to lust as merely physical gratification. It need hardly be added that there must be absolute *fidelity*, not only in deed, but even in desire. Let us remember the searching words of Jesus that even the lustful look is adultery (Matt. v. 28). We cannot affirm that it is wrong for husband or wife to have an intimate friend of the other sex. In common interests, intellectual, moral, or religious, there may be such sublimation of natural impulse that the fact of sex never intrudes itself. As women

are taking their place in the world there will be more opportunity, and it may be even necessity, for such a sexual intimacy. It must be recognised, however, that where conduct is not controlled by a sensitive and exacting conscience, there may be peril in such intimate friendships. Happy is the marriage in which husband and wife find their satisfying intimate friendship in one another. Liberty, guided and guarded by love, is the safeguard of the relations of husband and wife to one another. Hence no marriage is assured of moral success unless based on a love great enough to bear the burden of mutual obligation imposed.

(*d*) One of the serious problems to be solved in the present situation is the economic independence of women ; I am sure that in the majority of cases the solution does not lie in the woman seeking employment, and an income outside of the home.[1] The husband should recognise that the service his wife renders to him, or to their children in the home, is of so incalculable value that he can never fully discharge his debt to her. She should be able to feel as economically independent in receiving and expending the income, which by mutual agreement is assigned to her, and which should be as large as his resources and other responsibilities allow, as if she were drawing wages or a salary from an employer. There is the corresponding obligation on her part to keep within that income, and to spend as wisely in the interests of the home as possible.

(2) Reading so much as we do about the failure of marriage, we should preserve our sense of proportion. It is about the marriages which have failed that we hear most; the successful marriages do not rush into the Press. But it must be admitted that there are marriages in which husband and wife are the cause of untold misery to one another. Should such marriages be dissolved ? (*a*) There can be no doubt that the ideal of Christ is indissoluble marriage.[2] But Jesus was not legislating for a mixed society of Christians and non-Christians ; He was presenting an ideal as a rebuke of the sinful laxity in interpreting the legal provision for divorce. He does not censure Moses ; but recognises that there was a

[1] A serious danger arises when a woman on marriage gives up an income which allowed her as single to maintain a standard of living which her husband's income does not allow her to continue. Loyalty demands that she shall never reproach him with the sacrifice involved.

[2] On good critical grounds it can be maintained that the exception in Matthew (v. 32)—"saving for the cause of fornication"—is a later gloss to justify the recognised practice in the Church.

necessity of such a provision because of the moral perverseness of men (Matt. xix. 8). The Church should present this ideal ; and should not perform any religious ceremony unless for those who accept that ideal. But marriage must also be regarded as a contract ; and it would be desirable that the religious ceremony should be in addition to, and not a substitute for, the legal form which might be necessary to validate the civil contract.

(*b*) It seems to me that those who oppose divorce, unless when adultery has taken place, are not justified in basing their objection on the ground that marriage is a sacrament. Marriage may become sacramental, for even the physical union may be a channel of the spiritual grace of the love of husband and wife. But to call every marriage a sacrament seems to me to be a profanation of the holy ; and to call the marriages, the failure of which leads to the effort to secure divorce, sacramental, is simply a cruel mockery. The view of the rite tends to become *magical* when the quality of the personal relations is thus ignored. Further, it is surely a quite inadequate view of the relation between husband and wife to assume that the marriage is morally dissolved only by adultery. Is it not an undue emphasis on the physical aspect of the relation ?

When the hearts of both are so hardened in their estrangement that there is no desire for, and no hope of, reconciliation, the moral unity has been destroyed. Is it not a gross scandal of our divorce court that husband or wife supplies the other partner with evidence, sometimes bogus evidence not always detected as such even by an experienced judge, that there has been adultery ? I am not aware that the Scottish law, which accepts a real and prolonged desertion as ground of divorce, is responsible for any greater laxity in the relations of husband and wife than prevails in England. Whether a long sentence of imprisonment, or insanity, which cannot in all cases be certainly pronounced as incurable, should be counted as ground of divorce is, in my judgment, a much more difficult matter to decide, as the prisoner or the insane person, after release, might desire the restoration of the marriage, and so could not be regarded as guilty of having dissolved the marriage as a moral relation. The crime or the insanity is not, as is the adultery or the desertion, a deliberate repudiation of the obligations imposed by the relation. The other partner affected, however, deserves consideration ; and, if he or she desires release from the

obligation, may not that be regarded as a repudiation of the relationship? But, as in regard to desertion, a lapse of years is a condition of the recognition of the fact by the law as a ground of divorce, so here, no immediate or rapid divorce as a result of crime or insanity should be allowed. There would need to be great care in any legal formula which might be adopted to make clear that it is not an innocent partner seeking release from a guilty one, as in divorce on grounds of adultery or desertion. If there is any moral odium to be attached at all, it should fall rather on the person who seeks release from the obligations of marriage for these reasons. An additional reason for the divorce of the insane is that it is not in the public interest that they should be allowed to procreate. Such divorce must remain voluntary, and could not be compulsory, and the provision which the sane partner was able to make for the insane would remain an obligation after divorce.[1] Where before marriage insanity in either partner was known or suspected, and concealed from the other, nullity of marriage should be legally declared.

(*c*) One must recognise that facility of divorce promotes laxity of morals; and that divorce laws which make separation easy discourage that mutual moral discipline which makes marriage a personal union, and not merely a legalised sexual intercourse. Many parts of America are a warning of the danger of admitting such pleas, which might be farcical if the moral results were not so tragical, as "incompatibility of temper," "mental cruelty." Is there, unless in morally undisciplined natures, any such incompatibility as a sense of duty, forbearance, and forgiveness could not overcome? Happiness is not the only end of life, but character; and the moral discipline marriage involves, when divorce is not easy, makes for character. Easy divorce discourages moral endeavour and development. It is not the business of the Christian Church to advocate a relaxation of marriage laws; it is its business to hold up the Christian ideal, and to admonish and support its members in fulfilling the obligations, even when sacrifice is involved. It is not the duty of the Church, however, to oppose legislation which recognises in law the dissolution of the relation which has actually taken place in the partners. In the interests of morals, as it conceives them, it may be actually injuring moral interests. The insistence on adultery as the sole

[1] The case for *Insanity as a Ground for Divorce* has been well stated by Dr. F. S. R. Russell in a pamphlet issued by the Divorce Laws Reform Union.

ground of divorce results in the scandal of the divorce court. A husband, desiring to be released of his bond to a wife, agreeing with him in that one, if no other, desire, gives her evidence, real or spurious, of residence with another woman at a hotel. Adultery is committed to secure divorce, and the Church, in insisting on this as the sole ground of divorce, is promoting adultery. Not only so ; to me it is a lowering of the conception of marriage, of which sexual intercourse is only one of the functions, to maintain that the moral union is preserved so long as no sexual offence against its demands has been committed.

(*d*) Those who are acquainted with the actual conditions among the working classes know that in many cases the legal separations which do not allow re-marriage promote irregular sexual unions. A working man, separated from his wife, needs a woman to look after his home, or his children, if he has the custody of them. The conditions under which they are brought together often involves that an irregular union is begun. Some of these irregular unions prove more really " marriages " than many legally so recognised ; but the legal recognition would not only remove the sense of moral inferiority which is injuriously felt by some men and women in that position ; it would give the relation a stability it does not now possess. In many other cases it might prevent a succession of such irregular unions. Law is morally educative, restraining and sustaining, and it would promote the common morality if in many of these cases marriage were made possible without the scandal of a divorce on the ground of adultery. It seem to me morally an anomaly that a man or woman should be placed in a situation in which the proof of an irregular union is the condition of ending a regular union which has lost all reality. It should not be in the power of the injured partner in sheer vindictiveness to prevent the dissolution of such a relation. In this connection may be mentioned another of the legal anomalies which seem to me to have no moral justification. Unless the court exercises discretion, adultery on the part of the petitioner for divorce is a ground for refusing the divorce. If one partner is proved guilty of adultery the divorce is granted ; if both have been guilty the legal obligations are continued, even when the moral union has been as really, if not more really, destroyed. Not to make marriage less sacred, and not to make immorality easier, but to protect legal marriage against being made a moral sham, must the Christian Church consider, with freedom from

prejudice and with seriousness of purpose, this problem of divorce.

(*e*) In so doing it must consider primarily the interests of the children, if there are any, and not the happiness of the parents. In becoming parents, husband and wife have incurred a moral obligation which society has a right to enforce upon them. Their relation to one another cannot be determined solely by their sentiments towards one another ; but by their common duty to maintain a home where moral obligations are observed, in which the children may be morally trained. A child has a right to the love and the care of both his parents. And, if for no other reason, the moral unity of the home should be maintained. In many cases this effort to fulfil obligations to their children will react favourably on the relation of the parents the one to the other. Differences will be tolerated, and estrangements overcome, so that the children may not be injured. The relations of parents may, however, be so bad that the continuance of the home may be morally injurious to the children, and it may be for their advantage that one parent should obtain the custody while the other has adequate access, unless in their interest even that should need to be denied. To-day, when there are so many childless marriages, this consideration falls out ; and probably divorce will be more readily sought.

(*f*) The Christian Church must meet the increasingly perilous and lamentable situation, not by trying to maintain legal bonds, when all moral reality has been taken out of them, but by bearing its witness, and using its influence to raise the moral standards. As this is a relation in which moral obligation cannot be realised without personal sentiment, as love alone can here make law tolerable, the incalculable personal value to both husband and wife of a union based on, continued in, intense mutual affection should be persuasively presented to young people. The need of that affection resting on adequate knowledge of one another and adequate attraction of the one to the other should be insisted on, so that a lifelong relation may not be begun in the fleeting feelings of the passing moment, or of mere external liking, or trivial common interests. But, while affection should be emphasised as essential to marriage, it should be made clear that mere emotion cannot be its enduring foundation. There must be a sense of moral obligation and of social responsibility. The relation demands so much of the partners that only a sensitive conscience can sustain it ;

and the relation in respect of potential or actual parenthood involves so great a social responsibility that society is entitled to concern itself about the conditions of its permanence. If religion be a common interest, the moral can be raised to a spiritual unity, which even death cannot divide. For, while marriage as a natural relation or social institution is not to be anticipated in the future life, according to the teaching of Jesus (Matt. xxii. 30), when, within marriage, a personal relation has been developed, containing all the highest values of life, it is simply as incredible that death should dissolve that union as that it should end the communion of the saint with God.

II

(1) One of the most wonderful endowments of the living organism in contrast to the inanimate thing is that not only can it repair damage to itself, but it can reproduce its kind. Human parenthood is the consummation in personal relations of animal reproduction. Without sentimentalising about parenthood in the lower animals, we may see most suggestive anticipations of father and mother care. The provision made for reproduction in living organisms indicates that this is an essential vital function. In the plant the foliage and the flowers alike prepare for the fruit, which holds the seed. The complete human life also is one in which parenthood has been realised. Not to desire children, or to be indifferent to children, is an abnormality. Even if motherhood must mean more physically and psychically to a woman than fatherhood to a man, the demand being so much greater, yet the man no less than the woman is destined for, and completed in, parenthood. It is one of the tragedies, if not wrongs, of the civilised social order that some men, and many women, are deprived of the privilege and the responsibility of parenthood. It may be well that those who prefer a career or pleasure to parenthood should avoid it, as unfit for, and unworthy of, its sacred task. But what must be condemned and resisted by the Christian Church is the current depreciation of parenthood. We shall return to the problem of birth-control later ; but meanwhile the general statement may be made that parenthood is one of the greatest goods of human life, and that the large family, if the health and the happiness of parents and children have not

suffered, but been sustained, is not to be deplored as a social evil. If life is itself a good, the more lives there are to enjoy that good, the conditions of that enjoyment being given, the better—unless there be physical, economic, or social reasons which can be justified to conscience. Parenthood, controlled by a keen sense of responsibility of the one parent to the other, and of both to their children, is a moral duty and a social service which from selfish inclinations should not be shirked. While insisting that such parenthood is, and should be, accepted as the normal result of marriage, it is a mistake and a wrong to argue that reproduction is the only justification for sexual relations. Neither man nor woman is, or should be, regarded as being merely a link in the chain of life. Each is a person, with a claim to be an end, and not merely a means. There should be personal self-realisation even in the acts by which the continuance of the race is secured. The sex-relation is a personal relation, in which husband and wife may, and do, find satisfaction, as a physical expression of their mutual affection, and on that account alone has value, and finds justification. A childless marriage is not morally inferior, if parenthood is desired and in no way prevented. Sex-relations may be, and are, continued when any probability of parenthood has ceased. Since parenthood is a normal outcome of marriage, the common care of children incalculably enhances the value of the relation of husband and wife to one another ; and, unless for adequate reasons, the desire or the effort to dissociate parenthood from marriage will react unfavourably on the relation. Nevertheless, parenthood is not the sole reason for marriage, and the relation may be legitimate and valuable apart from parenthood.

(2) While at a later stage we shall consider the obligations of society to make parenthood, and especially motherhood, not a danger and a burden, but a safe and glad experience, we may now assume that the conditions of the home are normal, and consider what are the moral obligations imposed. (*a*) It is the duty of the woman during and after pregnancy to take such care of her health, so to order her whole life, that the child will be born healthy, and that she will be able to do for her child in his infancy what is a primary obligation of motherhood—that is, give him his natural nourishment at her own breasts. It is proved beyond all challenge that breast-feeding is preferable to bottle-feeding. And it would be well if family doctors were not so

complacent, and insisted, where the mother's health allowed, that no social inconvenience should be suffered to prevent the fulfilment of this obligation. The mother will find how much her own life is enriched by this close dependence of her child on herself. If she be physically unfit to suckle her own child,[1] she should feel it the more an obligation to give her child as much personal care in respect of artificial feeding as if she were herself nursing it. The handing over of their children by so many mothers to the care of others is a disregard of duty, and an incalculable loss to themselves of what, to the normal woman, is one of the greatest goods life can offer. Nor, in this connection, is the father without his obligation. His wife demands a more tender solicitude on his part; if she is debarred from the usual social engagements before and after the birth of the child, he should not follow his own pursuits, but be her companion. In order that she may be able to accompany him in his enjoyments, he must not desire her to give up the care of her child, but must be glad, so far as he can, to share that care with her. A child encompassed by such parental love from the very beginning makes a good start in life. It is a lamentable circumstance that economic necessity compels many women to leave the care of their children to others, or to give them quite an inadequate attention. Where there is no such necessity, I cannot persuade myself that mere personal inclination or ambition to follow a profession, to make a career after marriage, can justify a woman's accepting the obligation of motherhood by bearing a child, and then setting aside the duties towards the child which nature assigns to motherhood. The woman who fulfils all the claims of motherhood at whatever sacrifice is the finest and worthiest woman of all.

(*b*) When the constant physical care is no longer necessary, parents owe their children a close companionship, and will find their own life enlarged and enriched thereby. This does not mean a solicitude that is a constant interference with the child. Human development is self-development. To break the strong will of a child is a moral outrage. As large a measure of freedom as is consistent with consideration for, and courtesy to, others should be allowed. Individual interests, tastes, inclinations should be, as far as possible, encouraged. But the development must be guided,

[1] Surely a searching medical enquiry should be made as to the causes in our modern life which make so many women abnormal in this respect.

and the will controlled. An occasional assertion of authority is likely to provoke rebellion. There must be the constant influence of the loving presence of the parents affecting the growing persons insensibly. It is an incalculable loss that so much of the life of men, and of women, is lived outside of the home, apart from their families, and so this influence, which authority cannot replace, is being lost. I do not suggest that children should always be under the eye of their parents. They want, and they should have, companions of their own age ; and as much freedom in such companionship as due regard to their moral character will allow. But they need, and will welcome, the companionship of their parents, if they have been accustomed to it from earliest years ; and there is nothing artificial about it. Here too we must insist that the husband's outside obligations do not set him free from the duties of the home as far as he is able to meet them. He should often, if not always, prefer his boy to his billiards, or his girl to his golf. Many homes being what they are—the husband absorbed in his business, the wife in her pleasures—the boarding-school may possibly be a desirable substitute. But I cannot persuade myself that the severance from home, the segregation of boys and girls from one another, the discipline that must be maintained where large numbers are involved, can be better than the family life, where parents and children live together, and insensibly influence one another. That the children should go out to school for instruction the home cannot give them, and that that institution has an influence on character, must be conceded ; but to the home must fall a main share in this education in the largest sense, the development of the human personality for its social functions outside as well as in the home.

(3) What has just been indicated must be more fully presented. The children in a home educate one another. The *one-child* home will, in educational value, fall very far short of the home in which there are a number of children. The exclusive attention gained from the parents will be no compensation, as that attention, because it is so exclusive, is likely to be oppressive. It is good especially to have both sexes represented from childhood as they are necessary and complementary to one another. Here the parents' responsibilities are increased, and yet the burdens lightened, for the older children can take over some of the care of the younger. There must be constant unobtrusive observation to check

selfishness and to encourage service. Especially must the mistake be avoided of regarding the girls as destined by nature for the service of their brothers. There are tasks in the home which fall more fitly to the one sex or the other ; but all the children should learn the lesson of mutual service. It is not, however, the boy who is always the bully, the girl may play the tyrant also. Any tendency to domineering must be restrained, and, when need arises, repressed. There must be strict impartiality. The story of Joseph (Gen. xxxvii. 3) is not the only instance of the mischief which results from parental favouritism. While one child may be more attractive and congenial to one or both of the parents, it is not good for that partiality to be shown ; still more, if there is, as sometimes there is, prejudice against one child must no sign of it be given. If the parents do not always agree as to the treatment of a child, they must never act contrary the one to the other. The mother must not, as is not uncommon, shirk severity, when needful, and relegate to the father the exercise of discipline. If the comparison may be excused, she must not be the Gospel while leaving to the husband the burden of the Law. It must be a united responsibility and authority. While directing the common life of the home, the parents will discover how much of the discipline and development of their children can be left to their mutual relations. Where all the conditions are favourable, a large family is from this point of view more desirable than a small. The endurance of some hardship, or the need even for sacrifice, which a large family may involve, is not to be included in unfavourable conditions. Many of the best men and women have come out of homes where the means were straitened, where there was no luxury, and even little (if any) comfort or ease, where the children had early to share the burden of their parents. The *Dictionary of National Biography* would disclose how many of the great men have come from poor homes (not the poverty of a London slum, but of a Scottish " but and ben ") and large families. A great deal of current writing in favour of the restricted family in the interests of the child is nonsense, and pernicious nonsense.

(4) This seems to be the most appropriate stage of this discussion to consider the much-agitated question of birth-control, although the more correct description of what is intended would be prevention of conception. Here there are two questions, one in respect to the end, the other as

regards the means. Is it desirable that the number of children should be restricted? And, if so, what are the legitimate methods of restriction? (*a*) There is general agreement that the size of the family should not depend on natural impulse, but on moral obligation. Uncontrolled procreation is a survival of animal appetite, and can plead no moral justification. The welfare of the parents and the children alike must be taken into account, and the family should not be larger than can be properly provided for; the health and happiness of the mother especially must be the decisive consideration. But when such conditions are fulfilled, a family of four or five children in a home where a good training for Christian citizenship can be given is much to be preferred to a family of one or two. If a class is to maintain its proportionate membership in the community, it is calculated that there should be four children in the family. At present the restriction of the family is operating *dysgenically*, and not *eugenically* (to use the technical terms), and the increase of population is greatest in the least prudent class of the community—in the homes where there is least provision possible for the proper training of the family. That the increase of the population among the respectable working classes is greater than in the professional classes is not a matter about which I am "snob" enough to make any lament, since out of working-class homes many of the ablest and best men and women have come. But the rapid multiplication of the unfit is undoubtedly a racial danger. Where restriction of the family, however, would be most advantageous, there it does not take place, and where it is likely to affect the general character of the population adversely, it is being most practised. The reduction of the infantile death-rate—desirable as it is—has removed one of the natural checks on the too rapid increase of the population. Under the present economic system and social order, it does seem as if the present increase would very soon result in over-population.

(*b*) Before the conclusion is rashly adopted that the proper safeguard is the further reduction of the already greatly fallen birth-rate, careful consideration may well be given to the problem whether the best use is being made of the land and the other material resources of this country, and whether changes in the methods of producing and distributing the wealth of the nation might not remove the danger. When so much of the land of this country is not cultivated, or under-cultivated on account of the existing land system, when the

distribution of wealth is so unequal that a luxury which degrades manhood and womanhood is made possible alongside of a poverty and misery which shame the society which tolerates them, I am not prepared to admit that the only, or even the preferable, method of relief is the restriction of the population to its present limits, or even its reduction. A fact which is in this connection to be noted is that the raising of the standard of living in any class is usually accompanied by a fall in the birth-rate. By improving the conditions of life for all classes we do not encourage the multiplication of the unfit. Where there is imbecility or insanity, or any hereditary diseases, society is certainly entitled by strict segregation to prevent the transmission to future generations.

(*c*) We must not, however, confine our regard to our own small islands. Our Empire, on which we boast that the sun never sets, has still vast regions undeveloped, where lies incalculable potential wealth. The possibilities of Canada and Australia, to mention only the most conspicuous instances, have not been exhausted, although in many respects through too close an imitation of the motherland in its industrial development, too great a concentration of population in great cities, their evolution has taken a direction which may be advantageous to many of their present inhabitants, but is not such as would confer the greatest benefit on this country, or, indeed, on mankind generally. If the people within the British Empire have developed qualities of character which do fit them for a useful and honourable service of mankind, the reduction of their numbers by the policy of restriction, of which there are many advocates, would not appear to be the condition of human progress generally. The multiplication of the unfit must certainly be restrained ; to maintain the numbers of the fit seems no less an urgent need. To prevent any misunderstanding it seems necessary to add this explanation as regards the lands where there is a large native population. It is in the interests of mankind that the natural resources of these lands should be made available. It is in the interests of the natives themselves that they should acquire habits of industry and higher standards of living, which should not be a mere imitation of European, but the most in accord with their traditions and conventions, and most suitable for their conditions. But it is a moral outrage that they should be deprived of their own lands for the sake of European settlers, and that their labour should be exploited in the interest of

European capital. The development of the West Coast of Africa, in which native industries have been protected and encouraged, is one to be approved ; the policy which there is an endeavour to carry out in East Africa is one to be deplored.

(*d*) The considerations just advanced are not irrelevant, since in dealing with so serious a problem as the restriction of the family we cannot look at the population question only in relation to our own country, but must take into account what our people owes to the world. In the classes to which any reasonable considerations appeal, it does not seem at all necessary to urge warnings against reckless multiplication ; what is becoming increasingly necessary is to offer a reasonable plea for the acceptance of the full responsibilities of parenthood within the limits which the economic resources allow. If life is a good, the increase of the number of lives to enjoy that good is desirable. To men and women of normal character and capacity parenthood is a good in both relations which it involves. Husband and wife find their mutual relation enriched by their common interest in their children. A wife becomes of still greater personal value to her husband as the mother of his children. How much gain comes to both parents, probably more to the mother than even the father, great as his gain is, from their care for, and training of, their children ! The relation of marriage contributes much to the personal development of both men and women ; the relation of parents contributes still more. To suppress the desire for parenthood, to refuse its blessings because of its burdens, involves a psychical, and probably, in normally healthy persons, a physical loss, which has not yet been adequately investigated and cannot now be properly estimated. The worthier the parents, the more desirable is it that the training of children should fall into their hands, and the readier should they be to assume these responsibilities as an incalculably valuable social service. I do not think it is betraying a prejudiced male point of view, to which " advanced " women should rightly object, to express the conviction that no public career a woman could follow would really be more valuable to the world or to herself than motherhood at its Christian best. Her self-development, her realisation of her ideal, need not be sought apart from motherhood, but may be found in it. No less, allowing for the difference of sex, has fatherhood its gains for any man. From the Christian standpoint the depreciation of parenthood is unreservedly to be condemned.

(*e*) But if parenthood of the proper kind is to be encouraged for the sake of the common good, then the community must accept the responsibility of lightening, so far as it can, the burden of parenthood when it becomes oppressive. The care of the mother for the time which may be necessary before and after, to secure that the birth of her child shall be no injury to her health, and give the child a good start in life, and such care as may still be needed for the child to secure a healthy growth till infancy is past, are urgent social obligations. The infantile mortality is being steadily reduced, but, as yet, not the maternal. Is not a community morally bound to do all that can be done to preserve the life of mother as well as child? A cruel infliction on parents, which, it is to be hoped, will be speedily removed, is the almost insurmountable difficulty of securing adequate accommodation for a large family, nay, even the considerable difficulty often experienced to secure a home when there are any children. Public authorities should give a preference to large families on their housing estates.

Where, owing to the defects of an industrial system, the economic resources of the family are not adequate to secure for the child the care for his health and the education that he needs to make him a useful citizen, it is right that the burden of the parents should be lightened; and it is a despicable class meanness which leads spokesmen of the middle class to grudge what is being done in this way for the working classes. The child does not belong to the parents alone; he is, if brought up in health and with knowledge and character, an asset for the nation. Not only to relieve the burden of parenthood, but in its own interest, may society accept these obligations. Where the family resources allow for the necessary provision for the children, even here should the burden be reduced by a reduction of income-tax. The principle has been acknowledged, but should be carried a good deal further; and what is being spent on the education of the children should be taken into account, with due safeguards against needless extravagance in sending children to costly, because genteel, schools. In a subsequent chapter the economic basis of the home must be dealt with. The above illustrations have been given to enforce the argument that worthy parenthood deserves the encouragent of the relief of burdens which would be oppressive. We can now turn to the second question, as to the means by which, if necessary, the restriction should take place.

(5) I must frankly confess that, believing as I do that life is a good, that human personality has value, that there is gain, moral and spiritual, attainable in the relation of parent and child, and of the children in the home to one another, I do not at all welcome the lamentable necessity of the restriction of the family (reckless multiplication of children being, of course, excluded) on account of our defective economic and social conditions. Rather should I desire to press on with such reforms as may be necessary to relieve that necessity. But assuming that there are adequate reasons, physical, economic, educational, social, for the restriction of the family, what are legitimate and what illegitimate means? (*a*) The best means, to which no moral condemnation attaches, and which deserves moral commendation, is self-restraint in marital relations. But to this method the advocates of contraceptives offer what must be admitted to be objections demanding serious consideration. For the majority of normally healthy men and women, a prolonged abstinence from sex-relations involves too great a physical and psychical strain, which may affect health and happiness.

If it be urged in reply that such self-restraint is expected of the unmarried, it is argued that the constant intimacy of the relation of husband and wife, the intensified mutual affection which is developed within their relation, very greatly increase the strain, bodily and mental. It is an abnormal relation which is introduced if for prolonged periods—many months, and even, it may be, years—the satisfaction, not merely of a physical impulse, but of a personal desire is thwarted. The difficulty of the moral demand made should be sympathetically recognised; and no harsh judgment be pronounced on those who are sincerely convinced that they cannot meet it. But two considerations in support of the demand may be urged from the standpoint of Christian morals. *Firstly*, it should not be forgotten that there are resources of divine grace as well as reserves of moral power available to lessen, or even remove, the strain. If husband and wife pray together that they may be enabled to preserve their mutual relation unimpaired and even enhanced by the denial of its normal expression, will not the sufficient grace be secured? *Secondly*, if the reasons for this self-restraint are such as can be justified to a sensitive Christian conscience, will not these reasons become motives for the effort necessary? Can the impulse not be sublimated by the reasons, if they are worthy, for the restraint imposed

upon it? May not the vital energy be thus diverted into other channels, in such cases, higher, because in accord with what is recognised as duty? Those who hold views I cannot share about a distinctive sacramental grace, affecting body as well as mind, would add as in their judgment an effective method, avilable for all who in faith will use it, the reception of the sacrament of "the body and blood of Christ." That such self-restraint is most in accord with the Christian ideal must be affirmed, while the fact that in many cases it can be only partially and gradually realised must be recognised. It is the business of Christians to accept the yoke of Christ, but not to judge those who have not His enabling grace.

(*b*) As regards the mechanical or chemical means, it is for an obvious reason not desirable here to enter into any details about them. Although medical opinion is not the final court of appeal on any moral issue, yet if medical opinion should determine that a practice is injurious to health, that is a reason against it to which due weight must be given in coming to any moral decision regarding it. It does not follow that a practice is moral because it is not injurious to health; but a practice which is injurious can be moral only in quite exceptional circumstances, as when a missionary endangers his health in carrying out his duty. Now, medical opinion is by no means so unanimous on the safety of the use of contraceptives as the propagandists represent it as being. Unless some of the methods are employed with judgment and skill, there is danger of sepsis. An eminent physiologist, Dr. Hill, has declared that "any interference with the physiological act of copulation is bad, but people are faced with a choice of evils. . . . It is bad for both sexes to marry and have no children, but worse for the woman who has a strong instinct for maternity."[1] There are likely to be reactions, physical and psychical, which may not at once be observed, but which will in course of time affect the health and the happiness of both husband and wife. A woman doctor, Dr. Scharlieb, testified that in her long and varied practice she had had many cases of patients, who had used contraceptives, finding that when they desired a child they had become sterile.[2] It can at least be said that the case for the entire safety of the practice of contraceptives has not been fully made out. If, despite this uncertainty, a married couple decide that they are

[1] *Problems of Population and Parenthood*, pp. 334–335.
[2] *The Declining Birth-Rate*, p. 269.

justified in using any of the commonly approved methods on the advice of a medical man, condemnation may be unjust to them ; but the Christian conscience must remain uneasy ; it may be acquiescent, but cannot be approving, just as when the telling of a lie is held to be justified in exceptional circumstances of danger to the health or life of another.

(*c*) One by-product, as it may be called, of this propaganda may be mentioned. Although it is still maintained by most of the advocates of the use of contraceptives that the knowledge of the methods should be confined to married persons, and that the use is legitimate only within marriage, yet the knowledge does leak out, and unmarried girls do get to know, and are led to use one of the methods. While it may be urged that the chastity which a girl preserves only because she fears the shame of motherhood outside of marriage is not really virtue, yet this is sophisticated reasoning. The restraint which the fear of consequences imposes is a necessary auxiliary of right conduct. We justify punishment as deterrent, why despise a deterrent which nature provides ? If the use of contraceptives in marriage is justified, why not outside, if there is mutual affection, and there are hindrances to marriage ? So it may be argued by those who wish to silence the voice of conscience.

(*d*) How difficult a moral problem is here presented to the Christian conscience appears from the resolution on this question which was passed by the Copec Conference in Birmingham in 1924 : " In view of the difficulty of the moral issues involved in the practice of conception control in marriage, and especially the use for this end of contraceptives, the Conference urges the Churches here represented either severally or unitedly to investigate thoroughly and to consider with the intention of offering definite guidance to perplexed consciences on these and other relevant questions regarding marriage and parenthood. It would meanwhile lay emphasis on the privileges and obligations of Christian parenthood." [1] In 1913 a Committee of Anglican bishops issued a report which " condemns entirely the use of mechanical and chemical means to prevent conception, but admits that there may be cases in which a married pair may legitimately desire to limit their family. In these cases the Committee does not condemn those who restrict their marital relations to those parts of the month in which conception is

[1] *The Proceedings of Copec*, p. 281.

less likely to take place."[1] On this concession, however, the Committee was divided. A Committee of the National Free Church Council has issued a brief statement on the subject,[2] from which the following sentences may be quoted : "The use of any artificial means of preventing conception (whether mechanical or chemical) is to be very gravely condemned, as Christian morality requires that all natural functions shall be kept under moral self-control. While even within marriage such practice is to be condemned morally, it is a still greater moral peril to the unmarried, among whom there is reason to believe that it is spreading, and in many cases because of the information given by married to unmarried women." From this judgment, however, it is probable that many Christian men would dissent : and one cannot claim any general agreement in the Churches. This must not be put down to cowardice in arriving at, and maintaining, convictions ; but to the desire both to assert the Christian ideal and to recognise also the conditions which are making its realisation so difficult to-day.

(*e*) The demand which is being made that the Ministry of Health should allow the use of clinics for maternal and infant welfare, supported out of public funds, to be used for the diffusion of information regarding contraceptive methods shows a disregard for the Christian conscience in this matter. That public institutions should be used for a propaganda on a matter on which opinion is so divided would be intolerable : and a local authority should retain the right to restrain doctors or nurses using their position for that purpose. But if a medical man should, in the discharge of his duties, be led to the conclusion that it would be desirable for the health of one of his patients to impart the necessary information, he should not be procluded from doing so, even as the private practitioner is not. In this respect, the poor woman, who may need such advice, should not be placed at a disadvantage in comparison with her well-to-do sisters.[3]

[1] *The Declining Birth-Rate*, pp. 63–64.

[2] *The Declining Birth-Rate and the Duty of the Free Churches.*

[3] The National Birth-Rate Commission has issued two valuable Reports, to which reference has already been made : *The Declining Birth-Rate*, 1916, and *Problems of Population and Parenthood*, 1920. The two Copec Reports on *The Home* and *The Relation of the Sexes* should also be consulted.

III

Within the home there are other relationships besides those of husband and wife, parent and child, namely, those of the children to one another, of the employers and the employed, and of the family to a circle of friends. These, however, will demand much briefer notice.

(1) Much which might be here said about the relation of brothers and sisters has already been anticipated in dealing with the relation of the parents to their children in the training of them. Selfishness must be restrained ; mutual helpfulness should be encouraged. No prejudice nor partiality must be shown ; justice must be insisted on in the recognition of the rights of the others, and the acceptance of one's own duties. Where the relation of the parents to one another, and of both to the children, is Christian, then the home becomes a school of Christian love, forbearance, forgiveness, service, and sacrifice in the mutual relations of the children. No better preparation for the future relations of the sexes in the world, when the home is left, can there be than the treatment by the boys and girls of one another. Modesty, considerateness, chivalry, can here be acquired. A boy who respects his sisters is not likely to treat other women unworthily. A girl who knows how to behave with her brother will bear herself worthily among men. While there will be companions, according to age and sex, outside of the home, the more companionship there can be in the home the better ; and the parents can encourage that companionship by being themselves companionable. A danger against which family affection must be guarded is an oppressive solicitude which does not leave room for as free and full development of the individual differences of the children in capacity and taste and character as possible. There is a romance of affection and devotion possible between brother and sister ; and there is some loss in any home where there can be no such relationship.

(2) On the subject of the relation of the employers and employed within the home it is very needful to lay some stress in this connection. It should not be regarded as the same in all respects as the relationship is in factory and shop. The personal contact is more constant and more intimate ; the mutual influence for good or evil, weal or woe, can be greater. There must be consideration shown to the domestic helps, if consideration is looked for from them. Although

the term servant is objected to, as suggesting a servile relation, yet, from the Christian standpoint, it is a most honourable designation, for " the Son of Man came not to be served, but to serve " (Matt. xx. 28). While there must be law and order in the home, and the discipline necessary to it, there should be banished all sense of superiority on the side of employer, and of inferiority on the side of the employed. Although it may seem quixotic even to make the suggestion, Christians should, to display the distinctive Christian ethic at its best and fullest, demand as little service from others as they can. So far as their efficient discharge of the duties for which they are specially qualified allow, they should avoid giving trouble to others, and do as much for themselves as possible, when they have the time and the strength to do so. A man should husband his resources, and give himself to what he can do best, leaving to others what they can do for him to set him free for the tasks they could not attempt. Only let him always feel the debtor to those who by their service enable him to fulfil his calling. A *please* should accompany every request, and a *thank you* acknowledge every service. While it is impracticable in a home, especially when there are children, to fix the hours of labour rigidly, yet the household should be so ordered that no excessive demand is made on any one servant, and each day some hours should be allowed for outdoor exercise or indoor leisure. With goodwill on both sides a suitable arrangement can always be made. If there is such, there will be greater readiness to meet an emergency when special endurance or effort may be required. As regards the name to be used, it is thought by some employers to be more considerate to use the family name of the employed ; to others it seems that the use of the personal name shows more friendliness ; should not the preference of the employed in such a matter be considered ? Does Christian love demand that those employed should share the same table as the family at meals ? This is by no means an idle question. Two reasons for a separate meal can be offered. The family life, its affections and intimacies, of which the common meal may be made truly sacramental, would be interfered with by the constant presence of one not a member of the family, however highly esteemed and fitly treated within the existing relationship. Does not the same consideration apply to those employed ? Does it not allow them more freedom, if they are left to themselves, and not always under observation ? But it

follows that, as far as the family resources allow, the most considerate arrangements possible shall be made for the privacy and comfort of the domestic staff. A mere man ventures to offer these considerations, because, ungallant as it may seem, women have failed to solve this problem, the solution of which has been almost entirely in their hands, both as employers and employed. If domestic service were regarded as an honourable calling for a woman, not inferior to employment in factory or shop, it would attract women well suited to it, and would be a contribution to the preservation of the home. As things now are, many a mother finds her motherhood made a needlessly heavy burden by the inability to secure such domestic help. And the "servant" difficulty is probably one of the reasons for the restriction of the family where on other grounds it would be neither necessary nor desirable. This too leads to the preference for small houses, even where such a limitation may prove a hindrance to the full development of family life. Many a woman has less joy in her home than she might have because of this constant anxiety. The woman who prepares herself for a home of her own as a helper in another home should be made to feel that she is rendering a valuable service to the community. It is possible, however, that social evolution will bring us to a stage in which, as is the case in America to some extent, a collective housekeeping will replace the domestic we still possess. The Christian ideal demands that, whatever be the organisation, the affections and intimacies of the home shall be preserved.

(3) Where there is a Christian home, its influence should be expansive. There may be a family selfishness no less unchristian than is the individual. Through friendships the good of the home may be diffused. Does not the teaching of Jesus give distinct direction that hospitality is not to be confined to those who can offer a return (Luke xiv. 13–14)? If our social conditions make literal fulfilment of the command difficult, and if we can fulfil the command to care for the needy in other ways than their admission to our homes, yet what to-day even demands is that our homes should be more open to the lads and maidens, men and women, away from their own homes in strange places. Many a one in London has experienced a loneliness as of a desert. It has been said, and truly, that a young man can make the acquaintance of many bad women very much more easily than of one good. The claim of those who are exiles from

their own lands, drawn by business or study, must not be forgotten in this connection. One can understand the prudence of the parents who are unwilling to expose their sons or daughters to what might prove undesirable companionship. But were more Christian homes open to the stranger from the beginning, before the evil in the new environment had used its opportunity through the indifference of the good, how often would that danger be lessened ! Of society as it is presented in our newspapers, stimulating hurtful ambitions, this is not the place for closer consideration ; but what may be here insisted on is that the social relations will be the best in which the luxury and ostentation, the pretence and convention, of this society are absent, and the friendships are expansions of the Christian home. If our highest human symbol for God is Father, then the home must be more and more the pattern and the source of that transformation of all human relationships which will really secure the doing of that Father's will on earth even as it is done in heaven, of which we think as the Father's eternal home for His children.

CHAPTER II

EDUCATION

THE home must have an economic basis, for its members must be fed, clothed, housed, and that demands some wealth, and ought to involve also some labour to get that wealth. We might, therefore, have passed from the family to property and industry ; but it seems better to take as our guiding clue the development of human personality in the social institutions which are factors therein. Accordingly we pass in this chapter to deal with education.[1]

I

(1) The term *education* must first of all be carefully defined. What seems to me quite an inadequate conception is often based on a mistaken derivation. *Educatio*, the corresponding Latin word, is not derived from *educo* (*eduxi*), to lead or draw out, but from *educo* (*educavi*). Although ultimately both probably have the same root, yet the difference is worth emphasising. For education is not merely evolving out of the child what is already involved. We must not base our teaching and training on the assumption that each child in his development must repeat the evolution of the race. The mental and moral *recapitulation* cannot be assumed from the physical in the embryo. The social inheritance and environment must be taken into account as potent factors in the individual development. Education is self-development ; but it is a guided and guarded self-development. In contrast to older theories of education, in which there was undue repression, and communication of knowledge (cramming) instead of the stimulation of capacity, we must recognise the *nature* of the child, the general racial and the special family heredity as well as the distinctive individuality, as the necessary condition, and often limitation of the *nurture* to be given. Individual capacity, taste, disposition, must be taken into account. But this does not involve the opposite extreme—that the educator, parent or teacher, must be a mere observer of a drama, in which the child plays a solitary rôle. That independent enquiry and effort should

[1] See *Copec Reports : II. Education.*

be encouraged goes without saying. That the educator is to do all for the child, who is to receive passively, is not intended, when one insists that the social inheritance—the culture of the past—must be, as capacity develops, shared with the child by instruction, and that the social environment must be allowed to exercise its influence in directing the formation of the character. The child must not go back to the condition of primitive man, if that were possible. The parent or teacher must not become repressive of the child's spontaneous activity, but should both stimulate and direct it into the desirable channels for his best development, giving as much liberty as recognition of membership in a society allows, where duties to be done are accepted, and not merely rights to be claimed asserted. I must confess some recent theories of education do not commend themselves to my judgment, as they seem to ignore that human personality is essentially social, and consequently that relationship to others in a society must be recognised as a necessary feature of individual development.

(2) What must next be insisted on is that education is not mercly an intellectual process, but should take account of the whole personality, the body as well as the mind, the heart, the will. *Mens sana in corpore sano* is a good maxim, if *mens* is understood as including the emotional and volitional aspects of personality as well as the intellectual. We have left the faculty psychology behind, and are insisting on the unity of human personality, the influence of the *conative* on the *cognitive* side of man's nature ; in other words, of *interest* on *attention*. So also we are recognising the continuity of human personality ; the present receptivity and responsiveness depends on the previous development : the " new " content must be related to the " old " capacity. This is the principle of apperception. Into the technical problems of education it is not the function of this volume to enter ; but it is necessary to have some general conception of education to guide us in discussing what the Christian ideal for its realisation demands that education should be. Without in the slightest degree deprecating the value of intellectual education, the acquiring of knowledge in the pursuit of truth or an æsthetic taste for the appreciation of beauty as an essential part of the Christian ideal, it is necessary here to lay emphasis on two interests, of which education must take full account—morality and religion. To these we must return.

(*a*) Education should include athletics in the broad sense of a care, not only for the health of the body, but for as full a physical development as by appropriate exercise can be secured. Probably in this country, in school and university alike, a disproportionate importance is attached to sports, so that, e.g., a young man jeopardises his prospects of a degree for the sake of rowing in his college or university boat. But, as one who has seen something of education on the Continent, I am convinced that a moderate attention to athletics is desirable for the fullest possible development of the human personality. The moral qualities which on the whole in this country are displayed in our games are indicated by popular phrases : "playing the game," "that's not cricket," "a sportsman," "the team spirit." These are a valuable by-product of athletics, so long as the taint of ambition or avarice is excluded from them. An asceticism which despises the body is not Christian ; but a development of the body, not for mastery over the spirit, but as an efficient organ of the spirit, may properly be included in what deserves to be called a Christian character.

(*b*) Education should include *culture*, a knowledge as wide and a taste as fine as possible for the best thoughts of the best minds. Each child should have at least the opportunity of sharing in the vast and wonderful inheritance of thought and deed which has come from the past. Not every man is fitted by capacity or disposition to be learned, with vast stores of lore in one or several fields of human knowledge ; but even the elementary education should be such as to give to any special talent the opportunity for expression, and to those who have only average ability enough knowledge to have as intelligent interest in what the mind of man has achieved and is still achieving. While in the later stages of education there must be specialisation, as in this realm, as in others, the man who tries to be "a jack of all trades" will prove himself "master of none," in the earlier stages there must be given not only the tools, as in the three Rs, of knowledge, but such knowledge as will encourage the taste for fuller knowledge. Science and history, language and literature, art and philosophy, should all be included in the wide range of the culture to be imparted, so far as the developing capacity allows. I am myself opposed to early specialisation, so that a boy gets an almost entirely scientific training, and is left without appreciation for language, literature, art. The reaction against the excessive attention to classics in the past to a

"modernising" of all education has its serious danger, a narrowed ideal of culture, for any present which is ignorant of, and indifferent to, the past is impoverished. The scholar's capacity and interest must be taken into account, and subjects altogether uncongenial should not be forced upon him; but the wider the range of initial education the better, since the dominating consideration is the full development of the human personality.

(*c*) Further, *discipline* must have a place in education; by this I mean all instruction and influence which goes to the formation of character. There must be command and rebuke or encouragement, but formal instruction in ethics does not belong to the school education at least. Not only is the example of the parent or teacher much more effective, but example may be given through the child's interest in stories; "truth embodied in a tale" will enter through the door of the child's imagination more effectively than when a moral is ostentatiously paraded. It seems an exaggeration of a sound principle to forbid any words from the teacher which the scholar might need to carry home the lesson of a story. But the presentation of the story is best which lets it carry its own moral. The literature, history, or even geography lessons can all be so taught as to be useful in the formation of character. The order of the home, or of the school, in which the child has his appointed place, and in which the relations to others carry with them certain duties, is itself an important moral agency. Gradually, and almost insensibly, habits of regularity, punctuality, consideration for, or subordination to, others are formed; and these are the beginnings of moral character. In a previous section the Christian virtues, which are the excellences of character to be cultivated, have been adequately discussed, and also the psychic processes in the formation of character which psychology has brought into clearer light for us, and to which the educator should take heed so as to make use of them, and not to go against them in his methods of instruction or influence.

(*d*) Although it might be regarded as included in discipline as the means of forming character, there is an element of education which deserves separate mention, namely *service*. The self-instinct, as it has been inaccurately called, since it is something much more wide in its range and varied in its expression than an instinct, is part of man's natural endowment. The organism has the impulse to do what is necessary

to self-preservation. On the level of human consciousness this becomes egoism, or selfishness. Man also inherits what has as mistakenly been called the " herd " instinct ; in man this appears as altruism. In the child generally the egoistic impulse is stronger than the altruistic ; and it is important that the proper proportion between them should be established. The self must not be simply repressed ; rather its development should be directed towards social relations. Where there is only one child in a home, there is less opportunity for such a development ; for it is in the relation of the children in a home to one another that the distinctively Christian disposition can be acquired of not seeking service from others, but rendering it to them. If the Christian ideal is to be realised in human society, this disposition must be made general by education.

(*e*) No education is complete which does not include *faith*, the characteristic expression of religion as the relation of man to God. Only the denial of the existence of God can justify the exclusion from education of religion. Those who hold that denial as a conscientious conviction are so small a minority in our nation that, while respecting their unbelief and giving them full freedom to withold their own children from any religious instruction, we are not doing violence to their consciences if we insist that any education, for which the nation as a whole is responsible, should take account of the conscientious convictions of those who hold that to exclude religion from education is not merely to leave out a part, but to deprive the whole education of a quality which should pervade it. If God be in all and through all and over all, the relation to Him includes not a part, but the whole, of the life of man. There is no interest, activity, or relation of man in which His authority can be challenged, and in which His assistance cannot be received. Accordingly, if education is to be adequate, religion must pervade the whole of it.

(3) There are, however, several difficulties encountered in the inclusion of religious instruction and influence in the national educational system, which must be more closely examined. (*a*) It has been said that religion cannot be *taught*, it must be *caught*. This saying has more truth than such epigrams usually have. It puts in a catching phrase the truth that personal influence in religion counts for more than verbal instruction. This does increase the difficulty of securing an effective religious education for the children

of the nation through the ordinary educational channels. Most parents do aim at some moral education of their children ; few comparatively are concerned about their religious education, and from few would religion be *caught*. In our national system of education, to require a teacher to have a moral character which will have a moral influence over his scholars is not regarded as an unreasonable demand. But probably most citizens do not desire any religious tests for teachers, and the teachers are opposed to them. Accordingly, while there are many teachers who exercise a religious influence as well as impart religious instruction, we must for the most part be content with securing the latter, even if we cannot be assured that we are getting the former.

(*b*) Apart from this, the sectarian differences intrude a further difficulty. I am myself convinced that the religious instruction which is educationally sound for the scholars in the national system need not include any of those tenets which divide the Churches. It is not creeds nor codes, rituals nor polities, that the young mind should be concerned with ; but rather a personal attitude to God, which can be best described by the simple term faith. It is a recognition of God's existence, a realisation of His presence, a submission to His authority, a dependence on His grace as imparted in Jesus Christ, a character conformed to Christ's example, that should be the aim of religious education.

(*c*) A third difficulty presents itself when we consider the material which is to be used in the religious instruction. It will be agreed that the Bible must here have the first place, and there is in the Bible a great deal which is entirely suitable, although discrimination must be exercised in regard not only to the ages of the scholars, but also the stage of development which they may have reached. The material as well as the method of instruction must be *graded* in accordance with the capacity of the scholar. As long as the old view of the inspiration of the Bible in all its parts prevailed, no further difficulty was experienced, and any story, so long as it seemed to be within the range of interest and understanding of the child, could be and was chosen. But the new view—which recognises a progressive revelation, not only a completion, but a correction, of the religion and morals of earlier phases of development in later ; above all a consummating revelation of God in Christ as a standard by which all truth about God or duty for man must be tested—involves that no material should be used in such a

way as would give the child a lower than the Christian conception of God and goodness. That, at first sight, seems to exclude the use of the greater part of the Old Testament; and there are some Christian teachers who accept that consequence without reservation. It must be frankly admitted that there are records in the Old Testament of deeds done in obedience to what were believed to be the commands of the Lord, which, if taught to children in the old way, can produce only moral confusion : there are statements which, taken as literal fact or truth, are challenged by man's assured knowledge of nature and history. The selection must be scrupulously careful, so that the religious instruction should not have the opposite effect from what is intended. But, on the other hand, there are many Old Testament stories, the religion and morals of which are not on the Christian level, which it would be a loss not to use for the following reasons.[1] *First of all*, educationalists tell us that they are just the kind of material which gains the interest and holds the attention of children ; the Old Testament contains more of this kind of material than the New. *Secondly*, many of these stories, imperfect as in many respects their setting may be, do present instances of virtues and graces which have a permanent and universal value. Endurance, courage, fidelity, magnanimity, faith, are illustrated by heroes and saints of the Old Covenant. *Thirdly*, it would be a serious loss for the understanding of the New Testament, the appreciation of the significance and value of Christ Himself, were its background in the progressive revelation as recorded in the Old Testament not known in its general features. If not the youngest, yet most of the scholars can be made to understand the conception of God's gracious, because gradual, education of mankind in the knowledge of Himself and His will, since they too must learn that their own education must be gradual, and that they are not being deceived if knowledge is withheld from them till they are fitter to receive it. The supremacy of Christ as Revealer of God and Redeemer of Men can be exhibited more clearly in the comparison between what the best men thought and did before He brought God's truth and grace to men, and what we know from Him that we should now both be and do. Such a use of the Old Testament does demand wisdom and tact on the part of teachers ; but the fact that such

[1] I have tried to give some help in this matter in my book, *The Old Testament in the Sunday School*.

teachers are difficult to secure does not justify the general abandonment of the Old Testament in religious instruction.

(*d*) This fourth difficulty may arrest our attention. Owing to the sectarian differences to which reference has already been made, and to which further consideration will need to be given, there is not assured to all teachers the same thorough training to fit them to teach the Bible as they receive in regard to the other subjects they are expected to teach. There are many teachers who have been trained, and there are colleges for teachers which give this training ; but there are many institutions where teachers are being trained which make no provision for this subject. The teacher who has had no training, and nevertheless has no doubts about his or her fitness to teach, is not the most desirable kind. Religious zeal, valuable as it is, will not compensate for the lack of adequate and appropriate knowledge. Many of the best teachers, highly equipped educationally for their task, have scruples about teaching a subject regarding which they feel themselves relatively incompetent. Not a few know enough about modern scholarship to feel that it is impossible for them to teach the Bible in the traditional way, but do not know enough to feel confident in teaching it from the critical standpoint. Rightly do they hold that to teach in the traditional way would be an injury to their scholars ; yet they are uncertain how to make the teaching in the new way a benefit. The interest of the subject itself seems to demand that the teachers be qualified not only intellectually, but also morally and spiritually, for their task, for no religious impression can be made on the scholar unless there is a religious interest in the teacher, since here influence counts for more than instruction. But there cannot be religious tests for teachers, either by an enquiry into their religious experience or by making their prospects in their profession depend on their fitness and willingness to give religious instruction. Essential as religion is to education, its inclusion raises a problem which no other subject imposes upon the community.

II

This problem, peculiar to religion as a factor in education, must be more closely scrutinised, not only in general theory but in view of the special situation in England. This restriction need not involve a limitation of interest, as the

particular conditions do involve the application of universal principles. (1) If religion is to pervade the whole of the education, as has already been argued, then one seemingly easy and just solution is to be excluded, even although so eminent a Nonconformist as Dr. Dale favoured it ; that is, a separation of functions, the State to be charged with the *secular* education, and the Church with the *religious*. Whether so absolute a separation is at all possible may be doubted. How can history or literature be taught to the exclusion of all religion ? For has not religion been one of the vital interests and potent factors in the development of the human race ? To carry out this solution consistently the attitude of the teacher would need to be non-religious, neither for nor against religion. Should growing indifference or hostility in the community impose this solution on the public school system, great would be the loss of education. Countries which have adopted this solution are not altogether happy with its results. To exclude religion from general education involves, not neutrality, but hostility, for it condemns religion to be a thing apart, divorced from the rest of life ; and without religion life is not whole. Has the Church the resources to secure that the opportunity for religious instruction shall reach every child whom the public school system reaches ? It has no compulsory powers to bring children within its influence. There is, it seems to me, a growing conviction that, great as may be the difficulties in including religious instruction in education, they must be faced, and, if possible, overcome.

(2) Nonconformists in England generally stand for the inclusion of only Bible teaching. The difficulties which it at present presents have just been discussed ; but one very relevant objection of another kind may here be added. (*a*) It has been said that at the Reformation the authority of the Bible was substituted for the authority of the Church ; and this has about as much truth as such generalisations have ; but it needs qualification in two directions. On the one hand, the Roman Church did not challenge the authority of the Scriptures, but only denied the right of private interpretation, and asserted the authority of the Church to interpret. On the other hand, if the right of private judgment was theoretically conceded in Protestantism, it was not generally recognised in practice ; it was Luther's or Calvin's interpretation which was advanced as authoritative. The Churches of the Reformation did not leave ministers or

members free with their private interpretations; they imposed far more elaborate confessions than are the ecumenical creeds. Even if the antithesis were strictly in accordance with the facts, can we so separate Bible and Church? Significant is the title of that epoch-making book of W. Robertson Smith, *The Old Testament in the Jewish Church.* Whatever Protestant dogmatism may affirm about the Bible, modern critical scholarship can deal only with *The New Testament in the Christian Church.* The New Testament no less than the Old is the product of the thought and life of a religious community, in which, and through which, God has revealed Himself. The exaltation in Protestantism of the Bible above the Church, inevitable as it may have been as a weapon of controversy, is injurious as a tool in the work of the Church. If the Protestant dogmatist asserts that the Bible is the inspired word of God, does not the New Testament warrant the retort that the history of the Church began with Pentecost, and the Church is, according to the divine intention, the inspired agent of God to the world? The Christian religion is not an individual relation to God outside of, but only within, a society. The Christian religion could not be fully received from the teaching of the Bible alone, but only in the fellowship of the Church. The two hundred Protestant sects in the United States of America show what results from private judgment applied to the Bible with no recognition of the authority of the community of believers and saints in its essential unity and unbroken continuity.

(*b*) Many within Nonconformity are coming to recognise the inadequacy of Bible teaching detached from the influence of some Christian community, and are becoming very much more appreciative of the principle which leads the Church of England to maintain schools under the more direct control of the Church, much as they have abundant reason to disapprove and even complain of the practice in which this principle is sometimes carried out. It is the narrow sectarianism of which some of these schools have been guilty that has justified Nonconformist opposition. Undoubtedly schools in which there lurks the danger that the interests of one Church are made the dominant consideration, instead of a generously and graciously Christian religious education, have not a legitimate claim on public support. The inculcation in children of views of Church, ministry, and sacraments, which involve an uncharitable and intolerant

attitude to members of other Christian communions should gain no countenance from the community generally. There is evidence, however, that the leaders of the Church of England do recognise the mischief of this sectarianism, and do desire to come to some understanding in the interests of efficient religious education.

(*c*) Without involving myself in the controversies of the passing hour, let me affirm the conviction that, with due regard for the protection of the teachers against religious tests, the interests of education generally, and of religious education particularly, should be made the supreme consideration in all the action which the Churches take in any educational situations which may arise, such as the present reorganisation of the schools in view of the raising of the school age, and that, without the clerical interference which both teachers and educational authorities resent, the Churches should combine together to secure that the religious education shall be made efficient, giving such expert guidance and help as they may be fitted and desired to give. Roman Catholic and Jewish schools are a problem apart; and here the religious convictions which stand in the way of children of these communions being included in the general educational system must be respected. Protestants must recognise that Bible teaching by itself is as objectionable to Roman Catholics as the sectarian teaching, Anglo-Catholic or Roman, is to them. Every Christian must learn to respect religious convictions, however much he may disapprove of them as in his judgment false. As regards the relation of Nonconformists to the Church of England, let them not condemn the desire for Church schools as necessarily sectarian, but approve the principle which prompts that desire that the Church as well as the Bible is one of the divinely appointed means of grace, and that the end of an adequate religious education is not only individual experience and character, but also fellowship in the worship, and participation in the work, of a Christian community. Much as I should desire the end of the dual system, and a unified national education, in which adequate provision was made for efficient religious instruction, I cannot, as do many Nonconformists, approve any action to bring about such a result as wounds the consciences of any fellow-Christians. If God is love, if love is man's highest and fullest life, I cannot, to advance the interests of the religious education which I approve, allow myself to act towards other Christians otherwise than after

the pattern shown in 1 Cor. xiii. I am sure that the embittered controversies of the past have reacted injuriously, not only in the relation of the Churches to one another, but on the religious education which is to be desired for all the children of the nation.

(*d*) The discussion so far has had the general educational system in view, but it is no less important that in all schools, public or private, religion should be recognised as a necessary factor in any education which seeks the full development of the whole human personality. In the universities also there should be, wherever practicable, a faculty of theology with as high a standard of scholarship as any other faculty demands, and with the cordial support of the Christian Churches to ensure that it is an efficient interpretation of non-sectarian religion.

(3) While in the interests of education the Churches must maintain religious instruction and influence in the general system, they must not accept that, however efficient it might become, as a substitute for their own distinctive contribution to religious development. The instruction and the influence of the day-school teacher, valuable as it is, is not adequate. It does not, for one thing, attach the child directly to the Church in its witness, worship, and work. Whatever be the agency employed by the Church, this must be the object—that the Christian life once begun shall have its appropriate and favourable environment in the community of believers.

(*a*) That so small a proportion of the scholars in the Sunday schools pass into the membership of the Church is a convincing evidence that either the instruction or the influence is so far defective and ineffective. The cradle roll at the one end and the Church roll at the other end of the Sunday-school roll is the ideal to be realised. Sometimes the Sunday school is an institution apart from the Church, independently financed and organised ; sometimes teachers are not themselves in the membership of the Church, and apart from their service in the Sunday school have little or no interest in its work generally ; sometimes the ministers and officers of the Church show little, if any, concern about the Sunday school. The *first condition* of efficiency in the Sunday school is a vital connection with the Church. The *second condition* is that in the instruction given, and influence exercised, by the Sunday school, the scholars themselves shall be kept in as close relation to the Church as possible. More than once a year, at the Sunday-school Anniversary,

should the Sunday school share in the worship of the Church. There are services which the scholars can render in the work of the Church generally which should receive encouragement. The minister of the Church should, while not interfering in the conduct of the school, be no stranger there, but known to, and winning the trust of, all the scholars. Among the older scholars, membership in the Church should be presented as the *normal result* of the connection with the Sunday school. The *third condition* is that in the material used for the lessons there shall be included such as will give the scholars an interest in the history of the past, the activities of the present, and the proposals for the future, of the Christian Church. This involves the use of what, for want of a better term, has generally been called Extra-Biblical material : the lives of the missionaries, martyrs, saints, and heroes, which are the Church's glory, the tasks which it is now undertaking, and the trusts for the future that it now holds. By such teaching the boy or girl, the youth or maiden, should be inspired with the conviction that the Church is a society, membership in and service for which is not merely a duty, but a privilege, that not apart from it, but through it, the highest human values can be realised for the good of self and others.

(*b*) The Sunday school should not be the only educational agency of the Church. Not only is the practice of a children's portion in the morning service to be commended, as also the Children's Church, if it is so conducted as to provide for the attendance of the children at some part of the general worship, so that from earliest years they may feel at home in the building so consecrated ; but what needs to be insisted on is that the preaching itself should be education. It would be well if all preachers had been so trained that they were also teachers. The monotony of the same kind of sermon twice on each Sunday, apart from the strain it puts upon most preachers, in some measure accounts for the decrease in attendance at church. Without ceasing to be inspirational (to use an American term), the ordinary sermon would not suffer from being a little more instructional. And could not one service each Sunday be expressly of a more educational character ? How little do most Christian people know about the history of the Church, or about the world around them, as that appears in the light of the Gospel ! Preaching might involve more special study for the minister, but it would impose less general strain than the rather casual method of text selection and exposition which now so largely

prevails. By lectures, classes, study-circles, as there is opportunity and the minister and members have ability, could the Church contribute to the development of a more informed and intelligent, and, therefore, more effective and attractive Christian manhood or womanhood in its members than at present, with its altogether too superficial methods, it is doing.

(*c*) To be adequately educational, the instruction should show a wider range, and the influence reach a wider scope, than is at present common. If the believer is Christ's, as Christ is God's, then all things are His (1 Cor. iii. 23). As has already been said—but the principle must be repeated in many connections—religion is not a department of life, it is a quality of the whole life. Religious education must always preserve this wholeness. The individualism which has marked so much religious life hitherto must be transcended. If a man can be his best individual self only as he is most his social self, then the whole world as the sphere of Christian living can be embraced in the material of the religious education. Every human interest, activity, and relationship can be consecrated, if cleansed by God's Spirit from sin, selfishness, worldiness ; and such an all-embracing consecration of human personality should be the goal of religious education. How immeasurably Christian thought could be enlarged, and Christian life enriched, if only all the Christian Churches could be saved from their parochialism and sectarianism into this lofty and large vision of what Christian personality can become, and what for its full realisation a religious education that is Christian should be !

III

If we apply to our subject the Christian principle of universalism, so often repeated in Paul's letters, but implied also in Jesus' attitude to, and dealings with, men, namely, that in Christ all differences as dividing sexes, classes, nations, religions, races are transcended, and if we give a slight but legitimate extension of Paul's application of that principle in his practice in seeking to be all things to all men (1 Cor. ix. 22), we seem justified by the Christian ideal in demanding that each individual shall be given the opportunity for the best education, the fullest development of personality of which he is capable.

(1) In examining this demand, we must begin with the

qualification. While some of the differences, transcended in Christ, have been abolished, because inconsistent with the common life in Christ, such as that between bond and free, yet others remain, and must remain, even if transformed, such as the relation of man and woman. So in education the principle of uniformity does not follow from the principle of universalism. Not equality, but justice, must be the guiding principle ; we need not give each child the *same* education, but only the education which is *his due*, taking into account his capacity, disposition, inclination, promise, the *intrinsic* differences, but not the *extrinsic*, the circumstances of his parents, and such accidents of fortune, good or bad. It goes without saying that differences of age must be taken into account. It is not so generally recognised that difference of sex should be taken into account also. The education of girls should not be inferior to that of boys ; but it may well be that it should be different. While in the earlier stages of education, where capacity, disposition, and inclination have not yet been fully disclosed, there may be the uniformity of method ; yet at the later stages more regard should be paid to all which makes up the individuality. There are some boys who show skill with their hands, and little (or no) wit with their heads ; they prefer doing to learning. Others have a quickness in learning languages which distinguishes them. A laboratory attracts some more than a library. While I do not believe in early specialisation, and hold that a general culture should be imparted to all, yet I do admit that regard should be had to special talents and tastes ; for interest is a guide to capacity. On that account the proposed reorganisation of the schools is to be welcomed. The central or secondary, whatever the eleven plus schools may be called, should allow for some variety of teaching and training. Against one discrimination, which is not involved in the nature of the child, but is imposed by foolish and wicked social prejudice, one must protest whole-heartedly. The social rank or wealth of the parents must not be taken into account. It must not be assumed that the son of the working man should get only the education which would fit him for his father's station, honourable as that is if worthily filled. Why should the village girl, it is asked, know anything about English literature ? In the education, which in my judgment the Christian ideal demands, no children should be distinguished as rich or poor, but all should be human persons, with a claim to the best education to secure

the full development of the personality. No less must we resist the demand which successful business men often make, to whose opinion, because of their success, an importance is attached which neither their culture nor their character justifies, namely, that education shall be utilitarian merely, that its aim shall be to produce smart salesmen and clever clerks. That there should be practical training need not be denied, and that the general education should be such as to develop an intelligence which will be of value to any calling may be conceded. But, as long as the school age remains at fifteen, it seems undesirable to interfere with the general education by including technical instruction. It is a man of keen intelligence, wide interest, with a capacity for further culture, who is to be educated, and not merely a "hand" in any business. Such a policy would in the long run defeat itself. A boy well educated in the wider sense will prove himself a better salesman or clerk than one of inferior education, and will more quickly pick up the technicalities of his special work than one of less developed mind.

(2) Without a more thorough change in social conditions than "the inevitableness of gradualness" in social evolution necessarily allows, it is probable that for the majority of children the school education will end at fifteen. That it should be so raised is imperative, for it is only at that age that much of the sowing of the previous years can be garnered. Because hitherto the education has ceased at twelve or thirteen, much that has been gained is again quickly lost. Even fifteen is too early an age, if the full benefit is to be obtained, but probably it is the best for which we can at present hope. This age, however, should not be regarded as an end of the formal education. It is imperative that provision should be made for the continuance of the education, even when a trade or business has been entered. While the Churches should use their influence with the education authorities to arrange for evening classes, lectures, etc., they should attempt to meet the need themselves. After a few years of neglect it will be more difficult to awaken interest, and even capacity may have declined. If education be taken in the wide sense defined in the first section of this chapter, as including athletics, discipline, service, then Boy Scouts, Girl Guides, and all similar organisations fall within the Church's educational function. Hence not merely religious education in the narrower sense is the Church's task, but education

generally, because Christianity does not exist "to save souls"—a vague abstraction—but "to make men and women," of mental capacity as well as moral character, religious experience, and social value. If only the Churches would receive this wider vision, how much richer a life and larger a work they could secure![1]

(3) Wherever a boy or girl shows capacity for a higher education, even to the university standard, the Christian Church should advocate that adequate opportunity should be given, irrespective of the class or the means of the parents. It is in the interest of the individual boy or girl that he or she should secure the fullest personal development for which there is talent or taste. It is a social obligation, from the Christian standpoint as I understand it, that society should enable each member to be the very best that he can be. If as a Christian I am trying to love my neighbour as myself, I shall endeavour to secure that his child shall have as good educational opportunities as I desire for my own. The class discrimination in the existing educational system seems to me a challenge of the fundamental Christian principle. But it is in the interest of the society itself that no capacity of boy or girl should be undeveloped. The nation is the loser which is content to have "mute, inglorious Miltons" or "village Hampdens." There is not too much ability of the higher order at the disposal of any society at any time; and it needs for its own welfare to command as much trained intelligence and character as a widespread education can secure for it. An open path from the village school to the university for all who can tread it step by step is what the nation for its own common good should provide. I value the privilege I had of the years of study I spent at Oxford University; but I am ashamed of the social exclusiveness which a too high standard of living among the students involves. In regard to educational inclusiveness, the Scottish universities have a record of which their *alumni* may be proud. The kind of education which the university offers must in my judgment be protected from a narrow utilitarianism: they must not be allowed to become only, or even mainly, technical institutions to prepare for a profession: any such special training should be on a broad background of culture. It is now possible for a man to gain a degree or a diploma in some of the universities without

[1] See Yeaxlee's *Spiritual Values in Adult Education*, 2 vols., and his *Lifelong Education*.

becoming an educated man. I do not deny that a professional training may be made an instrument of culture; but there is a danger that it will not prove to be this.[1] I plead for this educational opportunity for all who are capable of benefiting by it, not to enable the working-class youth to get on in the world, to rise out of his class into a higher, and to forget and despise "the pit whence he was digged." (Isa. li. 1). That may be a secondary result; it is not the primary purpose: that has been indicated above in both its individual and social aspect. I cannot convince myself, keen as is my devotion to social progress, that Socialism is economically sound, politically practicable, or ethically desirable. Equality of circumstance is an unattainable project. But we can, and we ought, to relieve the present legitimate social discontent by aiming at an educational system, in which there will be equality of opportunity for each member of society to make the best and the most of himself, in so far as that depends on the education provided by the nation.

[1] See, for further discussion, chapter iv., on "Leisure and Culture."

CHAPTER III

INDUSTRY

I

(1) God alone creates; man makes by appropriating, adapting, and applying to his own needs what God in nature provides. God wills that all His creatures and children should be fed, clothed, sheltered; and He has in His care and bounty stored the earth, man's home, with plenty. We have not yet reached, and are still far from, that stage in human history, if we shall ever reach it, when, the resources of earth being exhausted, the provision for man's needs will fail. Maladjustments between population and means of subsistence there have often been, and still are, though in lesser degree; but these are local and temporary. Taking the earth as a whole, were all its reserves fully utilised, there is enough and to spare for all mankind. In an advanced civilisation man often finds himself so far removed from nature, and so involved in human industry and commerce, that he forgets God, and his dependence on God, and concerns himself with himself only, and his sufficiency, by his knowledge and skill to do all he needs for himself. The urbanisation of life tends to produce a frame of mind in which man's insufficiency, apart from God's constant care and abundant bounty, is overlooked. In the lower forms of religion, as we call them, where natural goods are sought from the gods by prayer and sacrifice, this truth is not so readily forgotten. If in the Christian faith the stress falls on man's personal relation to God, his communion with God in love and his conformity to God's likeness in life, yet the truth of natural religion should not be allowed to fall into the background. It does not in the teaching of Jesus. He saw the Heavenly Father everywhere in nature, clothing the flowers of the fields and the birds of the air (Matt. vi. 26–30). Not only the complexity of our industry and commerce, but even the sufficiency, at least apparent, of the explanation which science offers of natural processes, renders more difficult for us this directness and simplicity of vision of the Heavenly Father; but if we think deep enough, we may come back to this childlike trust. It

is not only theoretically desirable, but practically imperative, that we should begin the discussion of industry and property with this recognition of an absolute and constant dependence upon God. If we do, we shall more readily recognise that He, as " the predominant partner " (if we may dare to use such an analogy), has, and should have, the decisive voice in this (the economic) sphere of man's life and work, and that we are not guilty of an irrevelance in seeking to realise the Christian ideal here as elsewhere.

(2) The reference of Jesus to the carefree and toilless life of flowers and birds may lead to a misunderstanding ; He is warning His disciples against anxiety : He is not forbidding labour generally. Their calling as His disciples did for them involve an abandonment of their earthly business, as He had abandoned His ; and did demand of them a trust that God would provide for them, as in the pursuit of their vocation they could no longer provide for themselves. And still to-day the call may come to a man to risk the loss of all earthly goods for the gain of the heavenly treasure of the service of, and the sacrifice for, the Kingdom of God, the fulfilment of the purpose of God among men. But Jesus is not presenting mendicancy as a general rule ; He is not condemning labour.

(*a*) If we look more closely at the figures He uses, we shall find a contradiction of such a conclusion. The plant must adapt itself to its environment if it is to survive ; it must draw its nourishment from the air through its leaves, and the soil through its roots ; it must transform into living substance what it thus receives. The beauty and the fragrance of the flower attract insects ; and they are agents of the fertilisation of the seeds. The birds build their own nests, and forage for themselves and their young. Only plant and animal parasites, degraded specimens of life, shirk the conditions of life and growth. Nature is a great laboratory, in which all living things, if for the most part unconsciously, yet spontaneously fulfil their peculiar function. Further, Jesus' figurative language is drawn either from nature or from human life and labour. One could almost reproduce from His parables a description of the industry and commerce of His own day and land. It is the Father's will to provide for the needs of His creatures and children, as has already been stated ; but now, we must add, not without the labour of man. And the history of mankind shows us that that condition is a further proof of

His fatherly love. For labour is necessary for the self-development of human personality. It is not a curse imposed, but a boon bestowed. Where nature is bountiful, and wants are easily met with little toil, there barbarism remains. Where there is a struggle for existence because of what seems an unkindly nature, there civilisation and culture have developed. Man gathers knowledge and gains skill in order to meet his bodily wants ; he is brought into closer relation with his fellows in this common enterprise. When satisfaction of natural needs and security against physical dangers have been obtained, then the capacities which have been in this effort developed (mental, moral, social) can be directed towards the higher interests of the mind of man. Labour in itself, then, is no evil, but a good ; it should be regarded as a privilege and a duty. The man who does not work, but lives on the labours of others, is a human parasite ; and if compassion for him as a man, capable of becoming a child of God, did not restrain, we might even describe him as social vermin.

(*b*) The factors with which we are here concerned are the natural provision by God, the physical necessities of man, and the human labour by which man claims, uses, and enjoys that provision for his necessities. Since God provides all, desires the needs of all men to be met, and wills that man labour to meet his needs, man's dependence and God's will only must never be forgotten, but ever recognised.

(3) Accordingly, we may regard as a reasonable and righteous demand that all human relations in industry be regulated in accordance with the supreme moral principle of Christianity of equal love to self and neighbour. It is very evident, therefore, that we cannot for a moment concede the claim which is sometimes made that in the economic sphere ethical should be subordinated to what are alleged to be economic laws. If we are in this sphere concerned with the production, distribution, and consumption of wealth, as the usual definition of economics runs, we are concerned, not with any of the physical or chemical processes by which this natural provision is adapted to man's necessities, but with the human factor in industry, the needs, the desires, the motives, the efforts, the relationships of men ; and morality has here no restricted scope ; it is concerned with the *quality* of *human conduct* in every sphere. That in the common opinion there is a contrast, which may even become a conflict, between ethical and economic laws must

be admitted ; and we cannot, therefore, go further with our discussion of the application of Christian principles to industry without facing this issue. There are three questions we must attempt to answer. What are the economic laws ? Do they necessarily conflict with ethical laws ? If they do, which should be subordinated ?

(*a*) Before we go any further, we must distinguish between the constant and the contingent laws.[1] To begin with the second, there is no such universal and permanent economic order as there is a natural. Man has evolved, and is evolving ; and the economic system is also subject to change. A mistake which not the masters of the science, but inadequately instructed exponents, make is to assume a permanence and universality for generalisations which apply in only a particular situation and a temporary condition. Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* (1776), admirable as it may be as an analysis of industry and commerce in his own land and his own day, is not applicable to all countries for all time.[2] The Industrial Revolution has made such a change, and is still making such a change, that the science of economics must be ever progressive. Physical science makes progress in fuller knowledge and clearer understanding of a reality that is relatively constant ; but economics deals with a reality of which inconstancy is a distinctive, necessary feature. To try to revive mediæval economics, and the Christian ethics related thereto, is an absurd anachronism. Since it is human knowledge and power that can change, and do change, many of the conditions with which economics is concerned, full allowance must be made for the contingency of many economic maxims. This does not involve a denial, however, of permanent factors—land, capital, labour (to these we must return for further discussion). That there are laws relating to the material objects with which man is dealing, and also laws relating to the personal agents of industry, must be fully recognised ; and, although I do not dare to be dogmatic, I venture the opinion that a closer scrutiny of economic laws would disclose that we are really dealing with physical limitations in the object, or psychical tendencies in the subject ; and that economic laws lead us back to physics or psychology. Some illustrations

[1] This subject is discussed by Will Reason in an essay on " The Constant and the Contingent in Economics " in *Mansfield College Essays*.

[2] It must not be forgotten that in his book *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759) he referred " all mental emotions to the one source of sympathy."

may be given. If less is produced, there is less to divide and consume ; but unless for any reason the material available is restricted, higher wages and more regular employment may so stimulate the worker that he produces more. There is a scarcity of material objects desired by men, who can command something *which they can offer in exchange*, that is, there is an *effective* demand. There is an abundance of these material objects elsewhere ; but these cannot transport themselves without human agency. It is because persons see the opportunity of profits in meeting the demand that the supply is transported, or, if necessary, locally produced. Credit in the City, and the industry that the granting or withholding of credit stimulates or retards, depend on the estimate of the Bank of England Governors regarding the adequacy or inadequacy of its gold reserves. This policy of making credit depend on the gold reserves is being now seriously challenged by not irresponsible persons. With the material limitations we are not here concerned, although even these can be affected by human enterprise and endeavour. The human factor mainly concerns us.

(*b*) There are more or less permanent tendencies of human nature ; the " economic " man may desire to gain the *maximum of wealth at the cost of the minimum of labour*, and economics must reckon with that tendency; but the economic man is not the whole man. It may be admitted that the " economic " man is a very common type ; and that a competitive industrial system which assumes the legitimacy and even the necessity of this type will encourage and increase it, and either hinder the emergence of another type or hamper the activity of any other type. Many of the alleged economic laws which we set up in opposition to ethical demands, condemning them as unpractical, are on more searching scrutiny found to be based on the assumption that self-interest not only is, but must be, the dominant motive in the economic sphere. The opposition resolves itself into one of ethical types. To give only one illustration, the moral demand is made that a living wage for the worker should be a first charge on the products of industry. The retort is given : This may be very desirable ethically, but it is not practicable economically. We may ask, Why ? The answer would run as follows : No industry can be carried out without adequate capital and efficient management. The profits of the enterprise must be large enough to induce the possessor of capital to invest it, and the salary high

enough to secure the services of an able man as manager. Here we are concerned, not with invariable natural law, but with variable human motives. It might be possible to induce the possessor of capital to content himself with a smaller profit, and the manager to render the service at a lower salary. At bottom it is often the selfish interest of one class which stands in the way of doing right by another.[1]

(*c*) It may be urged by the apologist for the existing system that these motives are characteristic of human nature, and human nature cannot be changed. We must assume self-interest as the permanent and general motive in this sphere of human activity at least; and must regard as practical only what the dominance of such a motive permits. It may be that human nature as the raw material out of which character is formed by nurture does not change; but human nature, even if we regard it from the lowest standpoint of the psychology which bases itself on biology, and represents men as near the animal as it can, contains a *herd*-instinct as well as a *self*-instinct, and, indeed, has a varied endowment; and nurture can secure that one impulse shall prevail rather than another. This competitive industrial system is comparatively so recent that to assert that it is so deeply rooted in human nature that it cannot be changed is a quite unreasonable assumption. The moralist and the social reformer must recognise that there are serious hindrances in such dispositions to any rapid progress, and that the man who in industry desires to realise the "ethical" type will find that he is surrounded by men of the "economic" type, that he cannot realise his ideal as fully as he desires, even if he is ready to endure sacrifices. Moral progress must be slow within an industrial system in which ethical considerations do not dominate.

The conclusion to which this discussion leads us is that there are not economic laws in necessary conflict with ethical principles, and that it is possible so to influence the human motives dominant in industry as to secure an ultimate if not immediate, subordination of economic tendencies to moral inclinations. We must recognise that the existing economic situation, including human motives, does and must

[1] It might be desirable to fix by law the maximum interest, dividend, or profit that should go to the partners in a business, or the shareholders in a company. This is done in a haphazard way by the rise and fall of the prices of shares according to the earnings of a company. This leads to the evil of stock-exchange speculation.

condition all our endeavours at advance towards an industrial system, in which man's dependence on, and consequent obligations to, God shall find expression in his relations with his fellow-men.

(4) Two considerations which lend support to this conclusion, one objective and one subjective, may be added :

(*a*) The competitive industrial system, which is assumed as normal in most of the loose economic thinking which opposes itself to moral teaching, is proclaiming its own insufficiency, and is being modified. This development can be here sketched only as far as is necessary for the present purpose. Competition among the workers for the jobs which were going was seen to be so disastrous that combinations among them were formed to secure the strength of union in the conflict of the interests of labour against those of capital. Combinations of employers were formed to resist this aggression of labour. But in the common interests of labour and capital these combinations formed for conflict are being increasingly used for conciliation, to avoid and not to promote strikes or lock-outs. To prevent the waste of competition among sellers, there has been combination, as in syndicates, etc., and this tendency is rapidly assuming gigantic proportions not only within one nation, but internationally. It is such combination which is being prescribed as the remedy for the disease from which the coal industry is suffering. Endeavours of lesser range to reconcile the conflicting interests of employers and employed are being made in " bonus," " profit-sharing," " co-partnership " schemes, as also in the productive co-operative movement. The distributive co-operative movement has with extraordinary success sought to reconcile the interests of buyer and seller. Shall we call this a triumph of the " herd "-instinct over the " self "-instinct, or a recognition that as the self belongs to the herd, the interests of both are mutual ? While the motive in these movements has been mainly, it has not been solely, economic.

(*b*) There has been a growing recognition that, as one employer of labour on a very large scale, who did a great deal of " welfare " work among the labour he employed, once jokingly put it, " philanthropy pays." Bad moral relations—oppression on the one hand, rebellion on the other—are economically unsound. The tyrannical master does not secure the best service, and discontented labour is

less productive than contented. If once ethical considerations do succeed in invading the economic sphere, we may hope that their value on higher than prudential grounds will be recognised, and that a moralisation, even a Christianisation, of the industrial system will come into the region of "practical politics."

II

(1) Having justified, as I hope I have, the treatment of property and industry from the standpoint of the Christian ideal, a few brief explanations of the use of terms in the discussion may be excused for the sake of full understanding on the part of all readers. (*a*) In the preceding pages terms have been used which can now be defined. We may use the term *industry* to cover all the human activities which, as it were, bring the natural provision to the physical necessities of man, the bread to the mouth, and the wool to the back. But we may also use the term industry in a narrower sense as describing only part of the complex process. There is the *production* of the wealth and the *distribution* of it, e.g. the making of the pair of shoes and the selling of them. To the first we may restrict the term industry, and the second we may describe as *commerce* ; or we may distinguish them as trade and business (although these terms are more loosely used). *Wealth* includes all the material objects which satisfy human needs. About the spiritual goods of life we shall speak in a subsequent chapter. The term *distribution* is equivocal. It may mean not only the process to which we have just applied the term commerce, but it may also mean the *division* of the product of industry among its agents, the wages of labour, the profits of capital, the salary of management. It would be an advantage if the term *division* were always used. One of the most pressing of the economic-ethical problems of to-day is just this : what is the equitable division, or must it be determined by the economic power of each of these agents, irrespective of ethical considerations ? We have just now distinguished labour and management ; there is no scientific frontier between the two, but this general distinction may be drawn : labour is all directed activity, management the activity that directs. In relation to the general manager of a store, the departmental managers, in so far as they have no independent responsibility, are labour which he directs. It is generally assumed that

management has individually a very much higher claim for remuneration than has labour. The income of an employer, running his own business, is held to include salary of management as well as profits of capital. (*b*) What do we mean by *capital*? Wealth may be distinguished as of two kinds : material objects which immediately satisfy human needs, and material objects which may be used as means of the production and distribution of wealth in the first sense. Man uses his hands for labour ; but very much limited and very ineffective would that labour be if that were his only means. He has invented tools, material objects which enable him to accomplish what by his hands alone he could not do. Machinery is but a more complicated tool, moved by a motor power greater than man's muscles can command. Machinery must be housed in factory or mill. Although we often speak of capital in terms of money, it is necessary always to remind ourselves that the function of money is to facilitate the exchange of objects or of services, and that capital is not the money, but the material objects just described. The nominal capital of a business in the money value of the stock held by the shareholders might be very much greater than the real—that is, exchangeable—value of the material objects employed in it, even making a liberal allowance for the goodwill. A further distinction may be noted : what is wealth in the first sense for one person is wealth in the second sense for another. What the buyer consumes for the satisfaction of his own needs, the seller employs for the increase of his own wealth. The goods in a shop are the capital of the shopkeeper. This has been called *floating* capital, in contrast with buildings, counters, shelves, desks, etc., as *fixed* capital : and a distinction must be made between the same objects as intended for immediate consumption and as employed in the production or distribution of wealth. A farmer who draws milk, eggs, bacon, etc., for the use of his household from his farm, and keeps no note of their price, is not able to render to himself an accurate account of his profit or loss, as he has not recognised his double function in business as seller and as buyer. From the beginnings of human industry there has been capital ; the popular doggerel (if we may take it, though unhistorical, as an illustration) :

When Adam delved, and Eve span,
Who was then a gentleman?

involves an assumption of capital: for Adam must have had a spade and Eve a spinning-wheel. Man's first steps towards culture and civilisation were taken when he did not consume all the wealth he had secured, and made use of some of it as a means of making his labour more effective. Land,[1] in which we may include the source of every kind of natural provision for human needs, Labour, and Capital, are the three necessary factors in human industry. What causes the ethical problems in the economic sphere is the fact that the possession and control of these factors is not in the same hands; and so conflicting interests arise. We must, therefore, at this point, turn aside to consider the question of *property*—its rights and duties—from the Christian standpoint.

(2) As has been said already, man appropriates, adapts, and applies nature's provision to his needs by labour. Where the provision is abundant, so that what one man takes does not deprive another man of what he needs, or where life is literally from "hand to mouth," each day's provision being consumed at once, no problem of property arises. But when there is not enough for all, or when wealth has to be saved from present for future use, what claim has one man over another to satisfy his own present or future wants by an appropriation of the available wealth?

(*a*) There is the stage at which "might is right"; a man has what he can hold. But it has been recognised that some reason should be given why a man may claim for his own use wealth which others may need even more than he does. The common theory is that when a man has mixed his labour with the material object, that gives him a right to possession. The hunter has a right to keep as his own the game that he has slain, the shepherd the flock that he has reared and tended, the peasant the land that he has tilled, and the crops which have grown upon it. Property is the claim to the *exclusive* control and use of any of the objects which constitute wealth as it has been already defined. The next step is the claim to transfer that control or use to another, by gift, exchange for other material objects, or by bequest to others. The claim must be recognised by society whether the possession is due to acquisition by labour, or transfer by exchange or contract, or inherited by recognised custom or by express bequest.

[1] Important as is the subject of land, it cannot here be discussed. The Copec Continuation Committee has added to the Reports for the Conference in 1924 one on *Rural Life*.

(*b*) Most property now is held by those who have not mixed their labour with it, but have attained it in some of these ways. It is now recognised in civilised communities that, as it is impossible, so it is unnecessary to go back to the original title of possession. The stability of society depends on the recognition that present possession is nine points of the law ; and can be challenged only if force or fraud has been exercised in the obtaining of possession. The general moral condemnation of theft or fraud is a moral endorsement of the right of property. Among the peasantry in eastern Europe much less blame is attached to thieving than in more advanced communities ; and a curious distinction is made, which points back to the assumption that it is the mixing of labour with an object that gives a title to exclusive possession. To take cut timber is regarded as more of an offence than to cut down a tree in a forest, or to take fruit already plucked from the tree than to pluck it off a tree. Besides the prudential reason, the social disorder, or worse, which would result from a general disregard of the right of property, whether in any way earned by labour or not, is there a moral justification which can be offered ?

(*c*) It runs as follows. Man develops his personality as he gets to understand and to control his environment. A living from hand to mouth can belong only to a very elementary phase of his development. As he advances, he lives beyond the present moment and seeks to make provision for the future, not only by preserving for future what he does not need for present use, but still more by obtaining for himself the means by which he can more effectively secure future provisions (in other words, wealth for consumption, and wealth for the production of more wealth, i.e. capital). His development would be hampered and hindered could he not thus, as it were, expand his own personality, becoming more independent of the passing moment, more prepared for future needs, more capable of living the more abundant life, of which material objects may be a necessary means. Man expresses, exercises, and develops his personality by the acquisition, the management, the use, and the enjoyment of property. This would be quite a reasonable and righteous defence of property, if the actual result were that every personality had as much property as might be necessary for such self-development. But as society is now constituted, the *Have-nots*, as regards the possession of property adequate

for such an end, vastly outnumber the *Haves*. One man has a wealth so abundant that he is being ruined as a human personality by luxury, ostentation, self-indulgence ; another is so straitened in his means that his life is a constant anxiety and misery. We must fully recognise as too deep-rooted in human nature to be displaced the desire to possess not only for self, but for others also, the desire to make provision for the future of self and others, and the consequent incentive to labour which this desire affords. Family solidarity depends on the right to hold and pass on property. And social progress also demands a security of tenure from generation to generation.

(*d*) The recognition of the truth of the argument for property does not involve, however, any admission that the division of property to-day can be justified as right or necessary. The economic system as it now is results in a distribution of the products of industry among the necessary factors, land, capital, and labour, which is not at all proportionate to the value of the contribution of each. The laws in which the *Haves* have had much more influence than the *Have-nots* by an exaggeration of the right of property are responsible for an aggravation of a situation in regard to the possession of wealth which, in my judgment at least, cannot be justified to a sensitive Christian conscience, taking Jesus Christ seriously as our final moral authority. The legal right of the landowner to displace men by sheep or deer, as has been done in Scotland, to injure the farmer's crops by the sport of hunting, to withhold land from cultivation which might be cultivated, to exact an exorbitant price for land needed for house-building in the extension of cities, to the industrial development of which he has contributed nothing, and other such evils of our land system, show that righteousness is not enthroned in the courts of law. Any fuller consideration of this subject must be passed over, as the more potent factor in bringing about the economic situation in which we find ourselves has been brought about by capital ; that is, wealth which is held, not *for use* (consumption), but *for power*, the control of the labour, and through it of the life of others (production), and the most perilous and urgent issue in our social order to-day lies in the relation of capital and labour.

(3) The economist Hobson has in the title of one of his books, *The Evolution of Modern Capitalism*, described what is the distinctive feature of the last and the present century.

While, as has been shown in the first part of this volume, *capitalism*, in the sense of the dominance in, and control over, industry of capital, had begun already in the thirteenth century, and had become a problem for Roman canonists and afterwards for the Reformers, the evolution of modern capitalism, as we know it, goes back to the Industrial Revolution, including the invention of machinery, the use of steam as motor power, the provision of rapid means of transport by the steam-driven train or the steamboat, the resultant expansion of exploration, colonisation, industry, commerce. The result of this change in the methods of industry has been incalculably to increase the importance of the capital which these methods demand, and the growing dependence of labour on capital.

(*a*) While there have been many beneficent results from this progress in the methods of industry, a much more rapid increase of wealth, a wider division of it, since the standard of living of even the working classes has been raised, although the excess of wealth at one end of the social scale accentuates the contrast with the lack at the other end, yet the human relations in the economic sphere have been worsened. Had the evolution of capitalism not been modified by other forces, such as the combination of labour to resist oppression by capital, the situation would have been worse than it is. The working man has wrung from the reluctant employer shorter hours and higher wages, although, in view of the general raising of the standard of living, the real gain is not proportionate to the value of the wages in money. The most serious evil, from which most countries are at the present moment suffering most acutely, is irregularity of employment ; for production has outstripped consumption, the supply the effective demand, and this country is now exposed to a more intense competition than ever before. With these economic questions we are not concerned, but with the human interest. The dependence of labour on capital, the dominance of capital in industry, have resulted in a conflict of interest ; and, as difference of wealth increasingly is separating the employer and the employed, this conflict of interests tends to become an antagonism of class. Some believe a class-war to be inevitable, although on both sides wiser counsels are for the time prevailing in urging that there could not be this conflict were there not a common interest behind it. Although capital and labour may quarrel about their share in the product of industry,

both must desire that industry should prosper. Adversity makes strange bed-fellows, and both classes are being drawn nearer by their common trials. Can we be sure that there has been a permanent change of heart? Or are both desiring to be saints because they are sick, and will they give up the wish as soon as they are well again? I incline to the more hopeful view. Nevertheless, the influence of the Christian Church needs to be as fully exercised as possible to maintain the better mind in capital and labour.

(*b*) Can Christian ethics lay down any definite principles for the guidance of both? *First*, for owners of land as well as capital we may urge the consideration that, inasmuch as "the earth is the Lord's, and the fullness thereof," God should ever be recognised as the predominant partner—and property should always be used in recognition of dependence on Him, and the obligations towards fellow-men which that common dependence imposes. A stewardship towards God should be fulfilled in the service of men. Especially in regard to land must the control be so regulated as not to withhold any necessary benefit, or not to inflict any avoidable injury. Any human conditions, conventions, or institutions which come between man's need and God's bounty must be condemned as impiety to God no less than injustice to man.

Second, since the possession of wealth gives control over the lives of others, as by the employer over the employed, that control should be exercised with due regard to the dignity of human personality, with no assertion of superiority on the one side or expectation of servility on the other hand. Discipline in every common undertaking there must be; command and obedience are inevitable; but authority must never be allowed to degenerate into tyranny, and submission must never be made humiliating. Paul's letter to Philemon, *mutatis mutandis*, offers an example of what the mutual relation should be. It is the growing sense of self-respect which is making the workers resentful of the control which shows no respect to those over whom it is exercised. The industry should be recognised as a common enterprise, in the guidance of which labour has an interest as well as capital; how much confidential information the employer may communicate or reserve for the common interest is a matter of detail; but the principle of *partnership* should be affirmed, and the workers should have some share in determining the conditions of their work besides wages and hours.

A works' council has been tried and has worked in some industrial undertakings.

Third, moral obligations are mutual, and accordingly the duty of the worker is to do his very best as regards both quantity and quality of his output. The "ca' canny" policy, if it is really as widely practised as the opponents of labour-claims represent, cannot from an ethical standpoint be justified. A man is worse for not doing his best. Just as practices are condoned in war which would be condemned in peace, so in the conflict of capital and labour this policy is excused on three grounds. (1) It is argued: how can we expect a man to exert himself beyond what he must for no advantage to himself, but for the increased profits of an employer who will not pay any higher wages for better service? (2) The physical capacities of fellow-workmen vary; an output which would be easy for one would involve overstrain for another. If the strong man exerts himself to his utmost, his output will be taken by the foreman or master as the standard of effort which can be expected from the other worker. (3) While, in piece-work, wages earned are proportionate to work rendered, and thus the individual worker would appear to be free to work his best, without either of the previous reasons against this course of action, experience has shown that the very high wage of some workers has been made the pretext for lowering the standard rate of wages for all. The worker, however, should not think only of his relation to his employer, but of his relation to the community generally, and a recognition of that relation imposes the duty of doing the best work as a *service* of others. It should be added that some kind of labour should be regarded as a moral obligation on every man according to his capacity; and that the man who does not labour should fall under social condemnation. If, owing to his wealth, a man does not need to earn his own living, he should feel himself bound to render to society such services as are commensurate with the benefits which he receives.

III

In pursuing this matter further, it will be an advantage to relate the discussion to the subjects of the two preceding chapters—to the Home and to Education.

(1) The home has, and must have, an economic basis. What demands in the economic sphere does the welfare of

the home involve? Not only to provide *adequate income* for the physical necessities of the family, but also to afford means of culture, *adequate leisure* to allow for the cultivation of home affections, the mutual knowledge of parents and children, on which must rest their recognition and discharge of their respective duties, *adequate housing* to give such accommodation as health or decency in the separation of the sexes demands, and as will admit that degree of rest, quiet, and privacy which members of the family may for good living need—these are the challenge which the Family offers to Industry.

(*a*) While some doctrinaire economists still protest, the conviction is gaining ground that a *living wage* should be regarded as the first charge on industry, and that profits on capital or salary for management should be decreased, if necessary, to secure this end. This is undoubtedly the ideal. We must recognise that, the motives in industry being what they are, it cannot at once become actual in all cases. If the profit is so reduced that capital will not be attracted to the enterprise, and if the salary of management be so low as not to attract an efficient person, the business will fail, and the workers will lose even what wages they had; for them employment with lower wages is better than unemployment. That this is the situation, however, in any business must not be accepted by the community on the *ipse dixit* of the interested parties, the employers or the managers. An impartial tribunal should determine what is the wage which can be paid consistently with profitable and efficient conduct of this kind of business; and that should be made the *legal minimum.* The sweating in some trades was so great a scandal that Wages Boards do now exist, and have been extended from trade to trade. The minimum wage falls short of the living wage in many instances. What is necessary is to press for their increasing approximation. The regulation of wages has promoted efficiency, as low wages have often gone with wasteful management. And the good employer willing to pay his workers as much as he can afford is protected against the bad employer who by cutting wages could undersell him. The minimum wage as a means of overcoming the fatal apathy of many sweated workers has enabled them to combine so as to protect themselves against oppression by their employers, and, as it becomes practicable, to secure better conditions of labour for themselves. We are slowly moving towards the living wage.

(*b*) The determination of this living wage, however, presents a difficulty. An income sufficient for a single man or woman is insufficient for husband and wife, still more insufficient in proportion to the size of the family. If we fix the living wage as the income necessary for the support of parents and three children, the income does not afford a living wage for a larger family, and the bachelor or spinster without any dependents gets more than the necessary living wage. If we were content to measure wages solely by work done, excluding all other considerations, then these problems would not arise ; but the demand for a living wage forces us to face this question : For how many persons should the wage provide the means of life ? To expect a master to pay a man a wage proportionate to the size of his family would handicap the father of a large family, and would encourage the employment of single men, or of men with only a wife to keep. To pay a wage which would support a family of seven or eight would be economically wasteful, and few industries could afford it. Hence the proposal of a basic wage for all, sufficient to support husband and wife—for marriage should be made possible for all male workers—supplemented by a family endowment proportionate to the number of children. This endowment might be drawn from a common fund, to which the employed, the employers, and the community should all contribute a part, as is done in existing insurance schemes. Into the details of these schemes it is not necessary to enter, as the ethical principles of Christianity cannot offer a judgment on such matters. What is morally desirable is an adequate income for the family, not if wastefully used, but if economically and efficiently managed.

(*c*) The question which has been recently prominent is this : whether the payment of men and women should be equal. It is easy to say " Equal pay for equal work " ; but it is not quite so easy to determine whether, in view of physical and psychical differences of men and women, their work can be, strictly speaking, equal. I do not suggest superiority in the one sex or inferiority in the other, but only difference. Until we have family endowment, if we do get it, we must also take into account the fact that, while there are numerous exceptions, yet as a rule the man's family responsibilities should be recognised as greater than the woman's, as it is desirable that he should be able to support a wife and family. If by insistence on equality the man's wages were

brought down to the level of the woman's, in many cases the living wage would not be secured. If the woman's wage could be forced up to the level of the man's, in many cases women would find greater difficulty in getting employment. In actual conditions the solution of the problem by the ideal principle is not so easy as is often assumed. We want justice for both men and women ; but most of all we want the home to be preserved, and the wife and mother to be in the home.

(2) There are many reasons for the limitation of the hours of labour, such as the health of the worker and the opportunity he should have for other pursuits that will bring an interest into his life, which his daily toil, if of a monotonous character, cannot bring ; but in the present connection the emphasis falls on the need of cultivating the family life. The other reasons can be deferred, to be taken up in another connection. It is not so necessary now, as it once was, to insist on the need of shorter hours of labour. It is true that even with the shortened hours, the time of employment, and the distances from the home of the place of work in a family, may be such that there is no chance, except on Saturday and Sunday, of a common meal. If rightly used, the common meal may become a sacrament of the home affections. In the previous chapter stress was laid on the education which the members of a family can impart to one another. So far as economic needs and social conditions allow, the family life, with the influence of parents and children, brothers and sisters on one another, must be preserved. Some extreme feminists desire the repeal of all legislation which puts restrictions on the work of women in distinction from men as an unnecessary handicap on their employment. But here the interests of the home must be preferred to any individual advantage. If a wife and mother is employed outside of the home at all—a lamentable necessity—she should be at home in the evening and at night. She is the home-maker, as no other can be ; she can become the home-breaker if not free to fulfil her duties. How the hours of leisure in the home may be employed will be discussed in the next chapter.

(3) No question relating to the home is so urgent at the present hour, throughout Europe at least, as housing. The inevitable interruption of building during the years of the war, and the exhaustion of the financial resources of most of the countries engaged in it, have resulted in a shortage of

houses, and a failure in the years since the war to overtake that shortage adequately. Despite all that has been done by local effort in this country, with the support of the central Government, two glaring needs have not been met : the provision of houses at sufficiently low rents to bring them within the reach of the most poorly paid class of workers, and the removal of the slums. Houses condemned as uninhabitable are still being used, because the authorities dare not enforce the provisions of the law, since there is no shelter available for the people who should be displaced. In all cities there is terrible overcrowding. As this volume is concerned with the moral obligations of the Christian Churches in society, it cannot enter into statistical details, but the abundant literature on the subject of housing gives convincing evidence of the greatness of the need. The conditions of housing are injurious to health, are a challenge to decency, the separation of the sexes, and so sometimes at least a provocation to immorality, and do not allow for the rest, quiet, and privacy that the best interests of the members of the family demand. What the Christian Churches can do in this matter is to keep the painful and sometimes even shameful facts of the situation before the community, so that the public conscience will be aroused, and there will be a willingness to bear such burdens of increased rates as may be necessary to provide the remedy. They must in all ways available—by correspondence to the local Press, and by deputation if necessary—stimulate any indifferent or reluctant local authorities to use to the utmost every means at their disposal to build in accordance with the local needs. They should by united voluntary effort even undertake either the building of new houses at rents within the means of the poorest, or, when the workers need to live close to their place of employment, the reconditioning of old houses, which may be made habitable by repairs. This involves the securing of loans or investments at a very low rate of interest from Christian people, who in this matter are prepared to recognise a neighbour in the slum-dweller. Such efforts have been successful in different parts of the country. It is objected by doctrinaire economists that the provision in such ways of houses at uneconomic rents is an injustice and injury to the private builder. This has not been proved, as, allowing for all efforts by the local authority, the need of houses among those who can afford to pay an economic rent is still so great that the private builder can still play his part, profitable

to himself, in this imperative service to the community. What can be alone required is that in such provision of houses at uneconomic rents, whether by voluntary associations or local authorities, adequate investigation is made into the means of the family, so that only real need is met, and no unfair advantage taken by those who can pay an economic rent. The further objection that the proper remedy is the raising of wages, so as to allow for the payment of an economic rent, however sound it may be theoretically, is not valid practically, for human welfare cannot be sacrificed to the idol of economic orthodoxy. The difficulty of finding accommodation for large families has been mentioned. In all such efforts to meet the housing shortage a preference should be given to those with large families. To encourage parents to secure the accommodation adequate for the higher standard of family life already indicated, as regards the rent or the rates of a larger house some relief should be made proportionate to the number of children and the total family income. The worst kind of public economy is the restriction of expenditure which involves the extravagance of the waste of the health, the character, or the culture of the common people. That the heaviest burden should fall, as it now does, on the communities the resources of which are most limited, so that rates in West Ham are higher in proportion to the rents than in Westminster, is an injustice in our local government which calls for removal. Not only should individuals bear one another's burdens in fulfilling the law of Christ (Gal. vi. 2), but so also should communities. The rich suburb should contribute its proportionate share of the common expenditure of a city such as London is, since many of the inhabitants are drawing their incomes from trades and businesses the workers in which are dwelling in other parts of London under burdens too heavy for the strength of those on whom they are now made to fall.

IV

As it is the human personality in the economic as in every other social relation which is here the dominating interest, we may now approach some other economic problems by showing how the life of the boy or girl going out of the home to work is affected. (1) While legislation has ended the scandal of the child labour which disgraced the industry of the earlier half of last century, and which was accepted as a

lamentable necessity, even when it was recognised as lamentable, by the to us incredibly insensitive conscience of Christian men and women, nevertheless there is, owing to the limitation of the family resources, still too much employment before and after school-hours of boys and girls, interfering, as it must do, with their fully benefiting from the education being given to them. Such work by children should be, as far as is possible, discouraged and prevented. While the proposed raising of the school-leaving age to fifteen is to be heartily welcomed, and the obligation rests on the local authorities so to organise the schools as to derive the utmost possible educational advantage from the change, yet it is to be desired and hoped that the time is not so far distant when the economic reconstruction will allow a further extension of the age to sixteen. Meanwhile we must try to show what it is desirable should be done for the boy or girl beginning work at the school-leaving age, whatever that may be.

(*a*) In the previous chapter objection was urged to early specialisation in education, especially to making the education in the " eleven plus " schools too technical. A general culture should be provided for all children up to the school-leaving age. That does not exclude such manual or scientific instruction as a child may show an aptitude for, or such a recognition in the shaping of the last year of the curriculum as will make it a valuable preparation for entrance on a life-calling. But the instruction should not end when school is left ; provision should be made as liberal as local resources allow for the continuation of general culture, as well as such technical instruction as will secure greater efficiency, and, as far as is possible, greater interest in whatever may be the individual employment. To teach not only *what* is to be done, and the *how* of it, but also the *why*, is to make the worker more intelligent. Till the age of eighteen at least the continuation of education should be encouraged and provided for by the community : and even that age is not to be regarded as the limit, as education, if worthily conceived, is lifelong.[1]

(*b*) A boy or girl will do best what is congenial. There are different capacities and inclinations ; and industrial efficiency as well as personal development will be promoted as far as these differences are taken into account in choosing the employment. Regrettable it is, a loss economic as well as personal, that for possibly the majority of young people

[1] See the previous chapter, on " Education."

there is no choice. The boy or girl is glad to get any job which may be going. Yet, if the family circumstances allow, much more care should be exercised than is often done in seeking and finding individual aptitudes and tastes, as not only will work be better done, but life will be more happily lived, if the employment brings satisfaction. How painful is the lot of the man who finds himself compelled to do work that he does not like, and which even he loathes. A Christian man will regard it as his duty to do the best he can in whatever employment his circumstances have led him into ; but he can regard it as a calling from God, giving him his fullest opportunity to become his own best, if the work be such as he feels most capacity for, and greatest interest in. Psychology is coming to our aid in discovering capacity ; but interest should not be ignored. To force a boy into his father's business, when all his desire lies elsewhere, is an outrage on human personality. In many cases the hardship of uncongenial employment may be inevitable ; but all that can be done by teachers, parents, and others interested, such as the Christian minister, who is known and trusted, should be done to avert what is a real disaster. But this consideration leads us beyond the boy or girl entering on work.

(*c*) The general question confronts us : with the increasing mechanisation of industry, are not the majority of employments becoming such as to demand no special aptitude, and to impose a distressing monotony ? The man waits on the machine ; a quick eye and a swift hand are alone necessary ; there is no need of taste, judgment, or varied skill, only a routine of observation or movement easily acquired. Could anything less satisfying to a human personality be conceived ? There are, it is true, differences of opinion as to the effect on the worker of the monotony of the work. Some get so accustomed to it that it puts no strain upon them which they dislike, and even leaves them free to think their own thoughts, with only an almost subconscious response to the demand the machine makes on them ; others more sensitive do feel these conditions intolerable, and seek relief in various forms of excitement in their hours of leisure ; gambling and betting are the most ruinous of these. A few there seem to be who so identify themselves with their machine that the rapidity and accuracy of its complex movements become a pleasure to themselves. It may be that the highly developed, orderly cultured

observer falls into the psychological fallacy of ascribing to the many workers what he himself would experience if employed as they are ; and that for a great number, under-educated, under-developed, it is a relief that the machine makes so little demand on intelligence and interest. One cannot, however, looking at the matter as objectively as possible, evade the conclusion that the tradesman of former days, using his own tools with skill, planning, it may be, even his own work, seeing a whole bit of clothing or furniture pass from the raw material to the finished article under his eye, or even by his own hands, had a calling more fit and worthy to employ intelligence and interest than the machine-tender of to-day, who not only hour after hour repeats the same process, but is confined to an operation which is but a small part of the whole industrial process by which any article is produced. He cannot look upon the work of his hands and, as Genesis (i. 31) represents the Creator as doing, see that it is good. Machinery has come to stay ; and it is a vain endeavour to substitute handicrafts, although to encourage handicrafts for leisure hours is most desirable.

(*d*) How can this defect of industry be removed? It has been suggested that workers might be passed from one department to another, so that they would become familiar with the whole process from start to finish, and thus acquire a more intelligent interest in the operations in which they were then engaged, viewing it as a part of a whole. That is not, however, a method which is likely to be generally regarded as practicable. A modification of this proposal seems more within the region of the possible, namely, that they should get by special classes a theoretical acquaintance at least with the whole business in which they are employed : whence comes the raw material, whither goes the finished article, and how the one is changed into the other. Their human interest would be widened, they would realise how varied was the partnership, of which they were parts, from the producer of the raw material to the seller of the finished article, and also how real was the *service* which by this *partnership* was being rendered to consumers, scattered world-wide. How many employers will be enlightened enough to make such an arrangement? Could not the community, however, provide evening classes for this purpose? A more practicable remedy under present conditions is to secure for the leisure hours such varied interests as will make the

monotony of the working hours less a mechanisation of man himself.[1]

(*e*) The most serious problem in connection with the employment of youth is this : that the boy or girl can find readily a "job" (unless under exceptional trade-depression, such as prevails in many industrial areas at present) in which unskilled labour can at once command a higher wage than can the apprentice who is being trained for some skilled trade, but in which the employment lasts only a few years, throwing the youth on the labour market, unskilled and unemployed, at an age past that at which the training for a skilled trade needs to begin, and probably little disposed to submit to its discipline. The " blind-alley " employments are one of the most serious industrial evils. A physical, mental, and moral deterioration sets in : and, even if work is secured, it is often casual, and if this is not casual by its very nature, the worker has acquired such habits that his employment becomes irregular, as he passes from job to job. He may even become unemployable, a parasite in society, drifting into vice or even crime. We are suffering, without doing anything adequate to prevent it, an appalling waste, not only of industrial efficiency, but of human personality. There is no practicable proposal of such a reorganisation of industry as would put an end to the need for these " blind-alley " employments. Unemployment relief might be extended to such youths, but on very strict conditions of submission to a thorough course of training for skilled employment in labour colonies, for in most cases it would be well to remove these youths from their former surroundings altogether. In the long run, cost what it may, such a plan would prove more economical than is the present waste of young life, the nation's most valuable asset.

(2) This aspect of the subject of youth in industry leads us beyond itself to confront what is the most serious economic problem of our time in this country, as well as in many others—the problem of unemployment. We are witnessing an economic change which it would be no exaggeration to call a revolution. The staple industries of the country, the bases of the prosperity of the nation, are all in a perilous condition. The coal industry is perhaps that which bulks most largely in the public eye ; but cotton, wool, engineering and shipbuilding are all depressed. Other nations, of which

[1] See the next chapter, on " Leisure and Culture."

we supplied the needs, are developing industries of their own, and sometimes with British capital. Our export trade in these staple industries is not likely ever again to recover its former proportion to the total volume of world-commerce. The new industries, some of them luxury trades, are not at all likely to compensate for the losses involved in the decrease of these old industries. Into the economics of this situation it is not the function of this volume to enter. Only this can be said : that our " captains of industry " have not displayed such a wisdom or prudence, courage or enterprise as would justify their arrogant pretensions, that they can manage their own business without any outside interference. Apart from world-conditions, for which they are not responsible, many have mismanaged industry by over-capitalisation, by wasteful competition, by failure in reorganisation when necessary. Not only does the resulting depression inflict hardship on the working classes involved, but imposes a very heavy burden on the community generally, in the relief of the unemployed. Further, theirs is an economic interest; the nation's is a human—not only the health and happiness, but the industrial skill, the moral character, the social contentment of large masses of the population. That there are well-managed enterprises, showing due regard to the welfare of the workpeople, it would be bearing false witness to deny ; no less is it true that there is a growing concern among leaders in industry about the wider than the merely economic aspects of their activities. But the conditions are such that a policy of *laissez-faire* would be morally unjustifiable and socially disastrous. Whether the unemployment problem, the tragic human aspect of trade depression, is to be solved by relieving industry of rates, or by schemes of national development, financed by public loans, or by waiting on a more favourable turn of events, or by collective ownership and control of capital—these are proposals involved in political partisanship, and on these the Christian Churches in the name of Christ cannot offer a judgment, although individual Christians should feel their responsibility to come to some intelligent decision. What, however, may be said in asserting the sovereignty in the economic as in every other sphere of human life and labour is this—that human interests must come before financial ; that character is more important than wealth ; that, whatever injures even " the least of His brethren " insults Him (Matt. xxv. 45). In realising the ideal of a Christian economic order

the Church should stimulate the conscience of the community to support the State in any necessary legislation or administration. To the function of the State in industry we must return in a subsequent chapter ; but, as more immediately continuing the discussion of this and the previous chapter, we pass in the next chapter to consider Leisure and Culture.[1]

[1] This subject is discussed from the Christian standpoint in *Copec Reports : IX. Industry and Property.*

CHAPTER IV

LEISURE AND CULTURE

One of the objects of education was in a previous chapter described as culture, the development of the whole human personality as well as the preparation for the vocation, which every man should accept as an obligation. As the human personality cannot, however, realise all its possibilities in vocation, there should be personal interests and activities beyond the exercise of that vocation, especially if, as in the majority of cases, the profession or business or trade is so limited in the range of demand which it makes that it does not offer an adequate opportunity for self-expression. Under culture I include that manifold of interests and activities which reach beyond the duties of the calling.

One of the demands of the home is for *leisure* for the cultivation of the family affections. No less does the efficient activity in industry demand leisure ; for it is being recognised that long hours do not proportionately increase output, and that the shorter working-day justifies itself economically. This twofold demand for leisure becomes a threefold in the interests of culture. The more mechanical and consequently monotonous any occupation is, the greater need for leisure to live the wider human life apart from the daily toil. It has been demonstrated also that, while up to a certain point fatigue is not injurious to this physical organism, since in rest and sleep the drain upon the vital energy can be recovered, and health can be maintained : yet if the exhaustion is excessive, no such restoration is possible, and the organism suffers slow but sure deterioration, which may result in disease and premature death. Not only so, but such excessive labour leaves body and mind in a condition in which the best use cannot be made of the scanty leisure which is allowed. The tired body and jaded nerves crave for some forms of excitement which will make little (or no) demand for effort, such as the cinema rather than the drama, or will offer what seems a stimulus, such as drinking or gambling. Thus there are valid reasons for insisting on a working-day the length of which will not deaden the soul, nor bring disease to the body, but which will allow leisure for the human personality to live a life worth living, and not merely

to earn a living. Whether an eight hours' day, or a forty-eight hours' week is the maximum proper to every industry is a question with which the Christian moralist need not concern himself. It would at first scrutiny appear that the physical demand, the monotonous character, the social necessity, the economic value of different occupations vary so greatly that uniformity need not be insisted on. While these considerations may be allowed their due weight, the demand for all workers remains for adequate leisure for the wider human interests and activities which have been mentioned above.[1]

I

If the Christian moralist need not concern himself with the exact length of the working-day, but must insist on adequate leisure, he has a vital interest in the employment of that leisure, for it is how a man uses his free hours that makes or mars him, that shows what manner of man he is.[2] To regulate and control *leisure* is to deprive it of its distinctive character, as the derivation shows. The old French *laisir*, to be permitted, is derived from the Latin *licet*, it is permitted. A man's leisure is the time he has at his own disposal, free from economic dependence or social obligation, which he can use according to his own interests and tastes, in which he can escape from the bonds of necessity, under which most of his life falls, and be realising his freedom. Counsel, not command, guidance, not compulsion, is here in place.

(1) A great thinker (if my memory serves me right, Hegel) is reported to have said that when a man has wooed and won the woman he loves, and has found the calling which satisfies him he has balanced his accounts with the world, and need ask no more. The family affections and the wider interests and activities which may be related and auxiliary to the vocation may well occupy such a man's leisure. The Christian minister, for instance, if he takes a broad enough view of his calling may not only think of the whole world as the parish of his practical service, but the

[1] This demand includes not only the regulation of the hours in the working-days, but also the weekly half-holiday, and the Sunday, on which labour should be reduced to the practical *minimum*, and, therefore, amusements and employments which impose labour should be as far as is possible avoided.

[2] Interesting in this connection is Jesus' comparison of the men of His own time to children at play, when character reveals itself (Matt. xi. 16, 17).

whole realm of culture as the province of his intellectual interest. Only thus can he escape parochialism and professionalism, and show expansively and pervasively the universality of Christ. (*a*) That the home has a claim for more of the leisure of men and women than the tendencies of to-day allow needs to be urged. That many houses offer so inadequate accommodation which such a use of leisure would require is one of the social evils of our time which calls for immediate removal. While the differences of age and individual capacity vary, it would be unreasonable, however, to demand that all the interests and activities of the free hours of all the members of a family should be confined to the home. There may be a too exclusive cultivation of the family affections, which degenerates into a selfish sentimentality, and parents especially should not regard it as a fault in their children if they seek interests and activities in the wider world. The home should be surrounded by a wider circle of friends, all welcomed in it, yet chosen according to the individual inclinations of the members. So long as a friend's character is worthy and influence good, no parent has a right to make personal preference the standard of judgment. Here in the home, with its extension of friendship, is the best social sphere for the use of leisure.

(*b*) So also it is good if the culture can be an extension of the vocation, as the vocation will command a more intelligent interest, if it can be thus set in a wider context of knowledge. Would not the engineer find a fuller satisfaction in his daily work, were that the starting-point of mathematical and physical studies? The gardener might see beyond his hedge, if he studied botany and biology. The trader could think of himself as rendering a human service if, by knowledge of geography, he could imagine the whole process that lies behind the wares in which he deals.

(2) We must, however, recognise the desire for, and even the desirability of, wider employments of leisure. (*a*) If we associate athletics with culture as necessary for the *mens sana in corpore sano*, it might at first sight appear as if all use of free hours could be, and should be, brought under the one or the other, the exercise for the development of body and mind. But this is a counsel of perfection. It does seem that most persons need some *amusement*, a relaxation from the efforts which subserve the one interest or the other. So long as an amusement is not vicious nor cruel, so long as its influence is not degrading to the human personality, we cannot

condemn it, if it does not waste time for which these higher interests have a claim, and does not become an engrossing pre-occupation, so as to interfere with the pursuit of the more serious business of life. In previous chapters reference has already been made to cruel sports, to betting and gambling, intemperance in any of its forms, as sins to be condemned from the Christian standpoint. That encouragement should be given to healthful games by the provision of playing fields by the community for the masses who cannot afford to join private clubs is a demand which may be made in the interests of morality as well as health, for " Satan finds some mischief still for idle hands to do."

A great deal of juvenile delinquency should not be described as either vice or crime, but simply as an outburst of exuberant vital energy, which restrictions necessary for public order and comfort deprive of a free outlet. The streets cannot be, and should not be left to be, the only easily accessible play-ground of the children of the poor. How much would be gained for social solidarity, if there were more mingling of the youth of all classes in games. To play games is assuredly to be commended more than to watch others play, although the excitement of such athletic contests, so long as it is kept free of the illegitimate interest of betting, may afford such relief from the strain and stress of life that condemnation must be withheld. One cannot but regret that professionalism is invading our sports, although it may be contended that, just as a great actor or a great musician displays his skill for the delight of others, so may the football, cricket, tennis, or billiard champion. Unable through physical defects to share fully in any games, I do recognise fully the value of athletics as a heathful personal pursuit, or even of an interest in the play of others as a personal interest, much to be preferred to many forms of amusement, which might otherwise attract. I cannot but add my serious doubt whether it is desirable that women should assert their equality with men by engaging in all forms of athleticism. That the health of women has been greatly improved by the physical exercise encouraged, or even required, in schools is certain. What is not so certain, however, is that the excessive strain which some forms of athletics involve may not do the female organism—which, it must not be forgotten, is constituted for motherhood—greater and more enduring injury than a man would be likely to suffer.

(*b*) There are forms of popular amusement—the cinema (movie and talkie), the music-hall, the theatre, the dancing-hall—which, legitimate in themselves, may by the content or the associations of the entertainment involve moral peril, especially in so far as they may encourage false views and wrong desires in regard to sex. While it is but seldom that an obscene film escapes the central censorship, or the control of the local authorities, yet too large a number of the films is trivial or vulgar, stimulating the imagination, and exciting the emotions of the young especially in a most undesirable way. An attempt is being made to use the picture-house for educational purposes ; but the purpose must not be too obtrusive, as the crowds which flock to this, probably the most popular, form of amusement do not want to be educated. The pictures must be interesting as well as educative, if they are to hold the attention.[1] It is generally admitted that the entertainment offered by the music-hall is on a higher level than it was a generation ago ; but even if innocuous, it has the same defects as the cinema. Neither can be regarded as at present generally, as even indirectly, a means of culture ; either is at best only a distraction from the cares of life. In the theatre amusement and art meet. A great many plays are performed which are on no higher level from the standpoint of culture than the cinema or the music-hall. Great dramatic art is often wasted in performing dramas which are frivolous, and as immoral in tendency, if not obscene in presentation, as the rather uncertain judgment of the Censor will tolerate. The sex passion, especially in illegitimate licence, is too frequently the dominant interest. It would be folly to demand that a relation, so determinative of good or evil, weal or woe, in human life should be excluded from the stage ; but it is not desirable that a disproportionate attention should be given to it, as if men and women lived only to love, or rather, as many plays would suggest, to lust ; vice may be represented as well as virtue, but lust must not be depicted as heroic, and love as ridiculous. Let the stage by all means hold up the mirror to life, but to the whole of life, to its beauty and glory, as well as its filthiness and shame. There has been a very marked change in the opinion of Christian people as regards attendance at the theatre. Much there is remaining which still deserves censure.

[1] The National Council of Public Morals constituted a Commission of Inquiry, which in 1917 published a Report, *The Cinema, its Present Position and Future Possibilities.*

There are, however, dramas which are not only fine literature, but also good morals, using the term in no Pharisaic narrowness. Much there is in the associations of the theatre, the reaction of their profession on the character of many actors and actresses, which may still justify the Christian moralist's doubt whether this form of entertainment can be approved without many reservations. As regards dancing, as an occasional exercise and as a social entertainment it need not fall under censure ; but the excessive pursuit of this form of amusement, and the conditions under which the desire is often indulged, do undoubtedly form a serious moral peril. That men and women, who do not know one another well enough for any moral judgment, should be brought together under an excitement which weakens self-restraint, makes such dancing morally a doubtful indulgence.

(3) There is an employment of leisure, which is not merely for amusement, but as a means of culture, the development of the whole human personality, intellectual and æsthetic. A great deal of reading, of novels especially, is for amusement, and not a means of culture, but of the vulgarisation and degradation of the mind. Here again the sex interest is disproportionately emphasised. Moral standards which are the result of age-long experience of the good and the evil of sex relations are set aside ; and writers, whose intelligence, not to mention even their character, is not at all equal to the task, advocate experiments which, if generally adopted, could lead only to social disaster. Visiting museums, libraries, picture galleries may also become merely an amusement, with little, if any, influence on culture. Not less satisfaction, but more, may be got out of all such pursuits if they are followed with serious enough intent, and earnest enough effort to subserve culture. Before passing to this subject, however, some considerations of the Christian attitude to amusements must be offered.

(*a*) It is recognised that play in the child is a necessary and beneficial factor in personal development, and it is a Puritanical excess to condemn all amusement even in the adult. The bow cannot always be stretched, else it will lose its elasticity. Amusement may be *re-creation*, restoring interest and energy after labour. Change of occupation may not be enough if it makes similar demands on mind and body : there must be relaxation for re-creation. Busy and tired men make a serious mistake in seeking amusement in some form of violent exercise. Rest is often what is very

much more necessary than change of occupation. But the active man finds it impossible to rest, unless in sleep, with nothing to engage his attention. Here reading of light literature is a ready solace. Several scholars have confessed that they close a day's hard study with an hour spent on a detective story. Amusement can be morally justified only as re-creation, a relief from the strain of toil, and a recovery of fitness to take up the burden again. As *pastime* it cannot be justified. Hence the pleasures of the idle rich, who go from one enjoyment to another, and who often lose the zest of every pursuit to which they turn, should fall under unreserved condemnation. It is a fact which psychology confirms that he who makes pleasure his object in the end fails to attain it: for pleasure is the satisfaction which accompanies a purpose achieved, an interest gratified. A life for pleasure will end in a life without pleasure. One need not be an unduly austere or unsympathetic moralist to hold the conviction that one of the serious moral evils and social dangers of our day is the immoderate pursuit of pleasures, not only by the idle rich, but by many in all classes, who try to imitate their "betters" socially. The capacity for pleasure is, through excessive indulgence, blunted; new stimulants are invented; the limits of virtue are crossed; and the "far country" of vice is entered. The Church needs to preach to-day, "Love not pleasure, love God." If God is really loved, then a man can be free to do as he pleases, because, not only will his duty be his delight, his service his freedom, but also such amusements as his conscience allows him will give him a satisfaction which the pursuit of pleasure for itself cannot give.

(*b*) One would like, if one could, to connect the word amusement with the Muses, and to find in the word itself a plea for the association of all pleasures with culture as self-development. Unhappily the probable derivation is from the French *museau*, the snout of an animal, and the picture the word calls up is that of "a dog sniffing idly about." In this sense the Church cannot regard it as a duty to provide amusement. But in the worthier sense, as a means of fully realising human personality, there may be circumstances in which a church must make such provision. If the homes in a district are such as do not afford the opportunity for home pursuits for the leisure hours, if places of amusement have undesirable associations, if the social intercourse that lads and maidens quite naturally desire with one another can be

obtained only on the street, or in the public-house, then it becomes the duty of the Church to provide an environment for the hours of leisure which will not contradict but confirm the influences of the Sunday school, the Bible class, and the worship in the church. But there lies a serious danger here. The spiritual influence of the Church must be intense and constant enough to make such amusements as may be provided helps and not hindrances to the Christian life. These things can be added only if the Kingdom of God is being sought first (Matt. vi. 33). Many churches are not Christian enough to take this risk. Disaster has come to churches which came to be regarded as amusement agencies rather than as channels of the truth and grace of Jesus Christ. There must be experienced and responsible supervision; the admission only of those who are receptive of, and responsive to, Christian influences, the exclusion of any who show that they regard the Church only as a cheap purveyor of pleasure. Without moral or religious obtrusiveness, there must be a constant subordination of all the pursuits allowed to the end of character-forming of the Christian pattern.[1]

(*c*) The Church's duty to influence the community in a Christian way in regard to popular amusements, and the public provision for them, may be mentioned. It is now generally conceded that the community has an interest in, and a responsibility for, moral character as well as intellectual culture. It should have the authority to prohibit any public provision for popular amusement, of which the tendency is manifestly immoral, and under immoral I should include what brutalises (such as prize-fights) as well as what sensualises. And it should have the interest to use fully such authority as it may possess. In stimulating the conscience of the community the Church should act in a broadminded, large-hearted way: and must not allow individual prejudices to usurp the place of general principles regarding which it can expect the assent of sensible and decent citizens. The trivial for the seriously minded, and even the vulgar for a refined taste, must not be confused with the immoral. But this negative policy is not enough.

[1] One of the most difficult of the problems the Church has to face to-day is that of the legitimacy of amusements on Sunday. Without any Jewish Sabbatarianism, it must insist that the need of rest from labour for others as well as for self, and the higher claim of worship and service in the fellowship of the Church, should determine what (if any) recreations shall be indulged in by Christian people seeking to keep the Lord's Day holy.

There may be need in a community of encouraging the positive policy of a provision by the community of the means of wholesome amusement. Recognising that the influence of the amusements of the leisure hours is at least as potent, if not more so, than that of the daily occupation on character, this social obligation should be zealously enforced.[1]

II

Turning now from amusement to culture, although, as has been indicated, no "scientific frontier" can be drawn between them, the general principle may be formulated that the Christian ideal of human personality and human society includes culture as well as character as an essential demand. While Paul lays down for the Christian the restrictive principle "whatsoever is not of faith is sin" (Romans xiv. 23), he also states the expansive principle, to which we are entitled to give a wider application than for his immediate purpose he does: "all things are yours; and ye are Christ's; and Christ is God's" (1 Cor. iii. 23).

(1) Without depreciating the primary importance of religious experience and moral character in the Christian man, we may insist on the almost (if not altogether) equal importance of mental culture. So generally is this obligation ignored or neglected in the witness and work of the Christian Church that the reasons for insistence on it may be given. The text just quoted itself suggests three—God, Christ, the Christian man.

(*a*) For the aversion to Christian theology which is often shown by philosophers, scientists, artists, *littérateurs*, theologians are in some measure to blame. God has been sometimes represented as a departmental head, concerned only about saving from hell for heaven an abstraction called the soul, instead of as the ultimate cause, the final purpose, the essential reality of this vast, wonderful, glorious universe, the God in all, through all, over all. Sin has been allowed in the language of an exclusive piety to cast so dark a shadow over this world, that the splendour of God's wisdom, power, and goodness is not allowed to transfigure it. It is surely one of sin's worst penalties that our consciousness of it, necessary as it is, should obscure our vision of God. God is

[1] The importance of the wise and right use of leisure is recognised by the inclusion in the *Copec Reports* of one on *Leisure* (Vol. V.).

Creator, Preserver, Ruler of all, and we fail to know Him as He desires to be known if we do not seek to know Him, not only in all things, but with all the capacities of apprehension, appreciation, appropriation that He has given us. Through Truth, through Beauty, through Goodness, through Love He comes to us, and draws us to Himself, if we but allow ourselves to be drawn.

(*b*) Further, the meaning and the worth of Jesus the Christ are lessened if, as in the traditional divisions of dogmatics, the work of Christ is limited to His atoning death. For me that saving sacrifice is the centre, dark with excess of light, from which I describe the widening circle of my thought and life ; but I refuse to make such a restriction. His whole person was His full work, for the Person was realised in the work, and the work revealed the Person. We usually lay stress on the perfect moral character and the absolute religious consciousness as confirming His claim to be the Word become flesh (John i. 14) ; we should perhaps even regard it as an impertinent compliment to refer to His mental capacity, His intellectual interest, His æsthetic taste. But Truth and Beauty, as well as Goodness and Love, are revealed in Him. Under the historical limitations of time and place, how wide was His interest in nature and in man ; how keen was His insight into the souls of men, and the ways of God with men ! For Him the world around as well as the heart within revealed God as Father. Art, literature, science, philosophy did not come within the range of His activities, because of the restrictive historical conditions, and His exclusive vocation ; and yet may we not gratefully confess that in His apprehension of, and attitude to, God, nature, and man, there were the living roots of all culture. He was the Son of Man as nothing human was alien to Him. To know the Jesus of history, if not always the Christ of the creeds or the confessions, is, to use the words of Thackeray about one of his characters, " a liberal education."

(*c*) One of the dangers of religion, of the Christian no less than of the Jewish, is Pharisaism, the earnest and serious, but over-anxious desire for religious self-preservation, which generally involves not only self-restriction of human personality, but self-extinction of a great deal that essentially belongs to its full development. The Christian man should not be narrower in interest, less in endowment, lower in achievement than a full-grown man. That there must be abnegation of some of the possibilities of human personality must

be admitted. A man will be nothing-in-particular if he tries to be everything-in-general ; a jack-of-all-trades proves a master-of-none. A condition of excellence is concentration of effort, and that involves limitation of interest. While a man's vocation should not be allowed so to absorb him that there is no margin of culture beyond it, yet it must be admitted that he cannot make all culture equally his province, but must accept some restriction, but let it be as wide in range as he can make it. A man's social obligations also impose limitations. While the best a man can give the world is his best self, yet an exclusive devotion to self-culture is a refusal of the obligations which membership in a society imposes. An adjustment must be made, difficult as it is between self-culture and self-sacrifice in the service of others, between, to use Jesus' own words, the love of self and the love of a neighbour. Accepting this qualification, however, the duty of self-culture may be insisted on. A man's intellect, no less than his affections and volitions, are God's gift to be gratefully received, to be fully developed, and to be freely used ; and the man fails in fulfilling the divine intention who, in respect of culture, does not make the best possible of himself. Further, human personality is a unity and moral character and religious experience are not unrelated to, independent of, intellectual capacity. Wisdom does not depend on learning, the quality of the mind on the quantity of its contents ; and one does meet with moral and spiritual discernment where narrow is the range of knowledge. Is not the explanation that there has been a liberal education in communion with the living Christ, in study of the Holy Scriptures? This granted it remains true that " more harm is wrought by want of thought than even want of heart " ; and that an ignorant morality or piety is often an individual nuisance, and a social danger. The more intense a man's devotion, the more rigid his sense of duty, the more he needs to be saved from an unlovely and harmful one-sidedness by as wide a culture as his capacity and opportunity can afford him.

(2) What should such a culture include? (*a*) First of all its aim should be the fullest development of individual capacity ; it is not extent of knowledge, but excellence of mind which should be the aim. A man may be learned, and yet not cultured. All his learning may not make him a gain to himself and a good to others. Knowledge of facts is less valuable than insight into truth, the meaning of the facts,

and the gift of wisdom, which judges their worth. A one-sided intellectual development, in which the whole personality does not share, is not an adequate culture.

(*b*) Secondly, culture should include a threefold contact with nature—scientific, æsthetic, and practical. The modern quantitative methods of science—which reduce the universe to mathematical formulæ—valuable as they have proved themselves as an instrument of research into the laws, and thus control over the forces of nature, do not enable a man, in the well-known phrase, to think God's thoughts after him ; but such a knowledge of the natural sciences as will allow a man to appreciate the physical processes of light, heat, electricity, and their bearing on the wonder and the wealth of life, will make the world around more interesting and intelligible. A knowledge of the wonderful works and ways of plants, insects, birds, beasts, will widen the horizon of the mind, and the range of the affections, even if we can use the term love in its full sense only of personal relations. Such a knowledge will deepen the conviction that all things work together, even if that be accompanied by an only much qualified assurance that this working together is for good (Rom. viii. 28). We have got beyond the " design " type of apologetics, the attempt to discover the divine intention in individual phenomena ; but even modern science does not disprove the assumption of religion that the regularity of the physical phenomena, the adaptability of the vital organisms, and the mutual relations of the two spheres do indicate a purpose which, taken as a whole, is beneficent. Such a conclusion must not be the end of the study of nature, which must be disinterestedly pursued, but it may well be its result.

The æsthetic contact must not be regarded as less valuable for culture. The common saying, " There is no disputing about tastes," should not lead to an abandonment of the search for an objective standard of Beauty, and its discovery in nature. The moral standard is more directly of urgent importance for society than the æsthetic ; hence there is a social pressure to secure uniformity in the one case which there is not in the other. In most persons the æsthetic taste needs discipline and development ; how great the good of a sensitive appreciation of the beauty which nature discloses to those who have the eyes to see, and the heart to feel ! A wrong has been done in sacrificing the beauty of nature to utilitarian ends, and to be welcomed are all efforts to

prevent and to correct the wrong. It need not, however, detract from the pure æsthetic appreciation of nature to recognise gratefully its utilitarian aspects. In a previous chapter it has been argued that we should take account of utility along with the more usually recognised human ideals, since God has made man with a body, and has in nature provided for the supply of its needs. It may be that it is because I was brought up in a home where agriculture was a subject for frequent discussion, that I have this inclination to include an interest in nature as man's store-house as a not unworthy element in human culture.

(*c*) It is by man's labour that the wealth of nature is made available to meet human need, and an interest in that labour is not to be despised as beneath the notice of a man of culture. I have a good deal of sympathy with the farmer who thought his young minister an uneducated man because he did not know the difference between barley and oats. The parables of Jesus show His interest in the manifold ways of men, as well as His insight into the truth and wisdom of God. The familiar saying, " nothing human is alien to me," should not be held in contempt because of its familiarity ; there is no adequate culture where it is ignored. Mankind must always be an interest to men. As heirs of all the ages, we have access to their treasures through language, literature, history. Again, it may be that the position of my home, where, as a boy, for quite practical objects I was taught five languages, gives me an unjustifiable prejudice in favour of learning languages as a means of culture. But two valid reasons for that prejudice—if prejudice it be—may be offered, drawn from personal experience. *Firstly*, theology and philosophy have had a large place in my own studies ; and I have found that it is not possible to carry over from a German work into English all the more subtle *nuances* of thought. For instance, we complain of the length of the German sentence ; and translators often regard it as their duty to break up a long German sentence into a number of short English sentences. There is a loss ; a synthesis of thought is resolved by this analysis, and the unity is sacrificed. Again the German compound word is broken up into a phrase, but, although there is an English equivalent for every part of the German word, it has not the same mental compactness.

Secondly, since the war, I have taken part in several international movements, and I have discovered how difference

of language, even when there is competent translation, stands in the way of mutual understanding. The more subtle differences of national mentality escape detection and recognition, unless there is familiarity with the language.

Literature in its widest sense includes all that is written, but in the narrower sense only what has the double value, not only of the *what*, but also of the *how*, of the style as well as the content. That we should use literature for the enlargement of our knowledge is not its only use ; it has worth also for the refinement of our taste. What is said is enhanced in value if it is well said. Important as is what may be called informational literature, for that too may be literature in the strict sense when it not only imparts knowledge in its contents, but also offers delight by its style, what may be called *pure* literature—that is, that literature which is a branch of art, as aiming first of all and most of all at being a thing of beauty, which gives joy for ever—must hold a foremost place in culture. The study of literature in other languages beside the mother tongue belongs to any adequate culture.

History, as the record of man's achievement in thought and life, in some measure enables a man to transcend time and space, to become a contemporary of every age and a citizen of every land. Even the remote past can contribute something to our understanding of human evolution. Specialisation there must be ; and it is well that one man should become for others the instrument of minute and accurate research, say, of the tenth century before Christ in China, remote as that study may seem from any present practical interest ; but specialisation must be within a wider context of general culture, if even its particular task is to be effectively carried out. That an educated man should know everything about something, and something about everything is an unrealisable ideal, but is not without value as warning and as guidance. Our present danger is the expert, who, as has been said, is learning more and more about less and less. I should put in a special plea for as wide a knowledge of the world of to-day as is possible. The man who seeks to know all that is to be known about the twentieth century has a claim to be a scholar, if his methods of study are as meticulously exact as he has who knows all that is recorded of any past century. None can maintain that the interest is less intense, or the value of the study less great. I cannot regard as a man of a culture to be envied or

admired one who never reads the newspaper, and cares less for Germans or Frenchmen of to-day than for Greeks or Romans of the past. The present cannot be understood without the past, and the present must surely point forward to the future. What is the direction of human evolution? That question may be approached in two ways. The positivist or Comptist approach, which is characteristic of many writers on sociology, is from the standpoint of causality: it seeks to infer from the actual conditions what are the possible, or even the probable, consequents. The idealist approach dares to discover in human history an immanent teleology, a realisation of ideals, and to forecast what the course of this realisation is likely to be. The Christian approach interprets this causal process, this immanent teleology, as a fulfilment of divine purpose. No culture is complete which does not in human history recognise as potent factors of human evolution moral standards and religious convictions; and without minimising the potency of other factors — physical, economic, social — exalt man's moral religious development as the central current of man's movement in time, and discover in the human movement the divine activity, eternal, transcendent, yet immanent in time in opposition to sin, and in realisation of good. Man's culture is crowned, as it reaches beyond nature and man to God, in whom, and of whom, and through whom are all the objects which human culture in its manifold activities can apprehend and appreciate.

(*d*) Culture is not merely a passivity, a receptivity; it must also be an activity, a creativeness. There is a realisation of human personality in creation. This creativeness, which can afford employment and enjoyment for the leisure hours, can assume three forms, or at least, these three forms need here to be mentioned. Man may first of all co-operate with nature in its utilitarian aspects, as affording provision for the needs of man. During the Great War men and women found a new interest in their allotments. It was an economic necessity then; but it would be a loss if that interest were dropped because that necessity had ceased. As Antæus gained strength as he touched mother-earth, so I am convinced our modern society would be physically and mentally advantaged if our excessive urbanisation were to a far greater extent than is now possible restrained and corrected by a return to nature, and employments with the soil. The ideal is that every family should have a garden,

and that human life should be interested in, and occupied with, plant life. It is in agriculture and horticulture that man can enter into a close partnership with God, who feeds the birds and clothes the flowers. It has been said that the story of man according to the Bible begins in a garden, and ends in a city, but it is a garden-city, for "in the midst of it there is a river of life, and on the sides of it is the tree of life, the leaves of which are for the healing of the nations" (Rev. xxii. 1–2). Might not the professional man even gain more if, instead of leaving home to play golf, he could see some of his own handiwork in the beauties of the garden around that home?

Secondly, the mechanisation of industry can be counteracted by the pursuit of crafts. It is impossible for us to reverse the industrial evolution, and on any large scale to substitute hand for machine-made goods. Machinery has raised the standard of living for all classes of the community. But the recognition of that plain fact does not forbid the encouragement in every way possible of the employment of leisure hours in making articles, in which not only can the craftsman exercise his own taste as to shape and colour, but can have the pleasure of seeing the whole process from the raw material to the finished article. In such making he can express himself, as he cannot in his daily toil, if that involves working on a machine, which performs only a very small portion of the total process of production.

Thirdly, the craft may very easily pass into the region of art, and the artisan become an artist. Man need not only admire the beauty of nature in shape, colour, sound; he can produce beauty himself, not alone in imitation of the beauty which he appreciates in nature, but as expression in sensuous forms of something in himself which nature does not, and cannot, give him. Not only is it desirable that the beauty of nature or of art should be brought within reach of the industrial, urban masses, from whose environment and occupation beauty has been banished, but still more desirable is it that any creative capacity in any boy or girl should be developed, and afforded opportunity for cultivation. We owe it to those whom we imprison in their daily life and toil amid the ugly and dreary that they should have the desire, the ability, and the opportunity to escape into a fairer world. Let art be the possession of all who can delight in it, and not the privilege only of the few who can pay for that enjoyment.

(3) In view of the narrow outlook of the Churches

generally, this description of an adequate culture may appear Utopian ; but we are in this volume not merely describing the actual, but also attempting to indicate the ideal. It may not be generally realisable in any time we can now foresee, but of this I am certain, that the conception of God as Father, and of each man as potentially, until by faith in Christ he becomes actually, a child of God demands no less large and lofty a requirement of what the Church should use its influence to secure. The conditions of the realisation of the ideal are only to a very slight extent under the direct control of the Church. Education has slipped from its grasp; even religious instruction is for the most part not under its direction. Science, art, literature, philosophy would resent interference. It must learn that its method cannot be domination, and, indeed, domination is inconsistent with the distinctively Christian spirit ; but must be permeation by its influence in the service which it can render to these varied interests and activities. There are three ways in which the Church can serve culture. (*a*) In the first place it should, as far as its resources allow, set a high standard of culture in its own worship, witness, and work. It is true that the Gospel in Jesus' own ministry was " hid from the wise and understanding, and revealed unto babes " (Matt. xi. 25), and that in Corinth " not many wise after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble " were called (1 Cor. i. 26) ; but the Apostle who did most to make Christianity a world religion was a man of culture ; and in the beginning Christian theology owed much to men who had been philosophers. One need not be " high-brow " to recognise the need of the Church's now seeking to bring all the kingdoms of the world into captivity to Christ. But not merely as an instrument of propaganda is culture to be commended ; it has an intrinsic value ; and mental development, no less than religious experience, belongs to the equipment of the man of God, if he is to be fit for every good work (2 Tim. iii. 17). It is a constant regret to me that, engaged as I am in the training of men and women for the Christian ministry, the conditions do not allow of a far wider culture than the college is able to give, that so many of the students fail to realise how important for the fulfilment (the filling-full) of their calling a much wider range of intellectual interests would be, and that a clamorous demand for what is called practical training endangers the substitution of subjects of clerical technique for the cultural subjects which have hitherto been

considered as necessary for an adequate theological curriculum. A man of well-disciplined mind can, with a little study, adapt himself to a practical situation more readily than a man who has simply acquired "the tricks of the trade." The Church was the channel by which such culture of the ancient world as survived was transferred to the modern world, and was a pioneer in education. It is no less than a disaster that its intellectual authority has been, and not without reason, challenged, and thus its moral and religious efficiency has been weakened. It is still its task, in all ways it can reach the world, to commend the ideal of lifelong education as widely spread as can be, not for economic efficiency, but for the cultural completeness of God-given manhood.

(*b*) There is a special kind of culture which is the Church's distinctive province. Its message to the world is the Word of God, God's revelation of Himself to man. The record of that revelation is in the Bible. The Bible itself is great literature : it would be difficult to estimate how much our English literature owes to the English translation, the Authorised Version. Professor Moulton has in his books helped a wide circle of readers to appreciate the Bible as literature. The Bible is great history ; the record of the Hebrew nation and its contacts with all the great empires of the ancient world can be used to cultivate the historic sense—the tragedy of human failure, and the glory of human endeavour. It is not a text-book of science, and as such it is misunderstood and misused, yet through its recognition of God in nature it ministers to that contact with nature which has already been described as an essential element of culture. How inadequately is the Bible used as an instrument of culture by Christian preachers and teachers ! There are as yet unexplored regions of interest beyond anything that the Church in its ordinary ministries has attempted. A study of the Bible alone as it deserves to be studied would lead ever onward to wider horizons and fairer prospects than any other starting-point of study which can be considered.

(*c*) Just as the community is becoming increasingly responsible for the moral character of its members, so also for their mental culture. Here the Church can be a constant stimulus. Let it ever urge that a man is robbed of his due, is treated unjustly by the community which withholds from him any of the instruments of culture, and which by such withholding hinders him from the development of such

capacity as he possesses. In a common education to awaken desires for wider knowledge, to develop capacities for receiving it, and then to withhold the satisfaction is a cruel mockery. Libraries, museums, picture galleries, parks—all these are as much a common need as drains and streets and lamps. If the resources of a community are too restricted to allow of such liberal provision of the means of culture, let the Church not hesitate to teach that it is a much more Christian act for a rich man to provide these agencies of culture for the common good than to acquire any of them for himself, and to limit the enjoyment of them to himself. A culture is not Christian which is claimed as an individual possession, and is not shared as a common treasure.

CHAPTER V

CITIZENSHIP

I

(1) Let us recall the fact that man is a gregarious animal, as the biologist would say, or a social personality, as we here are thinking of him. If society, as Maciver defines it, is a *willed* relationship, while the relation of husband and wife is a social relation, that of parent and child is on the child's part a natural relation, until in conscious voluntary dependence on, and submission to, the parent it too becomes social. The social relations in education are between teachers and taught, among the teachers, and among the scholars : so in industry between employers and employed, and among employers and among employed. There is more or less constraint in those relations ; but in so far as the mutual obligations are accepted they are social. For the employment of leisure, or for the pursuit of culture, there must be social relations formed. Where a common interest or purpose draws a number of persons together, they conconstitute a *community*, and for the realisation of what is common to them they will form associations—recreational, educational, etc. Such associations may be altogether voluntary, recognised in the discharge of their functions as free from any interference by the State, and subject to such laws only as for the protection of the members against any violation of the conditions of the association may need to be enforced.

Some may, however, be recognised by the Government as its agents to secure the proper qualifications for the fulfilment of some function, such as the professional councils. The utmost freedom, consistent with law and order, and the common good, should be allowed. On the value of such associations to promote desirable common interests and purposes it is not necessary here to dwell. It has been said that the family extends itself socially in the friendships of its members. Without any formal organisation, how large a place is filled in human life by such friendship ! That it should so often be restricted by wealth, rank, or title is much to be deplored. And all such efforts as university, college,

or school settlements among the homes of the poor, if the spirit be neither patronage on the one hand, nor servility on the other, but genuine mutual regard and service, are to be welcomed as expressing the Spirit of the Son of Man, who was the friend of the outcasts of Jewish Society. Within the Christian Church even, it is to be feared, social distinctions are allowed to obtrude themselves; and sometimes the denunciation of the Epistle of James (ii. 1–4) would be deserved. "My brethren, hold not the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Lord of glory, with respect of persons." It is possible, tastes and manners being different, some adaptation of method, as in the Brotherhood or the Sisterhood movement may be justified. But it were well if, of the worshippers in one congregation, it could always be said that in friendship "The rich and the poor meet together" (Prov. xxii. 2): because of the thankful recognition that "the Lord is the maker of them all." We may use the term *citizenship* to cover the whole range of social obligations outside of the home, education, industry, and friendship, and we may restrict it to membership in the local community—rural, urban, city, county—with the duties involved. So restricted, however, it needs to be supplemented by what we may call *neighbourliness* on the one hand, and *patriotism* and *internationalism* on the other. The subject of internationalism must be reserved for the next chapter; here, using the term in the wider sense, we shall deal with voluntary effort, individual and associated, civic duties, and the claims of patriotism.

(2) The Parable of the Good Samaritan not only gives us this conception of what *neighbourliness* involves, it also suggests, when we venture to expound the story imaginatively, the four methods of dealing with the social problem.

(*a*) We can imagine the priest and the Levite, on arrival in Jericho, eloquently denouncing the social conditions which made possible the horrible sight which they had just witnessed. Such hypocrisy is not altogether unknown to-day. Denunciation need not, however, be a cloak for indifference and indolence: it has its necessary function in reform. Jesus denounced the scribes and Pharisees of His own day, and Paul the Judaisers. Much of the teaching of the Hebrew prophets consists of exposure and condemnation of the social, economic, and political evils of their age. Wrongs and miseries need to be exposed as the first step towards compelling attention, and so securing a public opinion and

a popular sentiment which will give driving-force to the movement for the amendment of any evil ways. The '*Sweating*' *Exhibition*, arranged by the *Daily News*, was a factor in securing the Trades Boards Acts; *Uncle Tom's Cabin* had a share in the abolition of slavery in the United States. It is to be hoped that Lady Simon's recent volume on *Slavery* will hasten the day of world-wide emancipation. The duty of denunciation still rests on the Christian Church; and neither fear nor favour should hinder the Christian preacher from lifting up his voice boldly and frankly against all evil.

(*b*) The Good Samaritan himself shows, however, that this is not enough. Not only must wrongs be denounced, but human need must be relieved. This is the aspect of social service, which the historical conditions threw into exclusive prominence in the Gospels. The Parable of the Judgment (Matt. xxv. 31–46) enjoins feeding the hungry, clothing the naked, sheltering the stranger, ministering to the sick, visiting the prisoners as the service of the Son of Man which is the condition of entrance into the heavenly Kingdom. It is a loss that the Latin word *caritas* has been specialised in our word charity as the giving of alms, or being tolerant in judgment; and the Greek word *philanthropia* has in our word philanthropy been narrowed to the relief of distress. Throughout the history of the Church the supreme ethical principle of love has found this practical expression; but sometimes the expression has been a substitute for the emotion, and has been regarded as a work of merit, advantageous to the soul of the doer. Although the Evangelical Revival appears to the superficial observer to be primarily concerned with individual salvation, yet it was followed by an extensive and varied movement of philanthropy; for love to God inevitably moves to love for man.[1] The assumption among Christian people was that individual philanthropy could meet the needs of the poor and the miserable; and its practice was a duty. The extent of the need was often under-estimated, and the cause of it was not understood. By the piety of that age it was often assumed that poverty was either the penalty of vice—idleness, thriftlessness—or a "mysterious dispensation of providence" which was held responsible then for a great deal which we now trace to human error or wrong, such as selfishness, greed,

[1] See *Christ and Civilisation*, chapter ix.

stupidity, cruelty.[1] When individual philanthropy realised its insufficiency, then a society was formed, in which the resources of the many were combined to meet a need which the individual had not been able to satisfy. We must not depreciate the value of such philanthropy, individual or associated ; nor must we suppose that the need for it has ceased, or will within a measurable time cease ; the imperfections of the social order cannot be so corrected within a generation, as to exclude all occasions for its exercise. Societies exist for almost every conceivable object in the relief of ills to which mankind is exposed. This movement calls for a careful scrutiny in at least three respects.

Firstly, there is loss to the giver where the activities of a society take the place of the personal contacts of individual philanthropy ; to write a cheque as a subscription to a society has not the same human reaction as to deal with the wants or sorrows of another, where sympathy is called forth. There is often loss to the recipient, for there is always the danger of the person being submerged in the official, when the distribution of charity has become the means of livelihood. In dealing with a great number, the persons come to be "cases," just as in industry the workers become "hands." This is not intended as a general charge against the distributors of the benefits which societies have as their object ; but it is a danger which cannot be altogether ignored. However inevitable to secure more adequate relief the creation of all these organisations may have been, they may become a hindrance to the fullest and freest expression of Christian love. What is still needed is that, whatever changes in the methods of philanthropy may come, occasions for the spirit of neighbourliness shall be preserved for Christian men and women, as an essential expression of their love for man in Christ.

Secondly, while the main support of the philanthropic societies comes from Christian men and women, and much genuinely and intensely Christian love is shown in their administration, in this country they have, for the most part, no direct connection with the Christian Churches, but have an altogether independent organisation. That has its advantage, as there is a wider range of appeal than if there were a closer identification with the Churches. Those who are outside the Church can, and do, give their support. But

[1] See B. Kirkman Gray, *A History of English Philanthropy*.

there is a disadvantage ; the Christian spirit cannot find so open a channel in many of these institutions as it could if all engaged in the service of others in them were inspired by the Christian motive, the constraint of the love of Christ to minister to Him in the least of His brethren. The Churches suffer in their own life I am convinced because such a Christ-like ministry is not an integral part of their interests and activities. It may be that " our unhappy divisions " (for I will so describe them, despite sectarian contentment with them) would make impossible so close a connection ; but the separation of the healing from the teaching ministry of Jesus in the Church is deeply to be deplored. This conviction was forced upon me, when last year I had the opportunity of seeing the work of the German " Innere Mission." It must be admitted that hitherto the German Churches, still dominated by the principles of Luther, have not taken as wide a view of the relation of the Christian Church to human society as I shall in the next section of this chapter endeavour to show that they should ; but they have acknowledged *Liebesthätigkeit* (love's activity) as a necessary expression of justifying faith. The order of sisters, who carry on most of the loving service in these institutions, accept this work as a lifelong vocation ; and although release from the vow is possible, it is not often desired. In one institution where are received sufferers from deafness, dumbness, blindness combined, I was deeply moved by the evident consecration of these sisters to their trying and often painful task. I should indeed thank God, if I could be sure that a similar spirit were present and manifest in all our philanthropic institutions. I am convinced that British Protestantism might learn much that is valuable, not only from this German sisterhood, but even from the best side of Roman Catholic monasticism, not in a negative asceticism, but in the positive self-denial and self-sacrifice of a consecrated service of others. Even in the work of the Churches the world is too much with us : and our Christianity would be more world-conquering if it were more world-renouncing.

Thirdly, the conclusion is being forced upon us, however much for the reasons just stated we may regret it, that individual or associated philanthropy is not, with the resources which it can command, sufficient for these things, and that for the effective removal of wrongs and relief of miseries the community as a whole must become responsible. We are rapidly passing from philanthropy to what is called

social politics for the solution of the social problem. Whether the agency be local or national, that necessity is being increasingly recognised in legislation and administration. How we can preserve the spirit of philanthropy despite these changes will need to be considered in the next section. But we must now return to what the Parable of the Good Samaritan further can suggest.

(*c*) The question which the Christian Church must further ask, if it is to-day to deal as adequately as is possible with the social problem, is this. Not only why was the road to Jericho not so well guarded as to make such an outrage impossible, but why should robbers be led to commit it? We cannot limit our consideration here, however, to what the parable immediately suggests: How should we deal with crime? This is a comparatively subordinate aspect of the social problem of to-day. As there has been again and again occasion in this volume to insist, it is in the economic conditions especially that the roots of many of our difficulties and dangers lie. There is therefore a call for a constructive effort so to alter these conditions that the wrongs, the miseries, and the needs, which are the symptoms of the disease to be treated, shall cease. In a previous chapter on industry some of the remedies already tested, or only being tried, have been mentioned. What here needs to be insisted on is this, that neighbourliness, citizenship, patriotism, whatever the sentiment may be which is most relevant and effective for the situation, should constrain each Christian man to acquaint himself with what is practicable; to use his influence to support every approved constructive effort; to accept for himself, if it is his own business, trade, or profession which calls for amendment, any service or sacrifice required. Many rich men will need to be willing to be less rich that the multitude of the poor may become less poor. A redivision of wealth is a necessity of the parlous state of our and other lands; and the Christian way is not that of violence, but of voluntary acceptance of the changes which must needs come. There we were concerned with altogether voluntary efforts, such as works welfare schemes, profit sharing, co-partnership; that these will suffice may be doubted. Just as voluntary philanthropy has not proved sufficient for the relief of the symptoms, so there may be need of legislative and administrative changes on the local or national scale to remove the disease. These voluntary efforts have their value as pioneers in ways hitherto untrod;

and the spirit behind them gives the promise that the method of the necessary change shall, in accord with the Christian principle, be not revolution, but evolution.

(*d*) The reflections just offered present the transition to the fourth task which the Christian man individually, and the Christian Church corporately, must face. Jesus would not have maintained that the society of His own day, which made the illustration of His parables a copy of the actual, was according to the mind and will of His Heavenly Father : for Him the present age was an evil age, and He awaited the coming age, in which there would not be such evils. The Christian Church has been too content with, too acquiescent in, the existing order of society. The more advanced and sensitive Christian conscience is compelled to cast down the challenge : Can a competitive industrial system, an acquisitive society, realise the Christian ideal of equal love to self and neighbour ?

II

We are here concerned with local government only in so far as it may be used as an agency for the realisation of the Christian ideal. What may more strictly fall under the heading of law and order—such as the administration of law, the preservation of order, the prevention of crime, the protection of person and property—and the provision of such communal needs as drainage, sanitation, lighting, roads and bridges, need not now detain us, as the necessity of the discharge of these functions is now generally recognised. All that must be insisted on is that it is the duty of Christian citizens to do what lies in their power to secure efficiency with economy, the exclusion of all sectional interests, the dominance of the common good. There are two groups of functions regarding which there is not the same measure of agreement : what may be called broadly *the relief of special needs* arising from poverty, sickness, weakness, etc., and *the supply of common wants*, such as water, gas, electricity. We may take these in order.

(1) What are the needs for which a society is corporately responsible ? Should these needs be relieved entirely by the community as a whole, or can there still be a partnership between voluntary and communal effort ? (*a*) The relief of bodily need, food, clothing, shelter for those who

cannot for any reason provide these for themselves, the care of those whom any physical defect, such as blindness, hinders from adequate self-support, the prevention of maternal and infant mortality, the preservation of the health of the community, the provision of education and means of culture, the protection of public morals, the supervision of public amusements—these are all being recognised as burdens, which the majority of the citizens have not adequate resources to bear for themselves, and which must be borne by all for each (cf. Gal. vi. 5, 2). While it is from the standpoint of Christian ethics imperative that individual responsibility shall be insisted on, that each man shall be expected to bear his own burden in the measure of his strength, it is no less imperative that mutual responsibility, the bearing of the burdens of the weak by the strong, shall be asserted as the fulfilment of the law of Christ. The general principle may be laid down ; there is a minimum of healthy, contented, useful life which a civilised, not to say a Christian, society should maintain for all its members. In view of the glaring inequality in the distribution of wealth, justice even demands that through the community the excess of the few shall be made to compensate for the defect of the many in regard to the resources for maintaining the minimum standard of living. It is in my judgment despicable meanness for the wealthy, who send their children to expensive schools, to grudge the education of the children of the working classes in the national school-system. It is the interest of the society as a whole that this minimum standard should be maintained, and not merely an individual advantage. The exercise of such functions as the community has already accepted will react on the common conscience ; and we may expect that the range of responsibility will gradually be widened, and that the limit of what a community will undertake for the common good has not been reached. No doctrinaire boundary can be set to this extension of mutual responsibility ; according to need is the claim, according to means is the duty of the members of a society in their relation to one another.

(*b*) Passing now to the second question—how far this claim is to be met and this duty done by public or private effort—we must take note that social evolution has been characterised by an increasing and accelerating transfer of these services from individual to communal responsibility. While an ecclesiastical interest still maintains non-provided

schools, their number is decreasing ; there is a growing public opinion in favour of their transfer to the public authority ; teachers and educational administrations would desire an end of the dual system of national education. It would be well if the religious scruples which are still potent enough to secure the continuance of these schools could be so adequately met in respect of the religious instruction to be given, that the justification for them would cease. The care of the poor was once a charge on the resources of the Church, but has now been accepted by the community. One change which has just taken place may be unreservedly welcomed, the abolition of the Boards of Guardians, and of the discrimination in the community of a " pauper " class. However admirable personally many of these Guardians may have been, and however excellently they may have discharged their functions, it was undesirable that such a segregation of the poor, depending on public assistance, should be continued. It is an advance that such assistance should become one of the functions of the local authority ; and that there should be a careful discrimination of the different kinds of need, and a corresponding discrimination in the agencies of the local authority to meet the needs. With the taint of pauperism removed from the institutions caring for the sick, which the public authority maintains, a closer co-operation with the voluntary hospitals should become practicable. The further question arises : will such co-operation prepare the way for the abolition of the voluntary hospitals ? There is still a widespread and strong feeling in favour of the maintenance of these hospitals. But the inadequacy of the resources of these institutions, the pathetic appeals which are being constantly issued on their behalf, the doubtful methods sometimes employed almost to compel a reluctant public to subscribe, may well raise a doubt as to whether that feeling can offer good reasons for itself. It seems to me that there is no principle involved in the maintenance of the voluntary system ; and that it is only a surviving prejudice of the excessive individualism of last century. The decisive consideration should be : How can the object in view, the care and the cure of sickness, the preservation of health, be most efficiently and economically secured ? That there is waste of resources in the methods of securing support by competing institutions cannot be denied. That the resources would be more adequate to cope with the need if distributed as rates over

the whole community cannot be doubted. Valuable as morally the voluntary support may be to the subscribers, is an inadequate provision for this need not too high a price to pay? The Christian moralist is not, in my judgment, justified in offering a final answer to the question. This is but one instance of the kind of question which will emerge as regards all institutions for the relief of need.

(*c*) Should this tendency to transfer the support and control to the public authority continue, and increase, does that involve that Christian love will be deprived of this sphere of its exercise? By no means. Two ways remain open for Christian service. *Firstly*, Christian men and women should recognise that membership, whether representative or co-opted on the public bodies which administer these varied forms of relief, is a distinctively Christian vocation. It would be a disaster if private advantage or individual ambition were allowed to be the motives for seeking such office. There have been many notable instances of public service from the highest Christian motives. And the Christian Church should more fully than it generally does recognise, commend, and encourage such work as no less Christian, if done from the Christian motive, than what is more immediately connected with its own activities. It is a grievous wrong that national party divisions are allowed to intrude into the constitution of public bodies. Genuine interest in the common good, and adequate capacity for public service, should be insisted on as the sole qualifications to be taken into account.

Secondly, in the discharge of their varied functions the local authorities will still need voluntary service associated with their official action, as, for instance, in school care committees, in health visiting, etc. While public control serves to secure efficiency, this voluntary service in the Christian Spirit can introduce just that human sympathy which does enhance the value of any kind of public assistance. Because so many of the functions for which the Church itself was, or Christian men made themselves, voluntarily responsible are passing over to the local authorities—a movement which seems desirable if varied human needs are to be adequately relieved—the sphere of Christian service is not being restricted, although the forms of it may be changed. A closer partnership between Church and State as represented by these local authorities is now possible, and, therefore, obligatory. Christian love may become the tender

heart and kindly hand in the relief of human need which the community as a whole is accepting as its own burden.

(2) There is an extension of the functions of the organised community which meets with a great deal of opposition, and is often spoken of in disparagement as *municipal socialism*. Besides the needs to be relieved in a community, for which responsibility is now generally recognised, there are common wants which could be supplied by private enterprise, but which are to an increasing extent being supplied by public effort. The provision of water, gas, electricity, means of transport, conveyance of letters and parcels, telegraphs, telephones may be mentioned as instances, although some of those services must be provided on a general national scale, and not on a local municipal ; but in all instances one principle is involved.

(*a*) Without committing oneself to a theoretical socialism or any indiscriminate application of any theory, one may formulate this guiding principle. *Where a general want is being met by a public service, which by its very nature is a monopoly, then there should be such public control as will guard the community against exploitation by private interests, such public control taking if necessary the form of public ownership.* There cannot be any competition as regards the supply of water, gas, electricity, for the pipes or cables cannot be duplicated under the streets. Only one set of tramway rails can be laid on the surface. A monopoly is inevitable ; and a monopoly can become a public danger ; the quality of the service may be bad, and the cost high. Whether complete possession or adequate regulation is the proper course in any case cannot be decided on any general principle. If sufficient control for the common good cannot be secured without entire ownership, then ownership is justified. Apart from housing, which has been and still is a blot on its scutcheon, the City of Glasgow is a conspicuous example of the success of municipal socialism, whereas London in many ways illustrates the triumph of private interests over the common good. What should guide the Christian citizen in deciding for or against the extension of municipal socialism is the answer to a question : By what method is the *best quality* of service secured at the *lowest cost* with the *fairest treatment* of those who are employed ? Efficiency, economy, justice, these are to be the guiding considerations. If it be objected that the transfer to public authorities of such services will discourage private enterprise, and the necessary accumulation of

capital, it may in reply be pointed out that the cost of such undertakings has to be met largely by loans, and that these loans can be obtained only if a high enough interest is offered to induce investment ; and that the management of such undertakings does offer as great an opportunity, if not greater, for the exercise of those personal qualities which it is supposed private enterprise can and does evoke. If it be further objected that the burden of rates is already too high, and that an extension of municipal socialism would make that burden intolerable, it may be urged that these public enterprises can be made to pay their own way without increasing rates ; and where that is not the case the addition to the rates may be justified if the benefit to the community is a sufficient compensation.

(*b*) There are cases of public service which are not a monopoly, and which are open to competition, but in which the quality of the service should be a decisive consideration. All will admit that there is no article of food so important for the public health as is milk ; for on its purity depend the lives of infants and children. Is a community warranted in bringing the milk supply under public control ? If the health of the community demand it, even municipal dairies will be justified. There are public services which are in reality monopolies, although they appear as open to competition. There are many industries in which there is agreement as to the price to be charged, so as to avoid underselling ; and that price is often raised, without economic necessity, to the public injury. It is coming to be recognised that the functions of the Food Council must be extended, and its powers increased. A local administration will probably be necessary to carry out any regulation of prices which may be decided on. Such regulation, if deemed necessary in the public interest, will be confined to the necessary articles of food ; and will be justified only if it can be shown that the public injury to be avoided is great enough to justify this interference with the freedom of traders, as well as the cost of the administration. For, in my judgment, we must preserve individual liberty and responsibility, initiative, and enterprise as a characteristic of life and work ; and regulate only where the common good makes an imperative demand. It is not possible to appeal to the Christian ideal as prescribing any particular course of action, economic or social, in these matters, for the Christian ethics is not committed to a theoretical individualism or a

theoretical socialism, but only to the commendation of such individual freedom or such social control as the duty of equal love to self and neighbour in the exercise of citizenship may in each particular case demand. And the Christian Church can bring distrust and discredit on itself, if it commits itself to pronouncements on matters which do not properly fall within the authority of the Christian conscience, but may demand specialised knowledge, and trained judgment in addition to the Christian motive. But when the Church cannot corporately speak, individual Christian men can, and ought to make themselves competent to serve in the manifold functions now falling to the local community, so as to secure that the Christian spirit shall pervade, and Christian principle shall direct these services in such a degree as to make it a fit and worthy agent of the Christian ideal.

III

(1) The local authority is necessarily subject to the national authority. It is Parliament which by legislation determines what shall be the functions of the local government, the conditions of its activity, and largely also the resources at its command. In the administration the various departments at Whitehall have a measure of direction and control. It is a common complaint that Whitehall is becoming more potent than Westminster. From the present standpoint this is not a question which need be discussed. There are two considerations as regards the relation of the central to the local government which seem strictly relevant. *The first consideration* is this, that as large a liberty as practicable should be allowed to progressive communities to make experiments for the common good, and that the influence of the central authority should be constantly applied to the more retrograde communities to keep them up to the mark set by legislation in the discharge of their responsibilities.

The second consideration follows from this : there are areas in which the resources are not equal to the responsibilities ; and these can only be met by inflicting an intolerable burden of rates. Very often where the need is greatest the means are least. On the other hand, there are areas where the resources are more than adequate to meet the responsibilities. The central government should direct its efforts increasingly to secure justice as between the rich and the poor localities,

either by the relief of rates, where excessive in relation to capacity to pay, by grants from the general taxation, or by contributions from one area to another. Thus, to give a concrete instance of each method : since widespread unemployment is not due solely to local, but to general causes, the burden of relief should not fall where there is, just for that reason, the least capacity to bear, and Greater London should be treated as one rateable area, so that the suburb in its strength should share the burden of the slum in its weakness. This application of ethics to politics may be advocated in the name of Christ, whose law is mutual burden-bearing. As the three functions of local government discussed in the previous section, which may be briefly described in the phrases, the maintenance of order, the relief of need, the supply of wants, are common to both local and central authority, it is not necessary in this section to go over the same ground ; and the considerations just presented must suffice as indications of the Christian attitude on the relation of the central government.

(2) We must in this section consider several fundamental questions as to the relation of the Christian Church to the State. We must first of all discuss the Christian conception of the State, as conceptions have been advanced which are not Christian.[1]

(*a*) In discussing the standard of Christian morality in a previous chapter, it was insisted that it is essentially *social* ; it is a relation to mankind, as well as to nature, animals, God. Beginning in the immediate relations of the home, its range expands until it embraces all reality. Christian universalism demands that the morality of any Christian shall not be bounded by any frontier or restricted to any class, nation, or race. The moral claim is wide as humanity itself. Hence we must at once set aside any conception of the State which makes it the ultimate moral authority, and its claim for loyalty and obedience absolute. Man wills the relations which constitute society in many ways. This community of varied interests and purposes leads men to form many associations. The State does represent a wide community of interests and purposes ; but it is not exclusive of other communities, and cannot claim absolute control over them. It is true that many of the historical struggles of the past have been due to the effort of the State to exercise

[1] See *Christian Ideas in Political History*, by C. E. Osborne.

an absolute control. In the reign of Elizabeth it was assumed that the Crown might exercise an absolute authority over the Church, and that subjects could worship God only as the State directed. As one who is not ashamed to look back to the *Separatists*, who set out to reform themselves according to the pattern which they found in the Scriptures without " tarrying for any " (queen or bishops), as spiritual ancestors I entirely repudiate the control of the Church by the State. It was a disaster for Protestantism when the principle of *cujus regio, ejus religio* was accepted. On the Continent of Europe to-day, as in Rumania and in Poland, there still lingers this assumption, that the State may regard as disloyal subjects all who will not conform to the religion which the State would wish to prescribe for them. It is not religious liberty alone which needs to be claimed ; but also liberty of thought to follow truth whithersoever it leads, and liberty of conscience to obey whatsoever it may command. For in all these exercises of the human personality the same principle is involved as finds an expression in two passages of the Bible : " Shadrach, Meshach, and Abed-nego answered and said to the King, O Nebuchadnezzar, we have no need to answer thee in this matter. If it be so, our God whom we serve is able to deliver us from the burning fiery furnace ; and He will deliver us out of thine hand, O King. But if not, be it known unto thee, O King, that we will not serve thy gods, nor worship the golden image which thou hast set up " (Daniel iii. 16–18). " Peter and John answered and said unto them, Whether it be right in the sight of God to hearken unto you rather than unto God, judge ye ; for we cannot but speak the things which we saw and heard " (Acts iv. 19–20). So long as the exercise of individual liberty does not endanger the safety of the community which it is the function of the State to guard, or assail the public order which it is charged to maintain, the State will be wise to leave its subjects free to think, speak, and act as reason, or conscience, or God may require, and to witness, worship, and work together for common ends, which are not dangerous or hurtful to other members of the society. Christianity must oppose itself to all State absolutism.

(*b*) We must recognise, however, that occasions may arise when what is regarded by the great majority as its legitimate authority comes into conflict with the liberty which a minority feels justified in claiming for itself. Without here entering on the question of the legitimacy of war, an

illustration from a time of war may be drawn. A nation, exposed to the peril to its own existence of invasion, or some other form of aggression, may regard itself as justified in demanding from its subjects that they shall put themselves at the disposal of the Government to be used as effectively as possible to ward off disaster : the majority of the nation may accept conscription for military service. If the preservation of a nation is a necessary function of the State, it cannot be said to be acting arbitrarily in taking such measure. But there is a minority whom conscience will not permit to fight. The State ought to recognise conscientious objections ; but it is justified in taking steps to satisfy itself that conscience is really involved in the refusal. It may in my judgment demand some form of national service which will not involve a direct violation of conscience. The conscientious objector who refuses any kind of national service, because at the time the nation is at war, seems to me to show a lack of moral judgment. A finer moral insight is shown by the man who will welcome any task, more irksome and perilous it may be than what most non-combatants are called to render. If, however, he persists in his refusal, and thus disowns the claims of citizenship, he must not complain if for the duration of that refusal he is denied the rights of citizenship. If the rights of conscience are to be maintained, the duty of conscience to be as reasonable and obedient as the circumstances allow must also be asserted. A truly wise citizen will not pick a quarrel with the State, unless for compelling reasons ; and he will maintain his attitude, if it involves shame and suffering even, without rebellion or complaint. While there are exceptions, submission to the State is a general moral obligation.

(3) The State exercises its functions among, and asserts its authority over, all persons living within a given territory. It cannot legitimately transcend its own frontiers, nor can those who come within its borders disown its right to control their conduct within limits. This general statement is subject to qualifications. A State may because of its wealth or power or treaty rights exercise a dominance over another people. The subjects of one nation may even, if resident in the territory of another, be exempted from some of the obligations of its own subjects, such as military service, for instance. But it may be said broadly that within the territory the State may claim the right to restrain or to command its subjects in order that the functions assigned to it may be

discharged. It may compel obedience ; it may punish defiance. But it is a false view of at least the more advanced modern States to maintain that their authority is based on force. An authority which was based on force alone would be a tyranny.

(*a*) The State can and does use force if its authority is defied, but that should be only in the last resort. The basis of the authority of the State is the consent of its subjects : they share a community of interests and purposes, which it protects and promotes. A State in its legislation and administration will seek to preserve that consent, and not challenge opposition, unless paramount needs demand such a course of action. It will not go so far in advance of public opinion and popular sentiment as will provoke the sense of oppression. No policy is likely to command unanimity ; there will be the assenting majority, and the discontented or protesting minority. But the large area of common interest and purpose shared by both parties should restrain a tyrannical majority and a rebellious minority from breaking up the national solidarity. The State can enforce its authority, but in a wisely and rightly governed nation the vast majority of the citizens, even if not agreeing with a particular policy, will accept that authority, and only a small minority will need to be coerced. Respect for authority in the governed, regard to liberty in the governors, can afford a basis for the relation of the subjects to the State in which force will seldom, if ever, need to be invoked.

(*b*) The question may, however, be raised whether from the Christian standpoint the use of force can under any circumstances be justified. Tolstoy and others have maintained that Christian principle demands anarchy ; not the kind of anarchy which uses bombs to overthrow, if it can, a tyranny ; but the anarchy which would deny a Government even the right of using force to suppress crime, or to resist aggression. This is a fundamental issue, and if the anarchists' solution of the problem is true, the Christian man would need, not only in a time of war, but wherever and however law was enforced to be a conscientious objector : any participation in local and central government would make him an accomplice in a non-Christian institution. A generation ago this would have been an academic question, but *pacifism* during and since the war has forced it to the front. The Old Testament assumes the right and the duty of the government of a nation ; and the prophets regard God as

using nations, even in their warlike conquests, as His instruments. Assyria is God's rod of chastisement for Israel (Isa. x. 5), and Cyrus is God's Anointed, " whose right hand I have holden, to subdue nations before him " (xlv. 1). Our Lord recognises the claim of even the oppressive Roman Government to tribute (Mark xii. 17) ; and Paul recognises the powers that be as ordained of God, and even as regards the exercise of that power in punishment of evil-doers, the ruler " beareth not the sword in vain : for he is a minister of God, an avenger for wrath to him that doeth evil " (Rom. xiii. 4). Against this may be urged, not only the passage in the Sermon on the Mount about non-resistance of, but submission to, wrong and force (Matt. v. 38–42), but also the more general teaching of Jesus about love for enemies, and returning good for evil (*vv.* 43–48), teaching which is echoed by Paul (Rom. xii. 20–21). Such conduct is enjoined by Jesus as the means of becoming perfect as the Heavenly Father is perfect ; and by Paul as an imitation of God " as beloved children " (Eph. v. 1). Recognising that the method of isolated proof-texts is not convincing to many minds, many pacifists lay stress rather on the general character of the revelation of God and redemption of man in Christ. God loves, forgives, and saves ; and God's method of salvation is urged as the standard of conduct and character for the man so saved.

(*c*) It may be fully admitted that the distinctively Christian way is love, forgiveness, submission to wrong, sacrifice for others. This is the ideal : the Church must witness to it, and work for it. The punishment of crime is not the distinctively Christian way to deal with sin, war is not the distinctively Christian way to meet invasion or aggression. But is non-resistance always the application of the Christian principle of love ? Is the remission of penalty always the best course in the interests of the wrong-doer himself ? Would the moral interests of mankind always be advanced by letting the oppressor or aggressor have his own way unhindered ? In view of the history of the past, the situation of the present, the prospect for the future, the problem of conduct for the Christian is not quite so simple as the pacifist would make it ; for no man can so isolate himself from his age and his surroundings as to undertake the realisation of the Christian ideal for himself without any regard to all the conditions, not as they affect his own safety, comfort, or happiness, for these he can and should

disregard, but as they determine what is morally the most effective course of action. I have no hesitation in saying that, in my judgment, the pacifist solution would not always be the most effective. Whether the teaching of Jesus about non-resistance refers to the disciples' conduct under persecution, or has the wider reference to the submission of the Jewish people under the Roman oppression, for either situation it was morally the most effective course of conduct. The tragedy of the Fall of Jerusalem shows the foresight, based on insight, of Jesus as regards the course of national policy ; the victory of the martyrs over the Roman Empire, that same foresight regarding the conditions of the progress of the Gospel in the world. In similar situations the same counsel should be followed. Christian missionaries and converts in the mission-fields can do no otherwise, nor should they desire so to do : the minorities in Europe can escape worse evils to-day only by submission, and even by loyalty to their new rulers. But such a situation must not be generalised, as though such a course of action were the only possible one for a Christian. Were the Protestants of the Netherlands not justified in resisting their Catholic oppressor ? Would the world to-day be a more Christian world, had no peoples struggled for national and religious liberty ?

(*d*) It must be admitted that this moral problem raises a theological issue ; it affects our conception of God. God is revealed in Christ as Father, as redeeming and reconciling love ; and that conception must be the guiding principle of our theology. But can that revelation be separated from " the ethical monotheism " of the prophets, in which judgment as well as mercy is found in God's ways towards men. Is not God Creator, Judge, and Ruler as well as Father ; and do not nature and history alike disclose His severity as well as, nay even more than, His tenderness ? Has there been no punishment of sin, but only forgiveness ? And does not what is regarded as the Gospel of Love teach that resistance to, and refusal of, salvation involves condemnation (John iii. 18–20) ; and the condemnation is surely the greater because salvation has been resisted and refused. " How shall we escape, if we neglect so great salvation ? " (Heb. ii. 3). Jesus Himself speaks of God's judgment on the unbelieving people (Mark xiii), and there is no indication that He regarded that judgment as inconsistent with the Fatherhood of God which He revealed.

(*e*) Mr. William E. Wilson, B.D., has recognised what is involved in pacifism ; he has the courage of his convictions, and in his book on *The Problem of the Cross* seeks to give such an interpretation of the New Testament teaching as is in harmony with that conviction. A discussion of the volume in detail would be here out of place. One sentence only would I quote, " The wrath of God," he says, " is no personal intervention of God into human affairs to punish, but is rather that state of sin and suffering into which men come naturally by rejecting God." God is evidently aloof from the course of human history (mark the deistic phrase, " no personal intervention "), and nature (note the dualistic " naturally ") seems to have more moral sense than Mr. Wilson assigns to God. There is no nature apart from God : but nature is God's habitual uniform activity through physical forces according to natural laws ; and even in these natural laws, and still more in the course of history, there is disclosed, at least so most serious-minded men have truly and rightly thought, a moral order which expresses God's condemnation of sin in the consequences that attach to it. God's wrath is assuredly no passion unworthy of His perfection, but it is a symbol of the reaction of that perfection against all that is opposed to it, and challenges its dominance in the world which He has made, rules and judges, as well as is saving. It is not the New Testament alone that would need re-interpretation to justify pacifism on this basis, but the entire theistic view of nature and history, and no less the moral conscience and religious consciousness of the vast majority of Christian men.

(*f*) To reject pacifism, and the anarchism which, if carried out consistently, it involves (for if a nation's crime may not be resisted, why the crime of an individual within a nation ?) is not to approve war as on the level of the Christian ideal; it is simply to recognise that the Christian ideal, just because it is so large and lofty, needs time for its realisation, more than in our ardour we are prepared to allow, and that at the present stage of human evolution war may be the less of two evils, between which a choice has to be made, however reluctantly and regretfully, by the Christian conscience, just as the preservation of society from chaos may still require the punishment of crime. It may be that the Christian conscience will be led to the conclusion that, as the world is now moving, war will never again be the less of two evils. It seems fitting to defer further consideration of the subject of

war to the next chapter ; but something must be here added on the subject of crime, and its treatment.

(4) The aim of the previous paragraph has been to justify the use of force by the State when, in the fulfilment of its functions, it is necessary. (*a*) As the State is responsible for the preservation of the life and the protection of the property of its subjects or citizens, it cannot renounce its use, as can the individual. That is a consideration which is sometimes ignored. A Christian may refuse to assert his rights, or to resist wrongs inflicted on him. But is his duty as clear if injustice or injury to another or others is involved ? Could a husband allow his wife to be outraged, or a father suffer his child to be mutilated, without the effort to save ? The case has been put very simply. " If I were taking my child," say Dr. F. A. M. Spencer, " on a journey through a lawless country, would it not be right for me to protect his or her person from brutal outrage, just by letting people see that I have a revolver ? Or, if I am travelling alone, ought I not similarly to safeguard my own person for the sake of my children at home ? The moral interests of those who might be tempted to murder or outrage me or my child would appear to demand this measure of self-protection."[1] Where there is a Government strong enough to restrain and repress crime the individual citizen, unless in the exceptional case of a sudden assault, need not exercise his right of self-defence ; but can leave it to the law and its agents. Here a special responsibility rests on these agents. The members of a jury might individually be prepared not to prosecute, but in their corporate capacity they are morally bound to convict, if the evidence is adequate. No society could be preserved if crime went unpunished.

(*b*) The Christian spirit may be infused into the administration of justice. Not only to the relation of God and man, and to the relation of individual men to one another, but to society as a whole and its erring members we can apply a useful distinction made by the writer just quoted between forgiveness and pardon. " There are two words in English with allied but distinguishable meanings : pardon and forgiveness. The former is perhaps the more dignified term ; the latter suggests greater intimacy and tenderness. A King pardons a subject : a parent forgives a child. When a King pardons a criminal he remits the penalty to which the

[1] *The Theory of Christ's Ethics* . 84.

latter had rendered himself liable. When a father forgives his child, he receives him back into loving intimacy. God is to men both King and Father, and at least, if we believe that he punishes we may think of Him as both pardoning and forgiving in the senses defined. If He punishes and then restores to intimacy, He may be said to have refused to pardon but to have forgiven. In any case, refusal to pardon by no means prevents restoration to the affectionate intercourse which characterises the relation of parent and child."[1] Even as God manifests His righteousness in the consequences which in the natural and moral order follow transgression, and the wrongdoer deserves to suffer those consequences ; even so, however imperfectly human justice may reflect the divine righteousness, the law must be vindicated, and the violator must get his deserts. From that principle I at least cannot depart in my thinking. But just as God's grace does not annul, but fulfils God's righteousness (Rom. iii. 31), inasmuch as the intention of the law is more thoroughly fulfilled when the transgressor is turned from the error of his ways, and defiance is changed into loyalty, so mercy must ever temper justice. Not only the rights of society to maintain the social order should be taken into account, but also its duties towards all its members, even the worst, to do all it can to make the best life possible for all. If the State has an authority over, it has also a responsibility for, its subjects, and that responsibility must never be ignored in the exercise of that authority. In so far as a society is itself to blame for the adverse physical, economic, moral, or social conditions of any section, which are a provocation to crime, it so far shares the guilt of the transgressor, and should recognise that fact in the treatment meted out to him. Again, for the public convenience and order it may be necessary to impose irksome restrictions, a breach of which must be punished, but which the common conscience would never regard as strictly crime. A great deal of what is called juvenile delinquency comes under this head. Boys playing football in the streets may be a nuisance and a danger ; but they should not be treated as even potential criminals. All the circumstances which minimise the heinousness of the offence should be taken into account in determining the penalty. Contrary to the provisions of some of our laws, and the practice of some of the administrators of law, injuries to the

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 187.

person should receive severer treatment than offences against the claims of property. Callous cruelty especially demands the severest penalty. There must be discrimination, and a discrimination which recognises that the attitude of the law must never be vindictive, the expression of passion, however great the provocation ; but always of a wise goodwill. If it cannot pardon in remitting all penalty, although in dealing with not only a first offence, but even a repeated offender, if there be any reason to justify such a course, it may be right to remit the penalty, it ought to forgive, in the sense that it will deal with the offender in such a way as will make restoration to normal social relations possible.

(*c*) I cannot agree that punishment should be *deterrent*, in order to warn others what will befall them if they transgress, or to restrain them from transgression, but it can be deterrent in so far as it may restrain the offender from again transgressing. I cannot see the justice of punishing one man that other men may be kept from sinning. The main purpose of punishment should be *reformatory*, to restore the marred and maimed manhood. Even on the lower ground that society must protect itself by punishing offenders, it may be argued that a more enduring protection can be secured by the reformation of the criminal. The imprisonment as conscientious objectors of many men of high character and fine intelligence has, in recent years, thrown a flood of light on what is still defective in our prison-system. But there is a will to amend that system so that it may become more reformatory than it is. Christian men should use such influence as they possess to forward and to spread this movement.

(*d*) There are two forms of Christian service to the criminal, which are not adequately recognised and, therefore, insufficiently practised. One is the visitation of the prisoners, which is now being encouraged in a greater degree than before, the objects of which are to make friends with them, to exercise care and afford help to their families, and to enable them to recover their place in society on discharge. The other is the good work being done by prisoners' aid societies, and probation officers. But on a far wider scale and in a far greater measure must the Christian Church assert its principle, that Redemption, and not Retribution, should be the aim, even in dealing with transgressors of the law.

(*e*) The application of this principle should guide us in

the solution of the problems which, in recent years, have been much discussed. Should flogging and capital punishment be abolished? Judges and magistrates are found insisting on the necessity of both; but, when we remind ourselves that the administrators of the law have generally in the past been the defenders of what now seem to us incredible barbarities, the general public will not attach very much consideration to this judgment. There are notable exceptions: and when a judge or magistrate recognises the defects of the law he is administering, his judgment deserves more respect. I cannot regard as consistent with the Christian valuation of human personality the infliction of such suffering as flogging involves, or the taking of life from another, even if he has himself taken life. Any deterrent effect which the fear of either punishment might exercise on the criminal is more than outweighted by the lowering for the whole society of the standard of respect for even the worst man as potentially the child of God. Even if the objection held valid in previous times that only thus could society protect itself against violence—a doubtful plea, as brutal treatment of crime has aggravated rather than restrained brutality—to-day to retain these two penalties seems a survival of a past we have left far behind us morally. Whatever the punishment may be of murder, it is clear that there must be far more discrimination as regards the motive and the manner of the crime in determining the penalty. Without imitating the sentimentality of French juries, who acquit those guilty of crimes of passion—especially the sexual passion of jealousy—there is a difference between yielding in a fit of violent temper to a provocation and a calculated crime from motives of greed or revenge. What do the details of the crime disclose as to the character of the transgressor, the circumstances which may have contributed to the commission of the crime, the restraints that his previous development should have imposed, or the impulsions it may have given? These are considerations which should be taken into account. As we cannot isolate the individual from his environment, the most effective method of dealing with crime is not the punishment, however merciful, of the criminal; but such an improvement of society in all its conditions and influences as will make crime at last a psychical abnormality, to be treated as disease and defect rather than as voluntary transgression.

(5) While there is need of a constant exercise of Christian

influences, individual or corporate through societies for the specific purpose, or through the teaching of the Christian Church to realise within the administration of justice itself the Christian ideal of love and forgiveness, service and sacrifice, happily the range of the functions of the State has been, and is being so widened as to afford many a congenial task for Christian citizens.

(*a*) In the previous section it was shown that the State now concerns itself with the health, the educational fitness, the moral character of its subjects ; and this extension is not now generally challenged. For it is being recognised that for its own safety, prosperity, and progress the community wants healthy, intelligent, and moral persons who will willingly recognise the rights of others, and will properly discharge their own duties. It has again and again been insisted in this volume that religion is essential to the full development of human personality ; as it is not a superfluous ornament, as some of its detractors regard it, on the structure of life, but is an essential element for its solid foundations. That religious instruction should have a place in the national school system, while the conscientious scruples of teachers regarding the giving of it should be respected, is generally agreed, and there is a growing agreement among the churches to do what can be done within the limits of the school system to secure its efficiency by the proper training of teachers, and the use of agreed, carefully prepared syllabuses. The differences of religious conviction, not to mention the deplorable accompaniments of these, sectarian prejudices, forbid our expecting that we can go beyond this in securing religious influence as well as instruction, and the influence the instruction itself yields.

(*b*) The control of the Church by the State is increasingly recognised as an anachronism, an anomaly, even, it may be, an outrage, except in so far as the State is entitled to deal with the property (the *temporalia*), its use or transfer in accordance with the law. Whether such an adjustment of the relations between Church and State as has taken place in Scotland is possible or desirable in England is too large a question to be touched on ; but two considerations to guard against too ready an assumption that the two cases are similar enough to allow of the same treatment must be mentioned : the dependence of the Church on the State has been much closer in England than in Scotland ; and England has been a much more divided nation religiously

than Scotland has been. To give one Church, which does not command the loyalty of a very large and influential section of the community, a favoured position would provoke a sense of injustice far more keen than what is felt by the religious minorities in Scotland, small as they are in comparison with the great majority, which now adheres to the Church of Scotland. The existence of these minorities in Scotland must not be ignored, as they do represent a conviction regarding religious liberty and equality which has long existed in Scotland, and which very vigorously persists in England still. The growing antithesis of Catholic and Protestant, which the Anglo-Catholic section of the Church of England seems desirous of asserting more agressively, forbids an anticipation of so great an advance towards Christian unity in the Churches as would make possible a more intimate association of Church and State, even if desirable.

(*c*) As a descendant from a long succession of Scottish dissent going back to its earliest beginnings, and as an adopted son of English Nonconformity in its most pronounced form, I cannot consent to any association which would violate the principles of religious liberty and equality : but what I must here urge is the need of a fuller recognition in the Nonconformist Churches that the State has been so moralised, and even in the quality of much of its moralisation so Christianised, that it should not be treated with the suspicion which past history may have provoked, but which present conditions do not justify, and that there is a need of closer co-operation. Some Nonconformists regard the appointment and necessarily payment of Army chaplains, chaplains in prisons, hospitals, and workhouses, the acceptance of educational grants by Nonconformist schools, as a violation of Nonconformist principles. I cannot share these scruples. Such co-operation is not a sinful compromise ; it is an adjustment of permanent principles to varying conditions and necessities. While the Church must not allow itself to be exploited by any political party, while it must not identify the Christian ideal with any political programme, and most of all while it must not pollute its motives, interests, and efforts by any spirit of partisanship ; yet it has a right to make a corporate pronouncement in a political question when right or wrong issues are involved. That it should oppose the liquor trade, even if one political party derives much of its support from that trade, I have no manner of

doubt. That it should condemn " the class war," even if another political party tolerates the extremists who preach it, seems to me also to be certain. That it should give its encouragement to the League of Nations, and to peace efforts generally, goes without saying. There must be wisdom and knowledge, tact and courtesy, considerateness and courage in its testimony on public matters. But it cannot abnegate its functions to assert the sovereignty of Christ's truth and grace in the political as well as in every other sphere.

(6) The question on which there is at present the sharpest division of opinion is that regarding the functions of the State in the sphere of industry and commerce. (*a*) The majority of the citizens have no coherent theory on the matter, but are moved by their own interests. The same men who protest against what they call the interference of the State in the regulation of the coal industry, are just as vehement in advocating the interference of the State in imposing safeguarding duties. What the State may not do, when hours and wages of workers are involved, it may do when the profits of employers are affected. No rigid doctrine *pro* or *con* of the action of the State in the economic sphere can be laid down. What the lamentable conditions in this country, affecting the whole community, have demonstrated is that capital and labour have failed satisfactorily to adjust their relations, that industry has failed to organise itself so as to secure the most efficient and economical production of goods, that commerce can no longer assume that it has the same world-markets, and must be advised and helped to adjust itself to the new conditions. The reputation of the captains of industry as infallible guides has fallen into discredit. It is being, however reluctantly, recognised that, in the interests of the community as a whole, there must be on the part of the State enquiry, assistance, regulation, and direction even in the economic sphere, if there is to be recovery of security and prosperity in industry and commerce. It is a pity that the political parties should commit themselves to an abstract theory of individualism or socialism, as in practice neither theory can be carried out without reservations.

(*b*) The attempt to identify the Christian Church with the theory of individualism or socialism is wrong ; for the Christian Church is not bound by any economic theory. It is individualist in recognising " the infinite value of the

single soul," the rights and duties of the individual personality ; it teaches that every man shall bear his own burden of responsibility for himself (Gal. vi. 5). It is socialist, in that it teaches that no man liveth unto himself, that we are all members of one body (1 Cor. xii. 26), suffering or rejoicing together, that in fulfilling the law of Christ we must bear one another's burdens (Gal. vi. 2), that is, feel a mutual responsibility. Beyond the affirmation of the principles that industry should be conducted, not for profit only, but as *service* of the community, and that those engaged in it should not regard themselves as opponents, but as *partners*, it cannot go. It can commend and encourage all enterprises in which these principles are being applied so far as conditions will allow. If the common good demands the possession or the regulation of any economic enterprise, no moral principle can be urged against that policy. If individual initiative is valuable, and can be allowed without any injury to the community, no valid moral reason can be invoked against it. The extension of the functions of the State in the economic sphere seems an inevitable trend of social development. The destruction of one economic system in order to construct on its ruins another, even if it were certain to be better, and were to prove possible, is a danger : no less a danger is the maintenance of a system unmodified when it has ceased to function efficiently and beneficently. An evolution towards greater socialisation there will be, and the State will become increasingly a potent factor—that seems certain, but the *whither* is still hidden from us, and prophecy here would be presumption. The Church's vital interest is that the changes shall be affected without injustice or violence, and that they shall be such as to maintain the social solidarity of the nation, despite the unavoidable sectional discontents. *Solvitur ambulando* and *festina lente* are no less Christian than reasonable and righteous counsels.

(7) As a transition to the next chapter one question remains to be answered. Should the Christian citizen have as his sole motive regard for the fulfilment of the Christian ideal, or may there blend with it as giving the desire " a local habitation," the motive of *patriotism*, love for his own country ? (*a*) The life in Christ transcends all the differences which have divided men ; but does this Christian universalism abolish them all ? Such a social institution as slavery it has abolished as inconsistent with the Christian

brotherhood. The natural difference of sex it has not abolished, but has transformed from a relation of inequality, domination on one side, subjection on the other, into a relation not merely of equality, but of something more and better, a mutual affection which exalts both sexes. Does nationality belong to the things that are to be shaken and removed, or to the things which cannot be shaken, and remain? I have no hesitation in saying that, as the world now is, and as far as insight into present conditions can give us any foresight of future prospects, nationality seems to me to be a difference that will remain, even although as divisive it may cease. The differences of nationality are so deeply rooted in nature and history that they cannot be plucked up. Nor is it desirable that they should be. Although resident for almost half of my whole life in London, and grateful for the privilege of British citizenship, I have never felt it to be a Christian duty to rid myself of what is distinctive of my Scottish nationality. Unity, and not uniformity, is the goal of humanity, differences without divisions. Just as the higher organisms are complex, the body consisting of many unlike members, just as within a nation, to use Spencer's terminology, differentiation and integration, or to use common speech, division of labour and mutual dependence advance together, so in mankind may we expect nations to preserve their distinctiveness as a contribution to the wider variety within mankind as a whole. Accordingly, just as the family with its more intimate affections is essential to the wider interests of citizenship, so love and loyalty to one's own land is an intensification, and not an exclusion, of the common human relation.

(*b*) Two qualifications, however, must be added. *Firstly*, patriotism must always be subordinated, as must all natural relationships, to the higher claims of the Kingdom of God. It may be necessary for a man to hate his native land in the same sense as Jesus required His disciples to hate father or mother (Luke xiv. 26), to forsake it for the Gospel's sake. "My country right or wrong," is no Christian sentiment; although a Christian patriot will, especially in a time of deadly peril to his own people, be as tender as he can, if he must censure or condemn its policy, just as a decent man would speak to strangers of a wife's faults, even if she had forfeited his confidence, as little and as kindly as truth and righteousness would allow. The Christian's primary citizenship is in heaven, the realm where God's will is done,

and his earthly citizenship must ever be subordinated to that heavenly (Phil. iii. 20, R.V.).

Secondly, as a nation is a product of history more than even of nature, it must be recognised that under some conditions a fusion of national differences is not only possible, but desirable. How mixed in blood the people living in this island are—Celtic, Saxon, Angle, Norman, Danish ! While three nations still persist—English, Scottish, Welsh—and there is no reason for the submergence of their differences, there has been so much fusion as secures the necessary practical solidarity. The principle of self-determination of nations was in the post-war treaties stressed to inflict as much injury on the vanquished as possible ; but the peace of Europe depends on the national minorities not maintaining their aloofness, but, while retaining their rights under the Minority Treaties as regards language, religion, and schools, merging their interests and activities in the common good of the State to which they now belong, for no general rectification of frontiers is now possible which would not inflict injustice on some section of the population. An irreconcilable nationalism cannot be regarded as a Christian patriotism; and this is at present the greatest hindrance to the progress of the internationalism which alone can be the basis of an enduring world-peace.

CHAPTER VI

INTERNATIONALISM

I

As has been argued at the end of the previous chapter, there is a patriotism which is not inconsistent with Christian universalism. If a time will ever come when human solidarity will be as fully developed and as faithfully practised as is national solidarity, when there will be a parliament of nations and "a federation of the world," such a consummation, whether it is to be devoutly wished or not, is not yet within the region of practical actuality; and the Christian moralist only discredits his ideal by crying out for the moon. An indiscriminate cosmopolitanism is not the actualisation in present conditions of Christian universalism, but a discerning internationalism; and since the world-wide calamity of the Great War such internationalism has made, both in theory and practice, a more expansive and intensive advance than in any corresponding length of time in previous history: but we should deceive ourselves if we imagined that the principle is solidly enthroned above national prejudices and passions, and that a gust of national sentiment might not overthrow it, unless the Spirit of Christ, the Prince of Peace, the Saviour and Lord of all men, through the Church, His Body, reinforces to the utmost the humanitarian spirit. Although we may use the term internationalism, it is not only with differences among nations, as occasions and provocations of divisions, with which we have to concern ourselves, but with differences even more deeply rooted in human nature. It is a misfortune that the terminology is so fluid, and that words are so ambiguous in meaning. The word *racial*, for instance, is used far too loosely; to talk about a racial difference between Teuton and Slav is a misuse—one could almost say an abuse—of the word. It will be necessary, then, to begin by fixing the meaning of the words we use.

(1) It were to be desired, if that were possible, that the word *race* should be reserved for the *genus homo*, for mankind, for there is only *one human race*, and the essential unity of mankind needs to be emphasised. Assuming man's descent

from the monkey or ape, a book which appeared some years ago tried to trace the descent of different divisions of mankind from different species of the one genus. The Malay was, if my memory serves me, descended from the orang-outang, the negro from the gorilla, and the European from the chimpanzee. My acquaintance with these, my distant cousins, is not intimate enough for me to offer an opinion as to which descent is preferable. In more recent years a great deal has been written about the differences between the Alpine, the Mediterranean, and the Nordic races; and Mr. Hilaire Belloc has very wittily given the *reductio ad absurdum* of much of this writing.[1]

Behold, my child, the Nordic man,
And be as like him as you can;
His legs are long, his mind is slow,
His hair is lank, and made of tow.

And here we have the Alpine Race.
Oh! what a hard and brutal face!
His skin is of a dirty yellow,
He is a most unpleasant fellow.

And most degraded of them all
Mediterranean they call.
His hair is crisp, and even curls,
And he is saucy with the girls.

The common origin of mankind is generally recognised, even although one school of anthropology, that of Lévy Brühl, seeks to show that the mind of the savage is altogether different from that of the civilised man; but such differences as these are due to the difference in the stage of development reached, and also to the reactions of the mind on its varying environments. Among the peasantry in a civilised country there survive traces of savage mentality[2]; and an analogy, though probably less close than some psychologists assume, can be traced between the development of the child and the evolution of the race.[3] That there may be permanent differences, physical and psychical, of

[1] I am grateful for his permission to quote his words.

[2] *Papers on Inter-racial Problems*, edited by G. Spiller, p. 73.

[3] See, for further discussion of this matter, my book, *The Christian Doctrine of the Godhead*, pp. 259–261.

which colour is an outward sign, we cannot deny; but, whatever they may be, they are not such as to justify an assertion of superiority on the one hand, or demand a confession of inferiority on the other. Mental characteristics vary, but all men are capable of recognising and realising a common moral ideal; and all men can have a similar experience of the one reality of divine truth and grace. That truth has been expressed in his own fashion by Blake:

To Mercy, Pity, Peace, and Love,
All pray in their distress;
And to these virtues of delight
Return their thankfulness.

For Mercy, Pity, Peace, and Love
Is God, our Father dear,
And Mercy, Pity, Peace, and Love
Is man, His child and care.

For Mercy has a human heart,
Pity, a human face,
And Love, the human form divine,
And Peace, the human dress.

All must love the human form
In heathen, Turk, or Jew;
Where Mercy, Love, and Pity dwell,
There God is dwelling too.

—"The Divine Image."

For Christian faith, hope, love, there is only one God and Father, only one Saviour and Lord, and only one Spirit dwelling in all mankind as one.

(2) Much would be gained if, instead of describing as *races* the branches of the one human race, we laid stress that the differences are of *colour*, due to climatic conditions in the distant past, and not of race, as a common origin can be asserted for all mankind. It has been said that probably primitive man was not in colour identical with any one of his descendants; and that the white man is the primitive man *badly bleached*; and the negro is the primitive man *well toasted*. It would not do to say that the difference is only skin-deep, as there are other differences, but none to justify prejudice or hostility.

(*a*) One of the darkest blots on the civilisation, culture, and even Christianity of the white man is his treatment of the black, brown, yellow, or red. Asia and Africa are rising in revolt against European domination. Japan has maintained her independence, while abandoning her isolation. China has not yet consolidated her unity, but demands equality of treatment. In India, Great Britain is faced with one of the greatest political problems which the human reason and conscience have been called to deal with, since a grant of the independence for which there is a clamour would be a casting-off of responsibilities which cannot be disowned. In Africa the white man's record is the blackest—slavery, forced labour, and other outrages on human life and liberty. The *imperialism* which asserts the right, where there is the power, to hold a people in subjection in the interests of the stronger nation is inevitably doomed by the progress of mankind ; one wishes that one could add that it is unreservedly damned by the human conscience. This does not mean, however, that the principle of self-determination can immediately and without modification be applied to all peoples. Even as the child needs to be under guardians before independence can be achieved, so peoples need a tutelage to prepare them for full nationhood ; and against the principle of the *mandate*, as it is being administered by the League of Nations, the Christian conscience need not offer any objection. One could desire that such a responsibility to answer at the bar of the world's judgment could be extended to all territories, in which any nation exercises such a rule over other peoples, and not only those the position of which was affected by the Great War. Such a need having been recognised, the exercise of authority must be watched to guard against abuse.

(*b*) Three policies may be mentioned, *exploitation*, *segregation*, and *elevation*.

By *exploitation* is meant any abuse of the power over the life or the labour of the subjects by the Government to their injury and for the interest of its own people. A remonstrance against the attempt to introduce forced labour into the Kenya colony under cover of the local government's recruitment of workers through the chiefs was met by a twofold plea : that it was in the interests of the natives that they should acquire habits of industry, and that it was in the interests of the world generally that the resources of the country should be developed. The reply is obvious ; both

objects are desirable, but both should be pursued in such a way as will benefit the natives themselves and will not be mainly for the advantage of Europeans. The policy of exploitation can be unreservedly condemned.

For the policy of *segregation* there is something to be said ; but it can be only a temporary solution of the problem. It is well that as far as possible the *tribal life* should be preserved, so far as it is not bound up with heathenism, until the inevitable development of the tribe in such contact as it has with European civilisation makes a change in the social order desirable and possible. The development of the natural resources of the country by the free labour of the natives for their own advantage, under European guidance if necessary, should be within the framework of the native society, in so far as customs of savagery are abandoned, and its standards are raised as it advances in culture. What is ultimately desirable is that the native shall be enabled to take his place in one society along with the white as fully civilised and cultured, and both so Christianised that they shall stand on an equality as fellow-citizens. The time may come when this common citizenship will free intermarriage from the disadvantages which prejudice now imposes. For the time at least some of the best friends of the negro in America are convinced that such marriages are undesirable. The intimacy of marriage is so close that the difficulties it involves can be relieved only when there is not only an adequate affection, but such an affinity of nature, character, habit, taste, as makes the common life not irksome, but satisfying. It may be that the differences, physical and psychical, of which colour is a sign, are great enough to afford a permanent objection. What tells against this conclusion, however, is that the Latin peoples, French, Spanish, Portuguese, do not share the colour prejudice as do Germans and British.

The only policy in which the Christian conscience can find satisfaction is *elevation*, the raising of all tribes and peoples in civilisation, culture, morals, and religion to the same level, in which there will be freedom of intercourse without patronage on the one hand or servility on the other, but self-respect and mutual respect. Christianity alone has proved itself in human history a potent enough factor to make such a development possible. A scholar and saint such as Aggrey shows to how good and worthy a Christian personality an African can be raised. If it seems that for

some generations at least African and Polynesian converts need the guidance and guardianship of European teachers and leaders, yet such men do hold out the promise that in due time men can be raised even from savagery to Christian saintship ; and that in morals and religion we need not reckon on any permanent natural disability. Those who desire to exploit the native object that Christianity spoils him ; it certainly spoils him for the exploiter's purpose. It may be that the reproach of General Smuts has not been without justification in the past, and that missionaries have too quickly introduced their new converts into a trying environment, to meet the temptations of which they were not yet fit ; but does not the blame rest rather on the environment ? Segregation as a temporary policy may be the course of wisdom, but it can never be the ultimate purpose. One Christian society, without any colour bar, is the will of the one Father.

II

(1) The " racial," or what I should prefer to call the " colour," problem is, if not in the present, yet in the near future, the greatest menace to human progress, the most serious challenge to the Christian Church. It was necessary, therefore, to deal with it before dealing with what lies, as it seems, nearer at hand—the relation of the nations to one another as affected by the Great War. The effect has been twofold, for worse and for better. Despite the prejudices and the passions which were, as we now know, exploited to sustain the nation's will to fight to the finish, and the moral scandal of the 1918 Election in this country, we have as a nation, probably more than any other nation, recovered from the war " psychoses," and are intent on peace. The attitude of France and Italy at the Naval Conference shows that panic about security, not to say desire for domination, is still a potent factor of national policy in those countries. Germany is still smarting under the humiliation of defeat, resentful (not without some reason) of the conditions of peace imposed upon it, and still, despite its determination and industry, in economic difficulties. While there is in Germany a party who desire, and would, if they could, prepare for revenge (even as was the feeling of France after 1870) ; yet a growing majority of the nation has accepted the change

from the monarchy to the republic, an acceptance to which the loyalty of President Hindenburg to the new order has made an incalculable contribution ; and the social democracy is set against any revival of a dominant militarism. The influence of the Churches, restricted as unfortunately it is, is slowly but surely being shifted to the side of reconciliation. Of the new nations, Czecho-Slovakia, under the wise guidance of its President, Masaryk, and the skilful diplomacy of its Foreign Secretary, Benés, has made most progress towards stable political conditions. There was a good deal of Chauvinism for some years after the war, but an honest effort is being made to conciliate the minorities, German and Magyar. The spirit in Hungary is very bitter ; no inclination is shown to make the best of the new conditions ; and for that attitude there is justification, as Hungary had to yield to its neighbours territories which in strict justice it should have retained. The corridor which gives Poland access to the sea, but cuts off Eastern Prussia from Germany, the division of Silesia, and the treatment of its German subjects by Poland, not to mention other minor offences, has deservedly brought on Poland the distrust and even enmity of its neighbours. The treatment of the religious and political minorities by Rumania was a crying scandal, which the League of Nations failed to abate ; but a change of Government has recently brought some alleviation. While the Minority Treaties provided that the minorities should be allowed to preserve their language and religion, and the education which in accordance with these they desired for their children, these provisions were for some years more honoured in the breach than the observance. The numbers of the minorities under alien rule were greater before than after the war ; but what has made the change so galling is not only that the " top-dogs " have become " the under-dogs," and the " under-dogs " have let their suppressed hatred break out ; but that in some instances a population more advanced in culture, civilisation, morals, and religion has been subjected to a more backward government. What adds to the danger is that each of these minorities has a kindred people just across the new frontiers ; as, for instance, the Germans who in Posen have been transferred to Poland, of which Posen was once a part, and from which it was severed in the shameful partition which took place at the beginning of last century. This is not an exhaustive account of the situation in Europe, but only an indication of the

urgency of the problem of internationalism. An attempt to remove injustices by any revision of frontiers would inevitably produce war : any general revision in the future would simply shift the injustice from one minority to another. The only hope lies in such a growth of the spirit of internationalism as would lead the governing majority to treat the subject minority with justice, and the subject minority to acquiesce in the changed conditions, and in a spirit of conciliation to co-operate with the majority for the common good of the nation as remade.

(2) After this bird's eye view of the situation we may seek to diagnose it more thoroughly, and to indicate on the one hand the factors which tend to provoke war, and on the other the factors which may help to promote peace, as also the means for preventing war and preserving peace. (*a*) Within the colour divisions of mankind there are not only differences among nations, but also among *groups* of peoples, such as the Celtic, the Teutonic, the Slav ; prejudices and hostilities, which endanger relations between nations, are found as between group and group. There is an antipathy between Slav and Teuton ; the German talks contemplatively of *Polnische Wirtschaft* (Polish management) when he wishes to describe disorder and incompetence ; and among the Poles, Szwab (German) is almost as much a term of abuse as Zyd (Jew). But it would be rash to conclude that these antagonisms are rooted in natural characteristics, and are not the results rather of historical relations ; for the German very easily gets assimilated in Poland, and the Pole in Germany, as family names betray, if not disguised by altered spelling. Nurture has probably had more to do with the differences than nature. The difference of language is a barrier to intercourse, and the understanding which results from intercourse, although Switzerland seems an exception. Religion aggravates the division. In Poland a long string of abusive words will sometimes end with Luther, Calvin, Garibaldi (the last on account of his share in the overthrow of the temporal power of the Pope). But religion is not as potent to unite. The Balkan peoples are all Orthodox, but do not dwell in love one with another. When a speaker at an international gathering referred to the Eastern Churches as Orthodox Greek, a Rumanian delegate with some passion disclaimed such a description, and insisted on Orthodox Oriental. Nearer home, we know from a tragic history what religious differences have done in breeding

prejudice and hostility in Ireland. History is the record of feuds and wars of the past, of oppressions on the one hand and subjections on the other. The antipathy of the French and the German nations, which has been responsible for so much evil, and is still the disturbing factor in the present situation in Europe, is the most conspicuous instance. On the other hand, history may record reconciliations. England and France were hereditary foes, and the memory of Fashoda can still be recalled.

(*b*) The transfer of territory, as of Alsace-Lorraine in 1870, leaves a bleeding wound. The Polish corridor and the division of Silesia make much more difficult the reconciliation of Germany to Great Britain as a party to this dismemberment. Such transfer of territory has been in the past regarded as bringing fame to the conqueror, shame to his victim. It has been valued for the increase of military power which the subjection of the transferred population might bring. If not so evident, the economic consequences have been no negligible factor. How greatly Germany has been impoverished by the loss of two of her most important industrial areas—Alsace-Lorraine and part of Silesia. Today transfer of territory cannot be openly based on the rights of conquest; some such ideal principle as "the self-determination of peoples" is invoked; the unjust acts must be covered with the cloak of justice. Dynastic ambitions are not likely to play a considerable (if any) part among the provocations of war; the most disturbing factors are the economic; for national prejudice and passion can be exploited where there is an economic grievance or wrong. Invasion of territory is not the only danger to, and attack on, the life and the growth of a nation, which it will feel justified on the ground of self-defence in resenting and repelling. Among a nation's vital needs are food for its growing population, raw material for its increasing industry, markets for its expanding commerce, homes overseas for its surplus population. If a nation, especially one which has access to food, raw materials, markets, and overseas homes, such as the British, should pursue a policy of selfish isolation, attempting to shut itself off from intercourse with other nations, it would become, despite all peaceful declarations, the most serious menace to the peace of the world which history has yet witnessed, and would deserve to go down to its doom as empires of the past have done. One of the lamentable evidences of the absence of a keen intelligence or a sensitive

conscience in politics is that the proposal for Empire Free Trade has been criticised mainly on the ground that it would increase the price of food ; and the far more valid objection that it would worsen international relations has seldom been mentioned (if at all) ; but for a Christian citizen that should be the decisive consideration.

(*c*) It seems to me at least obvious that, if so competent and industrious a nation as Germany is to be reconciled, then its economic needs must be recognised and satisfied. I am endeavouring in this volume to avoid party politics ; but I feel myself justified in stating my conviction that a protectionist policy is provocative of war, and that the assumption which lies behind protectionist policy that the economic interests of nations are necessarily antagonistic, and cannot be reconciled, is the most serious challenge there is to the peace of the world. Elementary economics might teach some of these politicians that, if we refuse to buy from a nation, we cannot expect to sell to it our own products, for it will either be unable, or be unwilling, to buy from us. The economic prosperity of another nation is likely to increase our trade with it ; its adversity we must share through loss of trade. As long as commerce is regarded as conflict, peace will remain unstable ; only as it is recognised as co-operation will the dangers of war from this economic source be averted. We have no moral right to hold territory which we do not sufficiently populate to develop adequately its natural resources for the common good of mankind ; or to pursue in regard to the use of it any policy which injures the life or the growth of other nations. These provocations of war have been mentioned as indicating the range of the psychic, moral, and religious problem which is involved in the political and economic, and which is a direct challenge to the Christian Church to promote the solution by the means which in the truth and grace of Jesus Christ it can command.

(3) Although the promotion of peace, not as merely the negation of war, but as the common possession by all nations of the mental, moral, and spiritual human values, and as their co-operation with one another in securing these values is the final solution of the international problem, yet as a necessary course towards that goal we must consider the available methods of preventing war, and preserving peace amid the existing provocations.

(*a*) As I have already indicated, I cannot, much as I

desire to do so, commit myself absolutely to the *pacifist* position that in no circumstances can there be even the relative justification of war that it is the less of two evils. If it were necessary, no pacifist could go further than I should in denouncing the evils of war—its brutalities, cruelties, miseries, horrors, moral degradations. It is the extreme challenge of the Christian ideal ; it is the constant hindrance to the realisation of that ideal. To suggest that non-pacifists, as a pacifist said in my hearing, are *bellicists*—believers in war —is an instance of the arrogant Pharisaism which a few pacifists display, and is a cruel libel. We are as anxious as any pacifist could be to end war. It may be necessary, in the interests of the moral order itself, to restrain and resist national aggression, as it is to deal with crime within a nation. As long as mankind is not as fully organised in its international relations as are law and order within a nation, so long is it impossible to deny to a nation the right of self-defence. Even when, and as, international relations are organised, the right must be conceded to the supranational organisation, whatever it may be, to inflict punishment (probably an economic would suffice) on any nation which proved a criminal in its relation to others. Although, as will be shown, the contingency seems very remote in which a war could find any justification, the duty of absolute pacifism cannot be maintained. Two practical objections to the prominence given to its advocacy may be mentioned. Even if all Christians could be persuaded to adopt this principle, it would not offer a solution of the problem of war in the immediate future, for the process of persuasion would at best be slow, and war might come and go meanwhile. A more serious objection is this—that this propaganda divides the Churches, instead of uniting all Christians in such common efforts to prevent war and preserve peace as can and do command general assent. It is just because I am so determined to get war ended as swiftly and surely as possible that, even were I a pacifist, I should not press that point of view when I saw it could only produce division of sentiment, and diversion of effort. To give a concrete illustration. What might have proved a fruitful discussion of concerted practical action was diverted at the Copec Conference in 1924 into the unprofitable pacifist controversy. One of the recommendations of the Commission, in which both points of view were represented, which was unanimously adopted may be quoted : " They [the Christian Churches]

should unreservedly condemn, and refuse to support in any way, a war waged before the matter in dispute has been submitted to an arbitral tribunal or in defiance of the decision of such a tribunal."

(*b*) What was in view was the League of Nations, with its triple methods of dealing with disputes : the International Court for justiciable differences, such as could be dealt with by the application of recognised principles of international law or the legal interpretation of treaties ; arbitration for divisive issues not falling under the first head, but yet definite enough to be handled by arbitrators ; and conciliation, counsels which might or might not, but probably would, be accepted. The delay which would be involved in using any of these methods would allow time for passion to subside, and reason and conscience to prevail, in most, if not all, instances. In the few cases in which a nation insisted on being judge in its own case, and defied the judgment of such a world-organisation, every Christian citizen should certainly be a conscientious objector, cost what it might. As Great Britain has given its adhesion to the Optional Clause, accepting the jurisdiction of the International Court, it would be guilty of breaking its word if it withheld a justiciable case from that Court, or acted in defiance of its decision. Since then the Kellogg or Paris Pact has been signed, renouncing war as an instrument of policy, and undertaking to settle all differences by peaceful means. The nations who have signed the Pact are all, except Russia and the United States, members of the League of Nations. The Kellogg Pact suggests no means of enforcing its two principles. The League of Nations does provide sanctions of the obligation which its members accept to submit all differences which might lead to war to the League, to be dealt with by one or other of the methods mentioned above. As the United States is outside of the League, a difficulty might arise if it claimed the rights of a neutral to continue dealing freely with a nation against which the League had summoned some of its members to execute its decree. It has, therefore, been suggested that a third clause might be added to the Pact, by which all the signatories, including America, undertook to carry out the penalty agreed on against any violation of the Pact.

(*c*) In view of these facts, the Management Committee of the World Alliance for International Friendship through the Churches carried in 1929 a resolution, which the British

Council has endorsed ; this resolution had been referred to that Committee with a general endorsement by the Continuation Committee of Life and Work at Eisenach. The import of the resolution may be given in the argument for it offered by the Bishop of Chichester, who proposed it at Eisenach. " The Church, which, in loyalty to its Master, holds up the pacific settlement of disputes as the right method, must welcome the undertaking by the Governments to adopt pacific settlement as their rule and practice. But in welcoming the undertaking it must insist that it is sincere. I claim that it is not only lawful for the Church, but the Church's duty, to make it clear beyond any shadow of doubt that it cannot support any Government which, having received a *bona fide* offer to submit a particular dispute to arbitration (other methods of pacific settlement having failed), refuses that offer. I claim that when we have a World Court, and when that Court or another Tribunal of acknowledged competence and independence has been presented as a Court of Arbitration for the settlement of the dispute, the nations who have signed the Kellogg Pact are bound to accept such Court. And I claim that the Churches are bound to make it absolutely clear that where the Nations, having sworn such mighty oaths, break those oaths by refusing a *bona fide* offer of arbitration, the Churches cannot countenance the actions of those Nations, or lend their name or sanction to any war which may result."[1] Neither recommendation goes the full length with the pacifist. If a nation, despite its *bona fide* offer to submit the quarrel to arbitration, is nevertheless attacked, the Churches are not asked to pledge themselves not to support the Government repelling such an attack. But if it be remembered that all the nations almost are pledged to make common cause against such an aggressor, it is not at all likely that such a case would arise, unless we are to assume that the nations are forsworn, and that the Covenant of the League and the Kellogg Pact are to be treated as only " scraps of paper." That one nation might disown its obligations may be not improbable, but is a general conspiracy imaginable ? We may indulge the hope, if not too confidently, that the occasion will not arise when Christian men will be individually confronted with the question of conscience on which pacifism lays its stress. We may believe that in Great Britain the Churches are prepared to commit themselves to the obligation

[1] *Stockholm*, 1930, No. 1, p. 68.

just indicated, but at least one of the National Committees of the World Alliance on the Continent has repudiated the action of its delegates at the World Alliance meeting which adopted the resolution described above. Conclusive as the argument of the Bishop of Chichester may appear, the conscience of some of the Continental Churches somehow succeeds in evading it. And there is much education to be done among the Churches till even this position is reached.

(*d*) While we are not justified in saying that most of the signatories to the Covenant and the Kellogg Pact had "tongue in cheek" as they held pen in hand to add their names, yet the discussions at the Naval Conference, just reaching the end of its protracted labours, would justify the suspicion that these pledges against war for peace are not taken very seriously. If war between Great Britain and America is unthinkable, because ruled out by mutual pledges, why this dispute about parity at all, and why the need of these calculations of tonnage to secure it? France has not only, as have the other nations, the Covenant and the Kellogg Pact, but also the Locarno Pact; and nevertheless it is still concerned about its security, and has tried to lure Great Britain into a Mediterranean Pact as well. It demands increase of its naval armaments, and will not concede to Italy a parity which Italy has not the economic resources to make more than verbal. What is the explanation of this? The words of an experienced journalist who knows as few know the inner side of European diplomacy (Mr. Wickham Steed) may be quoted: "The Naval Conference has shown that the habit of thinking war is still too strong to be quickly broken—as is natural if we remember that for countless ages men have constantly thought war and have never thought peace for long at a stretch. War has been looked upon as the only means of preserving national safety, and every nation has claimed the right to decide whether or not its national safety was endangered by other nations."[1] He continues: "From whatever angle we look upon the future, we are brought back to the need of learning to think peace. Since peace is international, thought about it must also be international. But international thinking is of two kinds. Nations may try to think of others besides themselves, and frame their policies in accordance with their thinking. Or nations may think individually, and try to adjust their

[1] *Review of Reviews*, 1930, April, p. 276.

individual thoughts to the individual thoughts of other nations at international conferences as the Assembly of the League. The former sort of international thinking is the better. It is like the thought of a gentleman who, even when he looks after his own rights and interests, takes account of the rights and interests of others, whereas the latter kind of thought is rather that of a churl who only thinks of others when he finds out the drawbacks of not doing so. Gentlemanly nations are needed to foster good international thought and to set a high standard of international manners; and it is here that some of the supposedly minor functions of the League of Nations come in."[1] What is such international thinking but the Golden Rule in practice?

(4) The League of Nations has machinery for dealing with any of its members guilty of aggressive war, and it has in a number of cases used that power effectively; it has the threefold provision already mentioned for dealing with disputes. But to stop a fight or to end a quarrel is not the best to be desired in international relations. What is wanted is to get the nations so to understand one another, and so to treat one another, as to be willing to work together for what they will increasingly recognise as an expanding range of interests.

(*a*) This is being most successfully done in what Mr. Steed describes as "the supposedly minor functions," which are, however, proving of growing importance and of greatest promise for the future. "Among its ostensibly minor functions," he says, "are the work of the International Labour Office; of the Committee on Communications and Transit; of the Health Organisation; of the Committee on Intellectual Co-operation; of the Committees on Opium and other Dangerous Drugs, Child Welfare, and the Codification of International Law. Of all these branches of the League, I look upon the Committee and its first-born child, the 'International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation,' as being potentially, but not yet actually, one of the most valuable."[2] As the nations recognise more fully the community of so many of their interests, associate themselves together to avert common dangers, to repress common evils, to redress common wrongs, to secure common goods, there will be a development of the international mind, correcting prejudices and misunderstandings. Although Mr. Steed

[1] *Idem*, p. 279. [2] *Idem*, p. 280.

does not in the above mention the Economic Conference, and its sequel in the endeavours to arrest the increase of economic barriers to free intercourse, I attach every importance to this part of the League's work. Thus the prevention of war and the preservation of peace in the narrower sense has led on to the promotion of peace in the wider sense in the common tasks the League has assumed.

(*b*) The League of Nations exists, and, while its common action is reactive on the nations taking part in it, educating as to its own value, encouraging the habit of its use, yet the League can accomplish only what the nations are enlightened enough, internationally minded enough, to allow it to become. A British Government, subservient in its policy to France, has proved a drag on the wheels of its progress; a British Government inspired by an ideal of what international relations should be, and acting independently and yet considerately, may hasten the pace. It is what the nation thinks and wills that in the end does determine what the Government will be as hindrance or help. The League of Nations Union in this country aims not only at securing popular support for a policy which will make the best and the utmost possible use of the League of Nations, but also seeks, when necessary, to bring the pressure of public opinion to bear upon the Government, and to educate that public opinion. While the Christian Churches cannot commit themselves unreservedly to the Union, it does deserve the support of Christian citizens as one of the most hopeful and helpful political agencies to promote a wise and right internationalism.

III

(1) The previous discussion has shown that there is the international organisation to prevent war and to preserve peace in its negative sense, and that the League of Nations is becoming an agency for the promotion of peace in the positive sense, the cordial intercourse and the loyal co-operation of nations with one another. But that larger and loftier, and also harder task demands, not only greater mental enlightenment, but also higher moral purpose and deeper religious motive than prevail in most of the nations. There is need not only of education in, but of conversion to, internationalism, the spirit which will give life and power to the body of all international organisations.

(*a*) Here is the Church's task : it must restrain the nationalism that tends to isolate a nation from, and exalt it above, others ; it must stimulate the internationalism which lays stress on the common interests of mankind and summons to the common human tasks. Very few Christians indeed realise as yet how far the Christian universalism should transform their patriotism, and should conform their minds to internationalism. A Christian patriot must be prepared to find himself suspected as a traitor to his own country, and his internationalism branded as a preference of every other country above his own. Before the Churches of most lands can teach the nations, they have yet themselves much to learn. How many ministers of Christ would apply consistently the same standard of judgment to the policy of their own Government as to that of other countries ? When they fail to do this, as they do fail, it is not a conscious betrayal of the Christian principles ; but patriotism so readily becomes the motive of what the psychologists call *rationalisation*—the finding of respectable reasons for disreputable acts. Patriotism has often served as a spurious cloak of charity to cover a multitude of sins of national policy which should have been exposed in their ugly nakedness. The first challenge that the international situation offers to the Christian Churches is that they should examine themselves and see whether the light that is in them on the international obligations of their own nation be not darkness, and how great darkness (Matt. vi. 23). A searching intelligence, a sensitive conscience, a courageous purpose, are needed by the Christian citizen if he is not only in his individual relations, but also in the relations of his nation, to deal justly, and love mercy.

(*b*) Such a Conference as Copec (Christian Order in Politics, Economics, and Citizenship) was not a superfluity or a luxury, but a necessity : the Christian Church in each land should have its judgment-day, and summon its own land, and itself as regards its testimony to, and influence on, the nation, to the bar of the divine purpose as revealed in Christ, and being realised by His Spirit. Such self-examination by the Church, such scrutiny of the conditions of the nation around it, must be a corporate enterprise, in which all the Churches should join. Only as within each nation the Church is asserting the supreme authority of Christ in every part of man's life and work can it fit itself for its wider international tasks ; and these tasks relate not only to the

foreign policy of the nation ; for, as has already been indicated, matters which it is often claimed belong to its domestic policy alone may affect other nations favourably or adversely. Thus the fiscal policy may, in having regard to the benefit of the nation, or more probably to the interests of a section of the nation which has "a political pull," involve injury to another nation, and may offer a provocation to a quarrel or a war. Constant and general vigilance is necessary to secure that the national policy shall be consistent with, and not a challenge of, the Christian universalism which springs out of the relation of each believer to Jesus Christ as Saviour and Lord of all.

(2) The Church itself cannot become internationally minded, as it must needs be to teach and guide the nation, if it remains insular in its outlook and effort. It would be impossible to estimate how much the foreign mission enterprise has done to modify the insularity to which the Churches in Great Britain are exposed. As regards their relation to the Continental Churches, however, this insularity persists. As the Baptists have carried on a very energetic and successful world-wide propaganda for their distinctive principles, they have a wider outlook. The Presbyterians, too, have maintained close associations with the Reformed Churches of the Continent. Excepting the mission-field, Anglicanism, Methodism, and Congregationalism are, apart from scattered congregations, confined to the English-speaking nations, without any intimate associations with the Continental Churches. For their own sakes it is desirable that these Churches should escape their insularity, and should learn to appreciate the Lutheran and Reformed types of Christian thought and life. The closer association which one section of Anglicanism is seeking with the Eastern Churches will, in so far as it brings about closer relations, confirm that tendency in it which separates it from the Protestant Churches generally. Of primary importance is the cultivation by the British Churches of intimate relations with the Continental Churches. English Nonconformist and Scottish Presbyterian theology have been more influenced, although to no very great extent, by German theology than has Anglican. Scholarship in regard to the Bible and the history of the Church tends to become a more common possession. The importance which, as a previous quotation shows, Mr. Steed attaches to intellectual co-operation as one of the functions of the League of Nations may here be

underlined, especially in all that relates to religious life and work. A knowledge of another than the mother-tongue, access thereby to its history and literature, visits to other lands, not as a tourist confining intercourse to porters, waiters, and guides, but so as to get into personal relations with the people themselves in their homes and their churches, a habit of seeking to understand and to appreciate the customs and manners of foreigners, which at first are most uncongenial—such are the means by which individuals may make themselves internationally minded; and such a training is of special value for the educated youth, from among whom the teachers and leaders of the Churches in days to come will arise. For such a purpose exchange of preachers, teachers, professors, and students is to be commended and encouraged.

(3) Beyond this it is desirable that the Churches of all lands should corporately think, pray, speak, and work together. There is a tendency among persons who think themselves superior and strive to impress others with their superiority to talk disparagingly of conferences. But how can men work together in the interests of the Kingdom of God unless they have thought, prayed, and spoken together? The Papacy, it is true, does not use the method of conference; but, if the co-operation is to be voluntary, conference must precede it. I have spent many days in conferences, and laboured unweariedly for them, because what I have seen of them makes the devotion of time and strength worth while. I cannot attempt to describe all the international conference and co-operation; but must confine myself to three movements of an international character, with which I am closely associated.

(*a*) On the eve of the Great War a conference met at Constance to promote international friendship through the Christian Churches as the best safeguard against war and the best pledge of peace. The outbreak of war scattered the representatives of different lands; but after the war the efforts were renewed; and there is now solidly established and widely extended the World Alliance to promote international friendship through the Christian Churches. As love alone can cast out hate, so friendship must take the place of suspicion, fear, jealousy, and enmity in the relation of the nations, and what could or should promote such friendship more effectively than the love which can spring up out of fellowship in Christ? Wherever there are conditions which disturb peace and threaten war, there the World

Alliance seeks to bring the Christian Churches together in fellowship, so that after conference a policy may be framed, and by the influence of the Churches be commended to, and even urged upon, the Governments concerned, which will remove the grounds of complaint, the sense of grievance, and thus restore friendship within the nation, or between neighbouring nations. The minority question is not so threatening to-day as it was, largely because of the conferences between the representatives of Churches, to which the governing majority and the subject minority belong. The American and the British Councils of the World Alliance have given the leadership to this movement ; and one man must be specially mentioned because of his invaluable services—the Honorary Secretary, more familiar to the branches all over Europe as Sir Willoughby Dickinson, now, in recognition of his work, raised to the peerage as Lord Dickinson of Painswick. Into further detail it is not for the present purpose necessary to enter. Suffice it to say that as the Alliance was the first in time, so it still holds a foremost place in importance as an agency of the Christian Churches to promote internationalism.

(*b*) Essential as it is, in the present condition of Europe, to remove estrangements and secure the redress of grievances, so that friendship may prevail over all the emotions which divide nations from one another, this effort must be supplemented. A community of interests, as varied and as intimate to the thought and life of the Christian Churches as possible, affords a broader basis still for peace in its positive sense. Hence in close connection with the World Alliance there sprang up the preparation for the Conference on Life and Work, held in Stockholm in 1925. Its enthusiastic and energetic leader was that amazingly versatile, influential, " ecumenical " (that is the adjective he would most prize) churchman, Dr. Söderblom, the Archbishop of Uppsala. As the ministry of the Swedish Church is ecclesiastically recognised by the Anglican on the one hand, and as the Swedish Church is also in close fellowship with the Protestant Churches of the Continent on the other, no other man could have accomplished what the Archbishop did in securing the representation at the Conferences of all the communions of Christendom, save *more suo* the Roman Catholic. His commanding position in his own country secured for the Conference a royal welcome and national hospitality. The careful preparations for Copec, held in the

previous year, were found of value for this larger Conference also. It cannot be said that at the Conference itself the international spirit so dominated as to transcend national differences, as in the discussions the antithesis of the Anglo-American and the German view of the Kingdom of God, as the guiding conception regarding the relation of the Christian Church to human society, was made decisively manifest. The work of the Continuation Committee has, however, drawn the German Churches especially into the international movement with a gratifying enthusiasm and energy, which rather puts to shame the relative indifference of the British and the American Churches. A permanent result of the Conference has been the establishment at Geneva of the Christian Social Research Institute, in which the Christian Churches are co-operating to discover what the world's social (moral, economic, political) needs are, and in what ways the Christian Churches can and ought to teach, to lead, and to labour so as to realise the Christian ideal among the nations. Another result, which it is feared, owing to insufficient support, cannot be permanent, is the quarterly journal *Stockholm*, which is published in three languages (English, French, and German), and which deals with all the questions with which the Conference dealt which can be brought under the broad rubric, Christian Life and Work. As the movement has become more than a continuation of the Conference, a permanent Council is being organised. Thus two objects are being realised : the solution of the social problems within each nation is being discovered and applied, and in the joint effort the spirit of internationalism is being developed.

(*c*) Although the Missionary Conference in Edinburgh in 1910 gave the first impulse to the movement which resulted in the Faith and Order Conference in Lausanne in 1927, of which the late Bishop Brent was the sage and saintly leader, there can be no doubt that the intercourse of the representatives of so many Churches and so many lands in the two movements just mentioned gave the Lausanne Conference a favourable start. At Stockholm it was recognised that the discussion of the Life and Work of the Christian Churches leads on inevitably to the question of the nature, constitution, functions of the Church, that faith and order cannot be severed from life and work, that the ecclesiastical divisions of Christendom do hamper the practical co-operation of the Churches, that the Christian Church cannot

preach reconciliation to interests, classes, nations, races, if it does not begin that work within its own borders. Lausanne was no ornamental addition to Constance and Stockholm, but a necessary completion of the structure of international effort among the Christian Churches. It will be necessary in the next chapter to return to the subject of reunion as one of the urgent tasks of the Christian Church, if it is to fulfil effectively its world mission. With a consideration of the Church this volume must close, as its basal conviction is that the solution of the world problems lies with Christ as Saviour and Lord through the Church as His body, His complement by which He is completing all things in all men (Eph. i. 23). Written as these words are between Good Friday and Easter Sunday, I must add a reference to the seer's vision in Rev. v. It is not the Lion of the Tribe of Judah, but the Lamb in the midst of the Throne, who has prevailed to open the Book of the Divine Purpose in Human History, and to loosen the seals thereof; not divine omnipotence, but divine omnipatience, is the world's help and hope.

CHAPTER VII

THE CHURCH

I

(1) Paul's injunction : " Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling ; for it is God which worketh in you both to will and to work, for his good pleasure " (Phil. ii. 12, 13) presents the paradox of divine grace and human faith ; it is all of God, and yet man has his part. While Christian dogmatics describes how God wills and works man's salvation, Christian ethics defines how man must work it out. There is a danger of so magnifying God's omnipotence as to reduce man to a puppet ; or of laying so great stress on man's liberty and responsibility as a person as to reduce God to be only an auxiliary of man, and even not an indispensable auxiliary. As the previous chapters have been discussing Christian ethics, man's duty, it is necessary in this last chapter to recall that it is faith which energises in the love which is the fulfilment of the law, and that what may to the superficial observer appear a " creative " evolution of man is the fulfilment of the divine purpose in the power of God. What has already been indicated may here be recalled. At the Conference in Stockholm in 1925 a sharp antithesis presented itself in the discussions between what the German delegates described as Anglo-American *Aktivismus* and what might have been as truthfully described as German quietism. The one side seemed to the other to say that man can, and does, bring the Kingdom of God on earth, and the other side also seemed to say, man can do nothing, for God does it all. Mutual confidence has helped to lessen the antithesis.

(2) In the Introduction to this volume the use of the term Kingdom of God for the social progress of mankind was rejected for various reasons. Since that argument was written, a thorough exegetical, historical, and theological discussion of the *Kingdom of God and the Church in the New Testament*[1] has appeared which confirms the conclusion reached. The content of this volume may be sketched as offering a fitting introduction to the subject of this chapter.

[1] *Reich Gottes und Kirche im Neuen Testament*, von Dr. Gerhard Gloege.

(*a*) The writer defines the Kingdom of God as meaning *God's sole sovereign activity* in human history. He traces this conception in the Old Testament to its culmination in the hope of the Messiah, especially the vision of the Suffering Servant of Isaiah liii. The fundamental character of the New Testament proclamation is that the rule of God (not realm) is *dynamic* ; God is ever acting. It is raised above the conditions of time, and thus excludes the two contradictory conceptions of *evolutionism* and *synergism*. It is opposed to this world of sin and pain, and represents the coming æon ; and yet it has a positive teleological relation to this present age as a world consummation, not only cosmic, but also ethical and redemptive. Accordingly it is already present in the world in the divine activity in the person, teaching, and work of Jesus ; and this activity is a saving action, imparting forgiveness of sin, and in the Spirit a new life or *aliveness* (*Lebendigkeit*). Lastly, the activity is shown to be unconditioned in the hope of the Second Advent, the Resurrection, and the Judgment. To the spiritualism of the Greek belief in the immortality of a disembodied soul, the New Testament opposes this realism of a complete consummation. The author recognises that the eschatological language of the New Testament needs to be translated into the corresponding terms of our own day.

(*b*) What is of special value for the present purpose is the statement regarding the relation of the Kingdom as thus described to the Church. The author finds the roots of the Church consciousness of the primitive community in the doctrine in the Old Testament of " the remnant " as a community of the saved. Christ in whom God exercises His Sovereign activity is the Creator of the Church, which is neither identical with, nor yet a substitute for, the Kingdom, but first of all the *object* of this divine activity, and then the *organ*, the instrument God makes and uses for His ends. Even as God's rule, the Church as holy and inspired, as called by God out of the world, as a stranger and a sufferer in the world, is above the world and against the world. And yet the Church is within the world, subject to the conditions of time and space, exercising its activity there, actually there in its visible institutions, in its imperfection and struggle against sin. As the object and then the organ of the sovereign activity of God the Church is essentially one ; its unity is not uniformity, but variety ; and thus, as its roots are in the God over all, it is universal, the synthesis of all mankind.

What is in my judgment so valuable in this exposition is the emphasis on God's sovereign activity without the exclusion of the dependent and subordinate human activity, and the conception of the Church as the object of God's activity, and then as His organ, thus not excluding man's calling to work within this organ, and recognising both the ideal and the actual in the Church in their inevitable blending. That the discussion culminates, in the assertion of the unity and the universality of the Church, as rooted in the very nature of God, is to me a specially welcome feature of the book.

(*c*) The Church is the creation of the divine activity in Christ and His Spirit ; it is a creation individually and corporately. The individual soul has infinite value for God, as His redemptive, reconciling activity shows. While human liberty is exercised and human responsibility recognised in man's receiving and responding to God's grace in faith, it is the Spirit of God who, enlightening and quickening the soul, stimulates the activity of faith. Faith is both a human duty and a divine gift. In personal experience and character by faith in Jesus Christ the old things pass away, and all things become new in promise and potency, if not at once in actuality. The divine forgiveness cancels the past as separation from God through sin ; the divine Spirit gives a new life, or, as the word spirit itself suggests, a new aliveness, freshness, and fullness of life. This individual creation is not to isolation, but to fellowship ; for the love of God in the grace of Christ issues in the *common possession* of the Holy Spirit, and by that common possession the believers are constituted a *community* of interest, purpose, effort.

II

(1) As the writer just discussed maintains, *unity* and *universality* are essential characteristics of the Church of Christ. The movement for the reunion of the Christian Churches is an endeavour to recover not only the primitive condition of the Church, but its essential nature as God's creation in human history. National and denominational divisions, inevitable as they may have been under the historical conditions, in which the divine truth and grace are mediated, and must be mediated by imperfect human reason, conscience, experience, and character, are a contradiction of the reconciling function of the Church in

human society as the organ of the God who in Christ is reconciling all things unto himself (Col. i. 20), a challenge to the purpose of the one God who through Christ is seeking to become all things to all men, the highest good to all mankind. (1 Cor. xv. 28). Hence it is my conviction that the Christian Church cannot, as now divided, discharge its functions with full effectiveness and sure success, since its very divisions are inconsistent with the love which is the fulfilling of the law, and is the all too imperfect reproduction of the perfection which is the reality of God. To illustrate from the functions which will be afterwards discussed in more detail, the Church cannot let *the light* of the revelation of God as Father of all shine (Matt. v. 16) in its witness and its work, when so much of its zeal has been, and still is, though in less degree, shown in the advocacy of divisive doctrines and practices. The Church cannot preserve *the savour of the salt* (*v.* 13) of the distinctive character of the disciples of Jesus when bigotry and fanaticism disfigure so many of its pages : and Christian men to-day boast of their spiritual ancestry with no feeling of sorrow or shame for what disfigured their testimony, conscientious as it may have been. The Church cannot spread *the leaven* (Matt. xiii. 33) of the spirit of the divine reconciliation throughout all human relations, when the relations of Churches to one another are so often lacking in that same spirit. The Church cannot spread throughout the earth as the *mustard seed* growing into the plant (*vv.* 31–32), when its missionary enterprise is hampered by a display of the divisions of Christendom even in the heathen world.

(2) For many Christian men one of the surest evidences of the presence and working of the Spirit of God within the Churches is the Reunion Movement. Throughout the history of the Church there have arisen, as voices crying in the wilderness, heralds of the coming dawn of a United Church.[1] We must here confine ourselves to recent efforts. (*a*) As a result of the World's Missionary Conference, held in Edinburgh in 1910, a movement was begun in America of preparation for a World Conference on Christian Faith and Order.[2] Informal discussions by groups in several countries of the subjects to be dealt with were initiated. I was a member of such a group, consisting of an equal number of Anglicans and Nonconformists (seven of each). Two brief *Interim*

[1] See *Christian Unity ; its History and Challenge*, by G. F. Slosser.
[2] *Documents on Christian Unity*, edited by G. K. A. Bell, pp. 15–28.

Reports were issued ; in the first it was found possible to express agreement on the articles of faith, and the questions of order were held over. As regards order no such accord could be reported ; what was held in common on sacraments, ministry, etc., was stated, but in each case there was a wide divergence in the interpretation given to the common elements.

(*b*) The Great War delayed the preparations for the World Conference ; and in 1920 the *Lambeth Conference* issued an appeal to all Christian people to consider the conditions of reunion. The common basis suggested was the acceptance of the Holy Scriptures, the two sacraments, the Apostles' and the so-called Nicene creeds, and the historic episcopate.[1] To remove the difficulty felt by many Anglicans in receiving the Lord's Supper at the hands of a non-episcopally ordained minister, it was proposed that such ministers should, without casting any doubt on the spiritual value of their previous ministry, accept an extension of their ministry " throughout the whole fellowship " by " a commission through episcopal ordination," the bishops expressing themselves as willing to accept from the authorities of other communions " a form of commission or recognition which would commend *their* ministry " to the congregations of these communions. The Federal Council of the Free Churches was authorised on behalf of these Churches to appoint a committee to confer with a like number of Anglican representatives. Most of the work was done by a small sub-committee, of which I was also a member.[2] Into the details, familiar as they are to me, and of vital interest, it is not necessary for the present purpose to enter. Two matters of special interest may be mentioned, the one a recognition by the Anglican members of the Sub-Committee that the Free Churches possessed a ministry and sacraments within the one universal Church of Christ, although this was qualified by insistence on irregularity in the appointment of these ministries ; and the other a proposal that such episcopal ordination might be *sub conditione*, the ecclesiastical phrase which means that the ordination is real only if any previous ordination was not real : to this proposal the objection was at once made that the ordinance would be understood in one sense by him who ordained, and in another by the ordained,

[1] *Idem*, pp. 1–14.
[2] *The Church of England and the Free Churches*, edited by G. K. A. Bell and W. L. Robertson.

for the one would regard it as necessary to the validity of the ministry, the other as unnecessary, and only a concession to the scruples of others. As it was realised that no closer approach was possible within the terms of the Lambeth Appeal, these conferences were brought to a pause, if not an end, in September 1925. The action of the Free Churches, represented by the Federal Council, showed that these commissions were not prepared to go any further than their representatives, even if willing to go as far. Although these conversations had no definite result as regards the way to reunion, yet they have undoubtedly greatly improved the relations of the Churches to one another, making possible a far wider co-operation in moral and social efforts, and even in evangelistic work. The future will probably show that seed has been sown, from which a harvest of good will be reaped.

(3) The Meetings of the World Alliance, *Copec*, in 1924, and especially the Stockholm Conference in 1925, brought countries and Churches into a contact which was a favourable further preparation for the projected Conference on Faith and Order.

(*a*) At Stockholm, the larger Christian communions, except the Roman Catholic, out of thirty-seven nations were represented ; and although the constitution of the Conference expressly excluded the discussion of matters of faith and order, some sentences may be quoted to show that it was a real preparation. " It is a matter of deep thankfulness that in the plan of God and through the guidance of His Spirit the representatives of so many Christian communions have been led to assemble and have renewed in common fellowship their faith, hope, and love in Jesus Christ as Saviour and Lord. It is a matter for deep thankfulness that in spite of differences, sincere and profound, they have been enabled to discuss so many difficult problems with a candour, a charity, and a self-restraint which the Spirit of God alone could inspire. As we repeated the Lord's prayer together, each in the speech his mother taught him, we realised afresh our common faith, and experienced as never before the unity of the Church of Christ."[1] In a common experience as the foundation, and a common Christian character as the structure to be raised upon it—a real unity was made manifest.

[1] *The Message of the Universal Christian Conference on Life and Work.* See *The Stockholm Conference*, by Bell.

(*b*) Two years later the Conference on Faith and Order took place at Lausanne.[1] Here too the Christian communions from all parts of the world were represented, except, as before, the Roman Catholic Church. While there was manifest a spirit of caution, not to say timidity, on the part of the representatives of some communions, lest in the reconciling atmosphere of the meetings they should commit themselves further than their own communions would be willing to go, and while there were some of the American Protestants especially who showed themselves impatient with the inevitably slow movement, what was felt by all who were spiritually sensitive was the fundamental unity of all Christians in their faith, hope, and love towards the Lord Jesus Christ, as shown in the intense, genuine fellowship which was experienced in common worship. Hence many felt that the tragic feature was that this fellowship could not find its appropriate, what to some even seemed its inevitable, expression in a common celebration of the Lord's Supper, owing to the division on the subjects of ministry and sacraments among the Churches. Apart from this, the Christian fellowship was closer than at Stockholm, despite the fact that the subjects under discussion were in themselves more likely to divide. The Conference was by its constitution strictly limited in the task it could undertake. It was not called to formulate terms of reunion, nor to initiate movements for reunion, but only to consider and express the matters of difference no less than of agreement in the Christian Churches ; and the reports even were not adopted, but only received *nemine contradicente* for transmission to the Churches represented, with a request for a reply indicating their assent or dissent with these statements. If the result fell short of the extravagant anticipations of some who did not realise how wide are still the divisions in Christendom, how great the differences of conviction among Christian men, it more than fulfilled the hopes, and disappointed the fears, of those who knew all that was involved in the enterprise. Only the last Report, which recommended practical action going faster and further than the previous Reports gave ground for assuming that the Conference was prepared to go, provoked opposition ; and this Report was received, not to be transmitted directly to the Churches, but for further consideration by the Continuation Committee. The Orthodox Oriental Churches did not withdraw from

[1] See *Faith and Order, Lausanne*, 1927, edited by H. N. Bate.

the Conference ; they received the statement about the Gospel,[1] but dissociated themselves from the discussion of the other subjects—creed, ministry, and sacraments—as for them finally fixed by General Councils. The Anglo-Catholic section, which stood nearest to the Orthodox Oriental, contrary to the wishes of some of its members, refused corporately to take any action which might appear divisive. On the question of the sacraments, some of the Lutherans, especially the American, took a position near to the Orthodox and the Anglo-Catholics. While many differences were made manifest to harmonise which would be a difficult task, yet the great contrast was between what may be described broadly as the *Catholic* and *Protestant* tendencies. This contrast is within as well as between communions. Many of the American Episcopalians as well as the Irish, even as their official names indicate, are on the Protestant side, so also among Anglicans ; in the Protestant Churches of the Continent the Catholic tendency is not unknown.

(4) To express the contrast in the extreme antithesis, which admits of all gradations of qualification, we may say : that the Catholic believes that there is only one valid and regular development of Christianity in the world, prescribed by the Founder of the Church Himself, and preserved and transmitted by the historic episcopate as an apostolic succession, grace and authority passing by consecration and ordination from person to person in unbroken continuity ; and that the Protestant, relying on the presence of Christ in His Church, and the operation of His Spirit, claims validity and regularity for the sacraments and ministry of all Churches, or perhaps it would be better to say, does not concern himself about these, but asserts the legitimacy and even historical necessity of divergent developments. Both recognise the unity of the Church of Christ ; they differ as regards the degree of uniformity necessary to preserve and to manifest that unity. Each of these tendencies has its perversion from religion to superstition. The Catholic is in danger of falling into a *magical* view of ministry and sacraments in ascribing an inherent virtue to the prescribed channels of grace—formulæ, acts, elements, persons. The Protestant runs the risk of making the Bible as verbally inspired, and, as interpreted by the individual conscience and reason, an infallible oracle not only as regards morals and

[1] The hearty unanimity of the reception of this Report was one of the most cheering features of the Conference.

religion, but even science and history. The Catholic pot and the Protestant kettle should not call one another black because of such superstition. The one should judge the other at its best and not its worst. The Catholic believes that, if he obeys the will of Christ, as expressed in the valid and regular ministry and sacraments, he will enjoy the blessings of the grace of Christ. The Protestant believes that, if he follows the leading of the Spirit of Christ, he will not miss the blessings of His grace by means of, or even apart from, any ministry or sacraments. For the one Christ prescribes law, for the other permits liberty ; for both in the self-same Spirit. I have not yet discovered the synthesis of these tendencies. My solution of the problem is not compromise, but comprehension. The two perversions being excluded, cannot each tendency recognise the legitimacy of the other within the one body of Christ, and fellowship of the Spirit ?

(*a*) There is a common experience of Jesus Christ as Saviour and Lord ; there may be divergent interpretations of that experience ; but is not the experience, and not the interpretation, the essential reality ? Paul, who is so certain of his experience, is modest as regards its interpretation. Compare these utterances. " I am persuaded that neither death nor life . . . shall be able to separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord " (Romans viii. 38–39). " I know Him whom I have believed, and I am persuaded that He is able to guard that which I have committted to Him against that day " (2 Tim. i. 12). " Now we see in a mirror darkly ; but then face to face ! now I know in part ; but then shall I know even as also I have been known " (1 Cor. xiii. 12). This blending of confidence and diffidence is found also in 1 John iii. 2. " Beloved, now are we children of God, and it is not yet manifest what we shall be. We know that if he shall be manifested, we shall be like him ; for we shall see him even as he is." Most Christians sustain this experience, which is so certain, by the same means of grace. They differ in their interpretation of the conditions of the efficacy of these means. Neither the experience nor the efficacy of the means depend on the interpretation. The representatives of the Anglican Church at Lambeth admitted that Nonconformists had a ministry and sacraments (even if irregular) in the Universal Church, and did receive spiritual blessing by these means. Should the tentative interpretation be allowed to divide those whom the certain experience unites ? I myself believe

that theology can here render a great service. As historical scholarship it will show how eternal spiritual values have clothed themselves, and must clothe themselves, in temporary historical values. As constructive thought it will show how illegitimate and arrogant all dogmatism (ecclesiastical or credal) is in view of the conditions and limitations of human knowledge, the inadequacy of the intellect to express the contents even of human experience, still more of the divine reality, which in that experience is apprehended. The abandonment of the belief in the verbal inspiration of the Bible, and of the *rationalism* (such as that of Anselm and Descartes) which claimed that the mind had a store of ideas, which could be assumed as true, has changed the whole intellectual situation. What claim to be ultimate convictions, which cannot be abandoned, but must be asserted, on matters of faith and order, are now seen to have a psychological history, which deprives them of any absolute validity, and grants them only a relative value. Epistemology or the theory of knowledge, to which modern philosophy leads us, would sweep away as mere tradition or convention a great deal of what now divides the Churches, while affording a surer basis of certainty in regard to experience and its objects. After more than forty years of philosophical and theological study, the certainty of the reality of my experience increases, but the confidence in the adequacy of my interpretation decreases. Most of what still holds apart will be shown to be an illegitimate dogmatism. But, as all believers are neither philosophers nor theologians, what should be insisted on as preparing for reunion is this contrast of the certainty of experience and the inadequacy of its interpretation.

(*b*) Further, on the common basis of experience is to be built the common Christian character. The distinctive characteristic of that character is absolute love for God, and equal love for self and neighbour. The human ideal to be realised by the Spirit of God in man rests on the divine reality of God Himself as love, as in relation to man Father, and through this universal Fatherhood constituting mankind a common brotherhood. The New Testament recognises two degrees of that love ; there is *philanthropia*, love of all men, and *philadelphia*, love of the *brotherhood* in Christ ; the second is not an exclusion, but a concentration of the first. What needs to be insisted on, then, is that Christian love is the bond of perfectness as the reproduction of the perfection

of God, and that the prejudices and antagonisms which divide Christians from one another are a violation of the supreme law of love, and a defiance of Him who no less by the sacrifice of His death than the service of His life has the authority to impose that law. If Christians only had a vision of a Christian society, animated by Christ-like love, no theological or ecclesiastical difference would seem to them to justify their keeping apart from one another. All conference and co-operation in Christian life and work are a preparation of the reunion of the Churches in so far as they promote the *philadelphia*, which is the most effective means of reaching the ends of the *philanthropia* ; for the Church will be saving itself from the error and wrong of its divisions as it is used by Christ in saving the world from sin and sorrow.

(*c*) If the common Christian faith as realised in experience, and the common Christian love as expressed in *philadelphia* or fellowship, can and will draw Christians together, the common Christian hope of the world-wide Sovereign Saviourhood of Jesus Christ can be realised only as that unity in faith and love is made increasingly manifest and effective in the world. This is the answer to those who maintain that there is always this unity in faith and love. But how can a world confronted by the variety of interpretation, Catholic and Protestant, Lutheran and Reformed, Anglican and Nonconformist, be convinced that there is only one experience of the reality of the one Saviour and Lord ? Or how can a world, seeing the rivalry and competition of sects, be persuaded that all Christians do love one another with a love as redemptive and sacrificial as the love of Jesus Christ ? It is hypocrisy, *play-acting*, in the name of unity to deprecate and to neglect reunion, wherever and whenever possible. It is because I believe that the Christian ideal, which this volume attempts to expound, cannot be realised unless the common Christian experience and the common Christian character are revealed as a reality to the world in a united Christian Church, that these pages are being devoted to this more detailed discussion of the Reunion Movement.

(5) To resume the historical narrative, after this necessary digression as regards the prospects which Lausanne presented, (*a*) it may be frankly conceded that Roman Catholicism remains as arrogantly exclusive as ever, and that its corruptions and superstitions and its secular ambitions

make it impossible to desire closer relations, unless it undergoes a thorough reformation. It has replied to Stockholm and Lausanne in the papal encyclical *Mortalium animos*, in which His Holiness warns the faithful against any contact with what he calls the *panchristiani*, a reproach which the Archbishop of Uppsala has turned into a compliment. These *all Christians* want to be *altogether Christians*, which they cannot be unless all are together. The Malines conversations, too, have ended in a set-back to any hopes of the Anglo-Catholics to find a basis for communion with Rome.

(*b*) The Orthodox Oriental Churches are so divided by national antagonisms that their unity rests on a creed, sacraments, and orders of the past, and not on a living, full worship with one another in the present. Only an Ecumenical Council could bring about any change; and political conditions hinder the calling of such a Council by the Patriarch of Constantinople. Here, too, there would need to be great changes before reunion with Protestants could become possible. Rome, alarmed by such contacts as these Churches have with the Protestant, is making more strenuous endeavours to draw them nearer to itself, but so far with little, if any, success. While Rome must abandon its exclusiveness, these Churches must abandon their claim to finality, if there is to be any advance to reunion. The relations of Anglicanism to the Orthodox Churches is more hopeful, but progress is slow.

(*c*) There have been successful reunions among Churches of kindred creed and polity, as of Presbyterians in Scotland and Methodists in England; and even of Churches where there is not so close affinity, as of Methodists, Presbyterians, and Congregationalists in Canada. Other proposals are under discussion; the most crucial of these is that in South India, for it involves episcopal and non-episcopal Churches; and in such a reunion the contrast of Catholic and Protestant at once becomes practically important. A reunion must involve at least a common ministry and common sacraments. How can the two positions as above described be reconciled? It is generally agreed that the polity shall be episcopal, with presbyteral and congregational elements so far as these can be combined. The non-episcopal Churches accept the episcopate as a fact without committing themselves to any theory. The episcopal Church here makes no concession, as, whatever may be the prevalent theory, no theory has been made obligatory within itself. All future ordinations

will be episcopal ; that is a practical consequence of the acceptance of an episcopate, although the non-episcopal communions desire a recognition even in ordination of their distinctive types. What causes difficulty is the status within the Church of the existing non-episcopal ministries.

(*d*) The adjustment in the India proposals is that all existing ministries shall be recognised ; but that conscientious scruples are to be respected so that no non-episcopally ordained minister shall be imposed on a church which desires an episcopally ordained minister for the celebration of the Lord's Supper. In the mission-field the situation is further complicated by the fact that the missionary societies will continue to send out men already ordained. After thirty years the South Indian Church is to decide what, if any, exceptions shall be made to an episcopally ordained ministry, the status of ministers existing at that time remaining unaffected. Will missionary societies desire to send out non-episcopally ordained ministers, if the Church itself decides that episcopal ordination is to be required in all fresh ministries ? For me the solution is simple. Before that date, as soon as the conditions allow, the societies should be willing to leave to the Church in India the ordination of missionaries as well as native ministers. The extremes meet in a common opposition to these proposals. Many of the Anglo-Catholics are opposed to even a temporary recognition of non-episcopal ministries ; and some would like to impose the Catholic theory as well as the episcopate itself. Some of the Protestant missionaries dislike the authority assigned to the bishop, and are so opposed to the Catholic theory that they would like a formal repudiation of it. This is the difficult problem which the Lambeth Conference is called in to solve. A favourable decision would encourage other offorts at the reunion of episcopal and non-episcopal Churches ; an adverse would retard, if not altogether prevent. In the Dominions overseas and the mission lands, in face of heathenism, the divisions of Christendom are a scandal ; and heavy is the responsibility of those who would impose on the new Churches the divisive courses of the old, where there is no relative historical justification. Owing to the agreement of the Churches not to overlap in their efforts, whether a native convert is an Episcopalian, a Presbyterian, or a Congregationalist is a matter of geographical situation, and not personal conviction ; and it is the *reductio ad absurdum* of sectarianism to

try to perpetuate such differences. Best would it be, if possible, to evangelise and to educate, and then as soon as possible leave the new Churches to frame their own creed, polity, ritual.

(6) A last consideration which may here be presented is a forecast of what would seem the desirable form of reunion. Uniformity must not be confused with unity, as it is just the attempt to enforce uniformity in the past which has destroyed unity. A common witness to the Gospel, although it need not be in identical terms, a common work for the progress of the world, although in varied kinds of activity, a common worship, although not bound to one ritual, common sacraments received without scruple by all, and a common ministry, which would be acceptable to all—these seem necessary, if the unity is to be made manifest and effective to the world. But so far as common interests allow, as large a liberty, and consequent variety, as historical traditions, local conditions, national differences, racial characteristics and personal preferences may require, should be allowed. The greater part of the Church, in the whole course of its history, seems to have forgotten that Christians are not under law but under grace (Rom. vi. 14) ; and that where the Spirit of the Lord is there is liberty (2 Cor. iii. 17). The condition of an expansive and a progressive unity is, not uniformity, but adaptability. The Church must be, as the apostle was, " all things to all men " (1 Cor. ix. 22), avoiding suppression of individual or other differences, and oppression of a minority by a majority. How great will need to be the revolution in most of the Churches, if traditions and conventions of the past are to be left behind, if the calls and needs of the present are to be met, and so the promise of the future be fulfilled !

III

Having considered what in my judgment is an essential condition of the Church's full effectiveness in the world, we may now examine the functions it must discharge if it is to be the agent, used by the Spirit of God, to fulfil the ideal of human society. As has already been indicated in illustrating the need for unity, the functions are suggested most adequately by four metaphors of Jesus, two used of the disciples, and two of the Kingdom of God : *light*, *salt*, *mustard seed*, and *leaven*. It is interesting to note how these

supplement each other. As light the disciples are the agents of the divine revelation of truth and grace, and as salt they are the factors of the human transformation resulting from that divine revelation. As the mustard seed the Kingdom expands in, and as leaven it permeates, human society, also transforming. If the disciples let their light shine, the Kingdom will spread as the mustard seed grows ; if they will preserve their savour of Christian experience and character, their influence will permeate as does the leaven. Each of these functions must be briefly examined.

(1) The light of the revelation is not only truth, illumination for the mind (reason and conscience), but also grace, transformation of the whole personality (forgiveness, a new relation to God, and holiness, a new character in man). It is significant that this diffusion of the divine revelation through the agency of the disciples is not thought of as primarily in word, but in deed : " Even so let your light shine before men, that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father which is in heaven " (Matt. v. 16). Men reveal God most clearly and fully to the world when as children of God they become perfect as the Father in heaven is perfect (*v.* 48).

(*a*) While at first thought it might seem that *evangelisation* is the method of making the light shine throughout the world, when we think more deeply we shall realise that only that evangelisation is adequate which produces such a change in those who receive it that their life by God's grace will confirm the truth to themselves, and commend it to others ; and this method may be called *educational evangelism.* This has been the defect of the missionary method of the past, that it presented a belief to be accepted more than a life to be realised. For our present purpose it is specially significant that the teaching of Jesus should thus lay stress on good works as a means of revealing God, and the good works must correspond to the character and the purpose of the God so revealed. God is Father, and He is revealed only as His children live and labour and suffer in love among one another. The realisation of the Christian ideal is a revelation, the most effective revelation, of the reality of God to man. Hence evangelisation must include education, and every other means of making believers through their good works the light of the world.

(*b*) This wider ethical outlook is happily displacing the narrower theological view. It is interesting to compare the

nine volumes which were prepared for the World Missionary Conference in Edinburgh in 1910[1] with the eight volumes issued before the Jerusalem Meeting in 1928 as illustrating the expansion of interest and change of emphasis. Subjects which then were not even on the horizon of forward-looking missionary leaders now bulk largely in the forefront. The third volume of the second series is devoted to the relation of Missions to Race Conflict, a growingly ominous feature of the world. At the Conference in 1910 the Churches in the mission field had only a few native representatives ; in 1928 a large proportion could speak for Churches growing in independence. Hence a serious, urgent problem is discussed in the third volume—namely, the Older and the Younger Churches ; it is recognised that all sense of race superiority must be laid aside, and the missions must, in the spirit of the Baptist (John iii. 30), be willing to decrease in order that the native Churches may increase. A premature abandonment of immature Christian communities would be a disaster ; but a prolonged tutelage would be an obstacle to real progress. Europe and America have sent not only missionaries of the Gospel, but also agents of industry to Japan, India, and China ; and the evils of industrialism are being reproduced without the checks which only too slowly have been imposed on them in the countries nominally Christian. Volume five discusses these economic and social dangers. And so keenly is the need of considered and courageous action by the missions felt that a bureau of enquiry into these questions is being organised in Geneva. In most mission lands, however, the bulk of the population is still on the land ; and to make it possible to keep the people on the land, and so prevent the excessive urbanisation which we are recognising as an evil of Western lands, the missions are facing the Rural Problems (volume six). Owing to the spread of European culture to these lands, it is being recognised that the most serious rival to the Christian Gospel is not the ancestral faiths, which are losing their hold on the educated classes, but a godless secularism having its theoretical support in physical science, and its practical in this industrialism, and it is in view of this danger especially that the Christian Message must be framed (volume one). These conditions make it imperative that no less stress be laid on ethics and social ethics, and the closely related economics and politics, than on theology,

[1] Oliphant, Anderson & Ferrier. [2] Oxford University Press.

and in theology itself on the formation of the Christian community no less than on individual conversion.

(2) Just because these hindrances and difficulties are being so fully recognised, and their removal being so seriously attempted, is there reason to believe that while the growth in numbers may not be proportionately so great in the immediate future, not only will the quantitative spread (as of the mustard plant, Matt. xiii. 31, 32) be accompanied by a qualitative growth, but by (to change the metaphor) the strengthening of the stakes of the character of the native Churches will the cords of their expansion be lengthened (Isa. liv. 2); and in due time this expansion itself will become more rapid. Native Churches, fitted for liberty and responsibility, commanding their own resources, will, we may expect, be more efficient agents of evangelisation and education than missionary societies can be. The growing sense of race and nationality which is now, and may in the future be still more, an obstacle to progress, can, if wisely guided and encouraged, be made a condition of expansion. The immediate future will show whether this sense can be made an auxiliary, or will prove an opponent, of a universal Christian community. Important as consolidation is, expansion is no less urgent, lest the world fields be sown with the tares of godless secularism, before the wheat of the Kingdom of God takes root, and grows in fullness (Matt. xiii. 24–30). The interdependence of lands and peoples is such that the Christian ideal cannot be realised, unless as the whole world is being Christianised. This consideration must be stressed, as it is so often found that missionary enthusiasts have no interest in social reform, and social reformers have no interest in the spread of the Gospel. The defects in the social order of the countries from which the missionaries come are one of the greatest hindrances to the acceptance of Christianity as the world-religion; and the transference of the economic or social evils of Christian to heathen lands is more of an obstacle than even the defects of the native faiths. Too long has the Church at home been indifferent to social wrongs and miseries; and evil indeed would it be if that indifference were carried to other lands along with the Gospel. Hopeful as is the sign of these Jerusalem Reports that leaders of the missionary movement—the foremost place among whom belongs to Dr. Mott—are aware of the danger; yet what does damp the hopes is the knowledge also that among the supporters of

missions there still prevails an individualist pietism, unaware of the greatness of the tasks which fall on the missionary movement. The light must shine ; but it must not be only a message of individual salvation, but of world regeneration. The mustard seed must grow and spread into the plant ; but not only as an accumulation of individual converts, but as a foundation of Christian communities, controlled by the Spirit of Christ, organs of the Kingdom of God.

(3) This thought may be expanded by a brief consideration of the saying about the *savourless salt* (Matt. v. 16), and the parable of the *leaven* (xiii. 33). The word *salt* as used by Jesus does not mean purification or preservation, for the reference is to the savour of the salt. The salt enhances the pleasant taste of food. The context shows how the metaphor is intended. Jesus fulfils law and prophecy ; and the righteousness of the disciples is to excel the righteousness of scribes and Pharisees (Matt. v. 17 and 20). The Christian has a quality—mental, moral, spiritual—which distinguishes him from all men, as salted food from saltless. He has something the world has not. It is discernment of truth, attainment of holiness, intimate communion with God. He is a man, yet man of a higher order (cf. Matt. xi. 11) than even Hebrew prophecy could produce, because of his divine relationship. Primary is the religious experience of the love of God through the grace of Christ in the possession of the Spirit ; from this results the corresponding moral character, love shown in forgiveness and sacrifice ; and that character so dominates the social relations as to tend towards a Christian order of society. This is the distinctiveness of Christianity ; and the danger is the loss of this distinctiveness. That danger has again and again in the history of the Christian Church been actualised. If an organism lacks vitality, it is more affected by its environment ; and so the Christian Church has often been " fashioned according to this world," because it was not being ever " transformed by the renewing of its mind " (Rom. xii. 2). Of this the historical part has already afforded illustrations. Recovery has been possible only by reversion to the original type ; and progress has been maintained only as the type was preserved, not only in the individual Christian, but also in the Christian community. The Church is not failing in its duty to the world, but only securing the conditions for its fulfilment, when it watches and prays, thinks and labours for its own self-preservation according to its type, as salt which

has not lost its savour. The best a man can give the world is himself at his best ; and so the Church must be its best to give to the world the best.

(4) The expansion of the religious experience and moral character in the social relations is suggested by the parable of the leaven, although, like all figurative language, the analogy cannot be pressed too far, for the leaven loses in intensity as it transforms the whole lump by permeation. The Church must not lose the intensity of its distinctive character in the expansion of its influence. In view of frequent misrepresentation, this leavening of the lump is not to be thought of only as the influence on others of individual Christians. But the Church as a whole must corporately by word and deed, and all means at its disposal, seek to influence human society in all its interests and activities, domestic, educational, cultural, recreational, industrial and commercial, political and international, as the previous chapters have endeavoured to show. It must itself focus the Christian ideal if it is to radiate that ideal in the world around ; the Church must be a model of human society, a brotherhood spreading brotherliness ; its *philadelphia* must be the pattern of *philanthropia* ; its community in the Spirit the inspiration of the community of all mankind. It is through the Church as His body that Christ can make effectual His solution of the problem of the world. With all its failures and defects, no other institutions can effect for human society what Christ through His Church can. Christ needs the Church as His complement, and uses the Church for the completion of the divine purpose—that consummation when God shall be all things in all men (Eph. i. 23)—the whole manhood of all mankind redeemed, reconciled, and restored to God as the Father in, through, and over all His children.

CONCLUSION: FROM ETHICS TO ESCHATOLOGY

I

Regarding the consummation of the Christian ideal two questions call for an answer here : Will the consummation be on earth ? and : Will it include all mankind ? (1) As regards the answer to the first question, two errors need to be avoided. We must not depreciate this earth as merely the scene of individual probation for the future life ; and we must not exalt this earth as capable of being the scene of the consummation. The earthly life has its own intrinsic values ; and there is a purpose of God on earth for which we may anticipate a fulfilment which will satisfy the Creator of it, and His creatures in it. But to limit the consummation to such an earthly fulfilment, whatever it might be, would be to repeat the mistake of the Pharisees, which Jesus rebuked. Human institutions, valuable as they may be even relatively to the divine purpose on earth, are not ultimate values ; for we may surely generalise what Jesus said in regard to marriage as a physical relation and a social obligation (Matt. xxii. 30). The conditions of time and space, matter and sense, do not allow the full realisation of the ideal of the children of God, who must become as " the angels in heaven." Apart, then, from the physical speculations as to the cooling of the solar system, with which we need not now concern ourselves, it is well that we should think of the purpose of God on earth, in the fulfilment of which men have their part, in the wider context of that unseen world to which the generations pass one after another. In this connection we must heed Paul's counsel (2 Cor. iv. 18) not to look only at the things seen, but at the things unseen also, because the things seen are temporal, and the things unseen eternal. Eternal values are being realised within the temporal, as, for instance, the spiritual unity of husband and wife within marriage which I believe death cannot dissolve. This is no depreciation of the temporal values, as only within them, and by means of them, it would seem, the eternal values can be realised. Heaven is being made on earth ; and those now in heaven have an interest in what is being done on earth, for without us they are not

being made perfect (Heb. xi. 40) ; nor we without them, for the cloud of witnesses inspires us as we run the race, looking unto Jesus, the author and perfecter of faith (xii. 1, 2).

(2) The doctrine of eternal bliss for the saved, and eternal damnation for the unsaved, immediately after death is a doctrine which is not scriptural, and which, even if it were scriptural, has become intolerable to the Christian reason and conscience, and still more to the Christian heart, which feels the constraint of the love of Christ. The dogmatic universalism to which some have rushed is too hasty an assumption, and no less offends the Christian reason and conscience, although tolerable to the Christian heart. For there is a personal continuity between the present and the future life, and, although death as a crisis for the personality either may lead to self-discovery and self-recovery, as was the case with Peter when Jesus looked upon him (Luke xxii. 61), or may be a mirror-moment, followed by forgetfulness (Jas. i. 23–24) ; yet the possibility that he that is unrighteous will choose to be unrighteous still (Rev. xxii. 11) must be admitted. We cannot affirm that disobedience and defiance may not persist after death ; and God cannot save by omnipotence, only by the grace, which faith receives. That sin should continue eternally in God's universe is, however, an intolerable thought. The solution to which I am driven, however reluctantly, is that of *conditional immortality*, not in the rather literal scriptural representation of the Rev. Edward White, but as from the standpoint of modern science it has been expounded by Dr. J. Y. Simpson in his book *Man and the Attainment of Immortality*. As the organism survives only when it can and does adapt itself to its environment, so souls will survive which adapt themselves to their spiritual environment—God. "The more intense and rich the life of the spirit—the more adapted it is in any specific case to the true environment of souls—the more does the thought of extinction become impossible, the more certain is the conviction, even the present awareness of immortality. To be 'united with Christ' represents a spiritually and morally tempered condition of prepotency where survival of death is natural. It represents a moral achievement that was likewise open to those who in spirit saw His day afar off and were glad."[1] We need not assume that God will by His power annihilate the persistently wicked ; for if the future life will offer an

[1] Simpson's *The Spiritual Interpretation of Nature*, p. 320.

environment more favourable to goodness, and more adverse to wickedness, they will wither or fade out of existence, as would a tropic plant in the Frigid Zone. That alone will survive which deserves to survive. As regards the good, we must set aside the groundless assumption that at death they will at once be made perfect; a physical event cannot of itself replace a moral progress. The event of death may, however, bring a moral opportunity, of which we can use the words of Browning that it will be one of those moments "which apprise us of pursuing, or the right way or the wrong way, to our triumph or undoing." And that apprisal may mean a greater assurance, a stronger resolve, a more victorious effort towards the triumph. Not only may we anticipate that there will be progress to perfection, but that the personal gains (the eternal values) of this life will supply a more abundant entrance to that life beyond. He that has on his relation to Christ builded wood, hay, stubble, will be saved as through the fire of judgment; and he that has builded thereon gold, silver, precious stones will have thereby his eternal habitation enriched (1 Cor. iii. 12–15). May we not add that that progress need not be wholly dissevered from the progress of God's purpose on earth, in individuals and in society? This is suggested to us by Heb. xi. 40, and xii. 1—"the cloud of witnesses" who are sharers in the interest of our earthly race. In the more personal sense Dr. Simpson has expressed that thought also. "The immortal spirits of those whom we love are, and will be, willing to assist us. Christ, my father, my mother, each according to their ability in this unseen world, wishes me well, and will do me all the good they can; and in the degree in which each of them is co-extensive with God will be their power to help me."[1] The more thoroughly the saints are adapted to their spiritual environment, the greater their progress towards perfection, and the greater their helpfulness to men on earth. The Risen Living Saviour and Lord may thus be using the Church triumphant for the reinforcement of the Church militant.

(3) The two streams of individual salvation and world regeneration thus flow into one channel. If the full realisation of God's purpose must be conceived as, not on earth, but in heaven, some completion of human history, worthy of the God who has created the world, preserved and governed it, revealed himself to man, and redeemed man

[1] *Idem*, p. 42.

in it, seems to be reasonable; Christian faith and love demand such a hope. In that completion we may believe that Christ must be central, not in local, sensible manifestation, but in His saving sovereignty; and saints on earth and saints in heaven shall somehow share His triumph. In this rethinking of Christian eschatology we need not be hesitant because we cannot quote Scripture texts in support of it, if it seems a reasonable and righteous deduction from the conception of God which Christ has given us; and we need to keep it free of the corruptions of Roman Catholicism, such as purgatory, prayers for the dead, invocation of saints. That we may before God lovingly remember our loved ones in the unseen, and that they may help us from within the veil, are comforting thoughts, which need not lead us into error, but can be held in truth by the cleansing and hallowing of our minds by the Spirit. For such a hope will have an influence on our life and work here and now (1 John iii. 3). It will stimulate our endeavours for the personal development, which is a primary Christian duty, since our present mental, moral, and religious values survive as our future treasure. It will stimulate our efforts in serving the community, furthering its progress, since these social values are not merely temporary; but the consummation in heaven has an intimate relation to the completion on earth. It will stimulate our solicitude for the salvation of others, since they do run the risk of eternal loss, and have the promise of eternal gain. It will stimulate our confidence and courage, for we shall realise that we in our earthly race are encompassed by the great cloud of witnesses, and that God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, is in us and by us fulfilling His own purpose in the Church militant and the Church triumphant until both become one in Him.

II

This conclusion was being written when I came across a passage which, if true, would challenge the hope here advanced at every point. (1) One of the most popular theological movements on the Continent is the Barthian, and efforts are being made to make it the fashion of the hour here also. Of it I can say that the more I learn of it the less I like it. If it calls attention to some aspects of truth, ignored by "liberal" theology, it seems to me a lamentable

reaction against the theological progress of the last half-century, throughout which I have lived and thought to the convictions which this volume assumes as the theological basis of the exposition of the Christian ideal. The quotation is not from Barth himself, but from Brunner, who writes more clearly, and can be more easily understood. He closes his lectures on *The Theology of Crisis* with this confident statement: "Biblical Christianity does not deny either evolution or progress or the importance of an ethical and social application of faith. It does distinguish, however, the sphere in which relativity prevails from the sphere of the absolute, in which God both is and works His will. It is not pessimistic; in fact, it is the only real and possible optimism. But it denies most vehemently any optimistic outlook upon the historical process as such. History is not the evolution of salvation, as the Hegelian idea has it; history is the evolution of a mankind needing and obtaining salvation through faith in Christ. But, while history is viewed pessimistically as the world of sin and death which must perish, an absolute optimism is to be found in the assurance of salvation, not by gradual betterment through evolution, but by God's will through Christ; an optimism which no modern theologian possesses and which is more and more disappearing where the modern gospel of the so-called Kingdom of God is taught. The optimism of Christian faith is that of the fifteenth chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians, the certainty that the mortal shall put on immortality, that the eternal world will come, that God Himself will be seen face to face, in an inconceivable but real presence. It is this hope which made our fathers strong not only in prayer, but also in work, which enabled them to do things of which our generation only talks—real things. Our present Christianity abounds in activities, but lacks action. The anti-evolutionary optimism of Christian faith is the true basis of a really active Christian life."[1] Whatever truth there is in the criticism of an evolutionary idealism or a too optimistic activism, such as was censured from the Lutheran standpoint at Stockholm, has been fully recognised in the previous pages, in which the entire dependence of man in his insufficiency on God in His sole sufficiency has been emphasised, in which also any conception of the Kingdom of God as other than God's sovereign activity, of which the Church is the

[1] *The Theology of Crisis*, pp. 112–113.

object and organ, created by His grace in His Spirit, has been rejected, and in which relative historical have been distinguished from absolute eternal values.

(2) The defects of such a statement and the theology which is behind it may be briefly stated. The tone is too arrogant, the Barthians seem always to be saying : Wisdom was born, and will perish with us. The thought is too antithetical ; and the antitheses are too violently stated. The conception of God has not been adequately purified and transformed by Christ's revelation of God as Father. The impression these writers sometimes give is that Christ changed God Himself, and not that He has changed man's conception of God, revealing what God eternally is. That process of purification and transformation is not yet complete. We need to become more Christian in life to be able to think of God as Christ did. There is an almost Manichæan, Gnostic dualism in this theology between the relative and the absolute, world and God, God's immanence and God's transcendence. Man's sin, great and grievous as it is, has not so corrupted the world that it has ceased to be the world God made, preserves, and rules, in which He still is and works. God did not leave Himself without witness in the souls of men ; and the opposition of religion to faith is false for

> *Where'er the spirit of man has gone*
> *Agroping after the Spirit divine,*
> *Somewhere or other it touches the throne,*
> *And sees a light which is seen by none*
> *Save those who seek Him that sits thereon.*[1]

Jesus found the Father's goodness in nature, and Paul recognised a law written in the hearts of men (Rom. ii. 15). This theology is much more exclusive in the view it takes of revelation than is the literature of that revelation. God's moral and spiritual immanence in the world is denied, and His transcendence affirmed, in a quite unbalanced way. With the assumptions of this theology, I could not make the Christian religion or revelation intelligible to myself. With special reference to the subject before us, this theology ignores that the New Testament eschatology was almost more than any other element in the beliefs of the primitive

[1] I cannot verify this quotation from a poem by W. C. Smith ; and there may be slight verbal errors, but the sense is given.

community borrowed from Judaism; that in the New Testament a modification has already begun, as in the Fourth Gospel (communion with the living Christ, a present judgment, and a spiritual resurrection) or even in Paul (2 Cor. v. 1–10: "absent from the body—at home with the Lord"); and that more than any other doctrine this needs to be transformed by the distinctively Christian conception of God, and what history has taught us in regard to God's method of fulfilling His purpose. For these reasons I must decline to be moved by this challenge from the conclusions regarding man's duty and destiny, individual and corporate, I have advanced in these pages. Those who share these conclusions, however, must give no ground for the unjust sneer that they are not doing, but only talking about, real things, that their activities are not really "active Christian life." This volume is intended as a summons to work *out* the salvation which God is working in individual character and social progress. For

The work that we have builded,
Oft with bleeding hands and tears,
Oft in error, oft in anguish,
Will not perish with our years;
It will last, and shine transfigured
In the final reign of right;
It will pass into the splendours
Of the city of the light.

—Felix Adler

THE END

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